Las discusiones suscitadas en torno a la exhortación apostólica Amoris laetitia evidencian que a seis lustros de la publicación de Veritatis splendor la temática del objeto moral no ha perdido actualidad. En este contexto, es interesante observar que algunas de las discusiones relativas a este tema tienen su origen en posiciones afines a los presupuestos de la Moral autónoma. A fin de poder efectuar una valoración crítica de tales posiciones, en este estudio ofrecemos una aproximación a la racionalidad normativa teorizada (...) por Franz Böckle en diálogo con el correspondiente discernimiento de Veritatis splendor sobre dicha racionalidad, el cual alcanza su cenit en la afirmación de la existencia de actos intrínsecamente malos. (shrink)

Ingolf U. Dalferth studies the complexity of this procedure in three thought processes which deal with the central concepts in the Christian understanding of malum as privation (a lack of good), as evil-doing and as a lack of faith.

For retributivists, who believe that criminal sanctions should be used to punish only conduct that is blameworthy, the so-called mala prohibita offenses have always been a source of concern: When the conduct being criminalized is wrongful prior to and independent of its being illegal - as it is with presumptive mala in se offenses like murder and rape - the path to blameworthiness is relatively clear. But when the wrongfulness of the conduct depends on the very fact of its being (...) illegal - as is said to be the case with presumptive mala prohibita offenses like fishing without a license and buying drugs without a prescription - the argument in favor of criminalization becomes more difficult to sustain. Unless one believes that law-breaking as such is morally wrongful, criminal penalties would seem hard to justify. That, in any event, is the standard liberal, retributivist view. As I shall argue, however, things are considerably more complicated than this account would suggest. No offense, at least in the real world, is wholly malum in se or wholly malum prohibitum. Rather, the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibitum should be understood as contrasting, scalar qualities that all criminal offenses, to one degree or another, possess. Under such a conception, an offense could be, say, 80 percent malum in se and 20 percent malum prohibitum, or 20 percent malum in se and 80 percent malum prohibitum. Thinking about malum in se and malum prohibitum in this way can help us make a more precise assessment of the moral content of criminal offenses, taking account of the various ways in which law and legal institutions inform their moral content, the reasons people obey such laws, and what it means to “obey” the law in the first place. (shrink)

Om det ondas problem i nyplatonism och fornkristen filosofi.

Evil as a problem -- Thinking evil -- Orienting strategies for dealing with evil.

This essay is meant to draw the principle outlines of the development of a specific modern issue of penalty. Deriving from an erosion of Augustine's dominating paradigm of retribution as a balance of two equivalent “evils” the legitimation of modern punishment was not sought in ef ficient deterrence only – as utilitarian philosophers suggested. More deeply, a modern justification of punishment was developed within the political philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel by successively unfolding its close relation to the concept (...) of freedom. This does not only stress the criminal's own responsibility but also relies on the condition of a developed rule of law. As a result punishment was not only meant to restore sovereignty, often based on a social contract, but also the fundamental relation of mutual recognition between individuals. Adhering to a substantial understanding of the modern state under the rule of law this concept of penal law draws a marked distinction between “punishment” and “war” and also sets a clear limit to tendencies of expanding criminality beyond the rule of law. Regarding its philosophical impact it predominantly must be put forward against all measures which negate or extinguish the criminal's personality as a whole, such as torture, death penalty or life imprisonment. (shrink)

La distinction de droit pénal entre la conduitemalum in seetmalum prohibitumest vieille de cinq siècles dans les juridictions de common law, et pourtant son sens autant que son utilité continuent d’être débattus. Je me joins à la mêlée, en faisant valoir que les conditions ne peuvent pas être interprétées littéralement, mais que il existe un moyen d’établir la distinction qui est à la fois plausible et utile. Une conduitemala in seest un comportement quidoitêtre interdit dans toute société politique juste, alors (...) que la conduitemala prohibita peutêtre criminalisée, mais nedoitpas absolument l’être. Je sollicite dans mon explication des concepts de la théorie du contrat social. (shrink)

