In recent articles, Zangari (1994) and Karakostas (1997) observe that while an &unknown;-extended version of the proper orthochronous Lorentz group O + (1,3) exists for values of &unknown; not equal to zero, no similar &unknown;-extended version of its double covering group SL(2, C) exists (where &unknown;=1-2&unknown; R , with &unknown; R the non-standard simultaneity parameter of Reichenbach). Thus, they maintain, since SL(2, C) is essential in describing the rotational behaviour of half-integer spin fields, and since there is empirical evidence for (...) such behaviour, &unknown;-coordinate transformations for any value of &unknown;<>0 are ruled out empirically. In this article, I make two observations:(a)There is an isomorphism between even-indexed 2-spinor fields and Minkowski world-tensors which can be exploited to obtain generally covariant expressions of such spinor fields.(b)There is a 2-1 isomorphism between odd-indexed 2-spinor fields and Minkowski world-tensors which can be exploited to obtain generally covariant expressions for such spinor fields up to a sign. Evidence that the components of such fields do take unique values is not decisive in favour of the realist in the debate over the conventionality of simultaneity in so far as such fields do not play a role in clock synchrony experiments in general, and determinations of the one-way speed of light in particular.I claim that these observations are made clear when one considers the coordinate-independent 2-spinor formalism. They are less evident if one restricts oneself to earlier coordinate-dependent formalisms. I end by distinguishing these conclusions from those drawn by the critique of Zangari given by Gunn and Vetharaniam (1995). (shrink)

The ethical frameworks of consequentialism and formalism predict moral awareness and behavior in individuals, but current measures either do not treat these frameworks as independent or lack sufficient theoretical underpinnings and statistical dependability. This paper presents the development and validation of a new scale to measure consequentialism and formalism that is well grounded in prior research. The Ethical Standards of Judgement Questionnaire is validated via six studies. Measurement items are developed in the first three studies, which also confirm (...) the need to eliminate a unidimensional measure and evaluate these frameworks separately. The fourth study addresses discriminant validity and the two remaining studies provide insight into how consequentialism and formalism predict the degree to which behaviors are deemed acceptable by individuals in the context of consumer beliefs and religious beliefs. Suggested uses for the scale in both academia and organizations are presented. (shrink)

The general properties of signals permit a nonaxiomatic reconstruction of the quantum “probability” formalism independent of the standard Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Performance standards are specified for candidate clock, signaller, and reflector devices, and it is shown that the resulting formalism forces identification of a “probability”- or “intensity”-like structure as the absolute square of an amplitude, the relative phases of amplitudes appearing explicitly in the “probability” composition law. Inequalities are produced which on one interpretation reduce to the (...) Heisenberg relations, but it is pointed out that this reconstruction disqualifies position as an observable property of a signal. (shrink)

Social network research is widely considered atheoretical. In contrast, in this article I argue that network analysis often mixes two distinct theoretical frameworks, creating a logically inconsistent foundation. Relationalism rejects essentialism and a priori categories and insists upon the intersubjectivity of experience and meaning as well as the importance of the content of interactions and their historical setting. Formalism is based on a structuralist interpretation of the theoretical works of Georg Simmel. Simmel laid out a neo-Kantian program of identifying (...) a priori categories of relational types and patterns that operate independently of cultural content or historical setting. Formalism and relationalism are internally consistent theoretical perspectives, but there are tensions between them. To pave the way for stronger middle-range theoretical development, I disaggregate the two approaches and highlight the contradictions that must be addressed or resolved for the construction of any general and inclusive theory. (shrink)

This book offers, for the first time in aesthetics, a comprehensive account of aestheticism of the 19<SUP>th</SUP> century as a philosophical theory of its own right. Taking philosophical and art-historical viewpoints, this cross-disciplinary book presents aestheticism as the foundational movement of modernist aesthetics of the 20<SUP>th</SUP> century. Emerging in the writings of the foremost aestheticists - Oscar Wilde, Walter Pater, James Whistler, and their formalist successors such as Clive Bell, Roger Fry, and Clement Greenberg - aestheticism offers a uniquely synthetic (...) definition of art. It captures the artwork’s relations between form and content, art’s independent ontology and autonomy, art’s internal completeness, criticism, immunity to recruitment, the uniqueness of each medium, and musicality, as well as the logical-theoretical affiliation of art for art’s sake to epistemology, ethics and philosophy of language.<BR> Those are used by Michalle Gal to formulate a definition of art in terms of a theory of Deep Formalism, setting aestheticism, which aspires to preserve the artistic medium, as a critique of the current linguistic-conceptual aesthetics that developed after the linguistic turn of aesthetics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the "real" physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent (...) sociology that in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing. (shrink)

Mark Blaug played a central role in the development of the field of the methodology of economics, alongside his theoretical work and contributions to the history of economic thought. The purpose, in this article, is to focus on his contributions to the topic of 'formalism in economics', in relation to his methodological commentaries on the Popperian and Lakatosian approaches to the philosophy of science. In Blaugian spirit, the discussion is related to economic theory and draws on the history of (...) economic thought. The argument focuses on the troublesome interface between theoretical and applied economics in mainstream economics. The article includes, as a case study, an assessment of new behavioural economics in Popperian and Lakatosian terms. The conclusion is that such an appraisal exercise—i.e., whether the research programme is progressive or degenerative—is clouded by the interface between the form of empiricism promoted by Popper and Lakatos and the methodological framework of mainstream economics. No conclusion is feasible independent of methodological approach. (shrink)

In the philosophy and psychology of perception there exists a long-standing debate about the detachability of the visual from the conceptual contents of perception. The article analyses the implications of this dilemma for the attribution of aesthetic properties independent of the classification of aesthetic objects and the possibility of aesthetic formalism.

