Moderate rationalism is the view a person's having a rational intuition that p prima facie justifies them in believing that p. It has recently been argued that moderate rationalism requires empirical support and, furthermore, that suitable empirical support would suffice to convince empiricists to abandon their opposition to rationalism. According to one argument, the causal requirement argument, empirical evidence is necessary in order to justify the claim that any actual token belief is based on rational intuition (...) and moderate rationalism requires such a claim for its justification. According to a second argument, the reliability argument, empirical evidence is necessary in order to justify the claim that a putative source of evidence is reliable and moderate rationalism requires such a claim for its justification. According to a third argument, the empirical case argument, certain sorts of empirical evidence would be dialectically sufficient to resolve the traditional dispute between empiricists and rationalists in the rationalists' favor. Against the causal requirement argument, I maintain that the core doctrines of moderate rationalism are not hostage to causal claims and that such causal claims as may be plausibly part of other recognizably rationalist doctrines can be justified on broadly non-empirical grounds. Against the reliability argument, I show that no empirical evidence is required to justify belief in the reliability of rational intuition. Against the empirical case argument, I argue that the envisioned empirical support for moderate rationalism should not convince any traditional empiricist. (shrink)

I outline key empirical evidence from my research and that of other scholars, testing the role of cultural group selection in the evolution of human cooperation, which Richerson et al. failed to mention and which fails to support the CGS hypothesis.

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind/body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental (...) properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts’ spacing (Strappini et al., 2017a; Crutch and Warrington, 2007). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, that impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here we define a psychological property of restored object identification and we cross-reference the data of visually-impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy (PCA), six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e. restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. While the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence. (shrink)

This book explores the empirical evidence for Mocombe's consciousness field theory, which describes the origins and nature of consciousness in the universe/multiverse in his overall structurationist theory of phenomenological structuralism. Mocombe utilizes a logical metaphysical materialist approach to understanding the ontological question regarding the nature and origins of consciousness in the universe/multiverse. The work argues that the consciousness field emanates from an emerging fifth force of nature, the absolute vacuum, which constitutes and reproduces human consciousness and practical activities (...) in the multiverse as a frequency wavelength. The work offers three pieces of empirical evidence for Mocombe's consciousness field theory: the Garyian equation, psychonic wave, and life after life. In the end, the book contextualizes the aforementioned evidence within Mocombe's larger theory of phenomenological structuralism, which offers a resolution to the structure/agency problematic of the social sciences. The work concludes by applying Mocombe's phenomenological structural theory to understanding the constitution of contemporary neoliberal identity capitalism under American hegemony from the consciousness field to societal organization and reproduction. (shrink)

In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the (...) double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 11, November 2021.

Roth (1987) effectively distinguishes Quinean indeterminacy of translation from the more general underdetermination of theories by showing how indeterminacy follows directly from holism and the role of a shared environment in language learning. However, Roth is mistaken in three further consequences he draws from his interpretation of indeterminacy. Contra Roth, natural science and social science are not differentiated as offering theories about the shared environment and theories about meanings respectively; the role of the environment in language learning does not justify (...) an empiricist sense of objective evidence; and his advocacy of methodological pluralism does not appropriately sustain the project of social scientific methodology in response to holism and indeterminacy. (shrink)

Three experimental tasks—spontaneous telling of a story, reading, and parsing the story—were used to determine whether empirical data reflect the narrative structure of stories and can be predicted by a plot unit analysis of the stories (Lehnert, 1981). It was found that spontaneous pause durations at sentence breaks were highly correlated with the importance of these breaks as predicted theoretically. Only low correlations were obtained, however, when reading pause durations were correlated with the model. As for parsing values, the (...) value of the correlation coefficients depended on whether stories had sufficient superficial linguistic cues to help the subjects in parsing. It was concluded that spontaneous pausing not only reflects the narrative structure of stories, but can be used as a guide to constructing theories of narrative structure as well as for deciding between competing theories. (shrink)