I Die vermeintliche „Überwindung“ der politischen Theologie Die Geschichte der politischen Theologie in der Moderne erweist sich vorläufig immer noch als die Geschichte ihrer misslungenen Überwindungen. Trotz ihrer vielfachen Erledigungen zeigt die politische Theologie, entgegen Hans Blumenbergs Prognose, eine erstaunliche Fähigkeit zur „Selbstbehauptung“. Ihre Resistenz verdankt sie dabei nicht zum Geringsten der Prätention all derjenigen Gegner, die meinten, man könne, indem man eine spezifische Form von politischer Theologie kritisiert, gleich mit allen Spielarten des politisch-theologischen Diskurses aufräumen. Ohnehin werden die meisten (...) Überwindungen der politischen Theologie im Namen einer anderen politischen Theologie vorgenommen. So die berühmteste, von Erik Peterson stammende Widerlegung, die als Fazit der Untersuchung zum „Monotheismus als politisches Problem“ gegen Carl Schmitts politische Theologie gewendet war und den eher anstößigen Sprachgebrauch von der „Erledigung“ in Umlauf gebracht hat. Sie wurde von Peterson jedenfalls im Namen der trinitarischen Theologie des Augustinus vorgenommen, wobei Peterson eine solche Erledigung schon im Rahmen einer an Paulus' Römerbrief orientierten Theopolitik erprobt hatte. Darüber hinaus muss der Begriff der politischen Theologie nicht notwendig gegen die „Legitimität der Moderne“ eingesetzt sein, sondern versteht sich oft genug als deren dialektische Kritik, wie etwa bei Martin Buber, Paul Tillich oder später bei Jürgen Moltmann und Johann Baptist Metz. (shrink)

Plotinus knew that evils “wander about mortal nature and this place forever” and Schäfer begins his analysis of evil in the Enneads with a very helpful survey of the philosophical schools and literary tradition of ancient Greece which influenced Plotinus. These opening pages thus treat χαχόν as understood by Heraclitus, Plato, and Sophocles. Schäfer stresses the quasi-dualism present in these earlier thinkers in order to show how Plotinus’ insistence that all is derived from a single origin, the One, forced him (...) to give a more precise account of evil’s origins. He therefore set out to explain how the individuality caused by material substantiation is that which brings about an Unwissenheit und Harmoniestörung. The human soul becomes enamored by that which is good and an instance of the One-on-a-lower-level; paradoxically, therefore, evil is brought about not by some competing substance of the One but by its own emanated beauty. As the soul freely chooses diversity over unity, it finds itself more and more “fanned out”, forgetful of its true origin. (shrink)

Contrary to the commonly assumed opinion that Christianity sees pain as intrinsically evil – where evil is defined as the lack of something good – Aquinas defines pain not as a privation but rather a passion of the soul, i.e., an emotion that depends on sensual and/or intellective cognition of something evil, is good in itself, and may serve a purpose. This article offers a formalized version of the Thomistic definition of pain and related negative (unpleasant) emotions experienced by humans. (...) It also compares and contrasts this view with some contemporary scientific and philosophical models of pain. (shrink)

O presente artigo analisa a relação que ocorre entre as duas potências superiores da alma - intelecto e vontade - no momento em que se realiza uma qualquer acção, seja positiva ou negativa. Seguindo a análise que S. Tomás de Aquino faz nas Quaestiones disputatae de maio, o artigo mostra o interesse e a profundidade do tratamento que o Aquinate dá à questão, passando em revista, particularmente nas questões 3, 4 e 6, todos os elementos que contribuem para a realização (...) de um acto e evidenciando, nomeadamente de modo diferente a como o faz na Summa theologiae, o papel específico da vontade. /// The article examines the link between the higher powers of the soul (intellect and will) in the process of making an action, being it positive or negative. The author shows the special interest and profundity of Aquinas's analysis in the Quaestiones disputatae de malo (especially qq. III, IV and VI), thereby reviewing all the elements that are involved in the process of making an action and emphasizing, in a way that is slightly different from the Summa Theologiae, the peculiar role of the will. (shrink)

The author considers the problem of evil in the transgressive concept often identified with destructive transgressions. He describes possible approaches to the problem of evil asking, at the same time, about its source. He also carries out a discussion with reference to Kozielecki’s concept in comparison with other researchers of this issue in the area of anthropology (Immanuel Kant, Gottfried W. Leibniz, Leszek Kolakowski, Konrad Lorenz, Hannah Arendt, Herbert A. Simon and Philip Zimbardo). Evil is treated by Kozielecki as destructive (...) transgressions, that are always present in man, and are the source of the crisis and the regression of humanity. (shrink)

