PARANORMAL IS ABNORMAL ACTION OF MIND ON MATTER.\\ ONE NEEDS FIRST A THEORY OF NORMAL ACTION OF MIND ON MATTER.\\ CLASSICAL THEORY INADEQUATE: NO `MIND' IN THE DYNAMICS.\\ QUANTUM THEORY IS FORMULATED AS A THEORY OF MIND-MATTER INTERPLAY!\\ SIMPLER THAN CLASSICAL PHYSICS!\\ I SHALL:\\ 1. SHOW HOW QUANTUM THEORY OF MIND-MATTER IS CONSTRUCTED.\\ 2. DO TWO IMPORTANT MIND-MATTER CALCULATIONS.\\ 3. LOOK AT RAMIFICATIONS FOR PARANORMAL.

The population ethics literature has long focused on attempts to avoid the repugnant conclusion. We show that a large set of social orderings that are conventionally understood to escape the repugnant conclusion do not in fact avoid it in all instances. As we demonstrate, prior results depend on formal definitions of the repugnant conclusion that exclude some repugnant cases, for reasons inessential to any "repugnance" (or other meaningful normative properties) of the repugnant conclusion. In particular, the (...) literature traditionally formalizes the repugnant conclusion to exclude cases that include an unaffected sub-population. We relax this normatively irrelevant exclusion, and others. Using several more inclusive formalizations of the repugnant conclusion, we then prove that any plausible social ordering implies some instance of the repugnant conclusion. This understanding-that it is impossible to avoid all instances of the repugnant conclusion-is broader than the traditional understanding in the literature that the repugnant conclusion can only be escaped at unappealing theoretical costs. Therefore, the repugnant conclusion provides no methodological guidance for theory or policy-making, because it does not discriminate among candidate social orderings. So escaping the repugnant conclusion should not be a core goal of the population ethics literature. (shrink)

Cette conclusion cherche à restituer la psychologie associationniste du xixe siècle dans son projet épistémologique au-delà de la diversité des positions de l’époque. On y défend l’idée que l’importance de l’association des idées fut de permettre de prétendre fonder la psychologie comme science empirique de l’esprit. C’est la nouvelle fonction de l’association, dégagée en réalité dès l’œuvre de Hume, qui a permis un tel projet : non plus simple transition habituelle d’une idée à une autre, mais principe génétique de (...) l’ensemble de la vie mentale. (shrink)

The conclusion locates the diverse concerns of German Idealism and phenomenology in their historical contexts. German Idealism can be interpreted as a reaction to the Scientific Revolution, resisting the temptation to reduce the thinking subject to one more material object, and instead carving out the unique features of consciousness. Its accounts of freedom and intersubjectivity also should be understood in the political context of liberal revolutions and European imperialism. By contrast, phenomenology grapples with a world marked by world war, (...) economic upheaval, and a sense of cultural decline. Its adherents generally emphasize various forms of human finitude—including the limits of reason and freedom. Finally, the conclusion describes how the shared commitments of German Idealism and phenomenology continue to resonate in the contemporary world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Broome and others have argued that it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is better for a given person that he or she exist than not. That argument can be understood to suggest that, likewise, it makes no sense, or at least that it cannot be true, to say that it is worse for a given person that he or she exist than that he or she never have existed at (...) all. This argument is of critical importance to the question of whether consequentialist theory should take a traditional, aggregative form or a less conventional, person‐affecting, or person‐based, form. I believe that, potentially, the argument represents a far more serious threat to the person‐based approach than does, for example, Parfit's two medical programmes example. Parfit's example nicely illustrates the distinction between aggregative and person‐based approaches and raises important questions. But the example — though not, I think, by Parfit — is sometimes pressed into service as a full‐fledged counterexample against the person‐based approach. As such, I argue, the example is not persuasive. In contrast, the Broomeian argument, if correct, is definitive. For that argument relies on certain metaphysical assumptions and various uncontroversial normative claims — and hence nicely avoids putting into play the controversial normative claims that lie at the very heart of the debate. The purpose of the present paper, then, is to evaluate the Broomeian argument. I argue that this potentially definitive challenge to a person‐based approach does not in fact succeed. (shrink)

This conclusion gives short restatements on two fronts. First, it comments briefly on how the author's model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ compares with, and improves upon, existing models. Second, it provides some brief indications of the scope of required changes to existing political practice.

