ABSTRACTJacques Rohault is often considered to be one of the most meticulous followers of Descartes. Despite this, Rohault’s natural philosophy lacks much of the metaphysical bulwark that typifies Cartesian treatises of the seventeenth century. Instead, Rohault’s work, as well as his popular weekly meetings, strongly emphasized rigorous observation and experimentation. Traditionally, this emphasis on experiment over metaphysics is seen as a pragmatic omission to avoid the perils associated with censorship and Cartesian metaphysics. However, I find that the lack of explicit (...) metaphysics has real consequences that play out in the role Rohault assigns to experimentation. To show this, I highlight several areas where he adopts a broad experimental methodology even though Descartes explicitly rejects the relevancy of experiment on metaphysical topics. I place special emphasis Rohault’s extensive experiment on the void. In short, Rohault’s experimentation was designed to prove, through experimental mea... (shrink)

Paper presented in the 3rd edition of Bucharest Colloquium on Early Modern Science.

Summary This paper explores the legacy of the great French experimental physicist Victor Regnault through the example of Gabriel Lippmann, whose engagement with electrical standardization during the early 1880s was guided by Regnault's methodological precept to measure ‘directly’. Lippmann's education reveals that the theoretical practice of ‘direct’ measurement entailed eliminating extraneous physical effects through the experimental design, rather than, like physicists in Britain and Germany, making numerical ‘corrections’ to measured values. It also provides, paradoxically, exemplars of the qualitative (...) theoretical practices that sustained Regnault's misguided ambition to avoid theory. By considering the largely negative reactions to Lippmann's proposals for selecting suitable electrical units and methods of measuring the ohm, this paper associates these theoretical practices with the ineffectual rhetorical strategies employed by Lippmann to promote his work, and thereby indicates that the practice of direct measurement was limited to French experimental physics. Whilst this result aligns readily with the existence of divergent nineteenth century British and German cultures of precision, it emerges from a very different disciplinary context in which the practice of precision electrical measurement developed independently of submarine telegraphy. This is because, as this paper illustrates, telegraphic engineering and experimental physics remained separate professions in France. (shrink)

This Element introduces major issues in the epistemology of experimental physics through discussion of canonical physics experiments and some that have not yet received much philosophical attention. The primary challenge is to make sense of how physicists justify crucial decisions made in the course of empirical research. Judging a result as epistemically significant or as calling for further technical scrutiny of the equipment is one important context of such decisions. Judging whether the instrument has been calibrated, and (...) which data should be included in the analysis are others. To what extent is it possible to offer philosophical analysis, systematization, and prescriptions regarding such decisions? To what extent can there be explicit epistemic justification for them? The primary aim of this Element is to show how a nuanced understanding of science in practice informs an epistemology of experimental physics that avoids strong social constructivism. (shrink)

This provocative and critical work addresses the question of why scientific realists and positivists consider experimental physics to be a natural and empirical science. Taking insights from contemporary science studies, continental philosophy, and the history of physics, this book describes and analyzes the metaphysical presuppositions that underwrite the technological use of experimental apparatus and instruments to explore, model, and understand nature.

Academic careers in French science during the mid-nineteenth century were made within the Université de France, an integrated state system of secondary and higher education controlled by a centralized Parisian educational administration. Among the most respected members of thecorps universitairewere Charles d'Almeida and Pierre Bertin, two historically obscurephysicienswhose significance derives from their substantial contributions to the social organization, teaching and communication of French experimental physics. This two-part comparative biography uses their entwined careers to make a case for the (...) emergence of a discipline of French experimental physics from the corps during the tumultuous politico-cultural transition from the Second Empire to the Third Republic. Of fundamental importance are disciplinary regimes of teaching and inspection within the corps, the foundation of the Société française de physique and theJournal de physique, and the diversification of the traditional pedagogical role of the Ecole normale supérieure, which, from around 1860, began to offer a career pathway for aspiring scientific researchers. Having established in this paper the socio-institutional mechanisms for the stabilization of a distinct field, in part two I characterize the epistemological–methodological aspects of French experimental physics. (shrink)