Using the position as an independent variable, and time as the dependent variable, we derive the function $${\mathcal{P}}^{(\pm )}=\pm \sqrt{2m({\mathcal{H}}-{\mathcal{V}}(q))}$$, which generates the space evolution under the potential $${\mathcal{V}}(q)$$ and Hamiltonian $${\mathcal{H}}$$. No parametrization is used. Canonically conjugated variables are the time and minus the Hamiltonian ( $$-{\mathcal{H}}$$ ). While the classical dynamics do not change, the corresponding Quantum operator $${{{\hat{\mathcal P}}}}^{(\pm )}$$ naturally leads to a 1/2-fractional time evolution, consistent with a recent proposed space–time symmetric formalism of the (...) Quantum Mechanics. Using Dirac’s procedure, separation of variables is possible, and while the two-coupled position-independent Dirac equations depend on the 1/2-fractional derivative, the two-coupled time-independent Dirac equations lead to positive and negative shifts in the potential, proportional to the force. Both equations couple the (±) solutions of $${{{\hat{\mathcal P}}}}^{(\pm )}$$ and the kinetic energy $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}$$ (separation constant) is the coupling strength. Thus, we obtain a pair of coupled states for systems with finite forces, not necessarily stationary states. The potential shifts for the harmonic oscillator (HO) are $$\pm {\hbar {\omega}} /2$$, and the corresponding pair of states are coupled for $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}\ne 0$$. No time evolution is present for $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}=0$$, and the ground state with energy $${\hbar {\omega}} /2$$ is stable. For $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}>0$$, the ground state becomes coupled to the state with energy $$-{\hbar {\omega}} /2$$, and this coupling allows to describe higher excited states in the HO. Energy quantization of the HO leads to the quantization of $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}=k{\hbar {\omega}}$$ ( $$k=1,2,\ldots$$ ). For the one-dimensional Hydrogen atom, the potential shifts become imaginary and position-dependent. Decoupled case $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}=0$$ leads to plane-waves-like solutions at the threshold. Above the threshold ( $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}>0$$ ), we obtain a plane-wave-like solution, and for the bounded states ( $${\mathcal{K}}_{0}<0$$ ), the wave-function becomes similar to the exact solutions but squeezed closer to the nucleus. (shrink)

The presented enhanced version of Eriksen’s theorem defines an universal transform of the Foldy–Wouthuysen type and in any external static electromagnetic field reveals a discrete symmetry of Dirac’s equation, responsible for existence of a highly influential conserved quantum number—the charge index distinguishing two branches of DE spectrum. It launches the charge-index formalism obeying the charge-index conservation law. Via its unique ability to manipulate each spectrum branch independently, the CIF creates a perfect charge-symmetric architecture of Dirac’s quantum mechanics, which resolves (...) all the riddles of the standard DE theory. Besides the abstract CIF algebra, the paper discusses: the novel accurate charge-symmetric definition of the electric-current density; DE in the true-particle representation, where electrons and positrons coexist on equal footing; flawless “natural” scheme of second quantization; and new physical grounds for the Fermi–Dirac statistics. As a fundamental quantum law, the CICL originates from the kinetic-energy sign conservation and leads to a novel single-particle physics in strong-field situations. Prohibiting Klein’s tunneling in Klein’s zone via the CICL, the precise CIF algebra defines a new class of weakly singular DE solutions, strictly confined in the coordinate space and experiencing the total reflection from the potential barrier. (shrink)

There is another meeting place for quantum physics and psychology, both within and outside of cognitive modeling. In physics it is known as the issue of classical (probabilistic) determinism, and in psychology it is known as the issue of selective influences. The formalisms independently developed in the two areas for dealing with these issues turn out to be identical, opening ways for mutually beneficial interactions.

Analysis of the biophysical conditions for a correct application of the Volterra Competition Equations with resource-independent coefficients reveals the following:The traditional, mathematical formalism with the two equations representing two straight lines at the condition of zero growth applies.

The concept of time-coarsened density matrix for open systems has frequently featured in equilibrium and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, without being probed as to the detailed consequences of the time averaging procedure. In this work we introduce and prove the need for a selective and non-uniform time-sampling, whose form depends on the properties of the bath. It is also applicable when an open microscopic sub-system is coupled to another finite system. By use of a time-periodic minimal coupling model between these two (...) systems, we present detailed quantitative consequences of time coarsening, which include initial state independence of equilibration, deviations from long term averages, their environment size dependence and the approach to classicality, as measured by a Leggett–Garg type inequality. An interacting multiple qubit model affords comparison between the time integrating procedure and the more conventional environment tracing method. (shrink)

New musicology's rejection of formalist precepts eclipses how the subjectivization of aesthetics institutes the schema of music's opposition to reality. Social Werktreue—fidelity to the work and to the faithful reproduction of an original intent—replaces ideals of aesthetic transcendence with analyses of a work's socially constructed meaning. Hence, absolute music's social demystification positions music criticism within a system of oppositions ratified by bourgeois culture. The power individual works exercise in contesting reality deconstructs formalist dogma and social Werktreue. The temporality evinced when (...) works address us in new situations attests to the work's independent afterlife. By confronting formalist criticism and social critique with the schema Kant initiated when he legitimated aesthetic judgment's transcendental function, this independent afterlife argues against transposing the principle of interpretive fidelity onto the social plane. Works reveal dimensions of experience in the midst of existing social and historical conditions, thereby opening new horizons for music criticism. (shrink)

In his book _The Corded Shell_, Peter Kivy attempts to solve the problem of the expression of emotions by music. the task he sets himself is to explain away the apparent contradiction between the following propositions, each of which seems independently plausible: Music can correctly be described in terms drawn form the human emotions and the connotations of such emotion terms preclude their application to music. Most of us would, I think, accept. Why should we accept? Kivy's argument is that (...) in the central uses of emotion terms there is an equivalence between _being_ sand and _feeling _ sad. Music is insensate; it cannot feel anything and - therefore - cannot feel sad. But, according to the above equivalence, if it cannot feel sad it cannot be sad. And if it cannot be sad, music criticism which describes apiece in this way is, at best, confused. (shrink)

