The concept of precision medicine aims to tailor treatment based on data unique to the patient. An example is the use of genetic data from malignant tumours to select the most appropriate oncological treatment. The competing interests of utilitarianism and egoism create dilemmas for decisions regarding investment in precision medicine. The need to balance the perceived rights and needs of individuals against those of society as a whole is an on-going challenge in the distribution of limited health service resources. There (...) is need for proper planning, organisation and investment into precision medicine to cope with the consequences of both direct-to-consumer and healthcare-directed genetic testing for genetic counselling, therapeutics and diagnostic networks. Consideration needs to be given to providing adequate time and training to allow for meaningful shared decision-making with patients and there is a strong case in support of a hub-and-spoke model to provide rapid, solid tumour genetic mutational analysis to prevent patients missing out on beneficial treatments. (shrink)

Are species real categories or just conventions? Are species natural kinds? Are teleological statements a distinctive feature of biology? Can life sciences escape from teleology? These are common issues in philosophy of biology. This paper aims to show that in order to answer to each of these questions it is inevitable to take a position respecting the others. Therefore, there is a historical relation between the concept of species and teleological issues. In order to analyse such relation, I will take (...) a historical perspective.After making such historical reconstruction focused on the Aristotle, Linnaeus, Buffon and Lamarck thoughts, I will analyse the Darwinian peculiar view respect teleology and his ideas about species. Although Darwin set out the collapse of teleological essentialisms in biology, there are important vestiges of teleology in his theory. (shrink)

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the (...) physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying the way in which powers work. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its (...) pitfalls. (shrink)

How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on “non-final valuing”—i.e. valuing_ (...) x_ for the sake of something else—I argue that it involves adopting certain reasons on account of a desire for _x_ to contribute to other things. I then show how this contrasts final valuing. The result, I argue, is a plausible account of how the two modes of valuing differ that leaves open substantive views about what all can be valued for its own sake. This is helpful because it develops a popular methodology used to explore the value of a wide range of things, including natural entities, family heirlooms, and artworks, as well as, more broadly, entities that might have “extrinsic final value.”. (shrink)

The final hymn of the Rigveda, 10.191, the last three stanzas of which are dedicated to saṃjñānam ‘unity’, plays in a remarkable way with the preposition/prefix sam(-) ‘with; together’ and the phonetic sequence mā̆n. Some of the words with mā̆n go back to Proto-Indo-European *men ‘think’ (mánas- ‘mind, intellect, thought’, mántra- ‘utterance, spell’, and mantraye ‘I utter an utterance, recite a spell’); others are forms of the adjective samāná- ‘common, the same’. This brief communication shows that the display of phonetic (...) fireworks has analogs in our earliest hymns in Avestan and Greek, in which both reflexes of *men and etymologically unconnected words that have the same pattern of sounds are frequently found in the most “privileged positions”: the beginning and/or end of a section, poem, or entire poetic collection. (shrink)

‘The Final “Thank You”’ uses the work of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche to think the occasion of the 1995 rugby World Cup, hosted by the newly democratic South Africa. This paper deploys Nietzsche's Zarathustra to critique how a figure such as Nelson Mandela is understood as a ‘Superman’ or an ‘Overhuman’ in the moment of political transition. The philosophical focus of the paper, however, turns on the ‘thank yous’ exchanged by the white South African rugby captain, François Pienaar, and (...) the black president at the event of the Springbok victory. It is the value, and the proximity and negation, of the ‘thank yous’ – the relation of one to the other – that constitutes the core of the article.1. (shrink)

