This paper presents an alternative conceptual foundation for biological evolution. First the causal and statistical perspectives on evolutionary fitness are analyzed, finding them to implicitly depend on each other, and hence cannot be individually fundamental. It is argued that this is an instance of a relativistic perspective over evolutionary phenomena. New accounts of fitness, the struggle for life, and Natural Selection are developed under this interpretation. This biological relativism is unique in that it draws from General Relativity in physics, (...) unlike previous theories that drew upon statistical mechanics or Newtonian dynamics. A mathematical law of evolutionary change, as well as new theoretical biological concepts to underpin it, are likewise developed. The law and theory are then applied to give examples of how both cornerstones and edge cases can be understood using these new methods. Using General Relativistic Biology provides fresh insight into evolution, all while preserving the core, canonical scientific research program. (shrink)

Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things of any kind. But do we ever succeed in theorizing about absolutely everything? Not according to generality relativism, which J.P. Studd defends in this book.

The general relativistic and covariant differential form of Helmholtz's first vorticity theorem is presented. We prove in relation with it an invariant kinematic identity which is the generalisation of the Helmholtz theorem for general continua.

This is an essay about general covariance, and what it says about spacetime structure. After outlining a version of the dynamical approach to spacetime theories, and how it struggles to deal with generally covariant theories, I argue that we should think about the symmetry structure of spacetime rather differently in generally-covariant theories compared to non-generally-covariant theories: namely, as a form of internal rather than external symmetry structure.

The paper develops a theory of branching spatiotemporal histories that accommodates indeterminism and the insights of general relativity. A model of this theory can be viewed as a collection of overlapping histories, where histories are defined as maximal consistent subsets of the model's base set. Subsequently, generalized manifolds are constructed on the theory's models, and the manifold topology is introduced. The set of histories in a model turns out to be identical with the set of maximal subsets of the model's (...) base set with respect to being Hausdorff and downward closed. Further postulates ensure that the topology is connected, locally Euclidean, and satisfies the countable sub-cover condition. (shrink)

An ontology of Leibnizian relationalism, consisting in distance relations among sparse matter points and their change only, is well recognized as a serious option in the context of classical mechanics. In this paper, we investigate how this ontology fares when it comes to general relativistic physics. Using a Humean strategy, we regard the gravitational field as a means to represent the overall change in the distance relations among point particles in a way that achieves the best combination of being simple (...) and being informative. (shrink)

The fundamental open questions of general relativity theory are the unification of the gravitational field with other fields, aiming at a unified geometrization of physics, as well as the renormalization of relativistic gravitational theory in order to obtain their self-consistent solutions. These solutions are to furnish field-theoretic particle models—a problem first discussed by Einstein. In addition, we are confronted with the issue of a coupling between gravitational and matter fields determined (not only) by Einstein's principle of equivalence, and also with (...) the question of the geometric meaning of a gravitational quantum theory. In our view, all these problems are so closely related that they warrant a general solution. We treat mainly the concepts suggested by Einstein and Weyl. (shrink)

Super-substantivalism (of the type we’ll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier “on top of” spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts (...) of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism’s tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics. (shrink)

The general theory of relativity gives an absolutely covariant formulation of Helmholtz's laws of vorticity which is valid in arbitrary reference systems. For small relative velocities ui, (with ui,u′≪ε2) these generally covariant laws deliver Helmholtz's first law for a vorticity ωi in a rigidly rotating references system $\frac{d}{{dt}}(\omega _i - \Omega _\iota ) = (\omega ^l - \Omega ^l )u_{l,i} $ with the angular velocity Ω of the rotation.

Inspired by possible connections between gravity and foundational question in quantum theory, we consider an approach for the adaptation of objective collapse models to a general relativistic context. We apply these ideas to a list of open problems in cosmology and quantum gravity, such as the emergence of seeds of cosmic structure, the black hole information issue, the problem of time in quantum gravity and, in a more speculative manner, to the nature of dark energy and the origin of the (...) very special initial state of the universe. We conclude that objective collapse models offer a rather promising path to deal with all of these issues. (shrink)

The generality relativist has been accused of holding a self-defeating thesis. Kit Fine proposed a modal version of generality relativism that tries to resist this claim. We discuss his proposal and argue that one of its formulations is self-defeating.