In the Copenhagen interpretation the Heisenberg inequality ΔQΔP≥ℏ/2 is interpreted as the mathematical expression of the concept of complementarity, quantifying the mutual disturbance necessarily taking place in a simultaneous or joint measurement of incompatible observables. This interpretation was criticized a long time ago and has recently been challenged in an experimental way. These criticisms can be substantiated by using the generalized formalism of positive operator-valued measures, from which an inequality, different from the Heisenberg inequality, can be derived, precisely illustrating (...) the Copenhagen concept of complementarity. The different roles of preparation and measurement in creating uncertainty in quantum mechanics are discussed. (shrink)

A re-evaluation of the notion of vacuum in quantum electrodynamics is presented, focusing on the vacuum of the quantized electromagnetic field. In contrast to the ‘nothingness’ associated to the idea of classical vacuum, subtle aspects are found in relation to the vacuum of the quantized electromagnetic field both at theoretical and experimental levels. These are not the usually called vacuum effects. The view defended here is that the so-called vacuum effects are not due to the ground state of the quantized (...) electromagnetic field. Nevertheless it is possible to maintain an empirically demonstrable notion of vacuum state that is consistent with the interpretation of the formalism of the theory. (shrink)

The formalism of mathematics has always inspired ontological theorization based on it. As is evident from his magnum opus Being and Event, Alain Badiou remains one of the most important contemporary contributors to this enterprise. His famous maxim—“mathematics is ontology” has its basis in the ingenuity that he has shown in capitalizing on Gödel’s and Cohen’s work in the field of set theory. Their work jointly establish the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the standard axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel (...) set theory, with Gödel’s result showing their consistency to the affirmative, while Cohen’s showing it to the negative. These results serve as the cornerstone of Badiou’s mathematical ontology. In it, drawing heavily on Cohen’s technically formidable method of forcing, Badiou makes the latter result the key to his defense of the possibility of a faithful tracing of the consequences in the ‘state’ of an ‘event’ by a ‘subject’. Whereas, Gödel’s result based on the assumption of constructability becomes the pivot for criticism of the general philosophical orientation that Badiou calls ‘constructivism’. Viewed from a position internal to mathematical formalism itself, and taking into account the twentieth century developments in the relevant field, Badiou’s stance seems to be neither appreciative of the actual course of such developments, nor just to the philosophical view point that was actually maintained by Gödel. In the present paper, this concern is intended to be substantiated through an exposition of certain facts pertaining to the said developments as well as to Gödel’s philosophical inclinations. (shrink)

We construct a consistent theory of a quantum massive Weyl field. We start with the formulation of the classical field theory approach for the description of massive Weyl fields. It is demonstrated that the standard Lagrange formalism cannot be applied for the studies of massive first-quantized Weyl spinors. Nevertheless we show that the classical field theory description of massive Weyl fields can be implemented in frames of the Hamilton formalism or using the extended Lagrange formalism. Then we (...) carry out a canonical quantization of the system. The independent ways for the quantization of a massive Weyl field are discussed. We also compare our results with the previous approaches for the treatment of massive Weyl spinors. Finally the new interpretation of the Majorana condition is proposed. (shrink)

The canonical formalism for the Maxwell field on a null surface has been revisited. A new pair of gauge-independent canonical variables is introduced. It is shown that these variables are derivable from a Hamillon-Jacobi functional. The construction of the appropriate C * algebra is carried out in preparation for quantization. The resulting quantum theory is similar to a previous result. It is then shown that one can construct the T-variables of Rovelli and Smolin on the null surface. The Poisson (...) bracket algebra exhibits causal relations along the null rays, but is nonsingular if the loops are restricted to those whose projections along the null rays are not tangent and one-to-one. Finally, there is a brief discussion of the relevance of this work to general relativity. (shrink)

The mathematical formalism of quantum theory has been established for nearly a century, yet its physical foundations remain elusive. In recent decades, connections between quantum theory and information theory have garnered increasing attention. This study presents a physical derivation of the mathematical formalism quantum theory based on information-theoretic considerations in physical systems. We postulate that quantum systems are characterized by single independent adjustable variables. Utilizing this physical postulate along with the conservation of total probability, we derive the standard (...) Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory, including the Born probability rule. This comprehensive derivation of quantum theory offers a clear and concise physical foundation for the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Local gauge theories are in a complicated relationship with boundaries. Whereas fixing the gauge can often shave off unwanted redundancies, the coupling of different bounded regions requires the use of gauge-variant elements. Therefore, coupling is inimical to gauge-fixing, as usually understood. This resistance to gauge-fixing has led some to declare the coupling of subsystems to be the \textit{raison d'\^etre} of gauge \cite{RovelliGauge2013}. Indeed, while gauge-fixing is entirely unproblematic for a single region without boundary, it introduces arbitrary boundary conditions on the (...) gauge degrees of freedom themselves---these conditions lack a physical interpretation when they are not functionals of the original fields. Such arbitrary boundary choices creep into the calculation of charges through Noether's second theorem, muddling the assignment of physical charges to local gauge symmetries. The confusion brewn by gauge at boundaries is well-known, and must be contended with both conceptually and technically. It may seem natural to replace the arbitrary boundary choice with new degrees of freedom, for using such a device we resolve some of these confusions while leaving no gauge-dependence on the computation of Noether charges \cite{DonnellyFreidel}. But, concretely, such boundary degrees of freedom are rather arbitrary---they have no relation to the original field-content of the field theory. How should we conceive of them? Here I will explicate the problems mentioned above and illustrate a possible resolution: in a recent series of papers \cite{GomesRiello2016, GomesRiello2018, GomesHopfRiello} the notion of a connection-form was put forward and implemented in the field-space of gauge theories. Using this tool, a modified version of symplectic geometry---here called `horizontal'---is possible. Independently of boundary conditions, this formalism bestows to each region a physically salient, relational notion of charge: the horizontal Noether charge. Meanwhile, as required, the connection-form mediates an irenic composition of regions, one compatible with the attribution of horizontal Noether charges to each region. Thes aims of this paper are to highlight the boundary issues in the treatment of gauge, and to discuss how gauge theory may be conceptually clarified in light of a resolution to these issues. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to provide a physical representation of quantum superpositions. For this purpose we discuss the constraints of the quantum formalism to the notion of possibility and the necessity to consider a potential realm independent of actuality. Taking these insights into account and from the basic principles of quantum mechanics itself we advance towards the definition of the notions of power and potentia. Assuming these notions as a standpoint we analyze the meaning of ‘observation’ and ‘interaction’. (...) As a conclusion we provide a set of axioms which comprise our interpretation of quantum mechanics and argue in favor of a redefinition of the orthodox problems discussed in the literature. (shrink)

