A partir de uma análise crítica do conceito de eudaimonia aristotélica, almeja-se compreender qual é o fim aos quais todas as nossas ações tendem e como podemos alcançá-lo. Para isso, utilizar-se-á como fio condutor desta pesquisa a analise do livro I da obra Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles, delineando os elementos que permeiam o problema da ação virtuosa, tais como o conceito de virtude, felicidade e alma.

In the contemporary virtue ethics literature, eudaimonia is discussed far more often than it is defined or fully articulated. It was introduced into the contemporary virtue ethics literature by philosophers who work in ancient philosophy, and who are familiar with the work of ancient eudaimonists (where the ancient eudaimonists are typically thought to include Plato, the Stoics, and (especially) Aristotle). Yet, predictably, among philosophers who study ancient philosophy, there is not consensus, but rather lively debate, about what eudaimonia (...) is: how the various ancient eudaimonists understood it, the role it played in their theories, and so on.2 In this chapter, I will discuss the role of eudaimonia in contemporary virtue ethics, and especially contemporary eudaimonist virtue ethics. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for five theses. The first thesis is that ethicists should think about happiness and unhappiness together, with as much detail and particularity as possible. Thinking about unhappiness will help us get clear about happiness, and distinguish the different things that come under that name. The second is that happiness and unhappiness can both be important positively valuable features of a worthwhile life. The third thesis is that Modern Eudaimonism, the claim that every reason to act (...) is a reason either to promote or facilitate happiness, or to decrease or prevent unhappiness, is false. The fourth thesis is thatAristotle is not a Modern Eudaimonist. Aristotelian Eudaimonism says that every reason to act is a reason that derives from what Aristotle calls eudaimonia. But “derives from” is a different connective from “either to promote or facilitate X, or to decrease or prevent not-X”; and eudaimonia is not happiness. So AE ≠ ME. Finally, the fifth thesis is that AE is false too. (shrink)

This article develops a eudaimonistic account of professional virtue. Using the case of teaching, the article argues that professional virtue requires that role holders care about the ends of their work. Care is understood in terms of an investment of the self. Virtuous role holders are invested in their practice in a way that makes professional excellence part of their own good. Failure to care about the ends of professional practice reveals a lack of appreciation of the value of professional (...) work. This ‘investment view’ is contrasted with the currently popular ‘key goods view’, which claims that professional virtues require a profession-specific teleological structure. Unlike ordinary virtues, which are governed by eudaimonia or human flourishing, professional virtues are allegedly derived from professional ends, like health or education. The article argues that this delivers an unconvincing criterion for determining the merits of character traits. (shrink)

Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value. This raises problems about how to reconcile Aristotle's requirement with (a) the fact that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves (usually benefits to others); and (b) Aristotle's apparent requirement that everything (including virtuous action) be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia. I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of loving (...) a friend for herself, according to which choosing a virtuous action for itself involves choosing it on account of those features of it that make it the kind of action it is, where these features include its intended consequences (such as the benefits it seeks to provide to others). I then suggest that Aristotle may take these consequences (including benefits to others) as contributing (and contributing non-instrumentally) to the agent's own eudaimonia, and that there is no conflict here with Aristotle's view that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul. For just as my activity of teaching is actualized in my students (provided they learn from me), so too my virtuous activity can be actualized in its beneficiaries. If this is right, then Aristotle's view is far from the Stoic (and proto-Kantian) view often attributed to him. (shrink)

This paper re-evaluates euthanasia and assisted suicide from the perspective of eudaimonia, the ancient Greek conception of happiness across one’s whole life. It is argued that one cannot be said to have fully flourished or had a truly happy life if one’s death is preceded by a period of unbearable pain or suffering that one cannot avoid without assistance in ending one’s life. While death is to be accepted as part of life, it should not be left to nature (...) to dictate the way we die, and it is fundamentally unjust to grant people liberal latitude in how they live their lives while granting them little control over the conclusion of their life narratives. Three objections to this position are considered and rejected; the paper also offers an explanation of why we think killing can be a benefit. Ultimately, euthanasia may be necessary in some cases in order to achieve eudaimonia. (shrink)