This article provides critical analysis of Aquinas’s designation of poverty as unqualifiedly evil. This paper provides an analysis of two different meanings of poverty: (a) in relation to things or to the external conditions in which people live and (b) in relation to an action in which people engage or are thwarted. Next, the paper discusses the sense in which poverty is an evil—and particularly, an unqualified evil—in relation to both of these meanings of poverty. Since Aquinas claims that poverty (...) is an unqualified evil so far as it prevents people from attaining the ends of sustaining themselves and assisting others, the final section of the paper discusses possible interpretations of these ends, suggesting that each end can be taken in a narrow, minimalist or subsistence sense and a broader, more holistic or contextualized sense. (shrink)

Pierre Bayle is perhaps most well-known for arguing in his Dictionary (1697) that the problem of evil cannot be solved by reason alone. This skepticism about theodicy is usually credited to a religious crisis suffered by Bayle in 1685 following the unjust imprisonment and death of his brother, the death of his father, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. But in this paper I argue that Bayle was skeptical about theodicy a decade earlier than these events, from at (...) least the time of his Sedan philosophy course (1675–77). I then argue that both the Various Thoughts on the Comet (1683) and Philosophical Commentary on Luke 4:23 (1686–88), which are usually read as treatments of superstition and toleration respectively, are works that also closely engage the problem of evil and demonstratethe skepticism of Bayle toward theodicy. (shrink)

In The Political Philosophy of Fénelon, Ryan Hanley argues that Fénelon was a realist who aimed to elevate and educate self-love—rather than resist it—in order to avoid tyranny. This roundtable article examines two of Fenelon’s arguments for how self-love, well-directed, could circumvent a king’s absolutist and tyrannical inclinations: 1) the king’s need to be loved and to love in turn, and 2) the relationship between faith and politics / church and state. Contrasting Fénelon with Machiavelli, I question whether the ruler’s (...) “need-love” for his people leaves him susceptible to forms of domination or at least, as Machiavelli warned, renders them politically weak. Given Hanley’s interest to recover Fénelon for the present day, I conclude by arguing that the thinker’s insights about the limiting role of well-directed self-love are inescapably tied to his critiques of absolutism. The same need-love of the people, I argue, cannot similarly check executive power under democracy. Nonetheless, Fénelon’s perspective remains valuable, as does Hanley’s project of recovery, since democracies continue to reckon with particular problems raised by self-love. (shrink)

There are currently more than 2,000,000 inmates in jails and prisons in the United States, or about 1 person in every 138 of the population (to say nothing of the large number on probation and on p...

-/- Unde malum? What is evil—if it is anything at all—and whence does it arise? Is evil just badness by another name? Is it the inevitable “shadow side” of the good? Or is it more substantial: an active, striving force that is opposed to the good in a Star Wars, Manichean kind of way? -/- Does evil always originate in the causal powers of nature? Is it sometimes based in the choices of moral agents? Or, perhaps most disturbingly, does (...) evil sometimes have its source in something non-human and impersonal—a malevolent tendency in the universe not just to general winding-down but also to outbreaks of targeted hellishness? -/- Finally, what is radical evil, and how does it differ from other kinds of evil? -/- These are some of the key metaphysical questions that philosophers have raised concerning evil. The goal of this entry is to provide a taxonomy of the most prominent answers: the main theories of evil’s kinds and origins on offer in the western philosophical tradition. This is meant to supplement the discussion in the entry on the concept of evil, although Section 1 begins with some conceptual and semantic issues. -/- Section 2 introduces two key distinctions that are then further developed in Sections 3 and 4. The first distinction has to do with the kinds of evil: insofar as evil is anything at all, is it a deep metaphysical feature of things, or is it always (or at least sometimes) merely an empirical phenomenon? The second distinction has to do with the origins of evil: is evil ever (or always) based in entirely natural phenomena, or does it sometimes (or always) have a moral or supernatural origin? -/- Sections 5 through 7 consider some puzzling cases of hard-to-categorize evils: systemic evil; symbolic evil; and so-called “radical” evil. (shrink)