The number of independent messages a physical system can carry is limited by the number of its adjustable properties. In particular, systems with only one adjustable property cannot carry more than a single message at a time. We demonstrate that this is true for the photons in the double-slit experiment, and that this is what leads to the fundamental limit on measuring the complementary aspect of the photons. Next, we illustrate that systems with a single adjustable property exhibit other quantum (...) behaviors, such as noncommutativity and no-cloning. Finally, we formulate a mathematical theory to describe the dynamics of such systems and derive the standard Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics as well as the Born probability rule. Our derivation demonstrates the physical foundation of quantum theory. (shrink)

Certain belief-ascription statements suggest that people can think about the same object, even if that object doesn't exist. Peter Geach, who in 1967 first discussed these statements, gave them the name of statements of intentional identity. In an especially puzzling form of these statements, a pronoun in one belief clause has its antecedent in another: "Hob believes a witch is F, and Nob believes she is G." In this form, the statements raise three interesting problems. They generate puzzles for a (...) program in philosophy of mind, according to which intentional properties of thought are to be analyzed as theoretical analogs of something independently explicable. They are beyond the scope of standard intensional logic , and therefore jeopardize its explanatory value in certain respects. For instance, they jeopardize the received theory of the de dicto/de re distinction in terms of the scope distinctions of SIL. They pose problems for certain theories of anaphoric pronouns, in the context of SIL. ;At first it seems possible to modify SIL so as to yield a quantificational interpretation of the recalcitrant intentional identity statements. In the modified theory, the statements are analyzed so that a wide-scope quantifier binds variables in separate belief contexts. The problem with such quantificational theories is that they are unable to account for another puzzle about intentional identity. Intentional identity appears not to be a symmetric relation: it can be argued that the inference from "Hob thinks a witch is F and Nob thinks she is G" to "Nob thinks a witch is G and Hob thinks she is F" is not a plausible one. A better formal approach than the quantificational ones contains two key components. The first is a framework for anaphoric pronouns combining certain features of quantificational, discourse referential, and demonstratival interpretations of pronouns. The second is the use of structured domains in the formal models. Various interpretations of the new formalism are possible, each drawing on a different analogical theory of the nature of thoughts and their intentional properties. The new framework explains in a unified fashion not only the apparent asymmetry of intentional identity, but a number of other perplexing features of belief. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben’s work on the power of sovereignty has been greatly influential in recent political thought. However, it has also overshadowed the independently original contributions of his two primary theoretical sources, Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. In this article, I argue that Agamben’s political defeatism can be traced back to a double misconception in his reception of these two authors: first a formalistic reduction of Schmitt, and second a Schmittian reduction of Benjamin. Through this reduction to juridical formalism, the (...) radicality of Benjamin’s historical materialist critique is replaced by a messianic nihilism, leading to the colonization of society by the logic of the concentration camp. Though Agamben’s theory of sovereignty and its implications for a positive political project have been contested, this origin of the decline of radical philosophy has not previously undergone a systematic critique. (shrink)

In General Relativity in Hamiltonian form, change has seemed to be missing, defined only asymptotically, or otherwise obscured at best, because the Hamiltonian is a sum of first-class constraints and a boundary term and thus supposedly generates gauge transformations. Attention to the gauge generator G of Rosenfeld, Anderson, Bergmann, Castellani et al., a specially _tuned sum_ of first-class constraints, facilitates seeing that a solitary first-class constraint in fact generates not a gauge transformation, but a bad physical change in electromagnetism or (...) General Relativity. The change spoils the Lagrangian constraints, Gauss's law or the Gauss-Codazzi relations describing embedding of space into space-time, in terms of the physically relevant velocities rather than auxiliary canonical momenta. But the resemblance between the gauge generator G and the Hamiltonian H leaves still unclear where objective change is in GR. Insistence on Hamiltonian-Lagrangian equivalence, a theme emphasized by Castellani, Sugano, Pons, Salisbury, Shepley and Sundermeyer among others, holds the key. Taking objective change to be ineliminable time dependence, one recalls that there is change in vacuum GR just in case there is no time-like vector field xi^a satisfying Killing's equation L_xi g_mn=0, because then there exists no coordinate system such that everything is independent of time. Throwing away the spatial dependence of GR for convenience, one finds explicitly that the time evolution from Hamilton's equations is real change just when there is no time-like Killing vector. The inclusion of a massive scalar field is simple. No obstruction is expected in including spatial dependence and coupling more general matter fields. Hence change is real and local even in the Hamiltonian formalism. The considerations here resolve the Earman-Maudlin standoff over change in Hamiltonian General Relativity: the Hamiltonian formalism is helpful, and, suitably reformed, it does not have absurd consequences for change and observables. Hence the classical problem of time is resolved. The Lagrangian-equivalent Hamiltonian analysis of change in General Relativity is compared to Belot and Earman's treatment. The more serious quantum problem of time, however, is not automatically resolved due to issues of quantum constraint imposition. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to strengthen the point made by Horty about the relationship between reason holism and moral particularism. In the literature prima facie obligations have been considered as the only source of reason holism. I strengthen Horty’s point in two ways. First, I show that contrary-to-duties provide another independent support for reason holism. Next I outline a formal theory that is able to capture these two sources of holism. While in simple settings the proposed account coincides (...) with Horty’s one, this is not true in more complicated or “realistic” settings in which more than two norms collide. My chosen formalism is so-called input/output logic. A bottom-line example is introduced. It raises the issue of whether the conventional wisdom is right in assuming that normative reasons run parallel to epistemic ones. (shrink)

