Centering Indigenous philosophical considerations, ecologies are best understood as kinship arrangements among humans, other-than-human beings, and spiritual and abiotic entities who together through the land share a sphere of responsibility based on both care and what Daniel Wildcat calls “multigenerational spatial knowledge.” Ecologically speaking, all kin can become persons by participating in processes of socialization whereby one engages in practices and performances that support responsible relations both within and across ecologies. Spheres of responsibility are not operable strictly within human relationships, (...) nor do what count as responsibilities necessarily center on the human. No being is born a person or automatically earns this status. Personhood must be gained and can be lost. Indeed, under current ecological conditions across the planet, we arguably inhabit a world full of marginal cases. (shrink)

Many share the conviction that wilderness should play a special role in any environmental ethic, even though the concept of wilderness remains contentious. Ever since it has been recognized that the traditional concept of a wilderness as a region “untrammeled” by human beings has a number of intractable difficulties, there has been no consensus on how we should understand wilderness, and most definitions or descriptions of wilderness remain negative (defining wilderness in terms of what it is not). I propose a (...) new ecological concept of wilderness, and show that this concept escapes the difficulties of the traditional concept and its recent alternatives, while being a useful ancillary to some of the leading contemporary theories in environmental ethics. (shrink)

Darwin's phrase “place in natural economy”, andSpencer's term “correspondence” can be regarded as first attempts to express the organism-environment relationships. The same concept has more recently been approached from the point of view of life-form, external activities, and habitat. Though all these points are interlocking, they have been stressed differently in the writings of American and European ecologists. It is proposed that the term “niche” would be most useful and rational if applied to the total of relationships between a living (...) organism and its complete environment, both biotic and abiotic. (shrink)

v. I. Cycles, causality, ecology -- v. II. Evolution & appendices.

This paper is part of a series in which we had worked in the last 6 months, and, specifically, intend to investigate the notion of timbre through the ecological perspective proposed by James Gibson in his Theory of Direct Perception. First of all, we discussed the traditional approach to timbre, mainly as developed in acoustics and psychoacoustics. Later, we proposed a new conception of timbre that was born in concepts of ecological approach. The ecological approach to (...) perception proposed by Gibson (1966, 1979) presupposes a level of analysis of perceptual stimulated that includes, but is quite broader than the usual physical aspect. Gibson suggests as focus the relationship between the perceiver and his environment. At the core of this approach, is the notion of affordances, invariant combinations of properties at the ecological level, taken with reference to the anatomy and action systems of species or individual, and also with reference to its biological and social needs. Objects and events are understood as relates to a perceiving organism by the meaning of structured information, thus affording possibilities of action by the organism. Event perception aims at identifying properties of events to specify changes of the environment that are relevant to the organism. The perception of form is understood as a special instance of event perception, which is the identity of an object depends on the nature of the events in which is involved and what remains invariant over time. From this perspective, perception is not in any sense created by the brain, but is a part of the world where information can be found. Consequently, an ecological approach represents a form of direct realism that opposes the indirect realist based on predominant approaches to perception borrowed from psychoacoustics and computational approach. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to contribute to the substantial body of feminist scholarship on the place of women in Aristotle’s psychic and political hierarchy. Whereas the traditional point of departure for such analyses is more typically Aristotle’s Politics, mine is his hylomorphic or organizational/ecological account of what defines a living thing and its powers in de Anima. My primary claim is that although his de Anima account does offer a more promising view of what defines particular kinds (...) of living things, including human beings qua the power of intellection, it does not ultimately save him from the ambiguity endemic to his account of women’s capacity to deliberate in his Politics. Such a result is significant for feminists who, in seeking nondualistic accounts of embodied human existence, have sometimes turned to Aristotle’s hylomorphism for support, but, I suggest, might be better off to seek such support elsewhere. (shrink)

Riker bases his concept on recent work in psychoanalytic theory, emotion theory, sociobiology, ethnogenic social psychology, and feminism, as well as on the insights of such philosophers as Aristotle, Nietzsche, Whitehead, Heidegger, and ...