In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘_K__3__L__P_’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which _K__3__L__P_ fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of (...) the theory of truth, I raise a cluster of philosophical difficulties for a _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive truth, all variously related to the fact that such a system proves things that would seem already by themselves repugnant, even in the absence of transitivity. At the level of the theory of validity, I consider an extension of the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity that is supposed to certify that validity in that system does not fall short of naive validity, argue that such an extension is untenable in that its nontriviality depends on the inadmissibility of a certain irresistible instance of transitivity (whence the advertised “final cut”) and conclude on this basis that the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity cannot coherently be adopted either. At all these levels, a crucial role is played by certain metaentailments and by the extra strength they afford over the corresponding entailments: on the one hand, such strength derives from considerations that would seem just as compelling in a general nontransitive framework, but, on the other hand, such strength wreaks havoc in the particular setting of _K__3__L__P_. (shrink)

A number of writers argue that objects can be valuable for their own sakes on account of their extrinsic features. No one has offered an account, though, that shows exactly how or why objects have this sort of value. I seek to provide such an account. I suggest that an object can have final value on account of its relation to someone one loves or admires, where it is one’s warranted love or admiration for the person that renders the related (...) object valuable for its own sake. I identify a feature of love and admiration that shows exactly why this is the case. I then end by suggesting how this account locates a reason to value non-intrinsically good things for their own sakes that avoids a “wrong reason” objection facing alternative views. (shrink)

His final set of lectures at the College de France, described here by Thomas Flynn, focused on the concept of truth-telling as a moral virtue in the ancient ...

Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity presents the character of the liberal ironist. An ironist is a person that has pressing and continuing doubts about her “final vocabulary.” A final vocabulary is a set of words that one uses to justify and narrate oneself. An interesting question is why words, and not beliefs, are used by Rorty to characterize someone’s identity. In this paper I take a step back from liberal ironism and focus on the notion of “final vocabulary” (...) and its role on a Rortian picture of moral identity. In order to do this, I explore it alongside concepts from the field of sociolinguistics and from other pragmatist theories of selfhood. I claim that Rorty presents important insights for a pragmatic naturalist conception of our moral identities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:FINALITY AND INTELLIGIBILITY IN BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION ANTONIO MORENO, O.P. Graduate Theological Union Berkeley, California I N SCIENCE AND philosophy the final cause has always..,been controversial. To biologists the problem is complicated, but many believe that it is impossible fo give a complete description of the phenomenon of life without taking into oonsideration the teleological aspect of it. Thus Rensch: A special feature of all living organisms is the (...) fact that biological processes in general appear to be: 'meaningful.' They are not only appropriate to the immediate conditions, but also seem to be directed to some purpose which in individual development is only achievE:d at a relatively late stage and after many modications of form.1 Simpson's approach to this problem is shaped by the conviction that biology should attempt to answer all the questions, one of whioh is the reason for a living being's activity: "Here, ' What for '-the dreadful teleological question-not only is legitimate but also must eventually be asked about every vital phenomenon." 2 To understand how finality is realized in biology, let us first turn briefly to the nature of the final cause. The Nature of the Final CaU8e Aristotle deals with causes in the seeond book of his Physics: It is through the causes that scientific conclusions about mobile heings are demonstrated. Movement is intelligible when we discover the causes that produce it. Among the 1B. Rensch, Biophilosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 107. 2 G. Simpson, Th,is Vi.ew of Life (New York: Ifarcourt, 1964),.pp. 104-108. l ANTONIO MORENO, O.P. causes, the first and most important is the final cause, which is defined as "that for the sake of which a thing is done." 3 The final cause is the motive or reason which impels the agent to operate. Motion is the vehicle by whioh the goal is attained and, consequently, the other causes exercise their causality in dependence on the final cause. Hence, Aquinas says: " The final cause is called the cause of causes, because it is the cause of the causality of all the causes. For it is the cause of the efficient ca:usality; and the efficient cause is the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form.".j, The final cause directs, inclines, and attracts; impelled by this attraction, the efficient pushes and exercises its action. Aquinas asserts that those who reject the final cause destroy the intelligibility of science, inasmuch as they suppress the motive or first reason which justifies motion. The final cause is not the cause that executes the adion, for this is the agent's function, the efficient cause. The final cause is the reason why the agent acts. Therefore, the efficient cause presupposes the final: "The end is not the cause unless it moves the agent to act. If there is no action the final cause does not exist." 5 It is interesting to note that many biologists believe that the existence of finality destroys causality, when actually the opposite is true. For example, Simpson says: " The finalist was often the man who made a liberal use of ignaV'a ratio,... when you failed to explain a, thing by the ordinary process of causality, you could ' explain ' it 1by reference to some purpose of nature." 6 A simple desirn or attraction is not a cause unless it is fol3 Aristotle, Ph&sias (Trans. W. D. Ross) Book II, 3, 194b34. (Oxford, 1962). 4 Thomas Aquinas, In V Metaph., Iect. 3, n. 782. Of. Summa Theol., I, q. 105, a.5. 5 Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952), q.5, a. l. 6 G. Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 274. FINALITY IN BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 3 lowed by the activity of the agent. The desire to attain the goal is called the " intention " of the action, even when the goal is not achieved, as happens in many of our actions. Failure does not destroy finality; inactivity does. For that which is first in the intention is the last to be achieved as the effect. The intention does not... (shrink)

