When, on December 7, 2000, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission proclaimed solemnly in Nice the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, many thought that European integration was practically guaranteed and that the Charter would soon be made into a binding legal text. Since then, the two attempts to enact a European consitution - the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union of 2004 and the arguably less ambitious Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 - both failed. (...) Further efforts at unification have stagnated, in part due to the 2008 economic crisis and the European Union’s inability to coordinate responses to issues as serious as immigration, the refugee crisis, and terrorism. In this paper, I examine a theoretical counterpoint to that bleak perspective for European unification, to wit, Jürgen Habermas’ eurofederalist proposal of the postnational democracy and European constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Economic globalization has resulted in the transfer of national power to supranational actors and their supranational procedures and institutions. Concomitant with this trend is the ascendancy of the discourses of democracy and human rights that have given rise to the idea of cosmopolitan justice. These trends, in turn, have weakened statehood [ Entstaatlichung ], requiring theoretical envisioning and practical institutionalization of a supranational model of political association. Among the competing theories, in this article I will defend the Kantian project of (...) constitutionalization of international law. In doing so, I take the doctrine of constitutional patriotism as an appropriate model of supranational political association in the European Union and defend it against the republican critique that rejects the idea as deficient. I argue that the European project of constitution-making can overcome the charges of democratic deficit and the lack of European demos by establishing the terms and conditions for democratic negotiation and institutionalizing shared practices of law-making. Key Words: constitutional patriotism • democratic deficit • the European Union • nation-state • supranational political community. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to look at some questions that arise when we try to abandon the conceptual and political framework of the nation-state. Is it impossible to conceive the unity of the state apart from the unity of the nation? Are shared political values insufficient to account for the existence of bounded states and special duties to one's own country? In the first section I will discuss the view that the idea of the modern state is incoherent and (...) that it tacitly relies on the social idea of membership provided by the nation. The following section will give an alternative to the nationalist account of the exist ence of bounded communities and suggest why Habermasians and Rawlsians are right in thinking that the shared value of justice can be sufficient for political unity. Finally, I give a brief indication of the rel evance of this discussion to the idea of European Union. Key Words: boundaries. • collective intentionality • constitutional patriotism • European Union • liberal unity • post-national identity. (shrink)

When, on December 7, 2000, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission proclaimed solemnly in Nice the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, many thought that European integration was practically guaranteed and that the Charter would soon be made into a binding legal text. Since then, the two attempts to enact a European consitution – the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union of 2004 and the arguably less ambitious Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 – both failed. (...) Further efforts at unification have stagnated, in part due to the 2008 economic crisis and the European Union’s inability to coordinate responses to issues as serious as immigration, the refugee crisis, and terrorism. In this paper, I examine a theoretical counterpoint to that bleak perspective for European unification, to wit, Jürgen Habermas’ eurofederalist proposal of the postnational democracy and European constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Habermas’s interventions in German political affairs gave rise to the concept of constitutional Patriotism. His earlier theoretical work did not revisit the idea in any distinct manner. Moral Consciousness, I argue, has traces of a legal identity and universal morality. While interpreting Kohlberg’s work, Habermas did not seek to tie the concept of citizenship or political identity into his account of Moral Consciousness. The concepts of political identity and a legal orientation come up, more recently and in a (...) clearly observable manner, in Habermas’s writings on Europe. His writings and speeches delivered on the idea of Europe before the Eurozone crises as well as those published and delivered after the crises refer to a strong sense of Constitutional Patriotism understood in the European sense. It is this idea that I would like to dwell on in this paper. (shrink)

In a modern, plural society, there can be no settled agreement on the concrete legal content of a country's constitution. The idea of the constitution is nonetheless pivotal in contemporary, liberal‐minded theories of political justification, such as the ones advanced by Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. Justification in these theories depends finally on “constitutional patriotism,” a consciously shared sentiment arising from an ethical assessment of their country by the country's people, according to which the country credibly pursues a (...) certain regulative political ideal for which the constitution stands. (shrink)