Among the principles that are generally taken to underlie the general theory of relativity is a general principle of relativity. Such a principle is supposed to extend the special principle of relativity, which holds observers in uniform motion to be indistinguishable by appeal to the laws of physics, to a requirement on observers in arbitrary states of motion. Starting with physical intuitions described graphically by Galileo, proceeding through a series of formal requirements on reference frames defined on models of space-time (...) theories, and considering other "observations" commonly associated with relativity principles, this paper argues that the general principle of relativity is neither justified by "fact", nor exemplified by the general theory of relativity. (shrink)

The covariant and relativistic generalization of the Helmholtz integral vorticity theorems and Thomson's circulation theorem are derived.

The introduction of an “elementary length”a representing the ultimate limit for the smallest measurable distance leads to a generalization of Einstein's energy-momentum relation and of the usual Lorentz transformation. The value ofa is left unspecified, but is found to be equal tohc/2E u, whereE u is the total energy content of our universe. Particles of zero rest mass can only move at the velocityc of light in vacuum, while material bodies can move slower or faster than light, whena≠0, without violating (...) the principle of causality. The laws of relativistic mechanics are actually generalized so that they include Mach's principle, since it is found that the universe as a whole can only be in a state of rest for any particular inertial observer. (shrink)

The physical meaning of gauge groups in bimetrical, Riemannian, and Hermitian theories of gravitation is discussed. In Hermitian relativity, Einstein's A-invariance means a super-gauge group which characterizes the Einstein-Schrödinger equations as the only nondegenerate general-relativistic field theory.

There exists a growing literature on the so-called physical Church-Turing thesis in a relativistic spacetime setting. The physical Church-Turing thesis is the conjecture that no computing device that is physically realizable can exceed the computational barriers of a Turing machine. By suggesting a concrete implementation of a beyond-Turing computer in a spacetime setting, Istvan Nemeti and Gyula David have shown how an appreciation of the physical Church-Turing thesis necessitates the confluence of mathematical, computational, physical, and indeed cosmological ideas. In this (...) essay, I will honour Istvan's seventieth birthday, as well as his longstanding interest in, and his seminal contributions to, this field going back to as early as 1987 by modestly proposing how the concrete implementation in Nemeti and D\'avid might be complemented by a quantum-information-theoretic communication protocol between the computing device and the logician who sets the beyond-Turing computer a task such as determining the consistency of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. This suggests that even the foundations of quantum theory and, ultimately, quantum gravity may play an important role in determining the validity of the physical Church-Turing thesis. (shrink)

Automatic conservation of energy-momentum and angular momentum is guaranteed in a gravitational theory if, via the field equations, the conservation laws for the material currents are reduced to the contracted Bianchi identities. We first execute an irreducible decomposition of the Bianchi identities in a Riemann-Cartan space-time. Then, starting from a Riemannian space-time with or without torsion, we determine those gravitational theories which have automatic conservation: general relativity and the Einstein-Cartan-Sciama-Kibble theory, both with cosmological constant, and the nonviable pseudoscalar model. The (...) Poincaré gauge theory of gravity, like gauge theories of internal groups, has no automatic conservation in the sense defined above. This does not lead to any difficulties in principle. Analogies to 3-dimensional continuum mechanics are stressed throughout the article. (shrink)

The long-standing dispute between absolutists and relativists traditionally focuses on whether there are absolute truths, absolute epistemic norms, and absolute.

In this paper a new trajectory-based representation to non-relativistic quantum mechanics is formulated. This is ahieved by generalizing the notion of Lagrangian path which lies at the heart of the deBroglie-Bohm “ pilot-wave” interpretation. In particular, it is shown that each LP can be replaced with a statistical ensemble formed by an infinite family of stochastic curves, referred to as generalized Lagrangian paths. This permits the introduction of a new parametric representation of the Schrödinger equation, denoted as GLP-parametrization, and of (...) the associated quantum hydrodynamic equations. The remarkable aspect of the GLP approach presented here is that it realizes at the same time also a new solution method for the N-body Schrödinger equation. As an application, Gaussian-like particular solutions for the quantum probability density function are considered, which are proved to be dynamically consistent. For them, the Schrödinger equation is reduced to a single Hamilton–Jacobi evolution equation. Particular solutions of this type are explicitly constructed, which include the case of free particles occurring in 1- or N-body quantum systems as well as the dynamics in the presence of suitable potential forces. In all these cases the initial Gaussian PDFs are shown to be free of the spreading behavior usually ascribed to quantum wave-packets, in that they exhibit the characteristic feature of remaining at all times spatially-localized. (shrink)