China is moving from a centralized to a market economy to bring about efficiency in its economy and to form a business partnership with the West. With its reform adopting an open-door policy, there may be a need to assure its partners in the western world that appropriate steps would be taken to develop and foster a business culture with which the western countries and the Chinese businesses can work. The present study attempted to find whether there has been a (...) change in business ethical culture, accounting system and practice in the Chinese business between 1978 and the present, and the degree of similarity in the Chinese ethics and guidelines compared to Western ethics and guidelines. The result of the study has been analyzed from an institutional perspective to explore institutional change. The result showed that there is general growing support of Chinese management toward change in business ethical culture and practice. It was observed that there was not much similarity in the documents used for ethical guidance and control with those of the West. The findings of the paper are expected to be relevant to international investors and executives interested in investing or working in China. (shrink)

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both (...) philosophical and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

According to perceptual accounts of mindreading, we can see, rather than cognize, other people's mental states. On one version of this approach, certain mental properties figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences. In a recent paper, Varga has appealed to empirical research to argue that intentions and emotions can indeed be seen, rather than cognized. In this paper, I argue that none of the evidence adduced to support the perceptual account of mindreading shows that we see mental (...) properties, as opposed to non‐mental properties. (shrink)

Post‐Marxist critical sociology of education has influenced the development of indigenous (‘kaupapa’) Maori educational theory and research. Its effects are examined in four claims made for Maori education by indigenous theorists. The claims are: indigenous kaupapa Maori education is a revolutionary initiative; it is a cultural solution to Maori educational under‐achievement; it has reversed the decline of the Maori language; it provides a valid educational alternative for an ethnically and culturally distinctive population. The analysis suggests that the indigenous theory approach (...) is representative of the position‐taking strategy that characterises post‐Marxist critical sociology of education, concluding that claims made in kaupapa Maori voice discourse are not supported by the empirical evidence which indicates a more complex social reality. (shrink)

Many philosophers in the field of meta-ethics believe that rational degrees of confidence in moral judgments should have a probabilistic structure, in the same way as do rational degrees of belief. The current paper examines this position, termed “moral Bayesianism,” from an empirical point of view. To this end, we assessed the extent to which degrees of moral judgments obey the third axiom of the probability calculus, ifP(A∩B)=0thenP(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B), known as finite additivity, as compared to degrees of beliefs on the (...) one hand and degrees of desires on the other. Results generally converged to show that degrees of moral judgment are more similar to degrees of belief than to degrees of desire in this respect. This supports the adoption of a Bayesian approach to the study of moral judgments. To further support moral Bayesianism, we also demonstrated its predictive power. Finally, we discuss the relevancy of our results to the meta-ethical debate between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists. (shrink)

This article is a response to McLeod and Baylis (2007) who speculate on the dangers of requesting fresh ‘spare’ embryos from IVF patients for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, particularly when those embryos are good enough to be transferred back to the woman. They argue that these embryos should be frozen instead. We explore what is meant by ‘spare’ embryos. We then provide empirical evidence, from a study of embryo donation and of embryo donors' views, to substantiate (...) some of their speculations about the problems associated with requesting fresh embryos. However, we also question whether such problems are resolved by embryo freezing, since further empirical evidence suggests that this raises other social and ethical problems for patients. There is little evidence that the request for embryos for research, in itself, causes patients distress. We suggest, however, that no requests for fresh embryos should be made in the first cycle of IVF treatment. Deferring the request to a later cycle ensures that potential donors are better informed (by experience and reflection) about the possible destinations of their embryos and about the definition of ‘spare embryos’. Both this article, and that by McLeod and Baylis, emphasize the need to consider the views and experiences of embryo donors when evaluating the ethics of embryo donation for hESC research. (shrink)