Political theorists tend to dismiss the concept of constitutional patriotism for two main reasons. On the one hand, constitutional patriotism — understood as a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance — is rejected on account of its abstract quality. On the otherhand, it is argued that constitutional patriotism, while apprearing universalist, is in fact particular through and through. According to this genealogical critique, it is held that constitutional patriotism might have been (...) appropriate in the context when it originated — namely West Germany, a half-nation with a deeply compromised sense of nationality on account of the Nazi past — but it is not universally applicable. This article reconstructs the origins of constitutional patriotism arguing that both the ‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, and the ‘purifying’ patriotism of Jurgen Habermas — focused mainly on the public sphere — can indeed be understood as relying on ‘supplements of particularily’. However, there are also normative connections between universalist constitutional morality and militant democracy on the one hand, and universalist constitutionalist morality and an imperative to remember on the other. Thus, the genealogical critique by itself is insufficient to invalidate the idea of constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Political theorists tend to dismiss the concept of constitutional patriotism for two main reasons. On the one hand, constitutional patriotism — understood as a post-national, universalist form of democratic political allegiance — is rejected on account of its abstract quality. On the otherhand, it is argued that constitutional patriotism, while apprearing universalist, is in fact particular through and through. According to this genealogical critique, it is held that constitutional patriotism might have been (...) appropriate in the context when it originated — namely West Germany, a half-nation with a deeply compromised sense of nationality on account of the Nazi past — but it is not universally applicable. This article reconstructs the origins of constitutional patriotism arguing that both the ‘protective’ and state-centred patriotism of Dolf Sternberger, and the ‘purifying’ patriotism of Jurgen Habermas — focused mainly on the public sphere — can indeed be understood as relying on ‘supplements of particularily’. However, there are also normative connections between universalist constitutional morality and militant democracy on the one hand, and universalist constitutionalist morality and an imperative to remember on the other. Thus, the genealogical critique by itself is insufficient to invalidate the idea of constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

Constitutional patriotism has been criticized for providing too thin an identity as the ground for common citizenship. Answering this criticism, Habermas recently stressed the role of affective attachments in creating constitutional patriotic bonds. Still, an account of the type of imagination that could foster such post-national affective attachments is lacking. Drawing on Herder's conception of political culture, I argue that constitutional patriotism requires a modern form of mythology. This would include narratives that shape people's imaginative (...) capacity to see their own culture as a vulnerable and fallible part of a plural mankind and as a free and equal contributor to the global advancement toward humanity. In contrast to ideological mythology, an enlightened use of myth would engage the interactive and communicative potential of poetic images in ways that shape a common feeling of humanity. In short, Habermas’ constitutional patriotism requires supplementing the power of law to create bonds between people. This can be done through the cultivation of imaginative engagements with foreign others. Such imaginative engagements would shape good dispositions that are conducive to tolerance, peace and justice. This addition also allows Habermas’ argument for constitutional patriotism to better answer the communitarian accusation of supranationalism. (shrink)

Habermas proposes a new solution to the problematic relation between republican values and democracy. He asserts that a new model of social cohesion is needed and he suggests that the sense of community in a democratic society should be founded exclusively on the acceptance and support of a system of constitutionally established rules which are the logical result of the historical evolution of constitution-making. He argues that an account of the constitutional process which led to the formation of the (...) modern republican state should provide the criteria for a rational set of norms which will exclude nationalism from the political arena. In this article, I point out the democratic hazards and the internal incoherence of Habermass alternative to the national state and I argue that a theoretical substitute should consider the existence of national identities as one of the aspects of modern pluralistic society. (shrink)