This paper aims at explaining and defending some of Cora Diamond's thinking about the role of a kind of guides to thinking about ethics. Aids to thinking of this type can take a very general form but can also be applied in context‐sensitive ways. Maria Balaska has raised the question whether Diamond manages to avoid relativism. Oskari Kuusela also criticises Diamond, focussing on whether talk of human equality can be said to correspond to reality. I will consider these objections (...) in turn and try to show that Diamond is not committed either intentionally or otherwise to relativism. (shrink)

In relativistic theories, the assumption of proper mass constancy generally holds. We study gravitational relativistic mechanics of point particle in the novel approach of proper mass varying under Minkowski force action. The motivation and objective of this work are twofold: first, to show how the gravitational force can be included in the Special Relativity Mechanics framework, and, second, to investigate possible consequences of the revision of conventional proper mass concept (in particular, to clarify a proper mass role in the divergence (...) problem). It is shown that photon motion in the gravitational field can be treated in terms of massless refracting medium, what makes the gravity phenomenon compatible with SR Mechanics framework in the variable proper mass approach.Specifically, the problem of point particle in the spherical symmetric stationary gravitational field is studied in SR-based Mechanics, and equations of motion in the Lorentz covariant form are obtained in the relativistic Lagrangean problem formulation. The dependence of proper mass on potential field strength is derived from the Euler-Lagrange equations as well. One of new results is the elimination of conventional 1/r divergence, which is known to be not removable in Schwarzschild gravitomechanics. Predictions of particle and photon gravitational properties are in agreement with GR classical tests under weak-field conditions; however, deviations rise with potential field strength. The conclusion is made that the approach of field-dependent proper mass is perspective for development of SR gravitational mechanics and further studies of gravitational problems. (shrink)

We consider the relativistic statistical mechanics of an ensemble of N events with motion in space-time parametrized by an invariant “historical time” τ. We generalize the approach of Yang and Yao, based on the Wigner distribution functions and the Bogoliubov hypotheses to find approximate dynamical equations for the kinetic state of any nonequilibrium system, to the relativistic case, and obtain a manifestly covariant Boltzmann- type equation which is a relativistic generalization of the Boltzmann-Uehling-Uhlenbeck (BUU) equation for indistinguishable particles. This equation (...) is then used to prove the H-theorem for evolution in τ. In the equilibrium limit, the covariant forms of the standard statistical mechanical distributions are obtained. We introduce two-body interactions by means of the direct action potential V(q), where q is an invariant distance in the Minkowski space-time. The two- body correlations are taken to have the support in a relative O(2, 1)-invariant subregion of the full spacelike region. The expressions for the energy density and pressure are obtained and shown to have the same forms (in terms of an invariant distance parameter) as those of the nonrelativistic theory and to provide the correct nonrelativistic limit. (shrink)

Radical relativism was born with a promise: to account for certain phenomena that opposite views are unable to explain. One example is the phenomenon of “faultless disagreement”, according to which two people, while disagreeing, are not at fault in any substantive way. The phenomena of retraction and assessments of truth in cases of eavesdropping are others. All these phenomena have been claimed to pose serious problems for rival views and be best accounted for within a radical relativistic framework. While (...) “faultless disagreement” and the notion of disagreement in general has benefited from extensive discussion in current debates over semantic content, retraction has not been in the spotlight that much. In particular, very few things have been said about what retraction exactly amounts to and how to conceive of its normative profile. This will be the focus of our paper. (shrink)

The formulation of a relativistic theory of state-vector reduction is proposed and analyzed, and its conceptual consequences are elucidated. In particular, a detailed discussion of stochastic invariance and of local and nonlocal aspects at the level of individual systems is presented.

A survey is presented of the essential principles for formulating relativistic wave equations in curved spacetime. The approach is relatively simple and avoids much of the philosophical debate about covariance principles, which is also indicated. Hypercomplex numbers provide a natural language for covariance symmetry and the two important kinds of covariant derivative.

This is a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of contemporary work on moral relativism. The selections are divided topically under the following headings: General Issues Concerning Moral Relativism; Relativism and Moral Diversity; the Coherence of Moral Relativism; Defense and Criticism of Moral Relativism; and Relativism, Realism and Rationality. The volume includes a comprehensive topical bibliography and a large introduction with explanatory summaries of all the entries.