Eva von Bahr (1874–1962) got her doctorate in experimental physics at the Physics Institute at Uppsala University in 1908. Subsequently she became the first woman assistant professor in physics in Sweden. In the face of many obstacles, she worked as a physicist for six years in Uppsala and Berlin. In 1914 she took a position as a school teacher. This article explores von Bahr’s trajectory through academic experimental physics. It is argued that network connections (...) with male scientists enabled her work. Her associations were a mix between institutional relationships and informal connections, resulting in what is labeled a ‘hybrid of connections’. Furthermore it is argued that von Bahr became an ‘outsider within’ in academic experimental physics. Her connections created openings, but these coexisted with hindrances. It is argued that von Bahr oscillated between being an insider and an outsider which created a fractured identity. Her position and identity was a mix between membership and non-membership. Through examining von Bahr’s career this article aims to bring together historical research on women in science and theoretical work in science studies. Furthermore, the article argues the analytical value of feminist perspectives on scientific collaborations as a way to a deeper understanding of the network structures of science. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to argue against Karl Rogers's attacks on realism in physics. Rogers argues that electrons do not exist independently of the relevant socio-technological process, but I show that such an assumption would make our best scientific theories incomprehensible. While the paper supports Rogers's attempts to refute positivism, it demonstrates that his own position is positivistic, and it corrects his overemphasis on the roles of technology and the experimenter. Rogers assumes that the founders of (...) modern science were simply mechanists, but I show how they were actually Platonic realists. Contrary to Rogers, realist faith in the fundamental unifying power of the laws of physics is shown to be reasonable, and any denial of this belief would imply that science is impossible. (shrink)

This paper characterizes José Celestino Mutis’ (1732–1808) appropriation of Newton in the Viceroyalty of New Granada. First, we examine critically traditional accounts of Mutis’ works highlighting, on the one hand, their inadequacy for directing their claims toward the nineteenth-century independence from Spain and, on the other, for not differentiating between Newtonianism and Enlightenment. Next, we portray Mutis’ complex Newtonianism from his own statements and from printed sources, including a variety of works and translations from British, Dutch, and French authors, in (...) addition to a wide range of Newton’s writings, unusual for an eighteenth-century reader in the Americas. Finally, we analyze a salient claim of Mutis’ Newtonianism in order to depict his appropriation and transformation of Newton’s ideas: the characterization of Newtonian experimental physics as a useful science. In so doing, Mutis further developed metaphysical and methodological positions not present in Newton’s works. (shrink)

In the popular literature of physics the electromagnetic field isoften treated as though it has an intrinsic particle nature. When thetheory is examined carefully, quantum theory only makes the weakerrequirement that the emission and absorption of light are restricted todiscrete amounts of energy. There are very few realizable experiments inoptics for which the classical Maxwell theory and the quantum theorymake a different prediction. I discuss some of these experiments with anemphasis on the distinction between what the experiments tell us (...) aboutthe measurement process, and what they tell us about the nature of thelight field. (shrink)

This essay seeks to illuminate the changing nature of experimental physics in the 1860s and 1870s by analysing the creation of dust tubes and dust figures by the German experimentalist August Kundt, and by showing how Kundt and his associate Emil Warburg used the ‘Kundt tube’ to test the new kinetic theory of gases. In so doing, the essay seeks to show how Kundt came to revise the vision of experimental physics that he had learned from (...) his teacher Heinrich Gustav Magnus, a vision in which the experimentalist's goal was to establish ‘the facts’. Kundt, by contrast, came to envision experimental physics as being in the service of theory: to confirm or disconfirm theory, or to provide theorists with new phenomena to theorize about. Kundt's vision, it is argued, is emblematic of the changing nature of experimental physics and reflective of the rise of the new subdisciplines of theoretical and experimental physics. (shrink)