Liberalism and pluralism are seen as being in tension in liberal Western nation-states, while multiculturalism, as a policy of resource allocation to minority groups, has been the standard response to pluralization. This limits the pluralist potential of a constitutional liberalism. The fusion of a liberal theory of autonomous individuality with a pluralist theory of multiple belonging has to look beyond multicultural policy in order to enhance liberal commitments to citizens through pluralist provisions. An analysis of the Indian Constitution's Fundamental (...) Rights, as a normative document, shows that the citizen can be understood as an autonomous individual given identity through belonging to a plurality of groups. Consequently, rights are taken to accrue to all citizens equally as autonomous individuals, but also by virtue of their belonging to groups, with special provisions made available for vulnerable ones. Rights for a plurality of vulnerable groups should not be seen as illiberal additions but integral to the conception of liberalism. If such a view of citizenship were to be integrated into the liberal constitutions of irreversibly pluralizing Western democracies, then a pluralistic constitutional patriotism could be fostered amongst members of vulnerable groups, while demonstrating that standard liberal rights guarantee equal citizenship for all. (shrink)

Some commentators worry that a plurinational constitutional order can only ever be an inherently unstable modus vivendi. They fear that the accommodation of sub-state nationalism will tend to undermine the viability of constitutional democracies. This article enlists Ronald Dworkin's theory of ‘law as integrity’ to show how these concerns might be assuaged. My central claim is that the expressive value of integrity can drive a divided society in the direction of an eventual community of principle, even in the (...) absence of a common political identity. I argue that this model of political community is a more plausible prescription for divided societies than the theory that competing nationalisms might be superseded by constitutional patriotism. I go on to explain, however, that integrity has a better chance of realizing this potential if the generally judge-centric focus of Dworkin's theory is expanded to make greater room for non-judicial interpretative responsibility. Occasional references are made to the example of Northern Ireland to illustrate my points. (shrink)

This paper centres on the question as to whether human rights can be reconciled with patriotism. It lays out the more conventional arguments which perceive them as incommensurable concepts. A central aspect of this incommensurability relates to the close historical tie between patriotism and the state. One further dimension of this argument is then articulated, namely, the contention that patriotism is an explicitly political concept. The implicit antagonism between, on the one hand, the state, politics and (...) class='Hi'>patriotism, and, on the other hand, human rights, is illustrated via the work of Carl Schmitt. However, in the last few decades there has been a resurgence of interest in patriotism and an attempt to formulate a more moderate form, which tries to reconcile itself with universal ethical themes. Some of these arguments are briefly summarised; the discussion then focuses on Jürgen Habermas’s understanding of constitutional patriotism. This is seen to provide an effective response to Schmitt’s arguments. There are weaknesses in the constitutional patriotic argument which relate to its limited understanding of both the state and politics. This leads me to formulate my own argument for “unpatriotic patriotism.” The discussion then examines and responds to certain potential criticisms of this argument. (shrink)

If patriotism is morally unacceptable, as some philosophers believe, then also education for patriotism cannot be tolerated, although some other non-moral reasons might be in favour of such education. However, it seems that not all types of patriotism can be convincingly rejected as morally unacceptable. Even more, if MacIntyre’s claim is correct that patriotism is not only a virtue but also the foundation of morality, then schools ought to cultivate patriotism. For, in this context, (...) class='Hi'>patriotism is morally required. But if this claim is mistaken and some sorts of patriotism are at best only morally allowed, as Primoratz argues, then schools are not obliged to cultivate patriotism. Although they are not required to cultivate it, they may promote morally acceptable types of patriotism such as “moderate patriotism”, “constitutional patriotism”, “republican patriotism” and “cosmopolitan patriotism”. And the contrary, extreme patriotism which leads to hostility towards other countries, international tensions and conflicts should not be promoted in schools. Therefore, the answer to the question as to whether education for patriotism is morally required, permitted or unacceptable depends on which kind of patriotism is being discussed. (shrink)

In this article I critically engage some of the philosophical ideas Kleingeld presents in Kant and Cosmopolitanism, namely patriotism, poverty and global justice. Against Kleingeld, I propose, first, that perhaps democracy is less important and affectionate love more so to both Kant himself as well as to an account that can successfully refute a Bernard Williams style objection to Kantian patriotism; second, that guaranteeing unconditional poverty relief for all its citizens is constitutive of the minimally just state for (...) Kant; and, third, that there seem to be more disanalogies between the domestic and the global public authorities in Kant's account of right than Kleingeld's interpretation allows for. (shrink)