In the ethical theories of the ancient Greeks, eudaimonia provided a grounding for the value of all other goods. But a puzzle for such views is that some things are good for us irrespective of the intervention of eudaimonia and its requirement of virtuous activity. In this article, the author considers challenges to the eudaimonist account of value on those grounds pressed by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Sophie Grace Chappell. The aim is ethical-theoretical, rather than historical. The author defends (...) the thesis that a form of eudaimonism that is largely Aristotelian in form and content can meet these challenges. (shrink)

I argue that Christians have at least two reasons to reject eudaimonism, interpreted as the view that attaining eudaimonia—or happiness—is what fulfills the moral life. First, I contend Christian conceptions of eudaimonia should encompass more than realized moral excellence and its requirements. Second, I claim Christians should construe the love at the heart of their moral life as fully realizable even if it is not evidently reciprocated. Both affirmations contradict eudaimonism by implying that eudaimonia depends on more (...) than fulfilling the moral life—the former by rendering eudaimonia more subject to luck than eudaimonists can allow, the latter by depicting the moral life as less subject to luck than eudaimonists can accept. These affirmations also enable Christians to regard God’s love integral to eudaimonia apart from its role in realizing moral excellence and to deny all inability to attain eudaimonia manifests moral failure. (shrink)

In Plato's Symposium, Diotima ends her speech suggesting that erōs is the key to immortality. This raises two problems. First, if erōs is aimed at one's own immortality, then it seems selfish and not a genuine form of interpersonal love. Second, she argues that erōs leads us to procreate, but procreation is a way of producing others, not ourselves. In this article the author argues that our misunderstandings of erōs and eudaimonia account for the trouble we have in seeing (...) how Diotima succeeds in explaining a reasonable balance between prudent self-care and genuine love of others that leaves room for a genuine, albeit exotic, personal immortality. (shrink)

This essay explores connections and divergences between Alasdair MacIntyre's eudaimonistic ethic and Søren Kierkegaard's agapeistic ethic--perhaps the greatest proponents of these ethical paradigms from the past two centuries. The purpose of the work is threefold. First, to demonstrate an impressive amount of convergence and complementarity in their approaches to the transcendent grounds of an ethic of flourishing, the rigors necessary for a proper self-love, and the other-directed nature of proper social relations. Second, given the inapplicability of common dichotomies, to pinpoint (...) more precisely where Kierkegaard departs from eudaimonism, and where MacIntyre departs from agapeism. Finally, to show that both Kierkegaard's and MacIntyre's grounds for departure are inadequate, and thus that the most central insights of eudaimonist and agapeist ethics can be harmonized to a greater extent than either Kierkegaard's or MacIntyre's framework can allow. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle does not believe all rational action aims at securing eudaimonia (happiness) for the agent. Intrinsic goods are worth having independently of their promotion of any further ends, including eudaimonia. Aiming for such a good or avoiding evil may be rational even when eudaimonia is impossible and not the agent's goal. "Politics" 1332a7f suggests that even the happy agent may act rationally without aiming for eudaimonia. The final section argues that, given that an (...) immoral agent secures the greatest of evils, an alleged conflict in the "Nicomachean Ethics" between the intellectualist Book X and earlier books disappears. (shrink)

P. Eliopoulos compares the attitudes to happiness taken by two Christian philosophers, separated by a very wide margin of space and time, Gregory of Nyssa and Søren Kierkegaard.

The concept of “the good life” is not one that receives much attention from conventional economic theory.1 About the closest it comes to such attention is in the area of welfare economics and here it is mostly concerned with the distribution of costs and benefits of various economic choices and wherein benefits are measured in terms of utility and costs in terms of disutility or utility foregone. It is usually taken for granted that utility is a function of consumption of (...) goods and services, and disutility is a function of the “toil and trouble” associated with the effort to acquire goods and services. Labor, therefore, is typically taken to be a major source of disutility. Even many economists will admit that .. (shrink)

The point of education is to support students to be able to live meaningful, autonomous lives, filled with rich experiences. The arts and aesthetic education are vital to such flourishing lives in that they afford bold, beautiful, moving experiences of awe, wonder and the sublime that are connected to the central human functional capability Nussbaum labels senses, imagination and thought. Everyone ought to have the opportunity to learn about art, to appreciate and create art, to critique art and to understand (...) how we are connected to the culture of our society. A life without art is unimaginable, and to the extent that people lack aesthetic experiences, their lives are impoverished, not ‘fully human’. Given that the distinctive value of art objects is that they afford aesthetic experience, it is upon this foundation that an argument ought to be mounted as to why schooling needs the arts, specialised teachers, and all students deserve aesthetic education. Therefore, in this paper, I offer a defence of compulsory aesthetic education across the curriculum on the basis of the aesthetic experiences the arts afford, and the central role such experiences play in eudaimonia—the flourishing life. (shrink)

