In this study, we examine how top management teams' foreign experience affects firms' green innovation performance and what role environmental regulation plays in their association. Using a large data set on firms' green patents and foreign work or education experience of top management teams from China, we find robust evidence that firms whose top management team members have foreign experience achieve significantly more green patents, and this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms subject to strong environmental regulation. Our findings (...) indicate that via enhancing firms' green innovation performance, top management teams' foreign experience has a positive corporate governance effect on advancing sustainable social development, and environmental regulation is helpful to promote this effect. (shrink)

Built on the integrated theoretical framework of antecedents of flow and expectation confirmation model, this research investigates the way flow experience drives the online students’ intention to engage in online English teaching platforms. This study focused on the online students engaged in online English learning platforms in Taiwan. A total of 500 online students were selected. An online survey was conducted with the help of a marketing research agency located in Taiwan. According to the results, the online students’ flow experience (...) was found to be in a significant relationship with continuous intention. The antecedents, including perceived enjoyment, challenge, and situational involvement, were found to be in a positive relationship with flow experience; however, confirmation and perceived vividness did not have significant effects on the flow. Furthermore, flow and confirmation were found to be in a significant relationship with perceived usefulness and satisfaction. Moreover, perceived usefulness was found to be in a significant relationship with satisfaction and continuous intention. Lastly, satisfaction was found to be in a significant relationship with continuous intention. Finally, the questions proposed in this research with their empirical findings offer profound understanding for establishing a well-devised online English learning platform that can motivate online learning. These results and managerial implications for online English language platforms are innovative and significant in practice. (shrink)

Experience value is positively associated with user voice toward social media, but existing research lacks an examination of its mechanisms of action. Based on value co-creation theory, this paper explores the relationship between experience value and customer voice, and explains the specific influence mechanism through the mediating role of user loyalty. The results of the empirical tests show that social value, entertainment value and information value have significant effects on user loyalty; user loyalty has a significant effect on promotive voice (...) but not on prohibitive voice; user loyalty mediates the relationship between body social value, entertainment value, information value and promotive voice. The findings of this research reveal the important role of experience value on customer voice, which is an important guide for social media to achieve sustainable development. (shrink)

In the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this paper provides a detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, as (...) well as its incompatibility with physicalism, is to be understood. (shrink)

This chapter explores whether and when experience can be evidence. It argues that experiences can be evidence, and that this claim is compatible with just about any epistemological theory. It evaluates the most promising argument for the conclusion that certain experiences (e.g., seeming to see) are always evidence for believing what the experiences represent. While the argument is very promising, one premise needs further defense. The argument also depends on a certain connection between reasonable belief and the first person perspective.

This is the most systematic, the most radical, and the most lucid treatise on freedom that has been written in contemporary Continental philosophy. Finding its guiding motives in Kant's second Critique and working its way up to and beyond Heidegger and Adorno, this book marks the most advanced position in the thinking of freedom that has been proposed after Sartre and Levinas. If we do not think being itself as a freedom, we are condemned to think of freedom as a (...) pure 'idea' or 'right', and being-in-the-world, in turn, as a blind and obtuse necessity. Since Kant, philosophy and our world have relentlessly confronted this schism. To combat this renunciation of freedom, one must think the experience of freedom in thought itself: what it is that, simply in order for there to be thinking, must partake of freedom. (shrink)

I develop a theory of what we mean by the 'look' sentences that we use to describe our visual experiences, and on that basis develop a new adverbial theory of what it is to have a visual experience with a certain character.