The paper discusses the identity-building power and motivational force of patriotism. The basic idea underlying the discussion is that far from being a mere irrational and destructive force, patriotism is an expression of ‘existing human social identity.’ Thus, it argues that rather than dismissing patriotism altogether as an undesirable and/or irrational phenomenon, we need to understand how to discriminate between alternative forms of patriotism while investigating what constitutional reforms might be required to support those forms (...) of patriotic identification that are morally desirable. I argue that to flourish, desirable forms of patriotism (what I call Ethical Patriotism) require a political milieu where forms of subsidiarity, functional representation and local participation combine to produce a more democratic and decentralized system of governance. Applied to a post-national polity like the EU, this conclusion invites to rethink the European constitutional project so as to make it less elitist and more open to influence and participation from below. Keywords: cosmopolitanism; communitarianism; identity; nationalism; governance; Europe (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 321–348. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2002. (shrink)

This article examines the moral, political and pedagogical tensions that are created from the entanglement of patriotism and human rights, and sketches a response to these tensions in the context of critical education. The article begins with a brief review of different forms of patriotism, especially as those relate to human rights, and explains why some of these forms may be morally or politically valuable. Then, it offers a brief overview of human rights critiques, especially from the perspectives (...) of Foucault, critical legal studies and postcolonial theory, and emphasizes that foundationalist perspectives of human rights need to be constantly contested. The next part of the article discusses how to overcome issues of incompatibility between patriotism and human rights. The final part proposes that a ‘rapprochement’ between patriotism and human rights in the context of critical education has to take into consideration that patriotic feelings (as a form of love for one’s country) constitute a particular form of ‘emotional education’. As such, the teaching of both patriotism and human rights would benefit from the notion of ‘critical pedagogies of emotion’ that interrogates the emotional commitments of patriotism and human rights and the consequences of these commitments. (shrink)

The thesis of my dissertation is that patriotism, and specifically Hegelian constitutional patriotism, is rational. I demonstrate from the standpoint of Hegel’s Logic that the state can have a greater or lesser degree of adequacy to its concept—which is freedom itself—and the more adequate it is, the more rational it is. I conclude that patriotic acts supporting such a state are rational if they give this rationality a practical expression.

This book is a lively intellectual history of a small circle of thinkers, especially, but not solely, Harry Jaffa and Walter Berns, who challenged the "mainstream" liberal consensus of political science and history about how the American Founding should be understood. Along the way they changed the course of the conservative movement and had a significant impact on shaping contemporary political debates from constitutional interpretation, civil rights, to the corruption of government today. Most importantly, these thinkers explain the deep (...) reasons for patriotism--why we should love America not just because it is our country, but because it is a free and just country. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that political philosophers like Rawls and Habermas that characterize their methods as non-metaphysical or postmetaphysical depend on constitutions in order to provide a positive and public reference point for democratic participants. Michelman shows how this dependency is problematic, by contending that disagreement about the meaning of constitutional rights and the indeterminacy of their application undermines the rationality of consensus. I argue that his concerns raise serious problems for Rawls’ theory. Habermas, on the other hand, (...) has some tools to deal with Michelman’s critique — namely, his distinction between discourses of justification and application, and his idea of constitutional patriotism — but he must concede that much of the substance of constitutional democracy is basically up for grabs. I conclude by suggesting why these consequences are less threatening than they may seem. (shrink)