In a fast-paced and interconnected global economy, a crisis is an eventuality for most organizations. Leading during a crisis can be particularly challenging because a crisis can disrupt a firm’s purpose, undermine the motivation of employees, and can encourage unethical behavior. In this article, I focus on managing a crisis of purpose. I articulate a framework that elaborates ways in which leaders find and pursue ethical purposes during times of crisis and why these specific purposes motivate employees and encourage organizational (...) resilience. Drawing on modern scholars’ theory of eudaimonia, I propose that leaders can find ethical purposes by framing crisis as opportunities for growth, authenticity, meaning and excellence. When leaders establish and pursue ethical purposes, they can motivate individuals and promote organizational resilience. (shrink)

The discussion of "eudaimonia" in the "rhetoric" has a central place in Aristotle's exposition of the material for speeches deliberative, epideictic and forensic varieties of rhetoric. Due to the telos- relatedness of the material for each variety of rhetoric, the treatise on "eudaimonia" (Rhet A5) provides coherence between the varieties by displaying standards in terms of which particular cases at hand are ultimately assessed as good, useful, noble, just or their opposites. A focal and normative meaning of (...) class='Hi'>eudaimonia can be identified in A5 which Aristotle expects a prudent orator to maintain even when he is faced with perverted audiences. (shrink)

Eudaimony and destiny.- Almost all the classical theories on ethics place man's objective as his search for happiness. This ideal is based on nature. Medieval thinkers, considering man as a person, came to the conclusion that he is called t o a transcendental destiny; however, because they continued to use the classical ideal of happiness as a conceptual model, they created quite a few difficulties: self-transcendence and self-fulfillment are opposing models. L. Polo, on the other hand, proposes a non-naturalist anthropology (...) that considers each person as destined to transcendence. (shrink)

The present paper concentrates on the comments of Michael of Ephesus to the 10th book of the Nicomachean Ethics. In particular it investigates the way in which Michael of Ephesus conceived the relationship between political and theoretical happiness. Doing so allows to evidence the theoretical ties that connect Michael of Ephesus with the Peripatetic philosopher Aspasius and demonstrates the influence of Proclus on Michael of Ephesus.

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility (...) of a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

This essay takes a first step in comparative ethics by looking to Aristotle and the Aztec's conceptions of the good life. It argues that the Aztec conception of a rooted life, neltiliztli, functions for ethical purposes in a way that is like Aristotle's eudaimonia. To develop this claim, it not only shows just in what their conceptions of the good consist, but also in what way the Aztecs conceived of the virtues (in qualli, in yectli).

This paper revisits Ronald Dworkin’s influential position that a person’s advance directive for future health care and medical treatment retains its moral authority beyond the onset of dementia, even when respecting this authority involves foreshortening the life of someone who is happy and content and who no longer remembers or identifies with instructions included within the advance directive. The analysis distils a eudaimonist perspective from Dworkin’s argument and traces variations of this perspective in further arguments for the moral authority of (...) advance directives by other authors. It then critiques a feature of the eudaimonist perspectives within these arguments—namely, the position that dementia has a retroactive negative impact on what a person has previously valued—and challenges the commonly held assumption underlying them that a person’s life and well-being have relatively low value beyond the onset of dementia. Although advance directives have moral authority as a means of guiding one’s future health care, accounts that dismiss the value of the lives and well-being of people living with dementia should be questioned to the extent that such accounts are used to support the moral authority of advance directives stipulating measures to foreshorten individuals’ lives. (shrink)

En este artículo se intenta mostrar cuál es la posible relación entre la esfera política y la esfera ética en el pensamiento de Aristóteles. ¿Son la política y la ética investigaciones absolutamente distinguibles o, por el contrario, son un solo proyecto investigativo? Para responder a esta pregunta, se sugiere que primero debe responderse la cuestión acerca de la naturaleza misma del bien último. ¿Es el fin de las acciones un fin dominante o inclusivo? Se analiza una de las propiedades de (...) la eudaimonía, a saber, la autarquía, y se mostrará cómo, dependiendo de la respuesta que se dé a la segunda pregunta, es posible contestar la primera. (shrink)