Am Leitfaden des Begriffs Malum oeconomicum fuhrt das Buch seine Leser in einen Dialog mit klassischen und zeitgenossischen Denkern uber die abgrundigen Seiten der Wirtschaft und ihre Spiegelungen in der Seele. In der Wirtschaft erscheinen Menschen tendenziell fureinander als blosse Werkzeuge ihrer Bedurfnisbefriedigung, andererseits wird wirtschaftliche Leistung mit Bedeutungen aufgeladen, die an das Heil in der religiosen Sphare gemahnen. Im Kapitalismus der Moderne entfaltet sich aus der Wechselwirkung zwischen einer entfesselten Produktion und den Antrieben des Innenlebens eine zuvor unbekannte (...) Dynamik. Ist diese in liberalen Theorien ein Anlass, das Malum oeconomicum fur verschwunden zu erklaren, so machen Fundamentalkritiker des globalen Kapitalismus geltend, dass dieser illusionare Bedurfnisse weckt und unversohnliche Gegensatze zwischen Arm und Reich hervorruft, deren Sprengkraft jeden sozialen Zusammenhalt gefahrdet. Aus der Lekture von Platon, Aristoteles, Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, John Maynard Keynes, Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse, John Rawls und Amartya Sen ergeben sich Aussichten auf das Wirtschaftsgeschehen, die uber die Engfuhrungen heutiger Debatten weit hinausweisen. (shrink)

Does criminal liability require an act? -- Motive and criminal liability -- The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility -- Transferred intent -- The nature and justifiability of nonconsummate offenses -- Strict liability, justice, and proportionality -- The sequential principle of relative culpability -- Willful ignorance, knowledge, and the equal culpability thesis : a study of the significance of the principle of legality -- Rapes without rapists : consent and reasonable mistake -- Mistake of (...) law and culpability -- On the supposed priority of justification to excuse -- Partial defenses -- The "but everybody does that!" defense -- The de minimis "defense" to criminal liability -- Why punish the deserving -- Malum prohibitum and retributivism -- Already punished enough. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalization, the legitimacy of making irregular immigration a crime. In order to do this, I identify three main ways in which the political decision to introduce a crime of IM may be defended: according to the first, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of states’ territorial sovereignty; according to the second, IM is a (...) justified malum prohibitum the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of a justified immigration regulation; according to the third, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its harmful consequences for receiving states’ citizens. My thesis is that none of these arguments succeeds in providing us with sufficiently good reasons to justify the use of criminal punishment to enforce the closure of state borders. As regards the first, I argue that it relies on a misleading conception of what is entailed by states’ territorial sovereignty, and that therefore it is unsound as an argument for the state’s right to control immigration. With regard to the second, I argue that, be they legitimate or not, immigration regulations enacted by states cannot provide those would-be immigrants they aim to exclude with content-independent reasons to comply with them; and this is a necessary pre-condition to conclude that IM is a justified malum prohibitum. As regards harm-based approaches, I argue that the notions they rely on are completely unfit as criteria for criminalization. This leads me to the conclusion that, unless other more convincing arguments are provided for, IM should not be criminalized. (shrink)

This article analyzes the relationship between the ideas of cruelty and injustice in Judith Shklar’s political theory. Shklar’s The Faces of Injustice is sometimes read as an instantiation of the liberalism of fear, which regards cruelty and the fear that it inspires as the summum malum. I challenge this interpretation and instead argue that her account of injustice should be read independently of her commitment to the liberalism of fear. In doing so, I show how her exploration of the (...) faces of injustice—especially the importance she accords to passive injustice and the sense of injustice—raises important challenges for the liberal case for putting cruelty first. Although democratic attitudes and institutions constitute the best available remedy for the sense of injustice, on Shklar’s account, those who focus too much on the requirements of democratic citizenship risk treating injustice as a greater evil than cruelty, which could, in turn, facilitate cruelty and undermine liberal democracy. I conclude by suggesting that the republican-inspired theory of citizenship from The Faces of Injustice, which Shklar outlines in response to the problem of passive injustice, reflects a distinct strand of her political theory that goes beyond the more familiar defense of law-bound constitutional government associated with the liberalism of fear. (shrink)

Suárez was probably the first theologian to propose a political understanding of the order of subordination among the demons. According to Aquinas, this subordination immediately reflects the natural differences in perfection between the demons. Suárez charged that a natural-based order of demonic subordination could not ground the capacity of the demons’ ruler—Lucifer—to use his power to impose civic obligations on fellow demons so as to pursue their joint evil goals. But can there be obligations ad malum? This paper explores (...) a number of possible paths seemingly available to Suárez to defend his controversial view. I argue that the most promising interpretation of Suárez is one according to which the obligations created by Lucifer’s commands are not obligations in conscience but rather what we may call “non-moral obligations.”. (shrink)