This paper contributes to an increasing literature strengthening the connection between epistemic logic and epistemology (Van Benthem, Hendricks). I give a survey of the most important applications of epistemic logic in epistemology. I show how it is used in the history of philosophy (Steiner's reconstruction of Descartes' sceptical argument), in solutions to Moore's paradox (Hintikka), in discussions about the relation between knowledge and belief (Lenzen) and in an alleged refutation of verificationism (Fitch) and I examine an (...) early argument about the (im)possibility of epistemic logic (Hocutt). Subsequently, I deal with interpretive questions about epistemic logic that, although implicitly, already appeared in the first section. I contend that a conception of epistemic logic as a theory of knowledge assertions is incoherent, and I argue that it does not make sense to adopt a normative interpretation of epistemic logic. Finally, I show ways to extend epistemic logic with other branches of philosophical logic so as to make it useful for some epistemological questions. Conditional logics and logics of public announcement are used to understand causal theories of knowledge and versions of reliabilism. Temporal logic helps understand some dynamic aspects of knowledge as well as the verificationist thesis. (shrink)

Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1969/1972.

Epistemology and epistemic logic At first sight, the modern agenda of epistemology has little to do with logic. Topics include different definitions of knowledge, its basic formal properties, debates between externalist and internalist positions, and above all: perennial encounters with sceptics lurking behind every street corner, especially in the US. The entry 'Epistemology' in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Klein 1993) and the anthology (Kim and Sosa 2000) give an up-to-date impression of the field. Now, (...) epistemic logic started as a contribution to epistemology, or at least a tool in its modus operandi, with the seminal book Knowledge and Belief (Hintikka's 1962, 2005). Formulas like Ki for "the agent i knows that " Bi for "the agent i believes that " provided logical forms for stating and analyzing philosophical propositions and arguments. And more than that, their model-theoretic semantics in terms of ranges of alternatives provided an appealing extensional way of thinking about what agents know or believe in a given situation. In particular, on Hintikka's view, an agent knows those propositions which are true in all situations compatible with what she knows about the actual world; i.e., her current range of uncertainty. (shrink)

Many have adopted the view that informal logic is importantly dependent on epistemology . Finocchiaro has raised this issue in the context argumentation theory, as perhaps distinguished from informal logic A recent pair of issues of Informal Logic , guest edited by Christoph Lumer, was devoted to epistemological approaches to argumentation. On the other hand, both Johnson and Blair and Johnson have expressed reservations. In this paper I want to take another look at the relationship between (...) informal logic and epistemology. I will argue that there are reasons for skepticism regarding the Received View that have not been taken into consideration and fully appreciated by those who advocate some form of this view. (shrink)

Papers presented at the National Seminar on Joina Logic and Epistemology held at the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona from 27th to 29th March 1995.

Most of the papers presented at a conference held at Oxford in August 1982.

This chapter contains sections titled: Mill on Our Knowledge of the External World Mill on Our Knowledge of “Necessary” Truths Mill's “Reduction” of Deductive Reasoning to Inductive Reasoning Mill on the Ground of Inductive Reasoning Mill's Methods Further Reading.

The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions--are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This volume presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the papers address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal (...) logic and its relations to necessary existence and to counterfactual reasoning. The general introduction locates the individual contributions in the wider context of the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality. (shrink)

This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, debates about higher-order knowledge, and issues of (...) knowability raised by Fitch’s paradox. The references and recommended readings provide gateways for further exploration. (shrink)

Norris presents a series of closely linked chapters on recent developments in epistemology, philosophy of language, cognitive science, literary theory, musicology and other related fields. While to this extent adopting an interdisciplinary approach, Norris also very forcefully challenges the view that the academic "disciplines" as we know them are so many artificial constructs of recent date and with no further role than to prop up existing divisions of intellectual labour. He makes his case through some exceptionally acute revisionist readings (...) of diverse thinkers such as Derrida, Paul de Man, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Michael Dummett and John McDowell. In each instance Norris stresses the value of bringing various trans-disciplinary perspectives to bear while none-the-less maintaining adequate standards of area-specific relevance and method. Most importantly he asserts the central role of recent developments in cognitive science as pointing a way beyond certain otherwise intractable problems in philosophy of mind and language. (shrink)

This book creates a conceptual schema that acts as a correlation between Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. It connects both fields and offers a proper theoretical foundation for the contemporary developments of Epistemic Logic regarding the dynamics of information. It builds a bridge between the view of Awareness Justification Internalism, and a dynamic approach to Awareness Logic. The book starts with an introduction to the main topics in Epistemic Logic and Epistemology and reviews the disconnection (...) between the two fields. It analyses three core notions representing the basic structure of the conceptual schema: “Epistemic Awareness”, “Knowledge” and “Justification”. Next, it presents the Explicit Aware Knowledge Schema, using a diagram of three ellipses to illustrate the schema, and a formal model based on a neighbourhood-model structure, that shows one concrete application of the EAK-Schema into a logical structure. The book ends by presenting conclusions and final remarks about the uses and applications of the EAK-Schema. It shows that the most important feature of the schema is that it serves both as a theoretical correlate to the dynamic extensions of Awareness Logic, providing it with a philosophical background, and as an abstract conceptual structure for a re-interpretation of Epistemology. (shrink)