An unauthorized look behind one of the greatest video game franchises of all time, Final Fantasy The Final Fantasy universe is packed with compelling characters and incredible storylines. In this book, you'll take a fascinating look at the deeper issues that Final Fantasy forces players to think about while trying to battle their way to the next level, such as: Does Cloud really exist? Is Kefka really insane? Are Moogles part of a socialist conspiracy? Does the end of the game (...) justify the means? As Mages, Moogles, fiends, and Kefka are mashed together with the likes of Machiavelli, Marx, Foucault, and Kafka, you'll delve into crucial topics such as madness, nihilism, environmental ethics, Shintoism, the purpose of life, and much more. Examines the philosophical issues behind one of the world's oldest and most popular video-game series Offers new perspectives on Final Fantasy characters and themes Gives you a psychological advantage--or at least a philosophical one--against your Final Fantasy enemies Allows you to apply the wisdom of centuries of philosophy to any game in the series, including Final Fantasy XIII Guaranteed to add a new dimension to your understanding of the Final Fantasy universe, this book is the ultimate companion to the ultimate video-game series. (shrink)

Finality suggests an unchangeable conclusion. It also raises the idea of a goal towards which a reality is directed. This is the sense in which one finds the final cause in Aristotle and other philosophers. Nearly everyone feels helpless before finality. This is because it evokes the spectrum of finitude as it appears to occur in the dead. No one in the prime of life and at the peak of health, wealth, pleasure and hopeful optimism actively desires death. (...) Yet like a shadow, the awareness of a possible sudden end stalks at everyone. It is not the most comfortable feeling. This raises a situation where both the idea and the reality of death must be confronted in order to make sense of life. Has it meaning? Is it destined or free floating? How and when will life end or does it even have an absolute termination at all? Is death life’s last unassailable barrier or just a simple demarcation from other forms of conscious existence in some way? Though often never put into words, failure to engage these questions raises conundrum. Attempts to answer them form and inform cultures, nourish customs, create traditions, inspire inventions, and generally stimulate the human spirit. They keep religions alive, engage thinkers, inspire fidelity to cultural roots and symbols and fire up the spirit of research. It is the position of this paper that confronting human finality is at the service of valorizing human life further. It is like an unseen engine that keeps the vehicle alive. Thus, life approaches death while death serves life. It (death) forbids anyone at the level of the intellect, experience and knowledge from making any absolute positive claims regarding the termination of life. Confronting death psychologically, physically and spiritually requires specific perspectives since each man must face it inevitably in his person and each culture and religion must make sense of it in its own way. That is what this study examines. (shrink)