For different reasons, Husserl's original, thought-provoking ideas on the philosophy of logic and mathematics have been ignored, misunderstood, even despised, by analytic philosophers and phenomenologists alike, who have been content to barricade themselves behind walls of ideological prejudices. Yet, for several decades, Husserl was almost continuously in close professional and personal contact with those who created, reshaped and revolutionized 20th century philosophy of mathematics, logic, science and language in both the analytic and phenomenological schools, people whom those other makers of (...) 20th century philosophy, Russell, Frege, Wittgenstein and their followers, rarely, if ever, met. Independently of them, Husserl offered alternatives to the well-trodden paths of logicism, nominalism, formalism and intuitionism. He presented a well-articulated, thoroughly argued case for logic as an objective science, but was not philosophically naive to the point of not seeing the role of subjectivity in shaping the sense of the reality facing objective science. Given the preeminent role that philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics have played in transforming the way philosophy has been done since Husserl's time, and given the depth of his insights and his obvious expertise in those fields, his ideas need to be integrated into present-day, mainstream philosophy. Here, philosopher Claire Ortiz Hill and mathematician-philosopher Jairo da Silva offer a wealth of interesting insights intended to subvert the many mistaken idees recues about the development of Husserl's thought and reestablish broken ties between it and philosophy now. (shrink)

Article history: This article sketches the Parallel Architecture, an approach to the structure of grammar that Accepted 29 August 2006 contrasts with mainstream generative grammar (MGG) in that (a) it treats phonology, Available online 13 October 2006 syntax, and semantics as independent generative components whose structures are linked by interface rules; (b) it uses a parallel constraint-based formalism that is nondirectional; (c) Keywords: it treats words and rules alike as pieces of linguistic structure stored in long-term memory.

This paper examines the problem of founding irreversibility on reversible equations of motion from the point of view of the Brussels school's recent developments in the foundations of quantum statistical mechanics. A detailed critique of both their 'subdynamics' and 'transformation' theory is given. It is argued that the subdynamics approach involves a generalized form of 'coarse-graining' description, whereas, transformation theory cannot lead to truly irreversible processes pointing to a preferred direction of time. It is concluded that the Brussels school's conception (...) of microscopic temporal irreversibility, as such, is tacitly assumed at the macroscopic level. Finally a logical argument is provided which shows, independently of the mathematical formalism of the theory concerned, that statistical reasoning alone is not sufficient to explain the arrow of time. (shrink)

Teodor Adorno's work Philosophy and Teachers was first read as a report at the Frankfurt Studenthome in November 1961. In this report Adorno continued the topic of criticism of those factors of the then formation of West Germany, which made impossible a personal fight intellectual to with the cultural remnants of a totalitarian society. Adorno drew attention an exam in philosophy, important element of the educational process. This exam should pass composed of future teachers, candidates for the work of the (...) teacher of gymnasium. This exam should be composed by future teachers, candidates for the work of the teacher of gymnasium. Adorno noticed the tendency of formalistic adherence to the Rules of Examination by some future teachers who are unable to understand the humanistic, emancipatory and spiritual essence of philosophy, and therefore do not understand the purpose of conducting this exam. Adorno honored the long tradition of academic freedom of the German University and noticed the figure of the German philosopher, describing him as the man whose intellectual activity influenced the humanization of the German University, which directly influenced to the corresponding cultural transformations. But in post-war universities in the Federal Republic of Germany there is a trend to the principles of scientific knowledge. This tendency is coupled with the attitude of some future teachers to knowledge as appropriation to the consumer way, was due to the absence of personal love for their own specialty and to their students. Adorno was convinced that such teachers are indifferent to their specialty and do not have a calling to him. Adorno defined as a sign to the absence of calling in these people is intellectual negligence, provincial speech and provincial inability to understand human freedom as a spiritual value. Such teachers are incapable of offering new knowledge to their students by way of perfekt speech and by way of perfekt written presentation. As completely different Adorno offered to see a person who is capable to appropriation of the knowledge that is needed to understand hemseif and his professional obligation. This person can will use self-understand and self-reflection, and therefore she can will independently to understand of the sense of their pedagogical work. This person will be faithful and patient in carrying out his work for the practical introduction of humanistic ideals of prior philosophical knowledge into society. (shrink)