The question of when to stop an unsuccessful experiment can be difficult to answer from an individual perspective. To help to guide these decisions, we turn to the social epistemology of science and investigate knowledge inquisition within a group. We focused on the expensive and lengthy experiments in high energy physics, which were suitable for citation-based analysis because of the relatively quick and reliable consensus about the importance of results in the field. In particular, we tested whether the time (...) spent on a scientific project correlates with the project output. Our results are based on data from the high energy physics laboratory Fermilab. They point out that there is an epistemic saturation point in experimenting, after which the likelihood of obtaining major results drops. With time the number of less significant publications does increase, but highly cited ones do not get published. Since many projects continue to run after the epistemic saturation point, it becomes clearer that decisions made about continuing them are not always rational. (shrink)

The success of particle detection in high energy physics colliders critically depends on the criteria for selecting a small number of interactions from an overwhelming number that occur in the detector. It also depends on the selection of the exact data to be analyzed and the techniques of analysis. The introduction of automation into the detection process has traded the direct involvement of the physicist at each stage of selection and analysis for the efficient handling of vast amounts of (...) data. This tradeoff, in combination with the organizational changes in laboratories of increasing size and complexity, has resulted in automated and semi-automated systems of detection. Various aspects of the semi-automated regime were greatly diminished in more generic automated systems, but turned out to be essential to a number of surprising discoveries of anomalous processes that led to theoretical breakthroughs, notably the establishment of the Standard Model of particle physics. The automated systems are much more efficient in confirming specific hypothesis in narrow energy domains than in performing broad exploratory searches. Thus, in the main, detection processes relying excessively on automation are more likely to miss potential anomalies and impede potential theoretical advances. I suggest that putting substantially more effort into the study of electron–positron colliders and increasing its funding could minimize the likelihood of missing potential anomalies, because detection in such an environment can be handled by the semi-automated regime—unlike detection in hadron colliders. Despite virtually unavoidable excessive reliance on automated detection in hadron colliders, their development has been deemed a priority because they can operate at currently highest energy levels. I suggest, however, that a focus on collisions at the highest achievable energy levels diverts funds from searches for potential anomalies overlooked due to tradeoffs at the previous energy thresholds. I also note that even in the same collision environment, different research strategies will opt for different tradeoffs and thus achieve different experimental outcomes. Finally, I briefly discuss current searches for anomalous process in the context of the previous analysis. (shrink)

This chapter presents the different purposes of observation and experiment in physics using examples that allow us to grasp the historical transformations linked to the development of instrumentation. We cover both the observational and experimental aspects of this discipline, which range from astronomy and astrophysics to nuclear and particle physics, including optics and solid-state physics.

From the very beginning it was realised that quantum physics involves radically new interpretative and epistemological consequences. While hitherto there has been no satisfactory philosophical analysis of these consequences, recent years have witnessed the accomplishment of many experiments to test the foundations of quantum physics, opening up vistas to a completely novel technology: quantum technology. The contributions in the present volume review the interpretative situation, analyze recent fundamental experiments, and discuss the implications of possible future technological applications. Readership: (...) Analytic philosophers (logical empiricists), scientists (especially physicists), historians of logic, mathematics and physics, philosophers of science, and advanced students and researchers in these fields. Can be used for seminars on theoretical and experimental physics and philosophy of science, and as supplementary reading at advanced undergraduate and graduate levels. (shrink)

