In this well-researched, articulate, and compelling paper, Summers presents the position that addiction is a misvaluation upon which a pattern of behavior is based and which resists contrary evidence. This inability to change one’s values in response to contrary evidence is the prime wrong at stake, given its implied diminishment of rationality. In approaching this conflicted set of issues, Summers carefully surveys an impressive range of sources—from clinical DSM-based diagnosis to neurobiological underpinnings of decision making and attention, to social (...) determinants influencing the question as to what counts as ‘addiction’—and settles on the. (shrink)

This study examines how firms’ socially responsible behavior relates to the timing of their share repurchases, considering share mispricing and the resulting wealth transfer between sellers and ongoing shareholders. We hypothesize that firms with a stronger commitment to societal goals prioritize the interests of all stakeholders more equally than those with a weaker commitment. Therefore, their managers are less likely to take advantage of the wealth transfer from selling to ongoing shareholders, which occurs when the firm is undervalued. Our results (...) show that firms with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement, ceteris paribus, announce repurchases during periods of lower undervaluation. Additional analyses show that this effect is more pronounced when investor protection is stronger at the country level. Moreover, higher institutional ownership increases the relevance of undervaluation in buyback decisions and the distribution of excess cash is a relatively more important reason for share repurchases when firms display higher CSR engagement. Overall, our findings demonstrate that firms that generally act in a socially responsible manner also refrain from exploiting sellers for the benefit of ongoing investors. JEL classification: G15, G35, M14. (shrink)

This paper uncovers a distinctively social type of injustice that lies in the kinds of wrongs we can do to each other specifically as social beings. In this paper, social injustice is not principally about unfair distributions of socio-economic goods among citizens. Instead, it is about the ways we can violate each other’s fundamental rights to lead socially integrated lives in close proximity and relationship with other people. This paper homes in on a particular type of social injustice, which we (...) can call social contribution injustice. The paper identifies two distinct forms of social contribution injustice. The first form involves compromising a person’s social resources so as to deny her adequate scope to contribute socially. The second form involves unjustly misvaluing a person as a social contributor, usually by not taking her seriously as a social contributor. (shrink)

This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength (...) of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives. (shrink)

Philosophers of race and other writers in the Black and Latinx intellectual traditions have remarked on what it is like to live under “the racial gaze,” to be shaped and limited by the way whites perceive us. However, little work has been spent developing how the racial gaze functions in whites’, and other racially privileged people’s, moral psychology. I argue in this paper that there is a morally objectionable way of perceiving people of color. This claim builds on an insight (...) from Iris Murdoch that our perception can be morally evaluable and extends it to issues of race. I articulate how racial stereotypes and misvaluing distort one’s perception of people of color and that these distortions are organizing around a dominant conception for race that plays an important role in the oppression of people of color. I believe understanding racist perception lays a foundation for understanding the moral dimensions of interpersonal (as opposed to structural) racism. (shrink)

Many people, communities and countries are in favour of abortion as a healthcare right, arguing that women have a right to receive an abortion upon request. Some contexts place ethical constraints on this right, typically based on the age of the preborn child, the mother’s safety, or the circumstances of the mother (and her conceiving of her child) more generally. At the same time, intersex pediatric surgery (IPS) is being increasingly ethically challenged with many countries banning healthcare facilities from performing (...) IPS. At first, there appears to be no relation between these two ethical issues. However, modern biotechnology such as the assistive reproductive technology (ART), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), makes it possible to screen for intersex conditions in utero, opening the possibility of intersex-selective abortion (ISA), a sub-set or instance of sex-selective abortion (SSA). What emerges is the realization that if IPS is wrong because, as its critics have argued, it wrongfully discriminates against and harms intersex lives, then ISA is much more wrong because instead of misvaluing intersex lives, it devalues intersex lives altogether. In other words, IPS might, as some have argued, discriminate by implying that an intersex child is better off being male or female but not intersex, but ISA discriminates by implying that an intersex child is better off not existing at all. Some have recognized this connection and have vainly tried to maintain both their pro-abortion commitments and their anti-IPS commitments. This has proved at best duplicitous, and at worst conceptually impossible. While it is known that a strong stance against IPS results in an inability to morally condemn ISA, with one notable exception in moral theology, this connection has not been generally appreciated. (shrink)