The paper analyzes the concept of a first cause, both for event causation and for agent causation. It turns out that one is rather ready to believe in the existence of first causes that are events, but not in the existence of first causes that are agents. The paper, however, develops and defends a complex argument to the conclusion that there is a first agent-cause. one version of that argument proves -- not necessarily the (...) existence of God -- but still the existence of a godlike agent. Finally, the notion of a first agent-cause is employed for an analysis of freely willed human action. (shrink)

The causes of asymmetries for handedness and cerebral speech are of scientific interest, but is it sensible to try to determine which of these came first? I argue that (1) first causes belong to mythology, not science; (2) much of the cited evidence is weak; and (3) the treatment of individual differences is inadequate in comparison with the right shift theory.

Enric F. Gel has recently argued that classical theism enjoys a significant advantage over Graham Oppy's naturalism. According to Gel, classical theism – unlike Oppy's naturalism – satisfactorily answers two questions: first, how many first causes are there, and second, why is it that number rather than another? In this article, I reply to Gel's argument for classical theism's advantage over Oppy's naturalism. I also draw out wider implications of my investigation for the gap problem and Christian doctrine (...) along the way. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes Bibliography.

This paper contains a critique of the 'Kalam' Cosmological Argument for a first cause of the universe as a whole. I argue that one of its major premises (that the universe began to exist) cannot be justified a priori from the paradoxes of the actual infinite, nor by appeal to current cosmological theories. But those who wish to infer from cosmology to the non-existence of a first cause also fail to make their case. I conclude with (...) some morals for the project of natural theology. (shrink)

can natural human reason establish the existence of a first cause of all things? Hobbes tells us quite plainly that it can. Yet on other occasions he also tells us that our natural reason cannot rule out an eternal chain of causes with no beginning at all. The plot thickens when we consider his ambidextrous treatment of the only proof to which he gives any serious attention. On the one hand, Hobbes seems to endorse a fairly conventional version (...) of the cosmological argument in The Elements of Law and Leviathan, reasoning without apparent irony from the inadmissibility of an infinite regress of causes to the existence of a first cause of all. On the other hand, he systematically attacks this sort of cosmological.. (shrink)

Medieval Modal Logic & Science uses modal reasoning in a new way to fortify the relationships between science, ethics, and politics. Robert C. Trundle accomplishes this by analyzing the role of modal logic in the work of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, then applying these themes to contemporary issues. He incorporates Augustine's ideas involving thought and consciousness, and Aquinas's reasoning to a First Cause. The author also deals with Augustine's ties to Aristotelian modalities of thought regarding science (...) and logic, reassessing the commonly held belief in Augustine's Platonism to not be a mistake as much as a simplistic view of his philosophy. Trundle links contemporary issues in epistemology, morality, theology, and logic, making several useful connections between ancient and medieval studies in modal logic and modern concerns. These applications of modal theory illuminate many puzzles in the works of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Whitehead, and Kuhn. (shrink)

This article argues that Aristotle depicts the soul as a detectable aspect of one’s being, is in the form of properties, and is discernable by cognition. Thus, he proposed that it is possible to discern the complementary connection between one’s being and the first cause of creation. Aristotle, like Kant, recognised that the age-old problem of scepticism posed a challenge to epistemological, ontological, and ethical claims. However, Kant did not develop his ideas regarding bridging the gap between what (...) is demonstrable and the first cause of creation – which resulted in perpetuating problems with scepticism and dualism. Consequently, in the effort to resolve the problems of scepticism and dualism, to promote self-actualisation, holistic well-being and, to help individuals realise their full potential there is a resurgence of Aristotle’s explanation of the relationship between self-knowledge and knowledge of the first cause of creation. This article contributes to the philosophy of science, the philosophy of the social sciences, the philosophy of religion, to contemporary literature on social psychology, and to literature addressing the interface between the sciences and perennial philosophy by demonstrating that Aristotle’s perennial wisdom and his epistemic approach – based on logical positivism – resolve problems related to scepticism, materialism, and dualism. (shrink)