In the past four or five years I have been especially dependent on Aristotle's writings as I have initiated a series of experiments that can legitimately be called empirical efforts to prove Aristotelian conceptions to be true. In actuality, of course, I am trying to prove my own theory to be true—that is, worthy of consideration because it is consistent with observed human actions. However, by extension, I am surely seeking evidence for Aristotle's image of human cognition. There (...) are two Aristotlelian conceptions that underwrite my theoretical and empirical efforts: predication and opposition. When we speak of a "predication" in cognition we refer to a process that is fundamentally creative. Predications deal in meanings; and the way in which we align meanings, lending the meaning of one concept to another is what predication is all about. Predication is the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying certain patterns of meaning in relation to other patterns of meaning. The second Aristotelian conception that I have been employing theoretically and investigating empirically is "opposition." Although association through frequent contact was recognized by Aristotle , he also appreciated that there is often an intrinsic tie of opposite meanings to be seen in human reason. In my own interpretation of Aristotle, I believe that we can see the ultimate necessity of predication stemming from the opositional ties of meanings like this. If I am cognizing within a congerie of interlacing meanings which relate to and, indeed, delimit the definitions of their opposite meanings, then it is up to me as a cognizer to continually "take a position" on just what I am going to affirm—or not! 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This work empirically tests the concept of the ‘whistleblowing triangle,’ which is modeled on the three factors encapsulated by the fraud triangle, in the Indonesian context. Anchored in the proposition of an original research framework on the whistleblowing triangle and derived hypotheses, this work aims to expand the body of knowledge on this topic by providing empirical evidence. The sample used is taken from audit firms affiliated with both the big 4 and non-big 4 companies operating in Indonesia. (...) The results of analysis using the PLS-PM method found a significant relationship between the components of the whistleblowing triangle and the intention of blowing the whistle. We found that financial incentives are the most significant predictor of auditors’ intention to blow the whistle in Indonesia. Other components, such as opportunity and rationalization, also play an important role in supporting auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Our findings also suggest that related pressures are the top priority for audit firms in Indonesia to consider in increasing whistleblowing intention. We expand the previous literature on whistleblowing which has been derived from the components of the fraud triangle :28–56, 2016; Smaili and Arroyo in J Bus Ethics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7, 2017) by adding empirical evidence. (shrink)

Is experiential evidence irrelevant to acceptance or rejection of belief in the existence of a Divine Being? Charles Hartshorne answers that it is indeed irrelevant, and this answer has an initial and, for me, continuing surprising ring to it. Specifically, Hartshorne makes two distinguishable claims: the traditional allegedly a posteriori arguments, the teleological and cosmological, are in fact incompatible with empiricist methodology and are disguised ontological arguments; the conception of God as necessary being demands that belief in such a (...) being's existence or non-existence in no way depend upon empirical evidence. On the contrary, I shall argue, first, that empirical evidence for God is truly empirical and second, that there is no incompatibility between empirical evidence and necessary existence. My argument will involve an attempt to understand and clarify somewhat the very difficult concepts of ‘experience’ and ‘necessity’ as they arise in the context of religious epistemology. I wish to make clear at the outset that my aim is not to eliminate ontological arguments for God in favour of empirical arguments, for I believe that Hartshorne's work on the modal ontological argument contributes substantially to providing grounds for reasonable belief in theism. Rather, my purpose is to show that ontological and empirical patterns of theistic argumentation are neither incompatible with each other nor reducible to each other. (shrink)

The author considers the empirical component of physical theories. He studies the origin and development of the theory of physical experiment, the structure and gnoseological hypotheses of the measuring process, as well as the relativity principle concerning the measuring equipment. Examples of modern physical theories are used in order to demonstrate the influence of experimental facts on the formation and development, verification and accepting of these theories in the structure of scientific systems. The role of accidental experimental facts in (...) this process is also the subject. (shrink)