This chapter focuses on the connection between moral disagreement and moral relativism. Moral relativists, generally speaking, think both (i) that there is no unique objectively correct moral standard and (ii) that the rightness and wrongness of an action depends in some way on a moral standard accepted by some group or an individual. This chapter will first consider the metaphysical and epistemic arguments for moral relativism that begin from the premise that there is considerable amount of moral disagreement (...) both within individual societies and between them. The second half of the chapter, by contrast, focuses on the objection that moral relativism threatens to make us unable to have moral disagreements because it seems to make us speak past one another. This part of the chapter also evaluates relativist responses to this disagreement problem that rely on semantic opacity, disagreement in attitude, metalinguistic negotiations, and truth relativism. The chapter finally concludes by considering future directions of research in this area. (shrink)

Although relativism is most often associated with ethics, one can find defenses of relativism in virtually any area of philosophy. In what follows, I will narrow my focus considerably. I first discuss the general structure of relativist positions and arguments. I will then examine several influential ideas concerning relativism in the late 20th century. Finally, I end by considering the rise of relativism in one area outside of ethics, epistemology.

Practice relativism is the idea that practices are foundational for bodies of activity and thought, and differ from one another in ways that lead those who constitute the world in terms of them to incommensurable or conflicting conclusions. It is true that practices are not criticizable in any simple way because they are largely tacit and inaccessible. But to make them relativistic one needs an added claim: that practices are "normative", or conceptual in character. It is argued that this (...) is not supportable by any explanatory necessity, and that the differences in outcomes, though real, are not instances of relativism. /// El relativismo de prácticas es la idea de que las prácticas sirven de fundamento para cuerpos de actividad y pensamiento, y que difieren unas de otras de maneras que llevan a aquellos que constituyen el mundo en esos términos a conclusiones inconmensurables o contradictorias. Es cierto que las prácticas no son criticables de ninguna manera simple porque en general son tácitas e inaccesibles. Pero para que sean relativistas hace falta una tesis adicional: que las prácticas son normativas o conceptuales. Aquí se arguye que esto no puede sustentarse en ninguna necesidad explicativa, y que las diferencias en resultados, si bien son reales, no son casos de relativismo. (shrink)

THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. -/- The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is overwhelming: (...) there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into an unpalatable moral relativism on which there is no non-arbitrary basis between a justice that underwrites forms of domination such as slavery and a justice that condemns such forms of domination is equally powerful and compelling. I show that there is a way to harmonize both views that is subject to empirical test. -/- First I show that the most widely accepted and influential formulation of liberal justice, John Rawls' Justice as Fairness, in. e.g, A Theory of Justice, cannot avoid the relativistic challenge because it would not be accepted, as a matter of sociological fact, by real people in a divided society once the "veil of Ignorance" is removed and real people step out from the Original Position. To put it differently, different reflective equilibria are inevitable in a divided society. Given the weight that Rawls properly puts on the realizability of a conception of justice and its stability in practice, this is a fatal objection. There can be no divided society that is "well ordered" in Rawls' sense, governed by a shared conception of justice and known to be so governed. -/- I then turn to the most powerful statement of the CLS view, Milton's Fisk's relativistic account in The State and Justice. For Fisk, justice is a compromise between what the dominant groups can compel and what the the subordinate groups will acquiesce to., There is no one such compromise in any given situation, so the account is in that sense relativistic, but more deeply, it is relativistic in that it offers no non-arbitrary, non-question begging way to choose between the official justice of, e.g., a slaveholding society and and the radical justice of the slaves, which has no place for slaveholders as a group or slavery as an institution.All that Fisk can offer is an arbitrary existential choice: I'm with the slaves. (Or the slaveowners.) Most of us would find this disconcerting or even unacceptable. -/- I show that Fisk's general sort of account can be modified to allow for an non-arbitrary choice. Given general facts about human nature, societies based on domination will produce resistance that over the long run will diminish or eliminate various forms of domination. Through a sort of ratchet effect, rights won will be hard if not impossible to reverse. Societies embodying forms of domination can therefore be compared on dimensions of stability: the more domination, the more resistance, and the less stability. Such societies are inferior on the dimension of justice to more emancipatory society on the terms of both kinds of justice, official and radical. -/- This is not question begging because regimes of domination incorporate stability no less than more emancipatory social orders. The choice between official justice embodying domination and radical justice that does not is not arbitrary because it is based on a shared commitment to long term stability. This offers an empirical test of which social orders are more justice, and a prediction that over time, domination will tend to decrease. (shrink)