In this work we attempt to confront the orthodox widespread claim, present in the philosophical and foundational debates about Quantum Mechanics (QM), that ‘superpositions are never actually observed in the lab’. In order to do so, we begin by providing a critical analysis of the famous measurement problem which, we will argue, was originated as a consequence of the strict application of the empirical-positivist requirements to subsume the quantum formalism under their specific understanding of a physical ‘theory’. In particular, (...) the ad hoc introduction of the projection postulate (or measurement rule) can be understood as the necessity of imposing a naive empiricist standpoint which presupposes that observations are self evident givens of “common sense” experience independent of metaphysical (or conceptual) presuppositions yet necessarily represented in binary terms. We then turn our attention to two “non-collapse” interpretations of QM—namely, modal and many worlds—which even though deny that the “collapse” is a real physical process retain anyhow the projection rule as a necessary axiom of the theory itself. In contraposition, following Einstein’s claim that “it is only the theory which decides what can be observed”, we propose a return to the realist representational understanding of physical theories in which ‘observation’ is not a “self evident” given of experience but something that can be only understood in the context of a theoretical (formal-conceptual) scheme. It is from this standpoint that we discuss a new non-classical conceptual representation which allows us to understand quantum phenomena in an intuitive (anschaulicht) manner. Leaving behind the projection postulate, we discuss the general physical conditions for measuring and observing quantum superpositions in the lab. (shrink)

The number of independent messages a physical system can carry is limited by the number of its adjustable properties. In particular, systems that have only one adjustable property cannot carry more than a single message at a time. We demonstrate this is the case for the single photons in the double-slit experiment, and the root of the fundamental limit on measuring the complementary aspect of the photons. Next, we analyze the other ‘quantal’ behavior of the systems with a single adjustable (...) property, such as noncommutativity and no-cloning. Finally, we formulate a mathematical theory to describe the dynamics of such systems and derive the standard Hilbert-space formalism of quantum mechanics. Our derivation demonstrates the physical foundation of the quantum theory. (shrink)

Contemporary physics is in a great need of a unified theoretical framework allowing for a comprehensive physical description of particles and interactions. One of the leading candidates for such a framework, the superstring theory, has recently provoked immense critics due to the lack of its experimental verification (L. Smolin, R. Penrose). The survey of the specificity of the unification mechanisms that are operative within the superstring theory shows that, in comparison with such a successful paradigm as that of the general (...) theory of relativity, the unification model of the theory does not follow the strict relation between the formalism and a unifying physical idea. The critical analysis of the superstring theory, presented by Lee Smolin in his book The Trouble with Physics, offers a detailed re-evaluation of theory's physical foundations but remains insensitive to issues of methodological, ontological and epistemological import. In particular, Smolin seems to be aware of the lack of the background independence as well as the need to compactify extra space-time dimensions that are hoped to be alleviated in the future M-theory. He treats purely mathematical criteria such as that of renormalizability on an equal footing with the physical interpretation of the theory. Such a methodological disarray leads to Smolin's biased estimate of the true drawbacks of the superstring theory. (shrink)

I argue that neural activity, strictly speaking, is not computation. This is because computation, strictly speaking, is the processing of strings of symbols, and neuroscience shows that there are no neural strings of symbols. This has two consequences. On the one hand, the following widely held consequences of computationalism must either be abandoned or supported on grounds independent of computationalism: (i) that in principle we can capture what is functionally relevant to neural processes in terms of some formalism taken (...) from computability theory (such as Turing Machines), (ii) that it is possible to design computer programs that are functionally equivalent to neural processes in the same sense in which it is possible to design computer programs that are functionally equivalent to each other, (iii) that the study of neural (or mental) computation is independent of the study of neural implementation, (iv) that the Church-Turing thesis applies to neural activity in the sense in which it applies to digital computers. On the other hand, we need to gradually reinterpret or replace computational theories in psychology in terms of theoretical constructs that can be realized by known neural processes, such as the spike trains of neuronal ensembles. (shrink)

Following a line of research that I have developed for several years, I argue that the best strategy for understanding quantum gravity is to build a picture of the physical world where the notion of time plays no role at all. I summarize here this point of view, explaining why I think that in a fundamental description of nature we must “forget time”, and how this can be done in the classical and in the quantum theory. The idea is to (...) develop a formalism that treats dependent and independent variables on the same footing. In short, I propose to interpret mechanics as a theory of relations between variables, rather than the theory of the evolution of variables in time. (shrink)

Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show that the (...) Born probability rule, and sets of definite-valued observables to which the Born probabilities pertain, can be uniquely defined from the quantum state and Hilbert space structure. We discuss the status of probability in modal interpretations, and to this end we make a comparison with many-worlds alternatives. An overall point that we stress is that the modal ideas define a general framework and research programme rather than one definite and finished interpretation. (shrink)

"Sport, Tradition and Freedom" entails a philosophical examination of the relationship between traditions of rationality and understandings of freedom in sport. Chapter One introduces the ideas of freedom and virtue. Chapter Two involves a critical and historical exploration of the traditions of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism and the effects that these traditions have had on accounts of freedom in sport. Chapter Three examines the issue of freedom in sport from a social critical-formalist perspective, particularly addressing the influence that the process (...) of commodification in advanced capitalism has had on sport. It also endeavours to suggest that the virtues, as explained by Alisdair Maclntyre, are important to the protection of formal freedom in sport, from the effects of advanced capitalism. Chapter Four examines the link between the modern liberal tradition and the virtue tradition. This link is made via the ideas of self-determination and authentic social unions which both traditions share. This chapter also investigates the influence that these various traditions have had on the framing and solution to issues in sport, using the drug issue as a paradigm case. The conclusion suggests that it may be profitable to explore the rationality of less dominant traditions in society when investigating sport. Inquiry revealed that many traditions of understanding in sport rely heavily on elements from political traditions in society. Freedom in sport has been linked to conservative notions of a craft, to liberal notions of play and the independent individual and to accounts of freedom which support the dominant capitalist institutions of society. The examination by social critical theorists of the freedom of authentic social practices and the location of this freedom in the formal rules of sport, provided an alternative to these previous explanations which had located freedom in either the attitude of the player or the economic institutions of society. On the formalist view of sport, freedom is located in the pursuit of gratuitous difficulty, which the rules of sport make possible. The protection of this freedom from social abrogation involves virtue, the formation of authentic social unions, and judgement in sporting participation. The concluding chapter suggested that the protection of formal freedom and the importance of judgement and "seeing without illusion" in sport is critical to issues such as feminism, professionalism and creativity in sport. (shrink)