The current global refugee crisis revealed that refugee children, youth, and adults are uniquely vulnerable to traumatic events. Yet, there are only a few studies available that report robust systematic data on art therapy interventions with mental health in recent refugee populations. The purpose of the study is to synthesize and evaluate the available research evidence on the use of art therapy in reducing post-traumatic stress disorder levels in refugees, and the quality of empirical evidence for each (...) of the reviewed studies. The authors adopted the Council for Exceptional Children evidence-based practice standards and quality indicators to evaluate the methodological soundness of the reviewed studies and the evidence-based classification of art therapy as a treatment intervention. We systematically searched electronic databases of pertinent review articles for the period from 2010 to 2020 using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses. Systematic searches identified 70 research articles but yielded eight eligible journals as per the inclusion criteria. Results indicated that, though considered a promising treatment approach, art therapy is presently classified as an intervention that falls under the category of practice with insufficient evidence. The findings suggest the need for further methodologically sound experimental studies to strengthen the evidence behind art therapy as an intervention to reduce PTSD symptoms in refugees around the world. (shrink)

This paper investigates the moral intuitions associated with the loop variant of the Trolley Problem, initially proposed by Judith Jarvis Thomson in 1985. Thomson challenged the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), which differentiates between intended outcomes and foreseen but unintended consequences. Through an empirical study involving 134 participants from the United States and China, the research explores whether intuitions about the loop variant are influenced by the positioning of track workers and cultural context. The results indicate that a significant (...) number of participants, particularly from China, perceive the permissibility of redirecting the trolley not merely as a means to kill one to save five but as a way to delay the trolley's impact. This suggests that cultural factors and the design of the loop scenario significantly influence moral judgments. The study supports the idea that the loop variant does not serve as a counter-example to DDE, offering insights into the motivations behind moral decisions and highlighting the importance of cultural context in ethical reasoning. (shrink)

Recently, empirically minded philosophers have employed evidence of widespread, fundamental moral disagreement to argue against moral realism. I argue that the empirical evidence does not refute realism because the disagreement is consistent with certain pluralistic versions of moral realism that posit a set of pro tanto normative principles. Others have appealed to pluralism in defense of moral realism but have used pluralism to attack the empirically based approach to ethical theory. Although I argue that the empirical (...) argument against moral realism fails, I defend the approach and suggest better ways that (pluralist) moral realism could be tested empirically. (shrink)

IntroductionInternational sharing of health data opens the door to the study of the so-called ‘Big Data’, which holds great promise for improving patient-centred care. Failure of recent data sharing initiatives indicates an urgent need to invest in societal trust in researchers and institutions. Key to an informed understanding of such a ‘social license’ is identifying the views patients and the public may hold with regard to data sharing for health research.MethodsWe performed a narrative review of the empirical evidence (...) addressing patients’ and public views and attitudes towards the use of health data for research purposes. The literature databases PubMed, Embase, Scopus and Google Scholar were searched in April 2019 to identify relevant publications. Patients’ and public attitudes were extracted from selected references and thematically categorised.ResultsTwenty-seven papers were included for review, including both qualitative and quantitative studies and systematic reviews. Results suggest widespread—though conditional—support among patients and the public for data sharing for health research. Despite the fact that participants recognise actual or potential benefits of data research, they expressed concerns about breaches of confidentiality and potential abuses of the data. Studies showed agreement on the following conditions: value, privacy, risk minimisation, data security, transparency, control, information, trust, responsibility and accountability.ConclusionsOur results indicate that a social license for data-intensive health research cannot simply be presumed. To strengthen the social license, identified conditions ought to be operationalised in a governance framework that incorporates the diverse patient and public values, needs and interests. (shrink)