This paper looks at some of the ways in which environmental philosophers have sought to press ecological concepts into the service of environmental ethics. It seeks to show that although ecology plays a major role in opening our eyes to sources of value in the natural world, we should not necessarily attempt to build our account of nature’s value upon the concepts which ecology supplies. No description is going to capture nature’s essence; no formula is going to demonstrate its (...) value. We should recognise the natural world as a particular historic individual and relate to it accordingly. This means acknowledging its value in a contingent, conditional and provisional way, and recognizing its value as a precondition of the value of our own lives. (shrink)

This paper outlines an alternative perspective on species that avoids some of the underlying assumptions held by the BSC and other gene-centred species concepts. It begins with a characterisation of the species problem and some of the assumptions underpinning conceptions of species. In particular, the underlying bias of some conceptions (such as the BSC) to focus exclusively on the adult stage of the life cycle in articulating what a species is.

We have become estranged from the cosmic movements, according to Bataille. We are confined by the error linked to the representation of ‘the stationary earth’. We have negated the immersive immanence of the whole and made nature into a fixed world of tools and things. How then do we recognise ourselves as part of the ‘rapture of the heavens’? Bataille urges us to consider life as a solar phenomenon, the free play of solar energy on the earth. This paper argues (...) how Bataille’s cosmic vision anticipates both planetary and ecological thinking. This entails a base materialism of difference based on a radical Nietzschean and Heraclitean theory of becoming and flux. This thought is developed along Bataillean concepts such as the movement of the whole, the labyrinthine, and compound beings, ipseity, as well as the concept of a communifying movement. This materialism paired with Vladimir Vernadsky’s biosphere lays the foundation for the laws of the general economy, which also constitutes an economy inclusive of a general ecology: a tragic vision of Gaia and Dionysos. Finally, poetry is considered, as a way we might reconnect with the universe and stimulate ecological imagination. (shrink)

The interest of this essay is meta-philosophical: I seek to reconstruct neglected concepts of thought available to us given the diverse use South Asian Buddhist philosophers have made of the term-of-art vikalpa. In contemporary Anglophone engagements with Buddhist philosophy, it has come to mean either the categorization and reidentification of particulars in terms of the construction of equivalence classes and/or the representation of extra-mental causes of content. While this does track much that is important in the history of Buddhist philosophy, (...) it is overly restrictive. Based on three examples, this essay reconstructs other concepts of vikalpa available before, during, and after Digṅāga’s epochal reformulation of Buddhist epistemology. The first example takes us away from the familiar context of content introduction in perceptual experience to consider Ratnakīrti’s way of treating cases where one exits from concept-involving modes of engaging content. The second takes up with Vasubandhu and Sthiramati the case of the contents of background awareness. The third and final case builds on the last concern, taking up a discussion of possible worlds in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This last was intended to address the relationship of thought to language. Moving beyond narrowly epistemological concerns allows a more expansive sense of vikalpa to come into view. Doing so, in turn, allows one to see that vikalpa need not indicate only occurrent representations, but also the structured systems of possible discriminations which some Buddhists took to serve as the background for all possible perception, thought, and action. The existence of such a background changes the salience and the value of distinctions drawn between conceptual and non-conceptual contents and experiences. (shrink)

In the literature the term “natural balance” occurs frequently and is used for highly divergent collections of facts and for results arrived at by different methods. In this paper it is attempted to give a review of the many possible meanings of “balance in nature”, and to evaluate the application of the term in the scientific literature.To achieve this twofold objective it seemed useful to start by giving as objective as possible a description of the “balance situation” in natural communities, (...) in analogy with the original physical concept and according to strict scientific criteria. On the basis of this working standard, part of the ecological literature is discussed with respect to statements and presumptions concerning “balance”. The extensive literature is classified according to several groups, on the one hand on the basis of the nature of the views , on the other hand according to the importance that certain authors attach to the theory of a given author. For each of these groups, an evaluation of the content of the term “balance” is given. It was found that the reasoning is not always sound and that the nature of the data on which the concept is based varies widely, which also holds for the method of reasoning applied in the conclusions drawn. In none of the publications arguments were found supporting the existence of a natural “balance situation” as formulated in the standard description. Consequently, it seemed justified to conclude that it is not correct to apply a concept “natural balance”, defined purely scientifically, to natural situations, either because “balance” in the indicated sense is simply not present or because the situation under consideration is not a natural one . The concept “natural balance” has had only heuristic value for scientific research. In other contexts it has a different value, because there criteria other than scientific or methodological ones hold for the content of a concept. It is therefore not objectionable to use the term “natural balance” in common parlance, especially since this usage makes it possible to convey to the layman a great deal in few words. (shrink)