I remember being intrigued by the title of this book years ago, as it is a revised and updated version of an earlier work of Michael Grosso. The title seems to imply that we all have a choice as we are leaving the physical body, the option of expiring into nothingness or moving to a realm beyond the material world. I wondered why one would choose the former, and exactly who is making that choice? By the time one finishes the (...) logical sequence of evidence, history, and theory that unfolds in the book, it becomes clear that the title’s inference is not what some might expect. Grosso believes that there are no final choices. Accepting finality is not logical when one comes to believe that our consciousness survives bodily death, and he believes that physical death is not permanent extinction, but a gateway to more living. The underlying and not so subtle message in the book has not only stood the test of time, but has become more relevant in view of today’s state of affairs. Considering the increasing threat of nuclear obliteration, climatic shifts, world divisiveness and conflict, natural disasters, pollution, famine, mass shootings, drug epidemics, and refugees roaming the planet, are these potential calamities something that could jolt the collective mind into a greater spiritual reality? The author has an interesting theory based upon near death experience research. (shrink)

I praise Metzinger's book _On Being No One_ by calling my essay "Finally Some One" meaning that I am pleased to see a first rate philosopher so carefully reading the neurobiological literature. Especially as it pertains to sleep and dreaming. Metzinger is comprehensive and comprehending. By studying the neurobiological substrates of normal dreaming, lucid dreaming and related altered states of consciousness (such as out of body experiences, hypnosis, and deja' vu), we may gain insight into the general rules governing brain (...) activity in relation to subjective experience. (shrink)

The article examines the role of the Last Judgment in Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy. It argues that the central ontological structure of Agamben’s early thought is that of the perpetually occurring origin. The figure of the perpetual final judgment captures precisely this ontological structure. In order to explicate this figure, the article examines Agamben’s relation to the Heideggerian project of the “destruction of judgment” in two steps. First, it examines the way Agamben turns the methodology of “destruction” into the project of (...) “decreation.” Second, it examines the Agambenian critique of judgment in terms of the perpetually occurring Last Judgment. The essay concludes with a brief examination of the Homo Sacer project and argues that “bare life” should be understood as life lived under this perpetual final judgment. (shrink)

As we know, the whole system of Hegel 's thought is based totally on the self-development process of the Geist. In other words, according to dialectical scheme of neoplatonism which Proclus systematized as a triad, μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή, Hegel says that the Geist remains in himself, comes out from himself, and then returns to himself. With this process of self-development of the Geist, Hegel tries to explain the realities in general such as nature, history, art, religion, and philosophy. This process of the (...) development of the Geist makes a circle mode with the triadic way of an sich - für sich - an und für sich, but itself as the final destination of the Geist after finishing the whole process, is not a mere itself at the beginning, but the completed itself filled with the self-consciousness and freedom in full bloom. The last moment when the Geist returns to itself, Hegel says it is ‘Ruhe in Gott’. This is the final moment which the Geist as reality of the world and the history arrives and also the conclusion of his philosophy. Then, what happens to this final stage of the return of the Geist to itself, and what does it mean? Most of all, Hegel saw that, as the goal of world history is the achievement of self-consciousness of the Geist on its freedom and the realization of the freedom, this goal was achieved in the self-return of the Geist. And he has seen that the finite and the infinite, which showed constant opposition in the history of Western thought, are united here. According to Hegel, the infinite and finite in the bad concept that came out of the intellect(Verstand) are confronted with each other, and existence and non-existence are substantially separated. However, in the true concept of the infinite derived from reason(Vernunft), is formed the unified moment, in which the confrontations of both parties has been resolved and everything had been included in itself. The transcendence that he advocates is not a transmundane transcendence that is separated absolutely from the finite sensory world in existence and then unreachable absolutely, but a ‘right transcendence’ in which the finite and the infinite are really inseparable and remain as moments of the process of the Geist. In his view, the former which Platonism represents in Western philosophy, is an 'empty transcendence,' but the transcendence that he speaks is a 'full transcendence' that encompasses all moments of the finite in itself. The return of the absolute idea to itself means not only the sublation (Aufhebung) of the finite but also the the sublation of the reality, of the other, of the outwardness, of the abandonment of history, and secures the opposites to those such as ideality, self-identity, inwardness, and trans-historicity. Hegel's Geist as returning to itself has self-consciousness recognizing that it negates and rules the world and the history at the same time. In other words, it is honored and then the glorifying of God has been achieved in the consciousness of itself as the Absolute that it has been the only subject and the sole ruler of world history. According to Hegel, this glorifying of God is the most valuable object of the Geist and history. The Geist that has completed the process of self-development in the return to the itself enjoys the serenity, which is not a 'vacant serenity' but a ‘full serenity’ integrating the finite and the infinite into its inner simplicity. Hegel regarded the transition from the other to being self-internal as a transition from necessity to freedom, and in this serenity the Geist enjoys the freedom that it has in its own nature, as possible as it can. That is to say, in this serenity, the Geist becomes absolutely free and became itself, negating and sublating all other-being(Anderssein). In his view, the "Serenity in God," where the Geist becomes itself and its absolute freedom is obtained, is the ultimate goal of the Geist, and the omega point of the history. (shrink)