In this article, the author notes that Thomas Aquinas, in his brief work entitled De Ente et Essentia, proved that at the base of understanding the world, the human being, and God in particular, there is our understanding of being and its essence. When we make a small mistake at the beginning in our understanding of being and its essence, it will turn to be a big one in the end. And what is “at the end” of our knowledge is (...) the discovery of the First and Ultimate Cause of all things, known as: Ipsum Esse, God, the Absolute, The Most Perfect Substance, on whom everything depends, and who depends not on anything else. These present inquiries about the proper understanding of being and its essence are aimed at formulating proof of the necessity of existence of a Being that is the First Cause, and which, existing as Ipsum Esse, is the source and reason of existence of all beings. Without these inquiries, the proof itself would be incomprehensible, and more importantly it would be a purely a priori one. Furthermore, without the existential conception of being, which Thomas first formulated, one could not discover the First Cause which, as Ipsum Esse, is the source of the existence of every being. This issue seems to have escaped the attention of the author of the book Aquinas’s Way to God. The Proof in “De Ente et Essentia.”. (shrink)

While it is unproblematic that someone evil causes further evil, it is difficult to explain how a good person can cause his or her first evil act. Augustine, denying that something good can be the cause of evil, concludes that the first moral evil has only a ‘deficient cause’, not an efficient cause, which is to say that it has no explanation. By contrast, Aquinas and Scotus hold that the first moral evil has (...) a cause, that the cause is something good, and that it is an efficient cause: the will. For Aquinas, the will can cause its first evil act only if it is momentarily non-culpably deficient, in that it does not make the intellect actually consider the moral rule relevant to the choice. For Scotus, no such occurrent deficiency is presupposed in the will causing its first evil act; the will’s freedom suffices. Yet there is surprising agreement: at bottom, Aquinas and Scotus both trace the first moral evil to the will’s ability for alternatives and no further. Thus their view converges with Augustine’s claim that evil ultimately has no efficient cause. (shrink)

This paper provides a new first cause argument by showing that atomism, i.e. the thesis that each composite object is composed of simple objects, together with causalism, understood in this paper as the thesis that every object is a cause or has a cause, logically imply the existence of a first cause if some additional general premises regarding the interplay between parthood, composition and causation are accepted. Thus it is shown that a commitment to (...) atomism, causalism and the additional premises result in a commitment to there being a first cause. (shrink)

Although the treatise presented here is most interesting, it was never widely disseminated. As far as we know, it is preserved only in Latin, in one manuscript. The text poses many questions. Who produced a copy of the text? Who is the translator? Is the treatise a genuine work of Averroes? And if so, what was his intention in writing this monograph on the First Cause?

The paper presents a new version of the "Cosmological Argument" – considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument is too unspecific to be unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.

In this paper, I draw attention to various doctrines common to different Vedāntic traditions. In particular, I pay close attention to the doctrine of beginningless _karman_. I also note that this doctrine seems to stand in tension with Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments (LCAs) and Kalām Cosmological Arguments (KCAs). This tension arises because defenders of these arguments argue that an infinite causal regress or an actual infinite cannot be physically instantiated and because the doctrine of beginningless _karman_ seems to imply that such (...) a regress or actual infinite can be physically instantiated. I address this tension by showing that not all interpretations of beginningless _karman_ involve an infinite causal regress or an actual infinite. I close this paper by highlighting a few features that Vedāntic traditions have that make them more resistant to some objections to LCAs and KCAs. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine some main threads of the identification stage of Scotus's project in the fourth chapter of De Primo, where he tries to show that a first efficient cause must have the attributes of simplicity, intellect, will, and infinity. Many philosophers are favorably disposed towards one or another argument such as Scotus's (e.g., the cosmological argument from contingency) purporting to show that there is an absolutely first efficient cause. How far can Scotus take (...) us from this starting point towards the ultimate aim of establishing the existence of a being more recognizably identifiable as God? (shrink)

‘Singular Causes First’ rejects Hume's thesis that singular causal facts are reducible to generic ones, adopting a reverse position, taking singular causes as basic. Using idealized examples, Cartwright shows that strategies to establish causal claims without using singular causal facts as inputs all fail, including probabilistic theories of causality. Not only is singular causal input necessary if probabilities are to imply causal connections, the resulting causal output is also at base singular.