Sound definitions of its basic concepts are fundamental to every scientific discipline. In some instances, like in the case of the ecosystem concept, the question arises if we can define such concepts at all. And if we can define them, how should we choose from the multiple definitions available? And what are the preconditions for a scientifically sound and useful definition? On the basis of the ecosystem concept, this paper illustrates a major, often neglected distinction in the definition of (...) class='Hi'>ecological concepts, namely that between defining criteria and additional descriptive statements connected to those definitions. As is demonstrated by examples from the literature, mixing up these categories leads to false inferences about the properties of physical objects (e.g. a particular forest) subsumed by the concept (e.g. the ecosystem). As a further consequence, this inference becomes problematic in terms of theory development and/or the application of ecological concepts for management decisions. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the common claim that the ascription of ecological functions to organisms in functional ecology raises issues about levels of natural selection is ill-founded. This claim, I maintain, mistakenly assumes that the function concept as understood in functional ecology aligns with the selected effect theory of function advocated by many philosophers of biology (sometimes called “The Standard Line” on functions). After exploring the implications of Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel selection for the prospects of defending (...) a selected effect account of ecological functions, I identify three main ways in which functional ecology’s understanding of the function concept diverges from the selected effect theory. Specifically, I argue (1) that functional ecology conceives ecological functions as context-based rather than history-based properties of organisms; (2) that it attributes to the ecological function concept the aim of explaining ecosystem processes rather than with that of explaining the presence of organisms within ecosystems; and (3) that it conceives the ecological functions of organisms as use and service functions rather than design functions. I then discuss the extent to which the recently proposed causal role and organizational accounts of ecological functions better accord with the purposes for which the ecological concept is used in functional ecology. (shrink)

The devastation arising from multiple factors originating in the Earth System has reached an unprecedented level in the last decades. So much so, that global, industrial civilization can be declared the cause of the shift of climatic and geological history, on Earth, in the age of Anthropocene. Industrial civilization is therefore threatened by consequences arising from its conditions. If civilization is to endure during the climate regime of Anthropocene it will need to transform into a form that allows it to (...) coexist harmoniously within the Earth System. The concept of ecological civilization tries to formulate the principles and imperatives of this transformation. Although it originated in the USA, only in China has it, so far, become part of the public, constitutional and political discourse. This chapter focuses on the philosophical roots of its Chinese version. It illuminates the different meanings associated with the concepts of culture and civilization in Western and Chinese thinking. Although the Chinese version of the concept of ecological civilization follows several Western concepts, it emphasizes traditional Chinese patterns of thought and ways of interpreting the world, especially Daoism. Contrary to the original version of Daoism’s emphasis on the principle of ecological democracy, the Chinese version exhibits authoritarian tendencies and this is reflected in Chinese environmental policies. Finally, the chapter focuses on risks, and inconsistencies, within the concept and with other Chinese policies and suggests ways in which China repeats approaches identifiable as European and North American green policies, not only, in industrialization but, also, in pursuit of green transformation. (shrink)

This article submits a proposal to replace the term sustainability with the term ‘ecological justice’. This novel expression adds to the term Anthropocene, which largely ignores the significant differences from the perspective of justice concerning which human cultures have profoundly reshaped the Earth. Ecological justice refers to the fact that the Earth is the habitat not only of human beings but also of a multitude of other life forms and includes the rights of nonhuman creatures. Over and above (...) this, the term ecological justice speaks to the rights of marginalised people who suffer because of the destruction of natural resources without having significantly contributed to their misuse. In this sense, a new orientation toward the integrity of creation is necessary to overcome the one-sided technicist and economically determined attitude that has become so typical of modern thinking in the Global North. Churches are challenged to develop an integrative concept of ecological justice from the perspective of the biblical tradition, including recent initiatives such as the ‘Wuppertal Call’.Contribution: To overcome generalising and anthropocentric perspectives, the proposal of this article argues for the preferred term, ‘ecological justice’. This term is inclusive to nonhuman communities in nature, taking into account the effects of environmental destruction on marginalised people. The challenge should be to develop an integrative and unifying concept of ecological justice. The following contribution addresses the question of semantics concerning the key concepts underpinning ecological challenges. (shrink)

