“La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister”J. M. CharcotRoughly speaking, references relate what is said to just those things about which it is said. A theory of reference is commonly taken to be a statement or characterization of that relation which references effect — that relation, that is, which holds between something that is said and some object just in case in that which is said reference is made to that object. Such a theory is often (...) further conceived as answering one or both of the questions: For any given object X, what is it for a reference to be made to X, and For any given reference, R, what is it for an object X to be the referent of R. Let us call a theory which correctly answers at least some of these questions a classical theory of reference. (shrink)

A number of classical theories are interpreted in analogous theories that are based on intuitionistic logic. The classical theories considered include subsystems of first- and second-order arithmetic, bounded arithmetic, and admissible set theory.

A standard view within psychology is that there have been two important shifts in the study of concepts and that each has led to some improvements. The first shift was from the classical theory of concepts to probabilistic theories, including the prototype theory. The second shift was from probabilistic theories to theory-based theories. In this article, I critically evaluate the view that the first shift was a major advance and argue that the prototype theory suffers (...) some of the same problems that have been thought to challenge the classical theory. (shrink)

""Why theories of religion?" After raising and answering this question the author begins his examination of theories of religion by first looking at the explanations given by religious believers (Revelation and Religious Experience). He then considers the view of thinkers who have sought to transform religion into philosophy (Plato, Kant and Hegel), before reviewing the theories of those who have seen religion as arising out of errors in primitive thinking (Tyler, Frazer and Levy-Bruhl) and those 'masters of suspicion', as Paul (...) Ricoeur has called them, (Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud) who offered what they believed to be exhaustive psychological and sociological theories of the origin and nature of religion. In the course of his discussion the author also engages with many contemporary thinkers whose discussions of religion have been based on these classical accounts."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

The classical theory of types in question is essentially the theory of Martin-Löf [1] but with the law of double negation elimination. I am ultimately interested in the theory of types as a framework for the foundations of mathematics and, for this purpose, we need to consider extensions of the theory obtained by adding ‘well-ordered types,’ for example the type N of the finite ordinals; but the unextended theory will suffice to illustrate the treatment (...) of extensional equality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:32. HUME'S CLASSICAL THEORY OF JUSTICE1 Let me begin by formulating a broad distinction between two sorts of theories of justice. I shall stipulate that a modern theory of justice is one which treats justice as a moral quality, in fact as one moral quality among a multitude of moral virtues, and which accordingly takes the obligation tö' be just as pre-eminently a moral obligation. On (...) this approach the philosophical appreciation of justice requires that we interpret it in terms of a moral theory, and correspondingly any viable moral theory is expected to afford a framework within which the virtue of justice is to be understood. The important philosophical question to be asked about justice concerns the moral obligation to abide by the conventions and rules of justice. By a classical theory of justice I mean one which treats this quality not as one moral virtue among many others but as fundamental to morality itself. Here justice would have to be explained before one could develop a satisfactory account of morality. Questions about the moral obligation of justice are on this approach not as important philosophically as questions about the basis of justice itself. The modern and the classical theories are distinguished by the relationship each posits between justice and morality. In the modern approach, the account one offers of morality conditions the account one can offer of justice, while in the classical theory the account one offers of justice conditions the account one can offer of morality. As exemplifying a classical theory of justice one might cite Plato's Republic or, closer to the present topic, Hobbes' De Homi ne. While there seems to be no definitive interpretation of Hobbes ' overall moral and political theories, in this work he maintains that the development of a settled morality is subsequent to the establishment of civil society and therein, of course, also of the order of justice. The following passage from the De Homine shows how the order 33. of civil justice plays a foundational role relative to the moral order. Eut whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof. 2 Attributing to Hobbes the view that the account one gives of justice and the civil order conditions and serves as a necessary presupposition to the account one can give of a settled morality permits us to count Hobbes among those thinkers who have offered a classical theory of justice. Because Hume seems in so many ways to deserve the appellation of thoroughly modern philosopher, it is not surprising that he is naturally construed as sharing in the modern conception of justice. I want to argue that this way of interpreting Hume is mistaken and that he is in fact a classical theorist of justice. I shall contend, furthermore, that getting clear about the kind of theory of justice Hume offers allows us to resolve a problem in his moral theory—specifically a problem relating to the correction of the moral judgment. In view of these aims, the paper has three parts: (1) investigation as to what kind of theory of justice Hume offers; (2) exploration of a quandary inherent in the modernist interpretation which serves as an objection to the thesis of this paper; and (3) resolution of this objection and conclusion as to the character of Hume's theory of morality. At the end I shall explore a few corollaries 34. of the thesis that Hume is a classical theorist of justice. 1. Hume: A Classical Theorist of Justice There are... (shrink)