Introduction: We live in a society that encourages self-medication and one reason is the availability of drugs that do not require a prescription and are easily accessible, the abuse of these have important implications for the health of the general population; being the most commonly used drugs: analgesics, antibiotics, antihistamines and others. Objective: Determine the causes that induce self-medication in freshmen and fifth year of the Faculty of Medicine of the Universidad Mayor, Real y Pontificia de San Francisco Xavier de (...) Chuquisaca - Bolivia, 2012. Methodology: Quantitative and descriptive cross-sectional approach. A sample of 284 students which they apply structural survey was obtained. Results.A high percentage of students who are self-medicating themselves without.medical.supervision. Conclusions: We can say that self-medication on freshmen and fifth year of medical school at the University Of San Francisco Xavier De Chuquisaca is induced by influence of social circle (friends and parents), advertising of certain medications, access to internet and lack of time. (shrink)

1. The texts and inscriptions dating from the early period – roughly the first 500 years after the Buddha’s passing away – do not support the conclusion that fully-fledged sects existed at that time. Rather, we should think in terms of ‘sectarian tendencies’ that emerged as actual sects towards the end of the early period. The available sources that speak of the First Schism are best read as sectarian accounts depicting the situation in the Buddhism of their own (...) time – roughly 100-500 CE – rather than as historical records of the pre-A?okan era. 2. All of the Sthavira sources mention the so-called ‘five theses’ of the Mah?sa?ghika as either the cause of the First Schism or as important doctrinal issues. And a review of relevant Vinaya sources demonstrates that the ‘five theses’ were probably accepted within the Mah?sa?ghika, which confirms that this was likely the principal cause of the First Schism. (shrink)

Many recent gene knockout experiments cause anatomical changes to the jaw region of mice that several investigators claim are evolutionary reversals. Here we evaluate these mutant phenotypes and the assertions of atavism. We argue that following the knockout of Hoxa-2, Dlx-2, MHox, Otx2, and RAR genes, ectopic cartilages arise as secondary consequences of disruptions in normal processes of cell specification, migration, or differentiation. These disruptions cause an excess of mesenchyme to accumulate in a region through which skeletal progenitor (...) cells usually migrate, and at a site of condensation that is normally present in mammals but that is too small to chondrify. We find little evidence that these genes, when disrupted, cause a reversion to any primitive condition and although changes in their expression may have played a role in the evolution of the mammalian jaw, their function during morphogenesis is not sufficiently understood to confirm such hypotheses. BioEssays 20:245–255, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

hobbes’s views on the existence and nature of God have occasioned much controversy.1 He has been interpreted as holding positions ranging from sincere, if unconventional, Calvinism to out-and-out atheism.2 Of particular interest has been Hobbes’s apparent endorsement of a version of the cosmological argument. Take the following, for example:For he that from any effect he seeth come to pass should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and (...) plunge himself profoundly into the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this: that there must be one first mover, that is, a first and eternal cause of all things, which is that... (shrink)

According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way (...) to detect themanot only in scientific experiments, but also from the first-person perspective. Since neither third- nor first- person evidence can rule out the actual occurrence of such dissociations, the alleged nomological connection between phenomenal and physical properties cannot be established, in principle. As a consequence, the distinction between logical and nomological possibility breaks down and it cannot be ruled out that such dissociations occur in an unlimited number of cases. (shrink)