Ensuring patient participation in healthcare decision making remains a difficult task. Factors such as a lack of time in the consultation, medical objectivation, or the difficulties of translating individual patient experience into the treatment plan have been shown to limit patient contributions. Little research attention has focused however on how emotions experienced by both the patient and the healthcare provider may affect the ability of the patient to participate. In this research, patient’s and healthcare provider’s emotions were identified and analysed. (...) The research method showed fear as a prominent emotion experienced. This included patient’s fears both inside and outside the consultation, as well as the healthcare provider’s fears in their professional practice. Using Martha Nussbaum’s cognitive-evaluative theory of emotions as an additional means of analysis, the research looked at what this emotion could show about the importance of the object of this fear to the person’s eudaimonia (flourishing). At the end of the article, several solutions were proposed to help mitigate this fear to keep it from becoming a destructive force in the healthcare provider—patient relationship. (shrink)

Through a discourse analysis of core documents related to the development of a new primary school subject titled technology comprehension (TC), this article explores how sociotechnical imaginaries of (trans)human perfectibility are promoted in technology education in Denmark. Based on the idea that transhumanism can be understood as a type of eudemonistic virtue ethics, I argue that TC is shaped by the idea that the purpose of technology education is to prepare pupils for the coming of a future characterised by a (...) profound digital transformation of society and human existence through the cultivation of ‘transhuman virtues’ related to normative—and politically produced—ideas of human perfectibility or, in other words, a sociotechnical eudaimonia. I identify two types of transhuman imaginaries, and thus two versions of sociotechnical eudaimonia, in the discourse of TC: 1) the imaginary of technological extension and 2) the imaginary of technological adaptation. (shrink)

The present study analyses the relationship between human beings, society and nature from the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau; European thinker inserted in a vast political-anthropological tradition that seeks to understand human existence, both in its essential and relational dimensions. In this sense, Rousseau highlights a contradiction: technical and cultural development, although necessary, can also lead to the degradation of nature and the human essence. Works such as Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality (...) and Reveries of a Solitary Stroller were chosen, precisely because they allow us to examine the consequences of human alienation about its relationship with the world, also demonstrating the search for harmony as the ultimate horizon of satisfaction. A critical position in the face of social relations and the need for esteem and recognition from others. In Reveries, for example, Rousseau reflects on happiness and the relationship with nature, which, if preserved, enables a refuge from social pressures and an encounter with the true “I”. It is a criticism of itself-love (amour-propre) like the search for possessions and honours; aspects that distance humanity from self-love (amour de soi) and pity for others. (shrink)

A recent special issue in the Journal of Business Ethics gathered together a variety of papers addressing the challenges of putting virtue ethics into practice :563–565, 2013). The editors prefaced their outline of the various papers with the assertion that exploring the practical dimension of virtue ethics can help business leaders discover their proper place in working for a better world, as individuals and within the family, the business community and society in general :563–565, 2013). Scholars are yet to explore (...) the role of virtuous organisational leaders in the pursuit of Eudaimonia. This paper is a qualitative study which considered company directors’ self-understandings in light of a virtue ethics conceptual framework. The aim of the study is to explore whether virtue ethics rather than deontology and consequentialism is a better vehicle for expressing directors’ self-understandings about their ideals and role. (shrink)

Current debates surrounding Aristotle's Politics involve attempts to explain the role of political participation in the pursuit of Aristotle's human telos, eudaimonia. Many argue that political participation is crucial to eudaimonia, equating the good man with the good citizen. Often this argument is based on Aristotle's labelling of humans as zoon politikon, or ‘political animal’, and the misleading translation of eudaimonia as ‘happiness’. We provide supported explanations of eudaimonia and zoon politikon which do not force us (...) to equate the good man and the good citizen. We illustrate Aristotle's analogy between the eudaimon man and the eudaimon polis and emphasize the role political participation sometimes plays in the pursuit of eudaimonia. On the basis of this evidence, we argue that Aristotle did not equate the good man with the good citizen necessarily, nor did he find political participation essential to eudaimonia. We then demonstrate that even without political participation, the polis plays a unique role in the pursuit of eudaimonia. (shrink)

“We Need Not hesitate to translate the word eudaimonia by the English ‘happiness’”. So Burnet wrote in 1900, but the hardening consensus is that he was wrong. The differences between the two notions, it is now commonly supposed, are too many and too deep to think that happiness and eudaimonia are very closely related; and consequently “happiness”, the long-established conventional translation, will seriously mislead us in understanding the nature of Aristotelian eudaimonia.