The Common Rule originally issued in 1991 and last amended in 2005 is scheduled to be replaced on January 19, 2018 by a revised Common Rule. The goal of the revisions is to modernize and improve applicability of the rule to a research landscape that has dramatically changed since 1991. Translating these changes into action will require comprehensive understanding of the final rule and detailed implementation planning by Human Research Protection Programs. This paper presents select changes that require substantial attention; (...) including for example: expansion of the exempt category, changes to continuing review requirements, changes to the informed consent form and the use of single IRBs for domestic multi-site research. In addition, myriad policies, procedures and workflows will have to be developed, drastically rewritten, or just mildly tweaked. (shrink)

O objetivo desse artigo é tentar compreender como se processa a percepção visual, segundo Aristóteles. Para alcançar tal propósito, avançarei a hipótese interpretativa segundo a qual a ocorrência da visão é o resultado de uma ‘duplicidade causal’, na qual estão necessariamente envolvidos tanto fatores materiais, correspondentes à causa material-eficiente, quanto fatores ‘não-materiais’, referentes à causa formal-final. A escolha por privilegiar essa ‘duplicidade causal’ se deve ao fato que a mesma parece estar em perfeita consonância com o hilemorfismo aristotélico, algo que (...) parece ser escamoteado tanto na interpretação ‘literalista’, quanto na ‘espiritualista’. (shrink)

Are we now in a position to give a "final accounting" of Freud's work? Before answering, I should say what this means, or rather what I mean. If we mean a verdict that is certain, in the sense that it could not possibly be overturned by new  ...

본 논문은, 대승불교의 『대승기신론』과 레비나스의 『전체와 무한』이 마음의 오염과 정화의 과정에 대해 얼마나 생산적인 대화를 나눌 수 있는지를 보이려는 목적 아래, 그 마지막 단계인 전자의 구경각究竟覺과 후자의 에로스를 비교 분석한다. 양자의 대화는 쌍방에 호혜적이다. 『전체와 무한』 쪽에서는 종잡기 힘들 만큼 얽히고설킨 에로스 드라마가, 『기신론』의 논리적 도식 덕분에, 그에 상응하는 명료한 분절을 얻었다. 『기신론』 쪽에서는 추상성에 갇혀 있던 구경각의 운동이, 『전체와 무한』의 세세한 연출 덕분에, 일련의 구체적 사건들의 드라마로 생동하게 되었다. 특히 『기신론』에서 수수께끼처럼 남아 있던 시각의 역설이 『전체와 무한』의 드라마를 통해 (...) 명쾌히 해명될 수 있었다. (shrink)

Gerdessen, H. Die einwirkung der willensbetätigung auf die eigenschaften der bezugsvorstellungen.--Ach, N., und Margaritzky, S. Über die sensorische einstellung beim heben von gewichten.--Kohlhagen, F. Über die gefügigkeitsqualität und ihre bedeutung für die kategorie.--Ach, N. Finale qualität (gefügigkeitsqualität) und objektion.