We examine the evolution of the concept of stability in community ecology, arguing that biologists have moved from an emphasis on biotic communities characterized by static balance, to one of dynamic balance (returning to equilibrium after perturbation), to the current concept of stability as persistence. Using Wimsatt's (1987) analysis of how false models can often lead to better ones, we argue that failed attempts to link complexity with stability have significant heuristic value for community ecologists. Nevertheless, we argue that, (A) (...) because there is no common characteristic that stability terms presuppose, community ecology might be better served by abandoning the concept of stability and by employing instead specific terms such as 'persistence', 'resistance', and 'variability'. (B) The current emphasis (of stability terms) on persistence of species provides little basis for explaining possible mechanisms that might account for persistence. (shrink)

Ricotta argues against the existence of a unique measure of biodiversity by pointing out that no known measure of α-diversity satisfies all the adequacy conditions that have traditionally been set for it. While that technical claim is correct, it is not relevant in the context of defining biodiversity which is most usefully measured by β-diversity. The concept of complementarity provides a closely related family of measures of biodiversity which can be used for systematic conservation planning. Moreover, these measures cannot be (...) replaced by summary statistics but must rely on inventories of biodiversity surrogates at candidate sites for conservation. (shrink)

This paper aims to illustrate one of the primary goals of the philosophy of biology⎯namely, the examination of central concepts in biological theory and practice⎯through an analysis of the concepts of population and metapopulation in evolutionary biology and ecology. I will first provide a brief background for my analysis, followed by a characterization of my proposed concepts: the causal interactionist concepts of population and metapopulation. I will then illustrate how the concepts apply to six cases that differ in their population (...) structure; this analysis will also serve to flesh out and defend the concepts a bit more. Finally, I will respond to some possible questions that my analysis may have raised and then conclude briefly. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic discussion, mainly for non-economists, on economic approaches to the concept of sustainable development. As a first step, the concept of sustainability is extensively discussed. As a second step, the argument that it is not possible to consider sustainability only from an economic or ecological point of view is defended; issues such as economic-ecological integration, inter-generational and intra-generational equity are considered of fundamental importance. Two different economic approaches to environmental issues, i.e. neo-classical environmental economics (...) and ecological economics, are compared. Some key differences such as weak versus strong sustainability, commensurability versus incommensurability and ethical neutrality versus different values acceptance are pointed out. (shrink)

Many edusemiotic writers have begun to closely align edusemitoics to biosemiotics; the basic logic being that, if the life process can be defined through the criterion of semiotic engagement, so can the learning process :373–387, 2006). Thus, the ecological concept of umwelt has come to be a central area of investigation for edusemiotics; allowing theorists to address learning and living concurrently, from the perspective of meaning and significance. To address the conceptual and experiential foundations of the edusemiotic perspective, this (...) paper will focus its attention on the basic semiosic processes that sustain the learner’s primary modelling system or umwelt—the world of meaning and sensory engagement that the organism is immersed in. This focus enables us to identify and explore four basic principles that an ecologically concerned edusemiotic perspective can be said to rest upon; the Iconicity Hypothesis, the Principle of Suprasubjective Relation, the Natural Learning Flow Principle, and the Continuity Principle. The identification and elaboration of these basic philosophical orientations will help establish the importance and relevance of the edusemiotic perspective for educational philosophy and theory in general. This task requires the methodological framework of Sebeok and Danesi’s Modelling Systems Theory, which; provides a biosemiotically grounded approach to understanding the diversity of modelling phenomena across all species, and; contextualizes the specific focus of this study within the broader forms of learning and knowing encompassed by a semiotic theory of learning. Hopefully such attention to the foundational doctrina of this new perspective will encourage more educational research to take what Semetsky has called the edusemiotic turn. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the forgotten friendship between Georges Bataille and the Russian émigré poet and philosopher Boris Poplavsky. Comparing their solar metaphysics, I focus on conceptions of friendship, sacrifice and depersonalisation. First, I retrace Bataille’s relationship to early Surrealis and Russian circles in interwar Paris, with a focus on his friendship with Irina Odoevtseva. I then offer a novel reading of Poplavsky’s poetry through the lens of Bataille’s philosophy, analysing a recurring motif that I call ‘dark solarity’. Uncovering a hidden (...) intertextual dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I argue for Poplavsky’s lasting impact on Bataille’s anti-Icarian sun cult. Finally, my paper demonstrates how Poplavsky’s writings on solar sacrifice, excess and friendship left marks on Bataille’s vision of a solar community, embodied in the secret society Acéphale. The dialogue between Poplavsky and Bataille, I finally suggest, is a missing piece in the entangled history of Russian and French philosophy, as well as an original contribution to discourses on friendship in twentieth-century continental thought. (shrink)