Many criticisms of epistemic logic have centered around its use of devices such as idealized knowers with logical omniscience and perfect self-knowledge. One possible response to such criticisms is to say that these idealizations are normative devices, and that epistemic logic tells us how agents ought to behave. This paper will take a different approach, treating epistemic logic as descriptive, and drawing the analogy between its formal models and idealized scientific models on that basis. Treating it as (...) descriptive matches the way in which some philosophers, including one of its founders, Jaako Hintikka, have thought about epistemic logic early in its history. Further, the analogy between the two fields will give us a way to defuse criticisms that see epistemic logic as unrealistic. For example, criticizing models of epistemic logic in which agents know all propositional tautologies as being unrealistic would be like criticizing frictionless planes in physics for being unrealistic. Each one would certainly be an unsuitable model for studying some kinds of phenomena, but is entirely appropriate for others. After outlining the analogy between epistemic and scientific models, we will discuss some ways in which idealizations are used by different research programs in epistemic logic. (shrink)

Indian theories of sentence and its meaning with special reference to grammar (Vyākaraṇa), logic (Nyāya), and ritualism (Mīmāṃsā).

Offers an extremely bold, far-reaching, and unsuspected thesis in the history of philosophy: Aristotelianism was a dominant movement of the British philosophical landscape, especially in the field of logic, and it had a long survival. British Aristotelian doctrines were strongly empiricist in nature, both in the theory of knowledge and in scientific method; this character marked and influenced further developments in British philosophy at the end of the century, and eventually gave rise to what we now call British empiricism, (...) which is represented by philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Beyond the apparent and explicit criticism of the old Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy, which has been very well recognized by the scholarship in the twentieth century and which has contributed to the false notion that early modern philosophy emerged as a reaction to Aristotelianism, the present research examines the continuity, the original developments and the impact of Aristotelian doctrines and terminology in logic and epistemology as the background for the rise of empiricism.Without the Aristotelian tradition, without its doctrines, and without its conceptual elaborations, British empiricism would never have been born. The book emphasizes that philosophy is not defined only by the ‘great names’, but also by minor authors, who determine the intellectual milieu from which the canonical names emerge. It considers every single published work of logic between the middle of the sixteenth and the end of the seventeenth century, being acquainted with a number of surviving manuscripts and being well-informed about the best existing scholarship in the field. ​. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis investigates the nature of Dr. Johnson's arguments in four main areas: religion, morality, literature and politics. The investigation proceeds by analysing the forms of the arguments and the coherence of their logic, establishing the premises of the arguments, and indicating which of a number of sanctions govern these premises. The sanctions looked at are reason, revelation, experience, testimony, authority and universality, with an attempt to establish (...) whether or not there is a hierarchy of these sanctions and, if so, which Johnson regards as the most important in each area. The thesis is organised in four parts which correspond to the subject areas. Each part has two sections: the first analyses the sanction applied to that subject, and the second takes from Johnson's writings examples of specific issues, showing how the sanctions are applied to them. ;Part I deals with Johnson's arguments on religion. The sanctions considered in this part are reason, revelation, testimony, authority, universality and experience. Attention is drawn to the antecedents of Johnson's arguments in order to indicate the background to Johnson's arguments. The specific issues looked at are the immateriality and immortality of the soul, ghosts and second sight, and the problem of evil. ;Part II deals with Johnson's moral arguments. Here the sanctions are reason, revelation, universality and experience. Again, the antecedents are identified, notably Samuel Clarke, Richard Cumberland, Mandeville and Shaftesbury. The specific issues highlighted are the duties of charity, retirement and idleness. ;In Part III Johnson's literary arguments come under scrutiny, and here the sanctions dealt with are rather different. Revelation is not involved here . Its place is taken by morality, which, having been examined in the preceding part, itself becomes a sanction, and is considered along with reason, experience, authority and universality. These sanctions are then applied to biography and pastorals. ;The final part deals with Johnson's political arguments based on the sanctions of authority, universality, reason and experience, and shows how these are applied to the American problem. (shrink)

This book is just what it says it is: A theory of textuality divided into two parts, logical and epistemological.