Writing the Final Degree Project is a difficult task for most undergraduate students. This is the case of Computer Engineering, a discipline in which the proper presentation of results is a complex written production activity. The RESULTS section is more complicated than others due to its structure, its communicative purposes and the way to achieve them. While there have been some descriptions of its rhetorical-discursive organization, most have focused on the prototypical organization of only one of the types of TFGs (...) produced in this discipline. Therefore, in this mixed research of descriptive scope, we rhetorically-discursively analyze the RESULTS section of Computer Engineering TFG’s, considering the particularities of the different types of TFG’s existing within the discipline. To this end, using genre analysis, we analyzed 117 RESULTS sections of Computer Engineering Final Degree Project. Among our findings, it is observed that in the section the moves ‘Present preparatory information’, ‘Report results’ and ‘Interpret results’ are prototypically employed. In turn, variations in the rhetorical-discursive organization are established, which are related to the 4 types of TFG that occur in the discipline. We conclude that there are 4 types of TFG in Computer Engineering, which affect the rhetorical-discursive organization of the RESULTS section. At the same time, we argue that attention should be paid to the particularities of the genre and of each section, since due to the different purposes pursued in each of them, the discursive functional units used differ from each other. (shrink)

Convergent scientific realism entails that science will sooner or later arrive at the final theory of the fundamental constituents of matter. At that stage, all fundamental truths about nature will be discovered so that the search for basic principle seems bound to come to a halt. I explore options for a non-convergent scientific realism that allows for sustained progress in basic research. I defend the views that the coherence of non-convergent realism requires an emergence claim and that this claim can (...) be supported. I develop the example of the relation between equivalence classes among biological functions and their physiological realizations. Given strongly emergent laws in the sense elaborated in the paper, progress in basic research may survive the discovery of the laws governing the tinymost parts of matter. (shrink)

(Ak 10:74).[1] During the so-called ‘silent decade’ of the 1770s, when Kant was working on the Critique of Pure Reason, he promised repeatedly not only that he would soon finish that work but also that he would soon publish a “metaphysics of morals” (Ak 10:97, 132, 144).[2] Yet it was not until four years after the first Critique that Kant finally wrote a work on ethics, and even then he merely laid the ground for a metaphysics of morals by identifying (...) and establishing the supreme principle on which a system of duties would be based (G 4:392). Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant once again dealt entirely with foundational questions in moral philosophy. Kantian ethics is primarily known, especially among English-speaking philosophers, through these two ethical works of the 1780s, neither of which contains anything like a ‘metaphysics of morals’. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that sports at their best qualify as final ends, that is, as ends whose value is such that they ground not only the practices whose ends they are, but everything else we do as human agents. The argument I provide to support my thesis is derived from Harry Frankfurt's provocative work on the importance of the things we care about, more specifically, on his claim that it is by virtue of caring about things and practices, (...) really caring about them ? even loving them ? we are able to regard and treat them as final ends. Sports, I claim, are paradigmatic examples of practices cared about and loved in these deep ways, and as such deserve to be considered, rather than dismissed because of their supposed triviality, as one of those ends around which a life most worth living can be legitimately forged. (shrink)