This article examines the role of experimental generalizations and physical laws in neuroscientific explanations, using Hodgkin and Huxley’s electrophysiological model from 1952 as a test case. I show that the fact that the model was partly fitted to experimental data did not affect its explanatory status, nor did the false mechanistic assumptions made by Hodgkin and Huxley. The model satisfies two important criteria of explanatory status: it contains invariant generalizations and it is modular (both in James Woodward’s sense). (...) Further, I argue that there is a sense in which the explanatory heteronomy thesis holds true for this case. †To contact the author, please write to: SNF‐Professorship for Philosophy of Science, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 21, 4003 Basel, Switzerland; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The aim of this research is focused on analyzing the alteration of the psychophysiological and cognitive response to an objective computerized stress test, when the behavioral response is controlled. The sample used was sports science students, with a mean age of 22.82 A quasi-experimental design was used in which the response of each participant to the DT test was evaluated. The variable “number of hours of physical activity per week” and the variable “level of behavioral response to stress” were (...) controlled. Before and after this test, the following parameters were measured: activation and central fatigue, and perceived exertion. Significant differences were found in all of the measures indicated. The usefulness of this protocol and the measures used to analyze the stress response capacity of the study subjects are discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.1 (2001) 99-119 [Access article in PDF] Animism and Empiricism: Copernican Physics and the Origins of William Gilbert's Experimental Method John Henry In the second year of this journal's run, way back in 1941, appeared Edgar Zilsel's classic and still widely cited paper on The Origins of William Gilbert's Experimental Method. 1 Focusing on Gilbert's De magnete of 1600, undoubtedly (...) a seminal text in the history of the experimental method, 2 Zilsel argued that Gilbert borrowed his methodology from elite craftsmen, artisans, and other manual workers involved in mining, smelting, smithing, compass making, navigation, sailing, and other activities which involved working with iron or with magnets. 3 On its appearance the paper contributed to a growing and still continuing debate in the history of science about the relative importance of scholars and craftsmen in the origins of modern science. Although Zilsel's general thesis has been critically evaluated in terms of that wider debate, 4 his very specific claims about the [End Page 99] role of elite craftsmen in providing Gilbert with a ready-made experimental method, have never been properly considered. This paper attempts to reassess Zilsel's claims about the origin of Gilbert's experimental method and, in so doing, to arrive at a richer understanding of what Gilbert was trying to do in De magnete and to suggest an alternative source for his experimentalism.The first thing to note about Zilsel's argument is that it had two strands. 5 One of these pointed to actual experimental techniques used by Gilbert and showed that they can all be found in earlier writings on magnets. To be more specific, the techniques in question are to be found either in the thirteenth-century "Letter on the Magnet" written by Petrus Pergrinus or Pierre de Maricourt, first published in 1558, or in The Newe Attractive, a work on the magnetic compass written by a retired mariner, Robert Norman, first published in 1581 but reprinted three times before 1600. 6 The second strand did not involve experiments at all, with one notable exception, but simply implied or suggested that Gilbert's experimental techniques must have been inspired by miners and foundrymen, or navigators and instrument makers. The problem here, as others have objected, 7 is that it is by no means clear that elite craftsmen were engaged in performing experiments in anything like the sense of the word required for the argument to cut any ice. For Zilsel, however, "we cannot doubt that many of [the miners and foundrymen of the period], stimulated to improvements by economic competition, were wont to try new techniques and to observe natural processes." 8 A few sentences later we are told that it is "obvious" that "among such manual labourers there were experimentalists, though experimentalists with practical aims only and without theoretical knowledge." 9 [End Page 100]The philosopher of science at this point might legitimately want to suggest that an experiment is not an experiment unless it is testing a theory, but we do not have to enter into such arguable niceties. 10 We can see that there is something profoundly tendentious in Zilsel's claims simply by reading on. At this point Zilsel mentioned the only experiment specifically referred to in this strand of his argumentation. Quoting Gilbert, Zilsel showed that Gilbert himself must have descended into a mine in order, as Zilsel says, "to verify the hypothesis" that the polarity of a magnet derives from the polarity of the earth: We had a twenty pounds' heavy loadstone dug and hauled out after having first observed and marked its ends in its vein. Then we put the stone in a wooden tub on water, so that it could turn freely. Immediately the surface which had looked to the North in the mine turned itself to the North on the water. 11Zilsel did not make the absurd claim that Gilbert must have seen miners doing this kind of experiment, but he did all he could to... (shrink)