A new direction in philosophy Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy (...) with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science. Criticism and decline Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology. A resurgence of interest During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence. Hard-to-find core writings now available This collection makes available a selection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers. (shrink)

The dissertation contrasts Kant's epistemological assertiveness with his ontological skepticism as a central issue in the development of the discourse in German Idealism. Fichte's phenomenological demarche essentially amplifies this problem but, at the same time, allows him to advance a path breaking critique of formal logic and to stress the importance of contradiction. Schelling, by restoring metaphysics, attempts to overcome Fichte's contrast between ontological dualism and epistemological monism. Finally, it is Hegel who directly addresses the need for a non-formal (...) cognitive logic. The author analyzes Hegel's deduction in the Phenomenology, invokes current genetic epistemology, and reads the Science of Logic as a genetic theory of systematic knowledge and as circular epistemology. Emphasizing the unity between the logical and the historical, the distinction between intellectual and rational explanation, and the cognitive importance of contradiction, the dissertation argues for the possibility a coming-to-be totality of reflective scientific reason. (shrink)

In this volume, Bimal K. Matilal blends knowledge contained in original Sanskrit texts and modern philosophical terminology in interpreting and reconstructing early philosophical theories, highlighting the critical and analytical nature of the Indian philosophical tradition.

A diplomatic edition of a commentary by Bcom-ldan-ral-gri (1227-1305), a Tibetan Buddhist scholar of the Kadampa (Bka-gdams-pa) tradition, on the "Pramāṇasamuccaya" written by the Indian Buddhist logician, Dignāga (c. 480-540 CE); includes extensive introductory material on the life and work of Dignāga, and reception of this treatise in Tibet.

The article discusses the formation of the philosophical concept of Leonid Evgenievich Gabrilovich (1878–1953), a Russian thinker of the first half of the 20th century. In the Rus­sian period of creativity, i.e. until 1918, as it is shown in the article, in his philosophi­cal development Gabrilovich experienced the influence of such fundamental theories as the philosophy of normative, immanent philosophy of W. Schuppe and phenomenology of E. Husserl. The article studies the following articles by L.E. Gabrilovich of the first, “Russian” (...) period: “On the concepts of truth and reliability in the theory of knowledge” 1908, “On two scientific concepts of thinking (to justify one dativist logic)” 1909, “On the meaning and essence of elementary concepts (an attempt at a new development of the problem of universal concepts)” 1910, as well as some others. It is shown that in his philosophical work L.E. Gabrilovich consistently and purposefully followed the de­velopment of his own concept, the nature of which makes it possible to attribute his phi­losophy to the logical and epistemological direction in Russian philosophy of the 20th cen­tury. The article proves that according to their ideas and structure, the analyzed texts of Gabrilovich revealed the themes of mathematical formalism, dativist logic, at the same time they were the main stages in the development of his own logical and epistemological concept as mathematical thinking and the actual form. L.E. Gabrilovich outlined the re­sults of these developments in the book “On Mathematical Thinking and the Concept of the Actual Form”, a 1914 essay written by him in German. It is concluded that the con­cept of “dativist logic”, developed by Gabrilovich in articles of 1909 and 1910, will later result in his theory of “actual forms”. (shrink)

In this contribution, we argue that a philosophical clarification of the discussion of adult cognitive development in psychology is needed in order to get a clearer view of what is at stake in this debated phenomenon. On the one hand, we contend that rather than epistemological relativism, mature adult cognition should be described in terms of integration. Integration means understanding that people have different views with each other and from us, but we still need to respect them as people and (...) take their emotions into account. This does not mean simple acceptance of their views as true, as the descriptions of epistemological relativism would suggest. On the other hand, we argue that rather than calling for many-valued logic as some Piagetian views maintain, an adult way of thinking recognises that many conflicts are not logically exhaustive, i.e., that there are more than two solutions to a problem at hand. This often means confusion between two kinds of opposition: contrary and contradictory. While the latter is logically exhaustive in two-valued logic (e.g., good and not-good), the former is not (e.g., good and bad). Our suggestion is that youthful absolutist cognition tends to see conflicts in terms of contrary opposites and assuming them to be logically exhaustive (there is no other solution). A mature adult way of thinking, by contrast, sees that such dichotomies are not logically exhaustive and even in situations in which we have not been able to figure out the solution, it is still possible to find it. Finally, we explore the possibility of articulating an adult way of thinking which recognises that one’s own conceptions might not be insufficient or incorrect by a historical comparison to Ancient Skepticism. (shrink)

The Entretiens of the Institut International de Philosophie for 1978 were held in connection with the World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, from August 27 to September 1. The theme of the Entretiens was Logic and Philosophy. The undersigned, then President of LI.P., was responsible for the planning of the programme. The programme was designed to consist of four sections with the headings Classical and Intuitionist Logic, Modal Logic and its Applications, Inductive Logic and its Applications, (...) and Logic and Epistemology. The aim was also to convey to philosophers who are not experts in logic an informative and representative impression of some of the main sectors of the vast and rapidly expanding field of philosophical logic. At the same time it was thought that this impression should not be conveyed in the form of a series of survey papers but through presentations and discussions of specific topics falling under the main headings men tioned above. For each section a rapporteur was nominated to read a paper and an interlocuteur to comment on it. The programme chairman is grateful that he was able to engage a representative selection of front rank philosophi cal logicians to perform the various tasks. The papers and the comments are printed in this volume in the order in which they appeared in the Programme of the Entretiens. (shrink)