In business schools, there is a persistent myth according to which management education is, and should be, ‘value-free’. This article reflects on the experiences of two business schools from Finland and Australia in which the UN Principles for Responsible Management Education have been pragmatically used as a platform for breaking with this institutionalized guise of positivist value neutrality. This use of PRME makes it possible to create learning environments in which values and value tensions inherent in management education can be (...) explored and exposed. Inspired by Rorty’s understanding of ethics—notably his discussion of ‘final vocabularies’ and ‘moral imagination’—and Flyvbjerg’s reading of phronēsis, the article discusses an approach to learning that helps both teachers and students in exploring and exposing values in management education by problematizing dominant business school vocabularies, thereby leading to moral development, in the Rortian sense. The article presents a number of final vocabularies that business students come to class with, some learning methods used to challenge these vocabularies through discussion of alternative vocabularies, and the new directions for moral imagination that may result. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of (...) F to vary according to the context in which F appears. Given the plausible assumption that there is an intimate tie between final values and appropriate attitudinal responses, it appears that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call ‘location problems’ of final value. I illustrate this problem by discussing alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms of ‘evaluative schizophrenia’. Third, considerations of theoretical economy tell in favour of conditionalism. Thereafter I respond to some recent challenges to conditionalism. An appendix surveys some meritorious implications that conditionalism offers for various substantial versions of such structurally different views about value as monism, pluralism, and particularism. (shrink)

I argue that the Bradley of the 1883 The Principles of Logic marks and separates contents under tension in judgments. The separation comes in attending to content as a device for recuperation of scale. For Bradley that involves scaling material of immediate presentations under limits. As unrealised commitments of so- called real and ideal are an exclusionary condition of singular comprehension, singularity of judgments is mark of singular reflex with privative force; not some singularity in objects taken in episodic correspondence (...) forming distinctively in singular judgment. The distinguishing input, as it were, to judgment forms is via content in some consequential and fact-like limitive facing of the real. I want to approach Bradley in this slightly negative sense as imposing via inversion some sensible restrictions under some conditions of scaling rather than in direct contact with materials to which one stands in some act of obversion, finally. (shrink)

One main quandary that emerges in the context of Immanuel Kant’s moral ideal, The Highest Good, is that on the one hand Kant sets it as a moral demand, that is, as a principle that must be comprehended as an attainable end for man in practice while, on the other hand, it is set as a moral ideal, i.e. as something that cannot be concretized and realized within the empirical world. The main goal of this paper is to argue for (...) the realizability of the moral ideal by means of the principle of reflective judgment as a form of judgment that in fact clarifies human limitation. I assert that the very recognition of this limitation constitutes the possibility for hope in that ideal, or for striving towards it, and that this striving is the only way that the moral ideal can be concretized. I examine man’s recognition of self-limitation as a response to the moral demand to realize the moral ideal and the necessity of the power of imagination for this, used reflectively. Keywords: culture, final end, Highest Good, hope, imagination, Kant, moral ideal reflective judgment, ultimate end. (shrink)

DHHS's rule on the care of imperiled newborns has a symbolic significance for the groups that struggled for compromise, but it will have a minimal impact on medical and moral decision making.

An examination of the evidence for and the theoretical implications of a universal word order constraint, with data from a wide range of languages. This book presents evidence for a universal word order constraint, the Final-over-Final Condition (FOFC), and discusses the theoretical implications of this phenomenon. FOFC is a syntactic condition that disallows structures where a head-initial phrase is contained in a head-final phrase in the same extended projection/domain. The authors argue that FOFC is a linguistic universal, not just a (...) strong tendency, and not a constraint on processing. They discuss the effects of the universal in various domains, including the noun phrase, the adjective phrase, the verb phrase, and the clause. The book draws on data from a wide range of languages, including Hindi, Turkish, Basque, Finnish, Afrikaans, German, Hungarian, French, English, Italian, Romanian, Arabic, Hebrew, Mandarin, Pontic Greek, Bagirmi, Dholuo, and Thai. FOFC, the authors argue, is important because it is the only known example of a word order asymmetry pertaining to the order of heads. As such, it has significant repercussions for theories connecting the narrow syntax to linear order. (shrink)

Theology, or the science of God, has to be distinguished from religion which might be godless, may contain very tittle of science, dogma, or creed, and sometimes consists very largely of the habit, attitude, or even the mode of public or private devotion or ritual.