The issue of scientific realism is discussed in terms of the specific details of the practice of experimental meson and baryon spectroscopy in the field of High-Energy Physics (HEP), during the period from 1966 to 1970. The philosophical positions of I. Hacking, A. Fine, J. Leplin, and N. Rescher that concern scientific realism are presented in such a manner as to allow for the evaluation of their appropriateness in the description of this experimental research field. This philosophical (...) analysis focuses on the empirical adequacy of these four philosophical models that purport to describe the process of acquiring knowledge of the physical world. In this specific case, an experiment performed by the HEP research group at the University of Notre Dame to study the scattering interaction. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the issue of to what extent the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation describes scientific practice. I rely on a time period from the history of High Energy Physics (HEP), which spans from early 1960s to early 1970s. I argue that theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE), which grounds theory-dominated conception of experimentation is too coarse-grained inasmuch as it prevents us from seeing the correct relationship that exists between theorizing and experimenting in the scientific practice of HEP. (...) I articulate that in order to be able to get a better understanding of scientific practice, a revision needs to be made in the general conception of TLE. I propose that such a revision is possible if we abandon the commitment that experimentation is always driven by theory. I consider what I call “theory-drivenness” of experimentation (TDE) as a form of theory-ladenness, which amounts to the claim that experiments, from their initial design up to their final stage, are carried out under the framework of a prevailing theory for the purpose of providing definite answers to specific questions already posed by the same theory. I argue that electron-proton inelastic scattering experiments in HEP were firstly carried out without having any recourse to a phenomenological model. From here, I claim that these experiments are not theory-laden in the sense implied by TDE. On the other hand, I argue, inelastic scattering experiments are theory-laden due to the fact that the scientists who perform them are committed to background theories of HEP. That is, I admit the validity of TLE as a philosophical claim, but I attribute a weaker status to it as opposed to its general conception. That is, I propose to differentiate TDE from TLE by claiming that TLE does not entail TDE. (shrink)

This article aims at reducing the gap between mathematics and physics from a Wittgensteinian point of view. This gap is usually characterized by two discriminating features. The propositions of physics assert something which might be false; they have a hypothetical character. On the contrary, since mathematical propositions are rules that condition the form of assertions, they remain immune from falsification. The propositions of physics refer to facts that may confirm or refute them. On the contrary, since mathematical (...) propositions have no meaning independently of the demonstration procedures, it cannot be said that they refer to “facts” that pre-exist demonstrations. If we take a closer look, however, these two differences fade away. On the one hand, the propositions of physics are more resistant to experimental tests than has been said in the wake of logical positivism. On the other hand, the “factual” empirical material is defined and co-constituted by instruments whose arrangement is determined by the theory to be tested. I conclude by discussing the possibility of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of contemporary physics. (shrink)

The Society for the Advancement of the Scientific World Conception has done me a great honor by inviting me to be the Sixth Vienna Circle Lecturer. The invitation has also stirred some deep emotions. A central figure of the Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, was my revered teacher of philosophy at the University of Chicago in 1948–9 and later an informal adviser when I wrote a doctoral thesis at Yale University on inductive logic, and he was a friend during those years (...) and thereafter. I was not a disciple, but Carnap did not demand discipleship as a condition for admission to his seminars or to his friendship. He seemed to be baffled by the fact that despite my interest in mathematical logic and theoretical physics I proclaimed myself a metaphysicician and had even published an article in the first issue of The Review of Metaphysics. Carnap formulated a “principle of tolerance” as a philosophical maxim concerning rules of language, but he practiced a human and highly moral version of the principle of tolerance in his profoundly liberal social commitments and in his relations with his students. If he were here tonight, I would wish for his tolerance of the lapses of rigor and the flights of speculation to which he would be exposed. (shrink)

The time-dependent Schrödinger equation has been derived from three assumptions within the domain of classical and stochastic mechanics. The continuity equation isnot used in deriving the basic equations of the stochastic theory as in the literature. They are obtained by representing Newton's second law in a time-inversion consistent equation. Integrating the latter, we obtain the stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The Schrödinger equation is a result of a transformation of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation and linearization by assigning the arbitrary constant ħ=2mD. An experiment (...) is proposed to determine ħ and to test a hypothesis of the theory directly. A mathematical apparatus is formulated from the Jacobian formalism to derive physical parameters from ψ(x, t) and to obtain operators for the boundary cases of the theory. The operator formalisms are compared by means of a well-known solution in the quantum theory. (shrink)

The Addendum of this note presents a brief perspective and an additional development pertaining to a previous paper. The even forceK n as well as the odd forceK 0 of the time-inversion-covariant (TIC) equation of motion in the presence of a magnetic field are derived from the results of the previous paper by a hint of generalization in classical physics. Then, by following identical steps as in the previous paper, the Addendum completes the derivation of the stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi and (...) the Schrödinger equations in the electromagnetic field. The Erratum of our note points out minor typographical errors plus one clarification of a definition. (shrink)

Vesely (experimental physics, U. of Vienna, Austria) provides the basic numerical and computational techniques, followed by an explanation of specific problems of computational physics. Appendices address properties of computing machines and an outline of the technique of Fast Fourier Transformation. The first edition, published by Plenum Press, Ne.