The official patriotic narrative that emerged in the USSR during the Stalin period shows the continuity of imperial models that served to constitute "love of the fatherland". This article presents several concepts about the formation of imperial patriotism prevalent in the course of history; it identifies tendencies of interaction between cultural tradition and foreign models. It also shows the principal possibility of combining patriotism with other forms of unifying and mobilizing discourses. The official patriotic discourse of the Stalin (...) era is analyzed as an eclectic ideological construct that, to a large extent, relied on the tradition of imperial patriotic education. The constants distinguishing Russian - Soviet patriotism include the representation of Russia 's imperial past, viewing the question of a multi-national state through the paradigm of the empire's "civilizing mission", and patriotism as an integral part of public political education. Some of the elements fundamental for Soviet "love of the fatherland" are preserved in modern Russian patriotism as for instance in the form of " Soviet " nostalgia or representations of militant "statehood". (shrink)

Two impulses dominated northern and central Italy in the late thirteenth century. One was the striving of cities for self-sufficiency and increased power. The other was the papal thrust toward political as well as religious overlordship. Often policies of the papacy and certain cities were linked by memories and fears of imperial interference. Ptolemy of Lucca's histories reflected his keen awareness of this situation. His more theoretical political works, the Determinatio compendiosa and the continuation of Aquinas's De regimine principum, did (...) more: they furnished remarkably supple and sophisticated ideological justifications of the views of municipal patriots and ecclesiastical zealots, and included as well stinging attacks on imperial claims in Italy. On the civic level Ptolemy was a republican, both on grounds of Italian pride and an early acquaintance with Aristotle's Politics. As N. Rubinstein remarks, “Ptolemy of Lucca's re-appraisal of the Politics constitutes the most vigorous formulation Italian communal theory had yet received by the beginning of the fourteenth century.” Ptolemy, in fact, was the first Italian republican who could justify his position in a theoretically competent way. But on the wider ecclesiastical level he was a vigorous monarchist. His Determinatio was an early and influential exposition of high papalist views, and although written about 1278, it has been called “the key to the whole vast ecclesio-political polemic of the fourteenth century.” Even by the middle of that century its arguments still seemed so contemporary that a new and extended version of it was prepared in 1342. (shrink)

In current debates on "constitutional" and "republican" patriotisms, the relationship between religion and patriotism is underappreciated while alternative forms of patriotism in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy have escaped scholarly attention. The present essay explores "another" patriotism in wartime Japan by comparing and contrasting the patriotism of two Protestant thinkers: Tsukamoto Toraji and Yanaihara Tadao. A close analysis of Yanaihara's patriotism in particular shows that there was an alternative form of patriotism which, from (...) a Christian perspective, combated militaristic nationalism which was anchored in State Shinto, thereby suggesting a significant link between religion and patriotism. (shrink)

_The purpose_ of the article is to clarify the most relevant philosophical dimensions of modern patriotism against the background of defending the processes of national identity. _The theoretical basis_ of the study consisted of institutional analysis, synergetic and philosophical-anthropological approaches, as well as existential philosophy and philosophy of applied ethics. Patriotism is seen as a path to self-expression, the world of life, mental self-limitation and self-aggrandizement of modern man. The peculiarities of modern considerations about the philosophical content of (...) patriotism within the framework of its comparison with other value structures, such as cosmopolitanism, liberalism, nationalism, etc., are established. _Originality._ The scientific novelty is that the article for the first time reveals the correlations of patriotism with other ideological and ideological doctrines and systems of political and social worldview, which fix the identity of individuals and groups in the context of ethnic, social or political community. _Conclusions._ The existential dimension of patriotism is based on worldviews of involvement in the local community. Trends in globalization are forcing modern people to "seek refuge" in small communities, or even in a family or other small group. "Local" or "neighborhood" patriotism acquires the character of an expression of involvement in a friend and relative. It almost completely "crosses out" the constitutional and ideological patriotism inherent in the states of the twentieth century. The reorientation of significant philosophical justifications of patriotism in modern conditions provokes a discussion about the spirituality and societal nature of patriotic meanings. In the struggle for the independence of modern Ukraine, we are all witnessing the process of overcoming "state" patriotism "local". This process is very important in the face of opposition to the totalitarian ideology of the Russian aggressor. (shrink)