The global financial crisis that started in 2008 was followed by recessions, austerity measures, protests, and demonstrations. Relative deprivation theory offers an explanation as to why people engage in protests and violence, and the literature contains evidence that economic and environmental variables are often to blame. However, previous RDT scholars have not investigated how a country’s entrepreneurial attitudes can affect increases in civil disorder, which is the primary purpose of this study. The authors’ results provide not only conflicting (...) class='Hi'>evidence regarding RDT explanations but also strong evidence that high levels of entrepreneurial attitudes can significantly dampen increases in society’s level of civil disorder. Levels of environmental degradation were found to have no impact on changes in civil disorder. (shrink)

There are two major possible responses to the question: what (if anything) can justify a basic income experiment? An experiment might be justified either because it gathers positive empirical evidence supporting rolling out a basic income, or because it justifies the moral desirability of such a measure. This paper critically explores both responses, the “empirical” and “ethical claim” in light of the Barcelona B-MINCOME pilot, alongside other similar experiments. We sustained that although the empirical claim is (...) necessary, there seems to be sufficient data to easily predict that all future experiments are to gather positive results too. Consequently, we argue that experiments are particularly well-equipped to foster debates on the work ethics and on the ethical dimension of social policies and welfare regimes in general. (shrink)

An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, (...) and the extent to which, e, if true, confirms h is an empirical, not a priori, fact. (shrink)

The revised Declaration of Helsinki allows placebo-controlled trials to be used even when there is an established therapy, provided there are adequate ‘methodological’ reasons for doing so. This seems to violate the principle of beneficence: where there is an established therapy, physicians treating patients with a placebo are withholding a known effective therapy. Because of this problem, we hypothesised that clinical researchers may be unwilling to risk violating the principle of beneficence and employ placebo-controlled trials in cases where there is (...) an established therapy. In this paper, we began to investigate this hypothesis. After summarising the arguments for and against using placebo controls in clinical practice, we exploredthe extent to which placebo-controlled trials are used in cases where there is an established therapy. To do this, we conducted as systematic search for all placebo-controlled trials published in 2015 in the five highest impact general medical journals. We identified 70 placebo-controlled trials. Of these, 66 were for indications where there was no established effective therapy. Only four used a placebo control in spite of there being an available effective therapy. The infrequent use of placebo controlled trials where established therapy exists highlights a seeming discrepancy between what the Declaration of Helsinki allows and what clinical investigators believe to be ethically acceptable. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the Declaration of Helsinki be reconsidered, and perhaps revised, in light of actual practice. (shrink)

Prior research on sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) has almost exclusively focused on environmental aspects (GSCM—green supply chain management) and the study of its external drivers and consequences. Framing our study within the “strategy‐conduct‐performance” paradigm, we consider the focal firm's role in the implementation of sustainable supply chain initiatives, social as well as environmental. We use data on the S&P 500 Index retrieved from Bloomberg, including variables for two relevant focal firm strategies: (a) reducing the environmental footprint of the supply (...) chain and (b) reducing social risks in the supply chain (SRSS). Hierarchical logit modeling is carried out to examine the sequential impact of governance board characteristics and the focal firm's adoption of related internal policies and practices on the likelihood of implementing these initiatives along the supply chain. Controlling for industry, firm size, and resources, we find that board structure and diversity influence the implementation of sustainable supply chain initiatives by increasing organizational commitment to environmentally friendly and socially responsible policies and practices. Consequently, empirical evidence exists for the importance of strategic factors, namely a proactive corporate stance on sustainability associated with governance board characteristics, as antecedents of sustainable (environmental and social) supply chain initiatives. (shrink)

Global consumption of antibiotics has accelerated the evolution of bacterial antimicrobial resistance. Yet, the risks from increasing bacterial antimicrobial resistance are not restricted to human populations: transmission of antimicrobial resistant bacteria occurs between humans, farms, the environment and other reservoirs. Policies that take a ‘One Health’ approach deal with this cross-reservoir spread, but are often more restrictive concerning human actions than policies that focus on a single reservoir. As such, the burden of justification lies with these more restrictive policies. We (...) argue that an ethical justification for preferring One Health policies over less restrictive alternatives relies on empirical evidence as well as theory. The ethical justification for these policies is based on two arguments: (i) comparatively greater effectiveness, and (ii) comparatively better tracking of moral responsibility. Yet the empirical assumptions on which these claims rest are limited by existing empirical knowledge. Using livestock farming as an example, we suggest that scientific research into characterising antimicrobial resistance and linking practices to outcomes ought to be guided (at least in part) by the imperative to supply the context-specific data needed to ethically justify preferring a One Health policy over less restrictive alternatives. (shrink)