In the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation, all relations of theory and experiment are taken on a par; namely, that experiments are performed solely to ascertain the conclusions of scientific theories. As a result, different aspects of experimentation and of the relation of theory to experiment remain undifferentiated. This in turn fosters a notion of theory-ladenness of experimentation that is too coarse-grained to accurately describe the relations of theory and experiment in scientific practice. By contrast, in this article, I suggest (...) that TLE should be understood as an umbrella concept that has different senses. To this end, I introduce a three-fold distinction among the theories of high-energy particle physics as background theories, model theories and phenomenological models. Drawing on this categorization, I contrast two types of experimentation, namely, “theory-driven” and “exploratory” experiments, and I distinguish between the “weak” and “strong” senses of TLE in the context of scattering experiments from the history of HEP. This distinction enables to identify the exploratory character of the deep-inelastic electron-proton scattering experiments—performed at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center between the years 1967 and 1973—thereby shedding light on a crucial phase of the history of HEP, namely, the discovery of “scaling”, which was the decisive step towards the construction of quantum chromo-dynamics as a gauge theory of strong interactions. (shrink)

ArgumentIn the theory-dominated view of scientific experimentation, all relations of theory and experiment are taken on a par; namely, that experiments are performed solely to ascertain the conclusions of scientific theories. As a result, different aspects of experimentation and of the relations of theory to experiment remain undifferentiated. This in turn fosters a notion of theory-ladenness of experimentation (TLE) that is toocoarse-grainedto accurately describe the relations of theory and experiment in scientific practice. By contrast, in this article, I suggest that (...) TLE should be understood as anumbrella conceptthat has different senses. To this end, I introduce a three-fold distinction among the theories of high-energy particle physics (HEP) as background theories, model theories, and phenomenological models. Drawing on this categorization, I contrast two types of experimentation, namely, “theory-driven” and “exploratory” experiments, and I distinguish between the “weak” and “strong” senses of TLE in the context of scattering experiments from the history of HEP. This distinction enables identifying the exploratory character of the deep-inelastic electron-proton scattering experiments – performed at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) between the years 1967 and 1973 – thereby shedding light on a crucial phase of the history of HEP, namely, the discovery of “scaling,” which was the decisive step towards the construction of quantum chromo-dynamics as a gauge theory of strong interactions. (shrink)

Experimental modeling in biology involves the use of living organisms (not necessarily so-called "model organisms") in order to model or simulate biological processes. I argue here that experimental modeling is a bona fide form of scientific modeling that plays an epistemic role that is distinct from that of ordinary biological experiments. What distinguishes them from ordinary experiments is that they use what I call "in vivo representations" where one kind of causal process is used to stand in for (...) a physically different kind of process. I discuss the advantages of this approach in the context of evolutionary biology. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy of science. We examine variability in the philosophical views of scientists. Using data from Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, we analyze scientists’ responses to prompts on philosophical issues (methodology, confirmation, values, reality, reductionism, and motivation for scientific research) to assess variance in the philosophical views of physical scientists, life scientists, and social and behavioral scientists. We find six prompts about which differences arose, with several more that look promising for future research. (...) We then evaluate the difference between the natural and social sciences and the challenge of interdisciplinary integration across scientific branches. (shrink)