In the conclusion, McGinn distinguishes the ‘commandment’ paradigm and the ‘parable’ paradigm of ethical reflection, and argues that analytical moral philosophy, despite its emphasis on moral language, tends to follow the former. In this book, McGinn has argued that the latter, as exemplified in fictional narrative, with its appeal to our aesthetic sensibility, is the true vehicle of moral thought and persuasion. The fictional world is ideal for the exploration of ethical questions and the acquisition of ethical knowledge.

The Conclusion provides a summary of the argument and its illustrations. The book’s argumentative arc ends with the claim that humanistic liberal education as practiced in the PTEV provides an example of how to build common ground for dialogue and enrichment among religious and secular approaches in higher education toward the end of developing a more effective approach to educating students for the 21st century. The evidence presented by the vocation programs examined in the book supports the conclusion (...) that these experiments provide American higher education with intellectual and cultural resources, examples of organizational innovation, and pedagogical practices that, taken together, constitute an alternative to the current situation that for too many students breeds either acquiescence in drift or a too narrow drive for achievement. The Conclusion ends by sketching reasons to think that a realignment of undergraduate education around the quest for purpose can make it possible for today’s students to break out of this dispiriting culture of acquiescence toward growth in academic learning, social development, and the formation of identities sustained by purpose. (shrink)

In a series of articles on population theory, culminating in his 1984 b00k Reasons and Persons, Dcrck Pariit presented dilemmas for utilitarian and conscqucntialist moral theories.] ParHt’s work has led to rcncwcd interest in thc theory of optimal population. More generally, Pariit is searching for a general theory of bcncHcencc—"Theory X"——that also will covcr population comparisons. Theory X corresponds to Kenneth Arrow’s notion of a social welfare function—both attempt t0 provide 21 generic formula or algorithm for ranking social outcomes on (...) the basis of their characteristics. (shrink)

The concluding chapter explores how the unjust physiological effects of racism and sexism might be countered as part of feminist and critical race movements for social justice. Social-political change can result in physiological transformation, and this change can take place in a number of ways. Most important are institutional changes. In addition, however, physiological changes can take place on a personal, individual level, and those transformations can range from greater to lesser involvement of conscious awareness of physiological states. In particular, (...) this chapter focuses on transformative methods on the individual level that work directly with biologically unconscious habits, rather than detouring through conscious thought. Developing the notion of a physiological therapy that does not prioritize bringing unconscious habits to conscious awareness, the book’s conclusion proposes a double-barreled approach of working for institutional change and transforming biologically unconscious habits as a response to the physiological effects of racism and sexism. (shrink)

In Chapter 17 of his magnificent Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit asks what he describes as an ‘awesome question’: ‘How many people should there ever be?’ For a utilitarian like me, the answer seems simple: there should be however many people it takes to make the world best. Unfortunately, if I answer Parfit's awesome question in this way, I may sink myself in a quagmire of axiological confusion. In this paper, I first describe certain aspects of the quagmire. Then I (...) introduce and explain some of the elements of a novel axiological view – ‘justicism’. Justicism is derived from some ideas originally suggested by Franz Brentano. It was developed in an effort to solve certain other problems confronting utilitarianism – problems explicitly about justice. I think, however, that as a sort of happy by-product, justicism also generates a plausible answer to Parfit's awesome question. This may come as a bit of surprise, since justicism is a form of totalism, and it is widely thought that no totalistic theory can provide a satisfactory answer to Parfit's question. After presenting and explaining my proposed solution, I address some objections. (shrink)

A rough and tumble, we have had; though one quite lacking in impoliteness. I hope I do not go too far in supplying that deficiency.Disagreement is endemic on political questions, both between and within ourselves. We do however come to conclusions, often strongly held. It may often be in doing so we are wholly irrational; but in so far as we are not, the philosopher should surely have something to contribute?Our conclusions, so far as they are at all rational conclusions, (...) will be based on some considerations or other: our premises. So, it may be thought, so far as we are rational we should be clear about what our premises are, how if at all they may be justified, and that our conclusions logically follow from them. Only if this is so are our conclusions justified. (shrink)