I discuss candidates for definitions of determinism in the context of general relativistic spacetimes, and argue that a definition which does not make recourse to any particular region of spacetime should be preferred over alternatives; one such notion is discussed in detail in the light of various physical examples. The emerging picture of determinism is a pluralist one: sometimes there is no unique way of making our intuitive concept of determinism precise. Instead, what is crucial for assessment of determinism of (...) the theory are auxiliary conditions under which it counts as deterministic or indeterministic, and justification for using them in a given situation. (shrink)

The essay is an attempt to offer a version of conceptual relativism that escapes Donald Davidson’s decisive criticisms of the notion of “conceptual scheme”. Two variants of relativism are distinguished, a weaker and a stronger one, and a clear formulation of what a strong version amounts to is put forward. The concrete proposal involves accepting a version of alethic pluralism. After discussing alethic pluralism in general, and after exploring both strong and weak versions of it, a suitable version (...) is presented: alethic functionalism. The final part offers an illustration of how embracing alethic functionalism may help the relativist. (shrink)

In the pair of articles of which this is the second, I present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. These problems are related to the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness should be (...) thought of as varying with some (more or less surprising) factor. In the first article, “Relativism 1: Representational Content”, I discussed the general issue of relativism about representational content. I argued for the conciliatory view that both relativist and absoutist conceptions of representational content can be legitimate. In the present continuation, I look in more detail at a special case of the general issue, namely the question of whether semantic contents, i.e. the contents assigned to linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language, should be construed in an absolutist or in a relativist way. (shrink)

In the pair of articles of which this is the first, I shall present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. All these problems and proposals concern the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue here is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their (...) correctness should be thought of as varying with some (more or less surprising) factor. In this, first, article, I shall discuss the general issue of relativism about representational content. I shall claim that there are legitimate ways of attributing contents that are absolute truth-bearers, and there are also equally legitimate ways of attributing relativistic representational contents. In the companion piece “Relativism 2: Semantic Content”, I look in more detail at the more specific question whether semantic contents (i.e. the contents assigned to linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language) should be construed in an absolutist or a relativist way. (shrink)

Epistemic possibilities are relative to bodies of information, or perspectives. To claim that something is epistemically possible is typically to claim that it is possible relative one’s own current perspective. We generally do this by using bare, unqualified epistemic possibility (EP) sentences, ones that don’t mention our perspective. The fact that epistemic possibilities are relative to perspectives suggests that these bare EP sentences fall short of fully expressing propositions, contrary to what both contextualists and relativists take for granted. Although they (...) rightly reject propositional invariantism, the implausible view that a bare EP sentence expresses the same classical (absolutely true or absolutely false) proposition in any context, they maintain that a change in perspective shifts either the sentence’s propositional content (to a proposition involving a different perspective) or its truth-value (the same perspectivally neutral proposition now evaluated from a different perspective). I deny that the semantic contents of bare EP sentences shift at all. But I also deny that these contents have truth-values. Rather, according to the radical invariantism I defend, these contents are not full-fledged propositions but merely propositional radicals. Only explicitly relativized EP sentences manage fully to express propositions, and these perspective-involving propositions are the only EP propositions there are. Nevertheless, bare EP sentences are perfectly capable of being used to assert EP propositions, because utterances of them implicitly allude to the relevant perspective. Various problem cases challenge radical invariantism to explain pragmatically which perspective is read into the utterance of a given bare EP sentence. Unlike contextualism and relativism, it can do this without having to resort to any semantic bells and whistles.. (shrink)

Historical studies suggest that all ideas, including the philosophical, scientific, and religious, are relative to the culture in which they are formulated. After clarifying the concept of relativism, and exploring the epistemological reasons why knowledge is relative, Kaufman argues that these admissions are not fatal to the achievement of valid knowledge in philosophy and theology.--D. D. O.

This book describes a relativistic quantum theory developed by the author starting from the E.C.G. Stueckelberg approach proposed in the early 40s. In this framework a universal invariant evolution parameter (corresponding to the time originally postulated by Newton) is introduced to describe dynamical evolution. This theory is able to provide solutions for some of the fundamental problems encountered in early attempts to construct a relativistic quantum theory. A relativistically covariant construction is given for which particle spins and angular momenta can (...) be combined through the usual rotation group Clebsch-Gordan coefficients. Solutions are defined for both the classical and quantum two body bound state and scattering problems. The recently developed quantum Lax-Phillips theory of semigroup evolution of resonant states is described. The experiment of Lindner and coworkers on interference in time is discussed showing how the property of coherence in time provides a simple understanding of the results. The full gauge invariance of the Stueckelberg-Schroedinger equation results in a 5D generalization of the usual gauge theories. A description of this structure and some of its consequences for both Abelian and non-Abelian fields are discussed. A review of the basic foundations of relativistic classical and quantum statistical mechanics is also given. The Bekenstein-Sanders construction for imbedding Milgrom's theory of modified spacetime structure into general relativity as an alternative to dark matter is also studied. (shrink)