Academic leaders in management from all over the world—including recent calls by the Academy of Management Shaw (Academy of Management Journal 60(3): 819–822, 2017)—have urged further research into the extent and use of questionable research practices (QRPs). In order to provide empirical evidence on the topic of QRPs, this work presents two linked studies. Study 1 determines the level of use of QRPs based on self-admission rates and estimated prevalence among business scholars in Indonesia. It was determined that (...) if the level of QRP use identified in Study 1 was quite high, Study 2 would be conducted to follow-up on this result, and this was indeed the case. Study 2 examines the factors that encourage and discourage the use of QRPs in the sample analyzed. The main research findings are as follows: (a) in Study 1, we found the self-admission rates and estimated prevalence of business scholars’ involvement in QRPs to be quite high when compared with studies conducted in other countries and (b) in Study 2, we found pressure for publication from universities, fear of rejection of manuscripts, meeting the expectations of reviewers, and available rewards to be the main reasons for the use of QRPs in Indonesia, whereas (c) formal sanctions and prevention efforts are factors that discourage QRPs. Recommendations for stakeholders (in this case, reviewers, editors, funders, supervisors, chancellors and others) are also provided in order to reduce the use of QRPs. (shrink)

The theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour have fundamentally changed the view that attitudes directly translate into behaviour by introducing intentions as a crucial intervening stage. Much research across numerous ethical contexts has drawn on these theories to offer a better understanding of how consumers form intentions to act in an ethical way. Persistently, researchers have suggested and discussed the existence of an intention–behaviour gap in ethical consumption. Yet, the factors that influence the extent of this gap and its (...) magnitude have not been systematically examined. We, therefore, contribute to the debate on the intention–behaviour gap by reviewing the empirical TRA/tpb studies that have assessed both intention and behaviour in ethical contexts. The findings from our review show that few studies assessed the intention–behaviour relationship and as a result, there is limited empirical evidence to date to quantify more accurately the intention–behaviour gap in ethical consumption. Our second contribution aims to provide an empirical case study which assesses the magnitude of the intention–behaviour gap in the context of avoidance of sweatshop clothing and to assess the roles of planning and actual behavioural control in potentially reducing the intention–behaviour gap. The findings of our case study suggest that there is indeed a large gap between intention and behaviour, and we conclude by calling for more empirical longitudinal studies to assess the complex nature of the relationship between intention and behaviour. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes the relation between brain sciences and philosophy of mind, in order to clarify in what ways philosophy can contribute to neuroscience and neuroscience can contribute to philosophy. Especially since the 1980s and the emergence of “neurophilosophy”, more and more philosophers have been bringing home morals from neuroscience to settle philosophical issues. I mention examples from the problem of consciousness, philosophy of perception and the problem of free will, and I argue that such attempts are not successful in (...) trying to settle questions like whether psychology can be reduced to neuroscience, whether we see the external world directly in perception, or whether we have free will. The failure results from an ability of the philosophical questions to evade the data. What makes these questions persisting philosophical questions is precisely that there is no way to settle them through empirical evidence, as they are conceptual questions and their solution lies in conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Many studies of world politics fail to take evidence seriously or consider basic moral truisms (for example, that the standards we apply to others we must apply to ourselves). This commentary illustrates these assessments in relation to two subjects which have attracted much interest in the West recently – terrorism and just war to combat terrorism. The evidence shows that the United States has engaged extensively in terrorism and that application of just war principles would entitle the victims (...) of that terrorism to use force against the United States to defend themselves if the United States is accorded that right. (shrink)