What kind of discourse is likely to build up constitutional norms? How do legal-philosophical insights get along with competing political claims? This book presents the main conclusions from the CITC (Congreso Internacional de Teoria Constitucional) in Cordoba, Argentina. While addressing the very foundations of Constitutional Law, leading scholars from Europe and America got together to debate legal and political issues which impinge upon institutional design and polity assessment, political representation and rights protection. Not to mention other vexing challenges (...) such as the proper latitude of judicial review, the threatening phenomena of untamed emergency powers and the current international dimension of supra-national state-building. Beyond governance and human rights discourse, the core content of this book is concentrated on shedding some light on which theoretical and/or political conditions could better stand and give shelter to civil obedience and constitutional patriotism. (shrink)

During the years leading up to World War I, America experienced a crisis of civic identity. How could a country founded on liberal principles and composed of increasingly diverse cultures unite to safeguard individuals and promote social justice? In this book, Jonathan Hansen tells the story of a group of American intellectuals who believed the solution to this crisis lay in rethinking the meaning of liberalism. Intellectuals such as William James, John Dewey, Jane Addams, Eugene V. Debs, and W. E. (...) B. Du Bois repudiated liberalism's association with acquisitive individualism and laissez-faire economics, advocating a model of liberal citizenship whose virtues and commitments amount to what Hansen calls cosmopolitan patriotism. Rooted not in war but in dedication to social equity, cosmopolitan patriotism favored the fight against sexism, racism, and political corruption in the United States over battles against foreign foes. Its adherents held the domestic and foreign policy of the United States to its own democratic ideals and maintained that promoting democracy universally constituted the ultimate form of self-defense. Perhaps most important, the cosmopolitan patriots regarded critical engagement with one's country as the essence of patriotism, thereby justifying scrutiny of American militarism in wartime. (shrink)

In 1771, Rousseau was asked to write a constitution for Poland. He replied with The Government of Poland. It is his last political work. At one point he describes the sort of Pole he hopes to produce: his �love of the fatherland . . . makes up his entire existence: he has eyes only for the fatherland, lives only for his fatherland; the moment he is alone, he is a mere cipher; the moment he has no fatherland, he is no (...) more; if not dead, he is worse-off than if he were dead�. On the face of it, this looks more like the description of a problem than any solution. I will explain how the mad patriotism of the Government of Poland is indeed a solution. I will treat it as a response to the general modern problem of �life in others� that Rousseau found endemic to big cities such as Paris, and which he has Saint-Preux detail in his letters from Paris to Julie in Book II of La Nouvelle Heloise. I begin with a short account of life in others, follow this with an account of how patriotism solves this problem, and conclude with an attempt to make Rousseau's patriotism less frightening, more necessary, and slightly more possible than it seems at first glance. (shrink)

Summary. The article deals with the close link between the diminishing influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on social and political processes in Ukraine and the restoration of the Ukrainian cultural and civilizational space. Namely, the gradual deprivation of Orthodox believers of the post-imperial syndrome, including attitudes, perceptions, behavioral models, etc., associated with the stay of Ukrainians in the foreign-language and other people's mentality and culture of the empire. It is noted that the receipt of the Tomos on recognition of autocephaly (...) and the constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine by Orthodox believers of Ukraine has a positive impact not only on the development of the OCU itself, but also the level of patriotism, restoration and development of the Ukrainian-speaking environment, archetypal traditions, rituals, behavior models, etc. The conclusion is about the religious aspect of promoting Ukrainian development from the Asian to the European cultural and civilizational model. (shrink)

Although Frederick Douglass disclaimed any patriotism or love of the United States in the years when he considered its constitution to be pro-slavery, I argue that he was in fact always a patriot and always a lover of his country. This conclusion leads me to argue further that patriotism is not as expressly political as many philosophers suppose. Patriots love their country despite its politics and often unreasonably, although in loving their country they are concerned with its politics. (...) The greatest among them freely dedicate themselves selflessly to the improvement of their country, partly because they love it, and partly because they are moved to take on great projects. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article states that patriotism constitutes a key role in the process of globalization. The author perceives the moral dimension of nation and homeland categories as the validation of such a position. Patriotism, which is not chauvinism, deeply connects with its own nation, as well as homeland, and due to its very nature, should be open to foreigners and other nations.