There are well-known quasi-formal arguments that identity is a "strict" relation in at least the following three senses: (1) There is a single identity relation and a single distinctness relation; (2) There are no contingent cases of identity or distinctness; and (3) There are no vague or indeterminate cases of identity or distinctness. However, the situation is less clear cut than it at first may appear. There is a natural formal theory of identity that is very close to the (...) standard classical theory but which does not validate the formal analogues of (1)-(3). The core idea is simple: We weaken the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals from a conditional to an entailment and we adopt a weakly classical logic. This paper investigates this weakly classical theory of identity (and related theories) and discusses its philosophical ramifications. It argues that we can accept a reasonable theory of identity without committing ourselves to the uniqueness, necessity, or determinacy of identity. (shrink)

Any "classical" theory of truth will satisfy tarski's criterion ("p" is true if and only if p), And the principle of bivalence (every proposition is either true or false). A non-Classical theory may be obtained by rejecting these principles: - in fact it is shown that rejection of the second entails rejection of the first. If the resulting non-Classical theory is formalized, A system structurally isomorphic to either s4 or s5 is obtained. An attempt (...) is made to show that the essential insights of intuitionist logic may be preserved if we replace their complex and in many respects "unintuitive" propositional logic by a theory of truth which is non-Classical in the sense described above. (shrink)

Classical political theorists such as Thucydides, Kant, Rousseau, Smith, Hegel, Grotius, Mill, Locke and Clausewitz are often employed to explain and justify contemporary international politics and are seen to constitute the different schools of thought in the discipline. However, traditional interpretations frequently ignore the intellectual and historical context in which these thinkers were writing as well as the lineages through which they came to be appropriated in International Relations. This collection of essays provides alternative interpretations sensitive to these political (...) and intellectual contexts and to the trajectory of their appropriation. The political, sociological, anthropological, legal, economic, philosophical and normative dimensions are shown to be constitutive, not just of classical theories, but of international thought and practice in the contemporary world. Moreover, they challenge traditional accounts of timeless debates and schools of thought and provide new conceptions of core issues such as sovereignty, morality, law, property, imperialism and agency. (shrink)

The article is about one of the vital problem for analytic philosophy which is how to define truth value for sentences which include their own truth predicate. The aim of the article is to determine Saul Kripke’s approach to widen epistemological truth to create a systemic model of truth. Despite a lot of work on the subject, the theme of truth is no less relevant to modern philosophy. With the help of S. Kripke’s article “Outline of the Theory of (...) Truth” and R. L. Kirkham’s work “Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction” the author tried to represent a non-classical approach which is now known as Saul Kripke’s truth value gaps theory. Considering his solving of the Liar Paradox, as well as the Strenghened Liar, it is obvious that there could be the circumstances (or facts) that make sentences have no truth value. In that case the solving of the paradox attracts Kleene’s non-classical three-valued logic which contains the third way and the solution falls into the gap between truth and falsity. Hence there are no relevant and full satisfactory ways to solve the Liar’s Paradox by the language-levels ap- proach. The task consists in an extension of the approach to natural languages and elimination of an ad hoc element as well. Besides that, the language-levels approach refers to the speaker that means that only the last one is allowed to define the hierarchy of the levels and truth value of sentence, but often he does not know what level he is speaking of. As Kripke stated, contingent facts can lead to a paradox which isn’t allowed for a logical point of view. However usage of mathematical apparatus allows the theory in question to be universalized and moreover paves the way to futher epistemological develop- ment of the problem in question. As Kripke’s theory is formalized and presented as a functional series, it gives access to a system model of truth whose elements would be epistemological theories (concepts) of truth. Such a model, for instance, confirms the validity of the deflationary concept of truth. Refs 7. (shrink)

In this paper I urge friends of truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts – proponents of paracomplete and paraconsistent logics – to consider theories not merely as sets of sentences, but as pairs of sets of sentences, or what I call ‘bitheories,’ which keep track not only of what holds according to the theory, but also what fails to hold according to the theory. I explain the connection between bitheories, sequents, and the speech acts of assertion and denial. I (...) illustrate the usefulness of bitheories by showing how they make available a technique for characterising different theories while abstracting away from logical vocabulary such as connectives or quanti- fiers, thereby making theoretical commitments independent of the choice of this or that particular non-classical logic. (shrink)

I extract several common assumptions in the Classical Theory of Mind (CTM) - mainly of Locke and Descartes - and work out a partial formalisation of the logic implicit in CTM. I then define the modal (logical) properties and relations of propositions, including the modality of conditional propositions and the validity of argument, according to the principles of CTM: that is, in terms of clear and distinct ideas, and without any reference to either possible worlds, or deducibility in (...) an axiomatic system, or linguistic convention. (shrink)