Although different perspectives on the essence and qualities of the absolute existence have been put forward by the philosophers, theologians, and Sufī philosophers, in the context of this article, we will examine whether absolute existence has a causal efficacy in addition to special existence in the unity of the First Principle and the first effect. We will discuss the views of two Ottoman scholars, Baghdādīzāda (who lived in the second part of the 10th/16th century) and Arpacīzāda (d.1033/1623), who (...) analyzed the effect of absolute existence with its aforementioned qualities on the simplicity of the First Principle and its being a part of the complete cause as an incomplete cause. It is generally accepted by the philosophers that the First Principle is the simple complete cause of the first effect by virtue of its essence without the need for conditions, tools, or the removal of any obstacle. Therefore, the First Principle must be the cause of the first effect with its simple existence that does not consist of any sensory or intellectual parts. Therefore, the decisive issue in the discussions regarding the definition of the complete cause is the inclusion of both simple and compound entities. Because the definition of a complete cause that includes only simple or compound causes would be incomplete since it does not include all entities. The definition of complete cause preferred by philosophers such as al-Asīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d.675/1277), who made important contributions to the conceptualization of complete and incomplete causes, as the totality of the things on which the maʿlūl depends in its existence, can only include composite entities. As a matter of fact, al-Sayyīd Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), in his Sharh al-Mawāqif and Hāshiya al-Tajrīd, states that the aforementioned definition of complete cause, which was mentioned by his predecessors al-Abharī and al-Kātibī has the possibility of including only composite entities, but he expresses that this situation is not a necessity with the example that a simple substance can be formed from a simple complete cause. The Ottoman scholar al-Khatībzāda (d.901/1496), who supported al-Jurjānī's sentiment that the aforementioned definition of the complete cause could only include composite entities, emphasized in his commentary on Tajrīd al-iʿtikād the possibility of accepting absolute existence as a necessary element for the realization of the complete cause, which led to the writing of separate treatises following the traces of this problem. In the context of al-Jurjānī and al-Khatībzāda's explanations, al-Baghdādīzāda addressed the possibility of absolute existence being a part of the complete cause without damaging the simplicity of the First Principle and wrote a separate treatise emphasizing that absolute existence does not eliminate the First Principle”s being a simple complete cause. Arpacīzāda was another Ottoman scholar who wrote a critical text in response to this treatise, which analyzed the effect of absolute existence on the existence of the first effect as a part of the complete cause and its relation to the special existence of the First Principle. In this article, we will try to reveal the effect of absolute existence on the First Principle's being a simple complete cause and the possibility of accepting it as a part of the complete cause through these individuals and treatises. (shrink)

Since 1900, debates about the justification of punishment have also been debates about the cause of crime. In the early twentieth century, the rehabilitative ideal of punishment viewed mental illness and dysfunction in individuals as the cause of crime. Starting in the 1970s, retributivism identified the immorality of human agents as the source of crime, which dovetailed well with the “tough-on-crime” political milieu of the 1980s and 1990s that produced mass incarceration. After surveying these historical trends, Wirts argues (...) for a social critical view that crime is best understood as a product of an unjust society, not faulty human beings. This view should take the lessons learned by the critiques of rehabilitation, however, and resist the tendency to reduce human beings to recipients of social services. (shrink)

In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the (...) class='Hi'>first variation the first enemy emptied the canteen and the second enemy threw it away. On this variation, the act of neither enemy comes out, on the analysis employed here, as causally relevant to, and thus not as a cause of, the fact that the traveler died, but the conjunction of the two acts is a cause of it. This version is a case of mutual preemption. I argue that it has the same structure as the voting paradox, which thus has an analogous solution. In the standard version, in which the first enemy added poison to the water in the traveler's canteen, the act of the second enemy (who threw the canteen away) comes out, on the analysis used here, as causally relevant to and as a cause of the fact that the traveler died, but the act of the first enemy comes out as neither. I also make a comparison with Lewis' accounts, and discuss alternative treatments of the puzzle such as those of Hart and Honore and of Gavison, Margalit, and Ullmann-Margalit. (shrink)

A lengthy argument for the existence of a being possessing most of the attributes ascribed to God in traditional philosophical theology is set forth by John Duns Scotus in the final two chapters of his Tractatus De Primo Principio.1 In 3.1-19, Scotus tries to establish the core of his proof, viz., that "an absolutely first effective is actually existent." It is an ingenious blend of elements that figure in standard versions of the cosmological and ontological arguments. However, while the (...) reader of De Primo is apt to be deeply intrigued by the suggestiveness and originality of Scotus' discussion, attempting to organize and interpret the various threads of argument is a challenging task. This no doubt partially explains the relative neglect of Scotus' argument in contemporary discussion of theistic proofs. In what follows, I offer a reading of the argument as well as my critical assessment of it. I will contend that Scotus is unable to achieve all that he wants, in that a critical aspect of his official version of the argument is centrally flawed. However, the text also seems to suggest a modified version of the proof which relies on intuitive support for a possibility claim. I maintain that this form of the proof is sound. Furthermore, owing to the comparative weakness of its underived premises, Scotus' proof can be seen to offer a novel and appealing alternative to the more widely advertised versions of the cosmological and ontological arguments. If I am right, then, Scotus' De Primo has an important contribution to make to the contemporary discussion of an issue of perennial philosophical concern. (shrink)