The susceptibility of Habermas' socio-political theory to the charge of motivational impotence can be traced to a problem in the way in which he conceives of discursive practical reason. By implicitly constructing the notion of discursive rationality in contrast to, and in abstraction from, the rhetorical and affective components of language use, Habermas' notion of discursive practical reason ends up reiterating the same binaries — between reason and passion, abstract and concrete, universal and particular — that provide the tacit parameters (...) used by his critics to motivate the charge of impotence. Habermas' project of reconciling social integration and political rule with freedom can succeed only by rebuilding his discourse -ethical theory of politics upon a notion of discursive practical reason that overcomes these philosophy/rhetoric binaries common to both camps. Key Words: communicative action • constitutional patriotism • discourse ethics • Jürgen Habermas • practical reason • rhetoric. (shrink)

The emergence of the European Union as an autonomous actor, to some degree independent of its member states, raises the issue of a common European identity. Nowadays, this identity is predominantly understood in universalistic terms. This is evident in Jürgen Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, which represents an attempt to integrate the EU on the basis of universal legal-political norms. This universalism is, however, problematic because identity is a relational notion and requires the constitution of a particular boundary. Although Habermas (...) admits the necessity of drawing a distinction between the inside and the outside, his universalistic approach, which ignores cultural aspects, prevents the marking out of a substantive boundary. By contrast, the article asserts the view that European identity can be delineated only in virtue of its being distinct from some concrete out-groups and that, in addition to the normative dimension, redefined as particular, such an identity must also include a value one. (shrink)

In his recent book Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World, Philippe Van Parijs argues in favor of the dissemination of English as the lingua franca. This, however, might entail certain forms of injustice. In the first part of this contribution, the three forms of injustice that Van Parijs discusses are presented along with his three respective solutions to these problems. At the same time, some criticisms on each of these forms are mentioned which have come forth in recent (...) literature. The second part of this paper examines the claim underlying Van Parijs’s book, viz. that it is a good thing to promote English as a common language. According to Van Parijs, this is necessary for developing an egalitarian conception of global justice as well as implementing such a conception. This article scrutinizes both of these arguments which are only briefly touched on in the book. I argue that a lingua franca is not a necessary condition for developing and implementing such an egalitarian conception. I defend this position through a close study of Van Parijs’s conception of deliberative democracy, which is a very demanding one. I show that even in a system of deliberative democracy, a common language is not a necessary condition for developing an egalitarian conception of justice. With reference to the theory of constitutional patriotism, I then argue that common values, rather than a common language, are more important for developing and implementing such a conception. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss the type of attachment and allegiance propounded in the recently proclaimed Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Charters such as Bills of Rights are generally held to be reflective of and evocative of a rights-based constitutional patriotism. The EU is not a state; there are widely different conceptions of what it is and should be, one of which is the vision of a Europe of nation states. Is the (...) spirit of the Charter thus instead that of deep diversity, i.e. reflective of a wide diversity of views, visions and values as to what the EU is and ought to be? The article contrasts constitutional patriotism and deep diversity as alternative underlying philosophies of the Charter and also briefly examines the Charter's presumed ability to produce either type of sentiment of allegiance. (shrink)