The article shows that three antirealistic theories of classical analysis and synthesis are logically possible: presentationistic, solipsistic and Kantian, but only the latter is actually being developed. Revealed its specific features and features shared with other, logically possible antirealistic theories. The correlation of the Kantian theory of analysis and synthesis of knowledge with his theory of analysis and synthesis of subjects of knowledge is analyzed. Gnoseological problems that forced Kant to assert that new knowledge is provided only (...) by the synthesis of knowledge, and analysis only clarifies the results of synthesis, are characterized. The Kantian solution to these problems is correlated with their realistic solution. The role that the Kantian "Copernican revolution in philosophy" plays in his interpretation of the analysis and synthesis of subjects of knowledge is investigated. The Kantian theory of analytical and synthetic judgments is considered. It is shown that the Kantian question "how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" is essentially a question about the nature of theoretical knowledge, which was historically formed in ancient geometry precisely as the unity of analysis and synthesis. A qualitative difference is shown between classical and geometric (by origin) analysis and synthesis. Three historical stages of their formation are described. The assertion of I. Newton that the natural science experiment arose as a result of the extension of the method of geometric analysis and synthesis to the natural sciences is investigated. (shrink)

Vol 1. Substance truth and person -- vol 2. Perfecting reality -- vol 3. Practical implication -- vol 4. The idealist theory of truth.

Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes some strong claims against so-called Classical Theory which spans the accounts of metaphors from Aristotle to Davidson. Most of these theories, because of their traditional literal-metaphorical distinction, fail to take into account the phenomenon of conceptual metaphor. I argue that the underlying mechanism for explaining metaphor bears some striking resemblances among all of these theories. A mapping between two structures is always expressed. Conceptual Metaphor Theory insists, however, that the literal-metaphorical distinction of (...) Classical Theories is empirically wrong. I claim that this criticism is based rather on terminological decisions than on empirical issues. Conceptual Metaphor Theory focusses primarily on conventional metaphors and struggles to extend its mechanism to novel metaphors, whereas Classical Theories focus on novel metaphors and struggle to extend their mechanisms to conventional metaphors. Since all of these theories study metaphors from the synchronic point of view, they are unable to take into account any semantic change. A diachronic perspective is what we need here, one which would allow us to explain the role of metaphor in semantic change and the development of language in general. (shrink)

The focus in this essay will be upon the paradoxes, and foremostly in set theory. A central result is that the librationist set theory £ extension \Pfund $\mathscr{HR}(\mathbf{D})$ of \pounds \ accounts for \textbf{Neumann-Bernays-Gödel} set theory with the \textbf{Axiom of Choice} and \textbf{Tarski's Axiom}. Moreover, \Pfund \ succeeds with defining an impredicative manifestation set $\mathbf{W}$, \emph{die Welt}, so that \Pfund$\mathscr{H}(\mathbf{W})$ %is a model accounts for Quine's \textbf{New Foundations}. Nevertheless, the points of view developed support the view that (...) the truth-paradoxes and the set-paradoxes have common origins, so that the librationist resolutions of the set theoretic paradoxes are at the same time resolutions of the truth theoretic paradoxes. Both the librationist resolutions of the set theoretic paradoxes and the truth theoretic paradoxes have non-trivial philosophical implications: librationist set theories have the consequence that there are no absolutely uncountable sets, and librationist truth theories allow the use of syntactical modalities in ways which circumvent limitations as those of \parencite{Montague1963}, and a truth predicate which is useful for more precise philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Gregory Reichberg’s argument against my reading of the classical just war theorists falsely assumes that if just cause is unilateral, then there is no moral equality of combatants. This assumption is plausible if we assume an individualist framework. However, the classical theorists accepted quasi-Aristotelian, communitarian social ontologies and theories of justice. For them, the political community is ontologically and morally prior to the private individual. The classical just war theorists build their theories within this framework. They argue (...) that just war is only waged by supra-individual political communities for irreducibly social ends. War by private individuals for private ends is always unjust. The ends sought in just war presuppose the justice of a hierarchy of authority over war such that the soldier is obligated to serve in war upon the command of his legitimate authority. In this way, the classical theorists accept a unilateral theory of just cause and a division of authority over war that entails the possibility of the moral equality of combatants. (shrink)

The author has recently proposed a “quasi-classical” theory of particles and interactions in which particles are pictured as extended periodic disturbances in a universal field χ(x, t), interacting with each other via nonlinearity in the equation of motion for χ. The present paper explores the relationship of this theory to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics; as a first step, it is shown how it is possible to construct from χ a configuration-space wave function Ψ(x 1,x 2,t), and that the (...) theory requires that Ψ satisfy the two-particle Schrödinger equation in the case where the two particles are well separated from each other. This suggests that the multiparticle Schrödinger equation can be obtained as a direct consequence of the quasi-classical theory without any use of the usual formalism (Hilbert space, quantization rules, etc.) of conventional quantum theory and in particular without using the classical canonical treatment of a system as a “crutch” theory which has subsequently to be “quantized.” The quasi-classical theory also suggests the existence of a preferred “absolute” gauge for the electromagnetic potentials. (shrink)