Contrary to some well-known views in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, in general it is not the case that the felt character of sensory experiences is determined by the information that these experiences pick up, or represent, about the world. In this dissertation I shall focus on a particular sensory modality, namely color vision, to support this thesis. ;Recently there has arisen a strong and popular view of phenomenal consciousness according to which the two fundamental problems about the (...) mind: intentionality and phenomenal experience, can be traced back to just one: intentionality. On this view, the phenomenal aspect of experience is a special case of intentionality, or our mental states' carrying information about the external world. For instance, when we see the colors of objects, we see, in a direct and transparent way, exactly those kinds of properties that the external objects have. Not only are the colors of objects causally responsible for our experiences as of color, object colors crucially determine what is called the phenomenal character of color experience. ;In this dissertation I shall argue that this view of color experience---the view called representational externalism---cannot be correct. I shall argue that from the empirical facts about object color and color vision we need not conclude that object colors do not exist, hence color vision is a grand illusion, however, we do have to conclude from these facts that though object colors are the causes of our color experience, what it is like to see the colors is not, in any theoretically interesting sense, determined by the colors themselves. To the contrary, what it is like to see the colors is crucially determined by how our color vision systems are constructed. In this dissertation I offer two independent arguments to support this claim. (shrink)

This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also (...) argues that the a priori and empirical accounts of evidence are on a par when we consider scientific practice, but that a study of artificial intelligence might serve to differentiate them. (shrink)

This article reviews and brings together two literatures: classical political economists’ views on the skilling or deskilling nature of technological change in England, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when they wrote, are compared with the empirical evidence about the skill effects of technological change that emerges from studies of economic historians. In both literatures, we look at both the skill impacts of technological change and at the “inducement mechanisms” that are envisaged for the introduction of new technologies. (...) Adam Smith and Karl Marx both regarded the deskilling of the labour force as the predominant form of biased technical change, but other authors such as Charles Babbage also took account of capital-skill complementarities and skill-enhancing effects of technological change. For Smith, the deskilling bias was an unintended by-product of the increasing division of labour, which in his view “naturally” led to ever more simplification of workers’ tasks. As opposed to Smith, Marx considered unskilled-biased technical change as a bourgeois weapon in the class struggle for impairing the workers’ bargaining position. Studies of economic historians lend support to Marx’s hypothesis about the inducement mechanisms for the introduction of unskilled-biased innovations, but have produced no clear-cut empirical evidence for a deskilling tendency of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century technological change as a whole. Industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather led to labour polarization, by simultaneously deskilling a large part of the workforce and raising the demand for some high-skilled workers. (shrink)

Socially assistive devices such as care robots or companions have been advocated as a promising tool in elderly care in Western healthcare systems. Ethical debates indicate various challenges. An important part of the ethical evaluation is to understand how users interact with these devices and how interaction influences users’ perceptions and their ability to express themselves. In this review, we report and critically appraise findings of non-comparative empirical studies with regard to these effects from an ethical perspective.Electronic databases and (...) other sources were queried using a comprehensive search strategy generating 9851 records. Studies were screened independently by two authors. Methodological quality of studies was assessed. For 22 reports on 21 datasets using a non-comparative design a narrative synthesis was performed.Data shows positive findings in regard to attitudes and emotional reactions of users. Varying perception of a social relation and social presence are the most commonly observed traits of interaction. Users struggle with understanding technical complexities while functionality of the devices is limited. This leads to a behavioral alignment of users towards the requirements of the devices to be able to make use of them.This evidence adds to three important ethical debates on the use of socially assistive devices in healthcare in regard to (1) reliability of existing empirical evidence to inform normative judgements, (2) ethical significance of the social presence of devices and (3) user autonomy in regard to behavioral alignment. (shrink)