A statement q is a conclusion intermediate between p and h if and only if (1) p justifies h, (2) p justifies q, and (3) (p and not-q) justifies h to a significantly lesser degree than p justifies h. I contend that Gettier-type counterexamples to definitions of factual knowledge violate the following principle: if one knows that h on the basis of p, then all the conclusions intermediate between p and h are true. This principle does not refer to (...) anyone's beliefs that intermediate conclusions are true. I test my contention against several examples which have been discussed in the literature. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Fred Dretske motivates his denial of epistemic closure by way of the thought that the warrant for the premises of a valid argument need not transfer to the argument’s conclusion. The failure-of-transfer-of-warrant strategy has also been used by advocates of epistemic closure as a foil to Michael McKinsey’s argument against the compatibility of first person authority and semantic externalism, and also to illuminate, more generally, why certain valid arguments appear ill-suited for (...) the purpose of establishing their conclusions. This paper takes re-examines some of the central attempts to explain transmission-failure, and a central line of objection to the strategy from Begging-the-Question theorists. The ultimate goal of this paper is to promote a decidedly Dretskean explanation of the unpersuasiveness of the said arguments. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Does Feminism Discriminate against Men? Are Men Worse off than Women? Taking the Second Sexism Seriously Conclusion.

Multiple -conclusion logic extends formal logic by allowing arguments to have a set of conclusions instead of a single one, the truth lying somewhere among the conclusions if all the premises are true. The extension opens up interesting possibilities based on the symmetry between premises and conclusions, and can also be used to throw fresh light on the conventional logic and its limitations. This is a sustained study of the subject and is certain to stimulate further research. Part I (...) reworks the fundamental ideas of logic to take account of multiple conclusions, and investigates the connections between multiple - and single - conclusion calculi. Part II draws on graph theory to discuss the form and validity of arguments independently of particular logical systems. Part III contrasts the multiple - and the single - conclusion treatment of one and the same subject, using many-valued logic as the example; and Part IV shows how the methods of 'natural deduction' can be matched by direct proofs using multiple conclusions. (shrink)

In this paper, it is argued that only in the section on dialectic in the Critique of Judgment does Kant reach a definitive and conclusive version of deduction, after discovering the concept of the supersensible. In the section on the deduction of pure aesthetic judgments, Kant does not satisfactorily explain the critical distinction between the sensible nature of humanity and the supersensible nature of human reason presupposed in the concept of universal communicability. While the concept of the supersensible illustrates this (...) distinction, it is only through this concept that Kant that can justify the specific possibility of claiming subjective validity in taste. The priority of the solution found in the dialectic is illustrated not only by a comparative analysis of the two sections, but also by a historical reconstruction of the process of the formation of the work, which shows that the first formulation of the concept of validity coincides with the use of the concept of the supersensible. (shrink)

Le but principal et premier de cette conclusion est de mettre en évidence le lien intrinsèque entre les récits de la « vie de Jésus » et le conflit d’interprétation au sujet du Nazaréen, tel qu’il résulte précisément de ses « actes de puissance » et de leur signification messianique ou non. Le deuxième but est d’expliciter l’analogie entre le conflit d’interprétation, tel qu’il se présente à l’époque néotestamentaire, et la figure qu’il prend aujourd’hui au sein du « forum-Jésus (...) », l’enjeu étant d’en dégager la signification proprement théologique. The objective of this conclusion is first and foremost to highlight the intrinsic link between the narratives of the “life of Jesus” and the conflict of interpretation concerning the Nazarene, which results from his “acts of power” and their messianic significance or lack of significance. The second objective is to make explicit the analogy between the conflict of interpretation, as it is to be found in the neo-testamentary period, and the shape it has taken on today within the “Jesus forum”, the challenge being indeed to bring out the specifically theological significance. (shrink)

This paper argues that logical inferentialists should reject multiple-conclusion logics. Logical inferentialism is the position that the meanings of the logical constants are determined by the rules of inference they obey. As such, logical inferentialism requires a proof-theoretic framework within which to operate. However, in order to fulfil its semantic duties, a deductive system has to be suitably connected to our inferential practices. I argue that, contrary to an established tradition, multiple-conclusion systems are ill-suited for this purpose because (...) they fail to provide a 'natural' representation of our ordinary modes of inference. Moreover, the two most plausible attempts at bringing multiple conclusions into line with our ordinary forms of reasoning, the disjunctive reading and the bilateralist denial interpretation, are unacceptable by inferentialist standards. (shrink)

The pioneers of European prehistory marched under a banner inscribed Ex Oriente Lux, assuming as an axiom that all the fundamental inventions and discoveries like farming and metallurgy were brought to Europe from the East. The Frenchman Salomon Reinach first challenged the dogma, branding it as le mirage orientale, and then the Germans set about inverting the roles of Europe and Asia till under Hitler it was seriously contended that conquering invaders from Europe had spread to the valleys of the (...) Nile and of the Tigris in time to create there the Sumerian and Pharaonic civilisations! Only now is it really possible to test the conflicting claims of the opposing schools by reference to objective data. (shrink)

. I give a systematic presentation of a fairly large family of multiple-conclusion modal logics that are paraconsistent and/or paracomplete. After providing motivation for studying such systems, I present semantics and tableau-style proof theories for them. The proof theories are shown to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics. I then show how the “standard” systems of classical, single-conclusion modal logics fit into the framework constructed.