The classical theory of probability has long been abandoned and is seen by most philosophers as a non-contender—a mere precursor to newer and better theories. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. The main reasons for its rejection—all related to the notorious principle of indifference—are that it is circular, of limited applicability, inconsistent, and dependent upon unjustified empirical assumptions. I argue that none of these claims is true and that the classical theory remains (...) to be refuted. (shrink)

We describe an explicit construction of algebraic models for theories with non-standard elements either with classical or constructive logic. The corresponding truthvalue algebra in our construction is a complete algebra of subsets of some concrete decidable set. This way we get a quite finitistic notion of true which reflects a notion of the deducibility of a given theory. It enables us to useconstructive, proof-theoretical methods for theories with non-standard elements. It is especially useful in the case of theories (...) with constructive logic where algorithmic properties are essential. (shrink)

The paper studies in detail a precise formal construction of spacetime from matter suggested by the logician John Burgess. We presuppose a continuous and perdurantistic matter ontology. The result is a systematic method to translate claims about the geometry of a flat relativistic, or classical, spacetime into claims about geometrical relations between matter points. The approach is extended to electric and magnetic fields by treating them as multifields defined on matter, rather than as fields in the vacuum. A few (...) tentative suggestions are made to adapt the method to general relativity and to quantum theories. (shrink)

This paper aims to pay tribute to Figal’s comprehensive and innovative analysis of the artwork and beauty, while challenging both his realist position on the immediacy of meaning and his monist stance that reduces sublimity to beauty. To enquire into the origin of aesthetic feelings and sense, and thus, to break the hermeneutic circle, we first trace the origin of this reduction to the reception of Burke’s concept of the sublime by Mendelssohn and Kant. We then recur to Husserl and (...) Dufrenne to trace the origin of the sense of the feeling of sublimity in the realm of affectivity or sensuousness. This genesis takes place in passive experience, where we identify an excess of sensuous sense over categorial meaning that is constitutive of the affective sense that our bodily sensations give to hyletic material. It is argued that this sensuous excess evokes a sublime experience in the phenomenological sense, involving an affective and disruptive bodily experience and an endless process of sense formation. Affective or sensuous sense is thus an event that irreversibly affects the bodily surface. To elucidate this phenomenon, we draw on the theoretical framework of Breton and Bataille, positing it as a form-transgressive ‘convulsive’ sublime, which we then illustrate in the architectural works of Tschumi and Eisenman. In short, we have retrieved the origin of aesthetic experience and redefined the feeling of the sublime as a phenomenological ‘convulsive’ sublimity. (shrink)

A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is (...) not always in accord with the norms of the standard theory of decision as ordinarily applied. Many classically irrational acts, e.g. betting on the occurrence of one event in the knowledge that the probabilities favor another, can under certain circumstances constitute adaptive behavior.One interesting interpretation of this clash is that the criterion of rationality offered by classical decision theory is simply incorrect (or at least incomplete) as it stands, and that evolutionary theory should be called upon to provide a more generally applicable theory of rationality. Such a program, should it prove feasible, would amount to the logical reduction of the theory of rational choice to evolutionary theory. (shrink)

We discuss the solution proposed by Fermi to the so called “4/3 problem” in the classical theory of the electron, a problem which puzzled the physics community for many decades before and after his contribution. Unfortunately his early resolution of the problem in 1922–1923 published in three versions in Italian and German journals (after three preliminary articles on the topic) went largely unnoticed. Even more recent texts devoted to classical electron theory still do not present his (...) argument or acknowledge the actual content of those articles. The calculations initiated by Fermi at the time are completed here by formulating and discussing the conservation of the total 4-momentum of the accelerated electron as seen from the instantaneous rest frame in which it is momentarily at rest. (shrink)

It is well known that the process of quantization—constructing a quantum theory out of a classical theory—is not in general a uniquely determined procedure. There are many inequivalent methods that lead to different choices for what to use as our quantum theory. In this paper, I show that by requiring a condition of continuity between classical and quantum physics, we constrain and inform the quantum theories that we end up with.

Arnopoulos explains the thoughts and practices of the ancient Greeks with regard to external affairs, or exopolitics, integrating political philosophy with modern international theory. He examines the political ideas of Plato and Aristotle specifically, and evaluates the ancient Greek policy ideals regarding constitutionalism, statesmanship, and foreign policy. In many ways, Arnopoulos would say this is a study not of what people do, but rather how they justify their deeds. He has been writing on the subject for about 30 years, (...) and this monograph is a consolidation of his thinking. His current academic affiliation is not noted. (shrink)