Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates traces the reception of Saint Augustine’s concept of beatific enjoyment in Peter Lombard’s Sentences. It identifies the main themes and problems which shaped the discussion of the concept in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century scholastic commentaries. Bringing together theological and scientific approaches to the idea of enjoyment, Severin Kitanov exposes the intricacy of the discourse and develops a new perspective for students and scholars.

The beatific vision is a subject of considerable importance both in the Christian Scriptures and in the history of Christian dogmatics. In it, humans experience and see the perfect immaterial God, which represents the final end for the saints. However, this doctrine has received less attention in the contemporary theological literature, arguably, due in part to the growing trend toward materialism and the sole emphasis on bodily resurrection in Reformed eschatology. As a piece of retrieval by drawing from the Scriptures, (...) Medieval Christianity, and Reformed Christianity, we motivate a case for the Reformed emphasis on the immaterial and intellectual aspects of human personal eschatology and offer some constructive thoughts on how to link it to the contemporary emphasis of the body. We draw a link between the soul and the body in the vision with the help of Christology as reflected in the theology of John Calvin, and, to a greater extent, the theology of both John Owen and Jonathan Edwards. (shrink)

The most studied source for Gerald Odonis' doctrine of the beatific vision is the text of his Advent 1333 disputed question known as his Quodlibet. The polemic nature of the question and its structural idiosyncrasies have led to difficulties in interpreting Odonis' theory of the “middle vision” of the divine essence that the separate souls of the blessed have, as well as in understanding his defense of Pope John XXII's controversial opinion (which excludes such a middle vision). By relating Odonis' (...) 1333 disputation to his earlier commentary on the Sentences, most notably his systematic discussion of the beatific vision in book IV, this paper shows how Odonis tried to fit his doctrine of the “middle vision” with his previous discussion, which itself reflects the influence of the 1317 publication of the acts of the 1311-12 Council of Vienne. (shrink)

그리스도교철학자들은 대체로 사람은 누구나 궁극적으로 행복을 추구한다는 아리스토텔레스의 통찰을 수용하면서 행복의 실질적 내용을 ‘지복직관’에서 찾는다. 그런데 이러한 행복론은 중대한 문제를 내포하고 있다. 지복직관은 신의 본질에 대한 완전한 인식에서 성립하는 것이다. 그런데 신의 본질에 대한 인식은 신의 본질에 상응하는 인식의 방식으로 이루어져야만 완전할 수 있다. 그러나 신을 제외한 어떠한 존재자도 신을 그의 본질에 상응하는 방식으로 인식할 수 없다. 그런데 이 경우 지복직관은 신 자신의 자기 자신의 본질에 대한 인식에서 성립된다고 말해야만 한다. 그러나 이러한 행복을 인간의 행복이라고 말할 수는 없을 것이다. 이러한 (...) 문제 상황에서 아우구스티누스 그리고 특히 토마스는 인간의 행복이 신의 본질에 대한 직관에 있음을 인정하면서도 신의 본질에 대한 인간의 인식에 한계를 설정함으로써 인간의 지복을 신의 자기인식으로서의 지복직관과 구별하였다. 한편 이러한 지복은 엄밀한 의미의 지복에는 미치지 못한다는 비판에 직면할 수 있다. 이에 대해 디트리히는 지복직관을 엄밀한 의미에서 추구하여, 원리의 양태에 따라 원리를 인식하면서 자기 자신을 인식하는 능동지성을 통한 신의 본질의 인식으로 파악하였다. 더 나아가 에크하르트는 지복직관에서 인간과 신은 구분되지 않는 하나라는 주장으로까지 나아갔다. 그러나 이러한 지복직관론은 신의 본질을 통한 신의 본질의 직관이라는 정의에 충실하지만, 인간이 더 이상 인간이 아닐 때 인간의 지복이 있다는 역설적 상황에 직면하게 된다. (shrink)