The causes and the outbreak of the Corinthian war, as well as the events immediately preceding it, have often been discussed by modern historians. Since the Corinthian war is the first attempt at achieving a new settlement in Greece after the Peloponnesian war and since it brought about new political alliances and the revival of old imperial rivalries, it is not only an episode in the continual warfare among the Greek states, but may also be regarded as a key (...) to the understanding of a part, at least, of the pattern of Greek history in the fourth century B.C. (shrink)

This paper discusses an asymmetry in the way that we think about causation. Put roughly, the asymmetry is this. We tend to regard hastening some event or result as a way of causing it, whereas we do not tend to regard delaying an event or result as a way of causing it. In the first two sections of this paper, I illustrate the asymmetry with some examples, characterize it more precisely, and explain why I think it is puzzling. In (...) the third section I discuss some responses to the puzzle that I take to be inadequate. In the following sections I present my own solution. I argue that the key to the asymmetry puzzle is a difference in the ways in which delaying and hastening are related to preventing. My explanation is compatible with the view that, in general, what delays an event or result is not among its causes. But it is also compatible with the view (to which I incline) that although delayers really are always causes of what they delay, there are pragmatic reasons why it is, in general, odd or unnatural so to describe them. (shrink)

The time when Guerras civiles de Granada was written produced a long process of assimilation and acculturation for the moriscos. The occurrences in this process mark the narrative tone of each part of the work, which is, more than a mere reflection of the epoch, an appeal to the contemporaries for consideration of the moriscos’ cause. The first part hints at the same direction as El Abencerraje and the second, Libros plúmbeos.

According to a widespread view, which can be traced back to Russell’s famous attack on the notion of cause, causal notions have no legitimate role to play in how mature physical theories represent the world. In this paper I first critically examine a number of arguments for this view that center on the asymmetry of the causal relation and argue that none of them succeed. I then argue that embedding the dynamical models of a theory into richer causal (...) structures can allow us to decide between models in cases where our observational data severely underdetermine our choice of dynamical models. (shrink)

This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: [email protected].

Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have (...) robust first-person perspectives. The author concludes with a view of intentional causation, according to which reasons are constituted by (but not identical to) neural phenomena. The idea of constitution without identity allows for a causal account of action that automatically includes first-personal aspects of agency. (shrink)

The epistemic theory of causality maintains that causality is an epistemic relation, so that causality is taken to be a feature of the way an agent represents the world rather than an agent-independent or non-epistemological feature of the world. The objective of this essay is to cause problems for the epistemic theory of causality. This is not because I think that the epistemic theory is incorrect. In fact, I spend some time arguing in favour of the epistemic theory of (...) causality. Instead, this essay should be regarded as something like an exercise in stress testing. The hope is that by causing problems for a particular version of the epistemic theory, the result will be a more robust version of that theory. My gripe is with a particular version of the epistemic theory of causality, a version that is articulated with the help of objective Bayesianism. At first sight, objective Bayesianism looks like a plausible theory of rational belief. However, I argue that it is committed to a certain theory of evidence, a theory of evidence that recent work in epistemology has shown to be incorrect. In particular, objective Bayesianism maintains that evidence is perfectly accessible in a certain sense. But evidence just is not so perfectly accessible, according to recent developments in epistemology. However, this is not the end of the line for the epistemic theory of causality. Instead, I propose an epistemic theory of causality that dispenses with the assumption that evidence is perfectly accessible in the relevant sense. (shrink)