: I’m going to generalize the points that L.A. Paul makes in her Transformative Experience and push them in a somewhat different direction. I will begin by talking about transformative experience in a generic sense and say how ubiquitous it is. Then I’ll distinguish that from the strict, specialized sense of transformative experience that Paul identifies. I will say why Paul’s focus on the strict and specialized sense allows her to arrive at a strong conclusion, but bypasses the more interesting (...) lessons which concern the importance of de se imagination and the possibilities for educating it. Keywords: Transformative Experience; Laurie A. Paul; Imagination; Decision Esperienza, trasformazione, immaginazione Riassunto: Intendo generalizzare le questioni sollevate da L.A. Paul nel suo Trasformative Experience, spingendole in una direzione differente. Inizierò parlando dell’esperienza trasformativa in senso generico, illustrando quanto questa sia diffusa. Quindi distinguerò questo senso generico di esperienza trasformativa da quello più ristretto identificato da Paul. Illustrerò poi le ragioni per cui la messa a fuoco di questo senso ristretto e specifico da parte di Paul le consente di giungere a conclusioni forti, evitando però i compiti più interessanti che riguardano l’importanza dell’immaginazione de se e le possibilità di educarla. Parole chiave: Esperienza trasformativa; Laurie A. Paul; Immaginazione; Decisione. (shrink)

Among the exciting prospects raised by advocates of predictive processing [PP] is the offer of a systematic description of our neural activity suitable for drawing explanatory bridges to the structure of conscious experience. Yet the gulf to cross seems wide. For, as critics of PP have argued, our visual experience certainly doesn’t seem probabilistic.While Clark proposes a means to make PP compatible with the experience of a determinate world, I argue that we should not rush to do so. Two notions (...) of determinacy are conflated in the claim that perception is determinate: ‘univocality’ and ‘full detail’. The former, as Clark argues, is only to be expected in any PP agent that models its world for the purpose of acting on it. But as Husserl argued, and as perceptual psychology has borne out, we significantly overestimate the degree of detail with which we perceive a univocal world.This second form of indeterminacy is due not to the probabilistic nature of PP’s model, but rather to its hierarchical structure, with increasingly coarse-grained representations as we move further from the sensory periphery. A PP system may, or may not, deliver a univocal hypothesis at each of these levels. An action-oriented PP system would only be expected to do so only at the level needed for successful action guidance. A naïve reporter’s overestimation of the degree of determinate detail in their visual experience can thereby be accounted for with a more gradual version of the ‘refrigerator light’ effect: we experience determinate details just to the degree that they’re needed – immediately as they’re needed. (shrink)

In this chapter I analyze the concept of self-consciousness in order to uncover its conceptual structure. The conclusions of this analysis describe some of the necessary categories of conscious experience. The concept of the self, the concept of consciousness, the concept of objectivity, the temporal distinctions between past, present, and future, and finally the idea of natural regularities, are found to be necessary categories for conscious experience, and hence describe the fundamental cognitive structure of self-conscious beings.

Problems and questions originally raised by Robert Nozick in his famous thought experiment ‘The Experience Machine’ are frequently invoked in the current discourse concerning virtual worlds. Having conceptualized his Gedankenexperiment in the early seventies, Nozick could not fully anticipate the numerous and profound ways in which the diffusion of computer simulations and video games came to affect the Western world. -/- This article does not articulate whether or not the virtual worlds of video games, digital simulations, and virtual technologies currently (...) actualize (or will actualize) Nozick’s thought experiment. Instead, it proposes a philosophical reflection that focuses on human experiences in the upcoming age of their ‘technical reproducibility’. -/- In pursuing that objective, this article integrates and supplements some of the interrogatives proposed in Robert Nozick’s thought experiment. More specifically, through the lenses of existentialism and philosophy of technology, this article tackles the technical and cultural heritage of virtual reality, and unpacks its potential to function as a tool for self-discovery and self-construction. Ultimately, it provides an interpretation of virtual technologies as novel existential domains. Virtual worlds will not be understood as the contexts where human beings can find completion and satisfaction, but rather as instruments that enable us to embrace ourselves and negotiate with various aspects of our (individual as well as collective) existence in previously-unexperienced guises. (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 롤플레잉게임이라는 가상세계에 대해 인도 이원론의 관점에서 이해하고자 하는 것이다. 인도 이원론은 순수정신인 푸루샤와 순수물질인 프라크리티라는 두 원리를 완전히 다른 영역으로 분리하고 이 둘은 절대 혼합될 수 없다고 하면서도 푸루샤는 붓디라는 물질을 매개로 물질세계를 경험할 수 있다고 설명한다. 이러한 이론은 컴퓨터 속 가상세계와 현상적 물질세계가 완전히 다름에도 불구하고 현실세계의 인간이 가상세계의 게임캐릭터를 경험하는 것과 유사하다고 보인다. 현실세계의 게임 플레이어는 캐릭터에게 지성을 조명하는 푸루샤이자 직접 인식과 판단을 행하는 붓디이다. 플레이어는 캐릭터에게 지성을 부여하고 그 행위 결과를 감수한다. 그리고 그는 이 (...) 모든 작용과 상관없는 현실세계의 주체이지만, 게임을 하는 동안에는 자신과 동일시된 캐릭터의 기쁨과 분노, 슬픔을 향수한다. (shrink)