In previous work we gave a mathematical foundation, referred to as DisCoCat, for how words interact in a sentence in order to produce the meaning of that sentence. To do so, we exploited the perfect structural match of grammar and categories of meaning spaces. Here, we give a mathematical foundation, referred to as DisCoCirc, for how sentences interact in texts in order to produce the meaning of that text. First we revisit DisCoCat. While in DisCoCat all meanings are fixed as (...) states, in DisCoCirc word meanings correspond to a type, or system, and the states of this system can evolve. Sentences are gates within a circuit which update the variable meanings of those words. Like in DisCoCat, word meanings can live in a variety of spaces e.g. propositional, vectorial, or cognitive. The compositional structure are string diagrams representing information flows, and an entire text yields a single string diagram in which word meanings lift to the meaning of the entire text. While the developments in this paper are independent of a physical embodiment, both the compositional formalism and suggested meaning model are highly quantum-inspired, and implementation on a quantum computer would come with a range of benefits. We also praise Jim Lambek for his role in mathematical linguistics in general, and the development of the DisCo program more specifically. (shrink)

Causal Bayes nets have been developed in philosophy, statistics, and computer sciences to provide a formalism to represent causal structures, to induce causal structure from data and to derive predictions. Causal Bayes nets have been used as psychological theories in at least two ways. They were used as rational, computational models of causal reasoning and they were used as formal models of mental causal models. A crucial assumption made by them is the Markov condition, which informally states that variables (...) are independent of other variables that are not their direct or indirect effects conditional on their immediate causes. Whether people’s inferences conform to the causal Markov and the faithfulness condition has recently been investigated empirically. A review of respective research indicates that inferences frequently violate these conditions. This finding challenges some uses of causal Bayes nets in psychology. They entail that causal Bayes nets may not be appropriate to derive predictions for causal model theories of causal reasoning. They also question whether causal Bayes nets as a rational model are empirically descriptive. They do not challenge, however, causal Bayes nets as normative models and their usage as formal models of causal reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:540 BOOK REVIEWS automatically without requiring the intervention of human beings who are convinced of its validity" (p. 356). If, however, a representative legislature, acting according to proper constitutional procedures, should decide to effect a strict egalitarian redistribution of property, then on Kant's theory this decision of the general will would be perfectly rightful and legitimate. The wealthy could not complain that their rightful property was being taken from (...) them because their actual or peremptory right to any property whatever is conditional on submitting themselves to the general will and to whatever laws of distribution it might choose to give. The state's only responsibility here would be to make sure that each citizen's right to freedom, equality, and independence is pro· tected; and Kant was even aware to some extent (if not as much as he might have been) that under a genuinely republican system, it is always the unequal distribution of property in society which poses the most serious threat to these rights. In spirit, therefore, Kant's theory is at the very opposite end of the political spectrum from theories of the minimal or nightwatchman state. Cornell University Ithaca, New York ALLEN W. Wooo History Making History: The New Historicism in American Religious Thought. By WILLIAM DEAN. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988. Pp. xiv + 175. $57.50 (hardcover) ; $18.95 (paper). This hook sets out to explicate, not historicism generally, hut a particular local and American variety thereof. Indeed one of Dean's major points concerns the importance of " local knowledge." He is addressing readers located, for better or worse, in American institutions, in a time and space shaped by American experience. These, he argues, need to cultivate a distinctively American way of knowing in philosophy and religion, a way of knowing that will be historicist, pragmatic, and empirical in character; adopting it would require important revisions in how we conceive and practice theology. Like all good historicists, Dean presents his argument by telling a story, creating a narrative context for the understanding of ideas. The story is most immediately about a group of contemporary thinkers that includes secular philosophers (Richard Bernstein, Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty), philosophers of religion and ethics (Jeffrey Stout, Corne! West), theologians (Gordon Kaufman, Mark C. Taylor), and a lone literary critic, Frank Lentriccia. By treating these writers together as " the new American historicists," Dean hopes to BOOK REVIEWS 541 show that they exemplify a distinctive style of thought that is both locally valid (because rooted in American traditions and practices) and religiously interesting. At the same time, the new historicists suffer from an ironic case of intellectual amnesia. While they consistently stress the inevitability of tradition and context in shaping thought, these writers often seem oblivious to the uniquely American tradition in which they stand. Thus Dean reaches back to recover elements of an older American historicism with roots in pragmatism, religious naturalism, and the liberal Protestantism of the prewar " Chicago School." The thought of these illustrious precursors, he argues, can help save today's historicists from the formalism that is their constant temptation. But what is historicism? Dean makes an emphatic distinction be· tween the historicism that grows out of the German idealist tradition and the historicism that " can be traced to the classical era in Ameri· can philosophy," e.g., to the thought of the pragmatists (p. 2). When Dean speaks of the older, idealist-influenced historicism he does not mean simply Ernst Troeltsch's famous proposal for a form of cultural and religious relativism; he is painting with a much broader brush. " Continental " historicism means for him something more like the idealist conviction concerning the " historicity " of the subject. After Kant, we do not simply apprehend the world, we construe it; and ever since Kant we have become more and more aware that we do so from particular, contingent perspectives. " Historicism" in this wide sense might be taken as a thesis about the inevitability of hermeneutics. But belief in the necessity of interpretation or hermeneutics is com· patible with affirming the reality of certain universal anthropological structures, e.g., of "reason" or "subjectivity" or "understanding". It is just such structures, Dean argues... (shrink)