John Earman's recent proposal that a substantive version of general covariance consists in the requirement that diffeomorphism invariance be a gauge symmetry is critically assessed. I argue that such a principle does not serve to differentiate general relativity from pre-relativistic theories. A model-theoretic characterization of two formulations of specially-relativistic theories is suggested. Diffeomorphisms are symmetries of only one such style of formulation and, I argue, Earman's proposal does not provide a reason to deny diffeomorphisms the status of gauge transformations relative (...) to this formulation. Carlo Rovelli's distinction between "passive" and "active" diffeomorphism invariance is also clarified. (shrink)

This book focuses on Albert Einstein and his interactions with, and responses to, various scientists, both famous and lesser-known. It takes as its starting point that the discussions between Einstein and other scientists all represented a contribution to the edifice of general relativity and relativistic cosmology. These scientists with whom Einstein implicitly or explicitly interacted form a complicated web of collaboration, which this study explores, focusing on their implicit and explicit responses to Einstein s work. This analysis uncovers latent undercurrents, (...) indiscernible to other approaches to tracking the intellectual pathway of Einstein to his general theory of relativity. The interconnections and interactions presented here reveal the central figures who influenced Einstein during this intellectual period. Despite current approaches to history presupposing that the efforts of scientists such as Max Abraham and Gunnar Nordström, which differed from Einstein s own views, be relegated to the background, this book shows that they all had an impact on the development of Einstein s theories, stressing the limits of approaches focusing solely on Einstein. As such, General Relativity Conflict and Rivalries proves that the general theory of relativity was not developed as a single, coherent construction by an isolated, brooding individual, but, rather, that it came to fruition through Einstein's conflicts and interactions with other scientists, and was consolidated by his creative processes during these exchanges. (shrink)

The institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour began comparatively earl- though not always under that name - in the Australasian region. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appoint ments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and 1960s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments (...) at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of Wollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia and in New Zealand. "Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science" aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume comprises a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. Papers address general issues, however, rather than local ones; parochial topics are avoided. Further more, though in each volume a majority of the contributors is from Australia or New Zealand, contributions from elsewhere are by no means ruled out. Quite the reverse, in fact - they are actively encour aged wherever appropriate to the balance of the volume in question. (shrink)

According to a number of international organizations such as UNESCO, the development of critical thinking is fundamental in youth education. In general, critical thinking is recognized as thinking that doubts and evaluates principles and facts. We define it as essentially dialogical, in other words constructive and responsible. And we maintain that its development is essential to help youngsters make enlightened decisions and adequately face up to the challenges of everyday living. Our recent analyses of exchanges among pupils who benefited from (...) philosophical praxis showed that dialogical critical thinking comprises four thinking modes and six epistemological perspectives that range from the simplest increasing in complexity to the most complex . Relativism merits special focus in that a majority of the pupils’ interventions that we analyzed are situated within this perspective, and in that relativism is charged with both positive and negative meanings. In its positive meaning, it is associated with reflection, plurality and open-mindedness, but in its negative sense, relativism refers to arbitrary decisions, to indifference and the status quo. This is why we maintain that relativism must be transcended. In this respect, we suggest two series of open-ended questions that are designed to provoke a disequilibrium in pupils’ certainties and, by so doing, stimulate their reflection towards inter-subjectivity. These questions are associated with the diversification of thinking modes and the increasing complexity of these modes. (shrink)

Radical relativism was born with a promise: to account for certain phenomena that opposite views are unable to explain. One example is the phenomenon of “faultless disagreement”, according to which two people, while disagreeing, are not at fault in any substantive way. The phenomena of retraction and assessments of truth in cases of eavesdropping are others. All these phenomena have been claimed to pose serious problems for rival views and be best accounted for within a radical relativistic framework. While (...) “faultless disagreement” and the notion of disagreement in general has benefited from extensive discussion in current debates over semantic content, retraction has not been in the spotlight that much. In particular, very few things have been said about what retraction exactly amounts to and how to conceive of its normative profile. This will be the focus of our paper. (shrink)

general discussion of relativism and of realism.