Tocqueville's chapter on the American Constitution reflects on the attempt to superimpose a large-scale union upon what was originally a loose collection of self-governing local democracies. The latter are communities which draw easily from the natural basis for public-spiritedness, which is local patriotism. The constitutional system, on the other hand, must nurture loyalty to a union whose core is a set of legal formalities specifying the allocation of powers. Tocqueville shows that the federal union avoids the combination of (...) republicanism with extreme centralization that was sought by the revolutionaries in France. Nevertheless, the constitutional system harbours a tension between the original, more natural sources of civic loyalty and the abstract principles necessary for a national structure based upon complex theories of federation. The insight into this tension between constitutional idea and local democratic practice is at the heart of Tocqueville's reservations about the future of the union. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rethinking "Intersectionality":Michelle Obama, Presumed Subjects, and Constitutive PrivilegeErin C. TarverIn February 2008, Michelle Obama famously said to a gathering of supporters, "For the first time in my adult life, I am really proud of my country." (Associated Press 2008). Her comment was swiftly seized upon by journalists and members of rival political campaigns, who used it to portray Mrs. Obama as "angry" and unpatriotic. In the weeks that followed, (...) Mrs. Obama's undergraduate sociology thesis on black students at Princeton was cited as further evidence of her supposed racial resentment and lack of patriotism, and there were widespread rumors that an audiotape existed of her using the word whitey.1 Around the same time, Fox News ran a headline referring to Mrs. Obama as "Obama's Baby Mama" (Koppleman 2008). Subsequently, there was a concerted effort on the part of Mr. Obama's campaign to "soften" her image through appearances on the shows The View and Paula's Party, and a speech at the Democratic National Convention that highlighted her motherhood and adoration of her husband, and avoided mention of her own career or political work. Despite such efforts, and perhaps in tension with the Obama family's general popularity following Mr. Obama's election, Mrs. Obama was later characterized by a cable news pundit as being reminiscent of "Stokely Carmichael in a designer dress" (The O'Reilly Factor 2009) and thus as a potential political liability for the Obama administration.While some feminists decried the "momification" (Traister 2008) of Michelle Obama as an act of appeasement by an administration that would [End Page 150] capitulate to the oppressive expectations of a public unwilling to find expressions of independent thought or professional ambitions appropriately First Lady-like, other critics noted that Mrs. Obama was being reviled more for daring to suggest that the United States' racial history was far from being strictly historical, opening her to the charge of being an angry Negro—while, ironically, being accused of "playing the race card." Others have pointed out that specific formulations such as "baby mama" are illustrative of the fact that such representations of Mrs. Obama are not easily classifiable as either sexist or racist, but instead draw on both sorts of tropes, as have such familiar representations of black women as promiscuous, or as militant, emasculating mammies.In this article, I consider methodologies for theorizing the function of such oppressions in the public discourses surrounding Michelle Obama, and suggest that a consideration of their manifestations in this context illustrates the need for more complex theoretical tools that can problematize the constitutive effects of such discourse for a multiplicity of subjects. Through parallel analyses of Beauvoir's The Second Sex and Fanon's Black Skin White Masks, I foreground the theoretical pitfall the consideration of sex- or race-based oppressions tends to occasion: the tacit presumption of some ostensibly "neutral" subject whose constitution is inadequately addressed. I suggest, with theorists of intersectionality, that this problem will not be solved merely by the addition of alternative explanatory frameworks (e.g., adding racism to sexism as a discrete phenomenon), since doing so is neither adequately representative of the experience of oppressions nor sufficient to the task of undermining the normative/perverse dichotomy or presumption of generic subjectivity that sustains them. However, I also argue that the work of intersectionality theorists should be taken farther than it has frequently been in the past (which, though given lip service by much of the feminist community, has not always been taken to imply the need for a major methodological shift), extending its insights to offer a critique of foundational subjectivity. Concomitantly, I argue that a failure by feminist philosophers to offer this critique could unintentionally result in the reinscription of the normativity of particular sorts of subjects—which is precisely what theorists of intersectionality have been concerned to call into question. I suggest that an analysis of the discourse surrounding Michelle Obama demonstrates that insofar as the intersectionality paradigm is understood merely to require the interrogation of overlapping oppressions on a given subject or subjects, and thus as leaving uninterrogated the constitutively privileging and subjectivizing effects of oppressive discourse, uses of intersectionality will reiterate... (shrink)