These last words are titled “Conclusion,” but they should be “Inception.” Professor Jacob Needleman encourages a vigorous conversation about commercialism in medicine. An honest conversation, he maintains, will spur understanding, indignation, and reformation. We do sincerely hope that such a conversation begins and is carried on to meaningful change. However, as the essays in this collection show, that conversation must take place in many different places and about many different things. All of our authors acknowledge that the problem of (...) commercialism is extremely complex. It cannot be understood as a simple fact or a single feature of modern healthcare. Thus, the conversation that discusses it must be varied and diverse. (shrink)

Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of . With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.

This study aims to uncover the processes of interaction through which knowledge acquisition in new employee orientation is monitored and controlled. Using video-recordings of orientation lectures as data, the study focuses on question–answer sequences in which the lecturer’s question probes into the state of the employees’ knowledge; in particular, it looks at the third turn of the sequence, in which the lecturer comes to a conclusion concerning the participants’ knowledge. This is shown to be an unavoidably practical accomplishment, which (...) is contingent on both the often ambivalent responses of the participants and the design of the knowledge-probing question. Also, the lecturer orients to being responsible for providing the employees with the necessary knowledge that they do not have. The study contributes to discussion of the interactional organization of knowledge in institutional settings, and it sheds light on the pros and cons of lectures as interactional encounters. (shrink)

There is a puzzle about how to understand the conclusion of a successful instance of practical reasoning. Do the considerations adduced in reasoning rationalize the particular doing of an action, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as claiming? Or does reasoning conclude in the formation of an attitude – an intention, say – that has an action-type as its content? This paper attempts to clarify what is at stake in that debate and defends the latter view against some of its (...) critics. (shrink)

El presente trabajo procura abordar, dentro del contexto del debate en torno a la influencia de valores extra epistémicos en las ciencias, el problema respecto de ciertas investigaciones científicas que pudieran contener conclusiones indeseables, en el sentido de que su contenido pudiera afectar a ciertos grupos sociales. Siguiendo el razonamiento del filósofo pluralista Philip Kitcher, se sitúa la discusión en torno a la renuncia a la búsqueda de ciertas verdades, cuando éstas puedan reñir con ciertos valores morales, políticos o sociales (...) que no estamos dispuestos a transgredir. En dicha línea, se pone acento en la influencia de las consideraciones morales que pueden influir en nuestro juicio sobre las verdades que describen el mundo, como asimismo en la dimensión moral del obrar humano que resulta ser un aspecto irrenunciable, lo cual es enteramente aplicable a la actividad científica. (shrink)

Through a consideration of the philosophical debates occurring in the Dutch and Dutch-related intellectual framework in the early modern period, in the present study some alternatives in the foundation of philosophy and science have been highlighted and analysed. In conclusion, it is time to assess them in a more systematic manner. Each alternative entails a different view on foundational arguments, which may be grouped into theological, metaphysical, and logical ones. This research reveals the essential features of a philosophical milieu (...) created by Descartes and constituting the framework for the dissemination of Newtonian science in Europe, leading to the birth of a philosophy of science as the study of the foundations, assumptions, methods, and limits of the study of natural realms. In fact, one can recognise several reasons for such foundation: on a general level, the need of providing philosophy with a secure foundation against the ‘sceptical crisis’ of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries highlighted by Richard Popkin. More specifically, however, the foundation of Cartesian and Newtonian philosophy and science served to defend the conceptual premises of new ways of thinking in an academic context, demonstrating the validity of such new ways and rejecting the commonsensical and non-explanatory assumptions of Scholastic philosophy, and, in the case of ’s Gravesande, the speculative character of Descartes’s physics itself. (shrink)

A commonsense virtue ethics can contribute to moral education by pointing out the importance of self‐regarding virtues. That importance is often ignored or neglected in school ”values” curricula.