This book is the first volume of a projected three volume work on the philosophy of science. It is devoted to the task of describing the experimental method of discovery as practiced in the physical sciences. In the Introduction, the work is referred to as a handbook and is designed apparently as the first stage in the construction of a theory of scientific investigation. Feibleman breaks down the process of discovery into six more or less distinct stages: observation, induction, (...) hypothesis, experiment, calculation, and prediction and control. Apart from the introduction and a concluding chapter which attempts to classify different kinds of results in the physical sciences, one chapter is devoted to each stage. The contention is that each successive stage, except the last, can be seen to emerge logically from the preceding stage. The book is extremely comprehensive in scope and contains a great deal of information about a wide range of aspects of scientific discovery. This is both a positive and a negative feature. Because of its comprehensiveness, many topics deserving closer examination are passed over quickly, and the various categories and stages which Feibleman employs often seem more or less arbitrary. There are important omissions. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Scheffler receive no mention. One finds oneself asking: what is the point of it all? Feibleman suggests one aim is to synthesize and abstract the method of the physical sciences in order to enhance its deployment in the social sciences. Another aim seems to be to provide some logical or theoretical justification of the procedures of the physical sciences. With respect to this last point, the descriptive classification of this volume is only a beginning. Whether it succeeds or fails must await the subsequent volumes.—M. B. (shrink)

Mandel and Pfleegor have shown the existence of interference effects produced by the superposition of two independent single-mode lasers even under conditions in which one photon is absorbed before the next is emitted by one or the other source. We propose here a modification of their experiment which would establish (if the interferences persist) the simultaneous existence of waves and particles (photons), a result which is assumed as basis by the stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Evidence that led to the hypothesis of a backwards referral of conscious sensory experiences in time, and the experimental tests of its predictions, is summarized. Criticisms of the data and the conclusion by Churchland that this hypothesis is untenable are analysed and found to be based upon misconceptions and faulty evaluations of facts and theory. Subjective referral in time violates no neurophysiological principles or data and is compatible with the theory of "mental" and "physical" correspondence.

This book explores the tradition of the 'science of man' in French medicine of the era 1750-1850, focusing on controversies about the nature of the 'physical-moral' relation and their effects on the role of medicine in French society. Its chief purpose is to recover the history of a holistic tradition in French medicine that has been neglected because it lay outside the mainstream themes of modern medicine, which include experimental, reductionist, and localistic conceptions of health and disease. Professor Williams (...) also challenges existing historiography, which argues that the 'anthropological' approach to medicine was a short-term by-product of the leftist politics of the French Revolution. This work argues instead that the medical science of man long outlived the Revolution, that it spanned traditional ideological divisions, and that it reflected the shared aim of French physicians, whatever their politics, to claim broad cultural authority in French society. (shrink)

This book takes a novel approach by highlighting comparative and long-term historical perspectives on experimental practice. The juxtaposition of accounts of natural, social, and medical experimentation is very enlightening, especially because the authors put the emphasis on the different kinds of objects of experimentation (physical matter, chemical reagents, social groups, organizations, sick individuals, archeological remains) and demonstrate how much the kinds of objects matter for the practice of experimentation, its methods, tools, and methodologies. Taken together, the chapters raise several (...) fascinating questions for further study: What do these different approaches have in common? Why do we call them “experimentation”? What are the intersections among the fields and their developments? The volume engages philosophical approaches that are not well known to Anglophone readers (Bachelard, Bergson, Bernard, Canguilhem, among others) and brings to attention a wealth of Francophone secondary literature on past and present scientific experimentation. The collection fills a yawning gap in science, science studies, and philosophy of science teaching, making it particularly valuable philosophers and historians of science in all subfields. (shrink)

The graphical presentation of experimental data in the physical sciences has several advantages which today are too familiar to require very detailed enumeration. Its greatest strength lies in the clarity and succinctness with which it displays the information contained in tabulated results: for the experimenter a graph provides a rough and immediate check on the accuracy and suitability of the methods he is using, and for the reader of a scientific report it may convey in a few seconds information (...) that could only be gleaned from a table of measurements by hours of close study. There are occasions whereonlythe analysis of experimental graphs will provide the information we require, but usually the actual analysis of results is carried out nowadays by computational methods. The use of graphs is therefore not so much a necessary part of scientific procedure as an extremely useful one, and one that is often taken very much for granted. (shrink)