We present a linear formalism which makes explicit and precise the confirming effect of independent multiple observers and repeated trials on composite ratings, taking as parameters quantitative estimates of the subjective inputs discussed. -/- Note that the subjective probability used here is so used to study the past not predict the future and is rather limited to what has been called in artificial intelligence "certainty factors," which are arbitrary, or, more well-known, the arbitrary values ascribed to predicates in fuzzy (...) "logic." This is clear because the scales themselves are arbitrary and of the radio-button type. (shrink)

We often have to draw conclusions about states of machines in computer science and about states of knowledge and belief in artificial intelligence based on partial information. Nerode suggested using constructive logic as the language to express such deductions and also suggested designing appropriate intuitionistic Kripke frames to express the partial information. Following this program, Nerode and Wijesekera developed syntax, semantics and completeness for a system of intuitionistic dynamic logic for proving properties of concurrent programs. Like all dynamics logics, this (...) was a logic of many modalities, each expressing a program, but in intuitionistic rather than in classical logic. In that logic, both box and diamond are needed, but these two are not intuitionistically interdefinable and, worse, diamond does not distribute over ‘or’, except for sequential programs. This also happens in other contemplated computer science and AI applications, and leads outside the class of constructive logics investigated in the literature. The present paper fills this gap. We provide intuitionistic logics with independent box and diamond without assuming distribution of diamond over ‘or’. The completeness theorem is based on intuitionistic Kripke frames , but equipped with an additional, quite separate accessibility relation between worlds. In the interpretation of Nerode and Wijesekera , worlds under the partial order represent states of partial knowledge, the accessibility represents change in state of partial knowledge resulting from executing a specific program. But there are many other computer science interpretations. This formalism covers all computer science applications of which we are aware. We also give a cut elimination theorem and algebraic and topological formulations, since these present some new difficulties. Finally, these results were obtained prior to those in Nerode and Wijesekera. (shrink)

In an accompanying paper Gomes, we have put forward an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on a non-relativistic, Lagrangian 3+1 formalism of a closed Universe M, existing on timeless configuration space \ of some field over M. However, not much was said there about the role of locality, which was not assumed. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap. Locality in full can only emerge dynamically, and is not postulated. This new understanding of locality is based solely (...) on the properties of extremal paths in configuration space. I do not demand locality from the start, as it is usually done, but showed conditions under which certain systems exhibit it spontaneously. In this way we recover semi-classical local behavior when regions dynamically decouple from each other, a notion more appropriate for extension into quantum mechanics. The dynamics of a sub-region O within the closed manifold M is independent of its complement, \, if the projection of extremal curves on \ onto the space of extremal curves intrinsic to O is a surjective map. This roughly corresponds to \, where \ is a linear projection. This criterion for locality can be made approximate—an impossible feat had it been already postulated—and it can be applied for theories which do not have hyperbolic equations of motion, and/or no fixed causal structure. When two regions are mutually independent according to the criterion proposed here, the semi-classical path integral kernel factorizes, showing cluster decomposition which is the ultimate aim of a definition of locality. (shrink)

The article deals with three patterns for interpretation of language in its relation to the cultural hegemony, i.e. Gramscian, Voloshinian, and Pasolinian. As was shown, the analysis of the language problem is the necessary precondition for justifying the unity of theoretical and practical elements within Marxist philosophy. A common feature for the aforementioned patterns was an attempt to answer a fundamental question: how it is possible to make explicit the relationship between ideology and relations of production by means of the (...) materialist dialectics. A refusal to fetishize language as a particular essence, a revealing that any sign systems are mediated by ideologies, and elaboration of a nonSaussurian structure of language are the core results of the proposed analysis. The starting point for the reflections of the mentioned thinkers was a tenet that communication in the state is determined by how much the institutions of power are able to bring the interests of society under control without disturbing the balance between the political body and the existing social forces. Thus, an ideology plays in two guises: as a symbolic order of legitimation on the society’s part and as a framing the growth of cultural forms. A distinction between the written and the spoken language becomes a politically significant tool to undermine the hegemony, for a balance between the political and the social, between the coercion and the approval, is widely open to fluctuations. Hence is the problem Marxist theorists have tried to solve: how can it be found out, with an examination of statements in non-political contexts, what someone talks of is a part of her political interest. The Marxist thinkers solved it in various ways. For instance, Gramsci focused himself on the reasons of making of the Italian literary canon; Voloshinov considered the proposition that in linguistics a formalism, as well as psychologism, following from a claim that semantics and means of expression are politically independent; and Pasolini sketched the difference between the spoken language, the spoken-written language, and the purely oral language, with unequal subjects of them. (shrink)

The apparent underdetermination of the formalism of quantum field theory (QFT) as between a particle and a field interpretation is studied in this paper through a detour over the problem of unifying QFT with general relativity. All we have at present is a partial or approximate unification, QFT in non-Minkowskian spaces. The nature of this hybrid and the problem of its internal consistency are discussed. One of its most striking implications is that particles do not have an observer-independent existence. (...) We trace the ways in which physicists reacted to this at first highly implausible ontological consequence. We conclude that quantum fields rather than particles are after all the basic entities in QFT. (shrink)

Bruineberg and colleagues highlight work using Markov blankets to demarcate the bounds of the mind. This echoes earlier attempts to demarcate the bounds of the mind from a dynamical systems perspective. Advocates of mechanistic explanation have challenged the dynamical approach to independently motivate the application of the formalism, a challenge that Markov blanket theorists must also meet.

In this Short Communication we will discuss the role played by quantum computing within the emerging morphological paradigm in the unconventional natural computing. We intend merely introduce the main reasons why a coherent representation of Universality in morphological natural computing needs to be grounded on a version of Quantum Field Theory independent, in many senses, from the Quantum Mechanics formalism in fundamental physics, namely formulated as a thermal field theory. This theory describes the “emergence” of natural information and computation’s (...) complexity at a quantum level, thus overcoming the trivializing argument against the so-called “pancomputationalism” in morphological natural computing. (shrink)