The philosophical problem of knowledge of other minds is rational justifiction. this paper covers n malcolm, h h price, j mill, strawson, hamshire, l wittgenstein and a j ayer's controversial thought. philosophical scepticism holds that it is logically impossible to know mental experiences. "i know, i have a pain." how do i know that other people also can have similar pain? it provides as ideal knowledge of mental events. when i say, "i have a pain," i can have certain (...) knowledge of this because i have conclusive individual evidence for it. (shrink)

[English in PhilArchive, unpublished]. Ruđer Bošković's (Rogerius Joseph Boscovich, 1711-1787) induction is described as a reasoning procedure that combines abductive, generalizing and deductive forms of inference. According to Bošković, the application of inductive reasoning extends beyond natural science. Bošković's critique of the use of the principle of sufficient reason is discussed, and constructive rules of Bošković's inductive logic are proposed from the standpoint of contemporary justification logic. To that end, justification logic could be extended with Bošković's typology of reasons. Hunter's (...) result (1965) is conceived as a confirmation that the inference from the constructive defectus rationis is a necessary component of Bošković's induction. - English version in _PhilArchive_. (shrink)