In a series of papers, J. Baird Callicott criticizes the wilderness concept of nature and the associated approach to environmentalism which focuses on the preservation of areas of land free of human intervention. As he notes, this concept rests on a human/nature dualism which defines the natural in opposition to the cultural and the artefactual, and thus in principle places humans outside the natural realm. This makes it conceptually impossible for humans to intervene in nature without denaturing it. Callicott rejects (...) this concept of naturalness for two general kinds of reasons. First, because it is socio-politically oppressive, as it is frequently applied to areas where some aboriginal... (shrink)

This paper compares the views of styles of science of Alistair Crombie and Ian Hacking with the notion of styles of art, as developed by Alois Riegl at the end of the 19th Century. Important similarities are noted, notably in the conceptualization of the autonomy of styles. Riegl developed in particular the notion of Kunstwollen , which encompasses an implied relation to the world, in both a cognitive and an ethical sense, and a relation to the public of art. The (...) latter aspect will be examined as the “role of the spectator”. Finally, a number of Riegl’s view on art are tentatively applied to styles of science. (shrink)

Efforts have been dedicated to the understanding of social-ecological systems, an important focus in ethnobiological studies. In particular, ethnobiological investigations have found evidence and tested hypotheses over the last 30 years on the interactions between human groups and their environments, generating the need to formulate a theory for such systems. In this article, we propose the social-ecological theory of maximization to explain the construction and functioning of these systems over time, encompassing hypotheses and evidence from previous ethnobiological studies. (...) In proposing the theory, we present definitions and two conceptual models, an environmental maximization model and a redundancy generation model. The first model seeks to address biota selection and its use by human populations. The second emphasizes how the system organizes itself from the elements that were incorporated into it. Furthermore, we provide the theoretical scenario of plant selection and use from an evolutionary perspective, which explicitly integrates the phylogenetic relationships of plants (or other living resources) and human beings. (shrink)

Hierarchy of systems organization is used as a framework in advancing methodological guidelines for posing correct questions related to ecological diversity.Diversity if defined in general terms as a property of a set of elements dependent on and determines: by the epistemological perspective. Ontological diversity, because it is indefinite, is regarded as unmeasurable.

In this chapter I consider two different perspectives on what it means to acknowledge and embrace anthropogenic ecological change with respect to ecosystem management and species conservation. On one view, embracing anthropogenic change involves taking greater responsibility for and control of the ecological future. We ought to use our best science and technology to thoughtfully and intentionally manage, and where necessary design and modify, ecological systems and species. On another view, embracing ecological change involves reducing human (...) influences and allowing systems and species space and opportunities to transition and reconfigure without intentionally designing them in accordance with how we think they need or ought to be. Anthropogenic change does not itself imply that there is a responsibility to take an interventionist and control-oriented approach to ecosystem management and species conservation. Whether and when people ought to do so will vary by case and context, not only in accordance with the relevant empirical information, but also in accordance with the operative values as stake. (shrink)

There are two competing conceptions of the nature and domain of ecological science in the popular and academic literature, an orthodox conception and a more expansive conception. The orthodox conception conceives ecology as a natural biological science distinct from the human social sciences. The more expansive conception views ecology as a science whose domain properly spans both the natural and social sciences. On the more expansive conception, non-traditional ecological disciplines such as ecological (...) psychology , ecological anthropology and ecological economics may legitimately be regarded as sub-disciplines of ecology, and the practitioners of such disciplines as ecologists. The orthodox-expansionist issue is significant both for the practice of ecology and for the self-identity of the philosophy of ecology. I argue in favour of the expansionist conception of ecology on general conceptual grounds, and by developing the case for one particular non-traditional ecological discipline, ecological psychology. (shrink)

Concepts and Conceptual Development draws together theorists from a wide range of theoretical orientations to consider many different aspects of 'the psychology ...

Ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that the best explanation for a large share of cognition is nonrepresentational in kind. In both ecological psychology and enactivist philosophy, then, the task is to offer an explanans that does not rely on representations. Different theorists within these camps have contrasting notions of what the best kind of nonrepresentational explanation will look like, yet they agree on one central point: instead of focusing solely on factors interior to an agent, an important aspect (...) of cognition is found in the link or coupling between an agent and the external world. This link is fluid, dynamic, and active in a variety of ways, and we do not need to add any internal extra something in the perception-action-cognition process. At the same time, even devout defenders of ecological psychology and enactivism recognize that plenty happens inside an agent during cognition. In particular, no one denies that the brain plays an important role. What, then, is the role of the brain if it’s not in the game of representing the environment? One possible option is to describe the brain as a resonant organ instead of a representational organ. In this paper we consider the history of resonance in more detail. Particular focus will be placed on two different sets of approaches that have developed the concept of resonance: a representational reading of resonance and a nonrepresentational, dynamic account of resonance. We then apply these accounts to a case study on music performance, specifically in the context of standard tonal jazz. From this application, we propose that a nonrepresentational resonance account consistent with both enactivism and ecological psychology is a viable way of explaining jazz performance. We conclude with future considerations on research regarding the brain as a resonant organ. (shrink)

The concept of ‘resistance’ has turned into a critical tool in different areas of political, philosophical and sociological thought. At the same time, the notion seems to be as productive as it is diffuse. ‘Resistance’ is used in very specific contexts in scientific or technical disciplines, and with extreme flexibility in social and cultural studies. In the latter two areas, the concept is often used without prior reflection on its characteristics and limitations. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze provides a possible (...) framework for conceiving cultural and political practices of resistance as positions of force, when he defines contraction as ‘a contemplation that preserves the preceding in the following’. The purpose of this article is to understand political ecologism in its activist and poetical dimensions, in light of a Deleuzian interpretation of resistance. (shrink)

Like biodiversity, sustainability is a buzz word in current conservation discourse. And like biodiversity, sustainability evokes positive associations. According to Allen and Hoekstra, “everyone agrees that sustainability is a good thing.” Both sustainability and biodiversity, however, are at grave risk of being coopted by people primarily concerned about things other than biological conservation. As Noss notes, “virtually everyone who has used the term sustainability seems to have had ‘human needs and aspirations’ as their primary concern.” Amgermeier and Angermeier and Karr (...) point out that local biodiversity can be artificially increased by introducing nonindigenous species into a biotic community; and, indeed, sports fisherpersons more concerned about angling opportunities than about biological conservation have cloaked their argument for introducing nonindigenous game fish to the Great Lakes in the mantle of enhanced biodiversity. (shrink)

Because of the problems associated with ecological concepts, generalizations, and proposed general theories, applied ecology may require a new "logic" of explanation characterized neither by the traditional accounts of confirmation nor by the logic of discovery. Building on the works of Grunbaum, Kuhn, and Wittgenstein, we use detailed descriptions from research on conserving the Northern Spotted Owl, a case typical of problem solving in applied ecology, to (1) characterize the method of case studies; (2) survey its strengths; (3) summarize (...) and respond to its shortcomings; and (4) investigate and defend its underlying "logic". (shrink)

We argue that ecologists have conceived of the community concept in at least three ways, and that ecologists have used “community,” as indicated by ecological terminology, in two main ways. The typological conception emphasizes phenomenological descriptions of co-occurring species, the functional conception emphasizes mathematical relationships among co-occurring species, and the statistical conception emphasizes the frequency of species’ co-occurrence. The type usage emphasizes idealized “types,” and the group usage emphasizes quantitative boundaries and/or mathematically precise interactions. We further (...) argue that all of these senses of “community” are problematic. Ecologists seem unable to say precisely what a community is, in part because of the difficulty of measuring community properties, determining the temporal and spatial scale for various communities, and evaluating the different meanings attributed to community terms. We suggest that although and appear to be difficulties that are heuristically useful for future ecological theorizing, does not. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Mountaintop Removal (MTR) is part of what I call “ecological violence.” Whereas the common conception of violence perceives it as harm directly inflicted against an individual by a person or group, I seek to illuminate a form of violence that operates in the complex interrelation between people and the environing world they disclose through their practices. Ecological violence, as I understand it, is ecological in that it concerns the practices through (...) which humans understand and uncover beings in their surrounding environments. It is violent in that it is concerned with practices that sever people and other beings from the relations necessary for their authentic being. MTR, I argue, is violent in just this sense. To make sense of the concept of “ecological violence” I draw on the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and György Lukács. (shrink)