This paper reviews and extends ideas of eukaryotization by endosymbiosis. These ideas are put within an historical context of processes that may have led up to eukaryotization and those that seem to have resulted from this process. Our starting point for considering the emergence and development of life as an organized system of chemical reactions should in the first place be in accordance with thermodynamic principles and hence should, as far as possible, be derived from these principles. One trend (...) to be observed is the ever-increasing complexity resulting in several layers of compartmentalization of the reaction system, either spatial (of which the eukaryotic cell is an example), or functional (as in the gradually deepening distinction between metabolic, enzymatic and information-storing functions within the cell). One of the causes of this complexification of living systems will have been the changes in environmental conditions, particularly the geochemical impoverishment of the biosphere during geological history, partly brought about by living systems themselves, and partly by the trend towards increasing efficiency and specificity of the reactions that occur. (shrink)

There is what might be called a ‘majority position’ in the history of Western philosophy according to which causes are sufficient for or ‘necessitate’ their effects. However, there is also a singificant ‘minority position’ according to which causes are necessary relative to their effects. The second/third century A.D. Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias is an ancient representative of the minority position. He attributes his own view — with some justification, I shall suggest – to Aristotle. This paper has two, somewhat loosely (...) connected purposes. The first is to explore the origin of the conception of ‘causes’ as necessary conditions in Aristotle, particularly in On Generation and Corruption 2.11 and Posterior Analytics 2.12, and the development and use of the conception in Alexander's De fato. The second purpose of the paper is to explore and criticize a sophisticated contemporary version of the conception of causes as ‘necessary in the circumstances,’ that of J.L. Mackie. (shrink)

ETHICISTS HAVE CRITICIZED THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S INvocation of "war" language as a response to the threat of terrorism in the post—September 11, 2001, world. Calling instead for a "police" model, these ethicists are found among both the pacifist and the just war traditions. This essay explores what a policing model might entail. First, it highlights some expressions of interest by just war ethicists in a police approach for tackling terrorism. Second, it critically surveys some representative examples of (...) pacifist appeals to such a paradigm. Third, it evaluates the call for a just-policing approach, showing how this model actually remains consonant with just war reasoning. Finally, the essay draws on the discipline of police ethics and examines what just cause, especially with respect to preemptive strikes, might look like in a just-policing approach to dealing with terrorism. (shrink)

There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how (...) disjunctive facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)

The social aspects of causality in medicine and healthcare have been emphasized in recent debates in the philosophy of science as crucial factors that need to be considered to enable, among others, appropriate interventions in public health. Therefore, it seems central to recognize the bearing of social causes (broadly understood, e.g., social inequalities and socio-economic status) in bringing about certain concrete pathologies. Being aware of the relevance of social causes in medicine and healthcare is particularly important in the face of (...) the role that artificial intelligence-based systems (such as machine learning algorithms) are increasingly playing in these high-stakes fields. In fact, these systems bear the dangerous potential of concealing relevant social causes. This is highly problematic not only because it reinforces issues of distributive injustice but also because it can pave the way for issues of epistemic injustice. The central aim of this chapter is to make a first effort to point out possible connections between the importance of recognizing social causes in medicine and healthcare and forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

In what sense do people doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first-order and second-order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their (...) interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of their concepts. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause hearers to doubt their interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of their concepts. Many cases of second-order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the article by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second-order gaslighting: metalinguistic deprivation, conceptual obscuration, and perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably has sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control. (shrink)

The leading accounts of the nature of causation divide into probability-raising and process-linkage views. On the probability-raising view, causation is rooted in the comparative probability of the effect with the cause versus without. On the process-linkage view, causation is rooted in the existence of a connecting line from cause to effect. I propose a third alternative which synthesizes these views while solving their problem cases. On this alternative, causation is rooted in the comparative probability of the connecting line (...) to the effect with the cause versus without: causes as probability raisers of processes. In the first two sections, I (briefly) outline the probability-raising and process-linkage views and identify a space of problems, and then I focus on developing the alternative probability-raisers-of-processes solution. I identify problems for this view as well, though I conclude that it is at least in important respects a step forward. (shrink)