Some aspects of "second-generation" Positive Psychology are analyzed and their origins explored. In particular, Seligman's importation of the concept of eudaimonia from Aristotelian ethics is critiqued and found to be problematic. This conclusion is reached through an examination of the concept of eudaimonia as it was employed in ancient philosophy. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Review on Kieran McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia: A Commentary on Ennead I.4, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

In his recent book, Happiness, Pedro Tabensky has argued for an Aristotelian account of happiness as eudaimonia or flourishing. However, his account of happiness appears to have the unfortunate implication that both individual eudaimonia and global justice are in principle unattainable. I examine Tabensky's reasons for believing that his account has such unfortunate implications, and suggest that, if appropriately modified, he would be able to avoid them. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(4) 2004: 402-410.

A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding (...) of representationalist or correspondence theories of truth. (shrink)

Special volume of "Thaumàzein - Rivista di Filosofia" dedicated to the theme of Socratic Eudaimonia and care for others. It is a multilingual volume comprising twenty papers divided into six sections with an introduction by Linda Napolitano. Edited by Santiago Chame, Donald Morrison, and Linda Napolitano. -/- Despite the appearances given by certain texts, the moral psychology of Socrates needs not imply selfishness. On the contrary, a close look at passages in Plato and Xenophon (see Plato, Meno 77-78; Protagoras (...) 358; Gorgias 466-468; Euthydemus 278; Lysis 219; Xenophon, Memorabilia III 9, 4-5) suggests that the “egoist”’s welfare depends upon the welfare of others (i.e. family, friends or the whole city). Since the welfare of his family, friends and city is part of his own eudaimonìa, the “egoist” (phìlautos) has a direct and intrinsic motive to promote the welfare of these others. -/- This multilingual issue explores the role that other peoples’ welfare plays in Socratic ethics. Special attention is paid to test-cases in which the principle that moral action is always good only for the agent seems to have no validity. I.e., under which circumstances is the self-sacrifice for the sake of others (such as the soldier’s self-sacrifice on the battlefield) good for the agent (as in Alcibiades I 115a-116d)? Essays deal with contradictions or tensions of this sort, and relate them to more general views on eudaimonìa held within Socratic literature. Comparison between different Socratic authors is used as a means to identify the distinctive features of Socratic eudaimonìa if compared to other Greek theories of happiness, such as the Aristotelian theory of philautìa (NE IX, 1166a-1166b; 1168a-1169b). (shrink)

행복(eudaimonia)에 대한 서양고대철학의 관점은 우리의 이성(logos)을 어떻게 하면 제대로 사용할 것인가를 주축으로 한다. 이논문에서 주장하고자 하는 철학상담적 행복론은 치료적 접근의 힐링(healing)논의가 아닌 서양고대철학의 전통에서 중요하게 다루어진 올바른 이성(orthos logos)에 관한 논의이다. 최근 들어 부각되고 있는 인문학에 대한 관심과 인간 삶의 궁극적 목적이라 할 수있는 행복의 주제는 어떠한 관련이 있을까? 이 논문에서는 아리스토텔레스의 실천적 지혜를 통해 진정한 행복에 도달할 수 있는지인간의 탁월성 발휘의 측면에서 그러한 가능성을 확인하고자 시도하였다. 이를 위한 기초작업으로 본 논문은 실천적 지혜의 개념을철학상담의 주제로서 새롭게 해석해 보았다. 아리스토텔레스의 (...) 행복을 현대적으로 분석하면, 고통스럽고 어려움에 처한 인간이 할수 있는 최선의 일은 이성의 발휘를 통해 적극적으로 삶을 성취하는 것이다. 현대인들은 부나 명예에 대한 과도한 욕망, 분노나 질투 등의 감정, 몸의 질병으로 겪는 고통뿐만 아니라 세계관 내지신념들 즉 자신의 고유한 생각들로 인해 고통을 경험하기도 한다. 진정한 행복의 성취를 위해서는 실천적 지혜를 활용하여 사유를풍부하게 수정해 나가는 일이 필요하다. 올바른 이성인 실천적 지혜를 발휘할 때에 인간이 진정한 행복에 도달할 수 있다고 본 논문은 주장한다. (shrink)