This paper proposes that pictorial experience, the experience that pictures give rise to when we understand them, involves the non-veridical experience of seeing the picture's subject matter. Using phenomenological analysis and material from philosophy of mind and perceptual psychology, it argues that both pictorial experience lacking awareness of the picture surface, such as illusion, and pictorial experience that includes this awareness, i.e. seeing-in, should be understood in this way.

The main question that we address in this chapter is what to say about reportedly libertarian experiences of free agency – in other words, experiences of options as being open, and up to oneself to decide among, such that, if they are accurate or veridical, then (at a minimum) indeterminism must be true. A great deal rides on this question. If normal experiences of free agency are libertarian, and if compatibilists cannot explain them away, then all of us may be (...) under systematic illusion at almost every moment of our waking lives. That is, our experiences would be illusory if humans do not in fact satisfy libertarian conditions (e.g., if indeterminism does not occur in the right time or place during decision-making, or we lack agent-causal powers). In some sense, more rides on the question of whether we are agents of the sort that we experience ourselves as being than on the question of whether we have the type of control required for moral responsibility. At worst, we are not responsible in only one sense if we lack what libertarians say we need. Yet even then, we would not be under systematic experiential illusion during most of our waking lives, as we are if our experience is libertarian, yet false. (shrink)

In _The Analyst’s Experience of the Depressive Position: The Melancholic Errand of Psychoanalysis_, Steven Cooper explores a subject matter previously applied more exclusively to patients, but rarely to psychoanalysts. Cooper probes the analyst’s experience of the depressive position in the analytic situation. These experiences include the pleasures and warmth of helping patients to bear what appears unbearable as well as the poignant experiences of, limitation, incompleteness, repetition and disappointment as a vital part of clinical work. He describes a seam in (...) clinical work in which the analyst is always trying to find and refind a position from which he can help patients to work with these experiences. The Analyst’s Experience of the Depressive Position includes: An exploration of the analyst’s participation and resistance to helping patients hold some of the most unsettling parts of their experience. Cooper draws some analogies between elements of theory about aesthetic experience in terms of how we bear new and old experience. An examination of the patient as an artist of sorts and the analyst as a form of psychic boundary artist: just as the creative act of art involves the capacity to transform pain and ruin into the depressive position, so does the co-creation of how we understand the patient’s mind through the mind of the analyst. Clinical chapters which focus on helping patients move from paranoid to depressive positions, with an emphasis on the analyst’s personal participation in that process. The Analyst’s Experience of the Depressive Position explores a rich, provocative and long overdue topic relevant to psychoanalysts, psychodynamically oriented psychotherapists, as well as students and teachers of both psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapy. (shrink)

« La liberté : ce singulier ne désigne pas ici une essence à laquelle rapporter toutes nos “libertés”. Il suspend au contraire toute détermination de ces “libertés”, qu’on sait bien “formelles”, sans pourtant vouloir le savoir… Il le fait au nom de l’expérience singulière de ce qui est sans essence : l’existence même. Cette expérience est un fait, lui aussi singulier, car il n’obéit pas à une logique du “fait” opposé à la “loi”. Ni fait, ni loi, mais l’être même (...) en tant que partage de l’existence. La pensée en provient, elle ne s’en empare pas. Quant elle s’ouvre à cette expérience, elle pense son possible hors d’elle-même, comme chose, force ou regard. La liberté est l’in-fini de la pensée. ». (shrink)

Ninian Smart, 1927-2001, English philosopher.