Does human happiness consist in God, as the widespread medieval view that God is the last end of human beings would suggest, or does it consist in the experience of God, the view suggested by medieval readings of Aristotle? In response to this theological problem, the important fourteenth-century philosopher John of Ripa developed one of the most innovative and subtle late medieval theories of the metaphysics of awareness. This article provides an account of Ripa’s theory of awareness and shows how (...) the theory was both motivated by and intended to solve this central theological problem for late medieval thought. In Section 1, I present the theological problem. In Section 2, I examine Ripa’s innovative theory of the metaphysics of awareness. In Section 3, I show how Ripa uses his account of the metaphysics of awareness to offer a solution to the theological problem. (shrink)

In this volume Samuel Parkison explores the significance of the doctrine of the beatific vision for the life of the church. Engaging in close readings of biblical texts and ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern theologians, Parkison shows that the beatific vision - that ultimate hope of seeing and being in the presence of God - is a central Christian conviction shared across the history of the church. Parkison not only invites readers into the wide-ranging developments of the doctrine, but (...) shows us the implications of the Beatific Vision for how the church envisions itself today. (shrink)

The beatific vision is widely perceived as a Roman Catholic doctrine. Many continue to view deification as a distinctively Eastern Orthodox doctrine incompatible with the Western theological tradition, especially its Protestant expressions. This essay will demonstrate that several Reformers of the first and second generation promoted a vision of redemption that culminates with deification and beatific vision. They affirmed these concepts without apology in confessional statements, dogmatic works, biblical commentaries, and polemical treatises. Attention will focus on figures in the Reformed (...) tradition though one could produce similar surveys for the Lutheran and Anglican branches of the Reformation as well. John Calvin will receive extended treatment because some scholars dispute whether he affirmed deification. This essay presents important evidence thus far overlooked which should settle the question. (shrink)

It has been shown that the thirteenth-century Dominican friar, St Thomas Aquinas, was an important theological influence on John Owen, the seventeenth-century English puritan theologian, chaplain to Oliver Cromwell, and Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, especially in the areas of the divine being, grace and Chalcedonian Christology. Suzanne McDonald has argued that, while Aquinas is unmistakably a source for Owen's doctrine of the beatific vision, Owen surpassed Aquinas's doctrine in a manner she judges to be correct, theologically speaking, and which exposes (...) the deficiency of Aquinas's account. Owen achieved this particular ‘Reforming’ or rather ‘re-forming’ of Aquinas's doctrine, she argues, by way of a ‘Christological re-orientation of the doctrine’ in terms of what is seen in the beatific vision and how it is seen, that is, its content and means. This article replies to McDonald from a Catholic and Thomist perspective, in response to her suggestion that Owen's account of the beatific vision opens up possibilities for ecumenical dialogue. The article attempts to achieve this first by reassessing the Christological contrasts McDonald draws between Owen and Aquinas in terms of content and means, and then by offering several suggestions as to why one might want to prefer Aquinas's account over Owen's. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l'A. nous propose une solution à un vexant problème théologique, à savoir la façon dont la vision béatifique complète la nature humaine tout en demeurant un don au delà du don divin qui est notre être naturel. En se penchant sur l'oeuvre de Thomas d'Aquin, Ryan encadre d'abord le problème. Ensuite il étudie l'émergence de la théorie dite de «pure nature» comme réponse à Baius, lequel affirmait qu'avant la chute d'Adam la vision béatifique n'était que le complément, (...) dû nécessairement à la nature humaine. L'auteur nous présente également la défense offerte par Garrigou-Lagrange de la théorie de «pure nature», ainsi que la critique offerte par de Lubac. Nous remarquons effectivement que la prise de position des partisans de «pure nature» et celle adoptée par de Lubac se réfutent mutuellement. Ensuite nous étudions la position de Rahner. Selon Ryan, l'apport de Rahner est important; cependant une solution basée sur «l'existentiel surnaturel» rahnerien reste intenable. En fin de compte, l'auteur nous propose une solution qui tire profit de ces points de vue divergents, tout en évitant les pièges qui les accompagnent. (shrink)

The beatific vision is central to St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the soul’s enlightenment. In its vision of the essence of God, the soul/intellect achieves its telos, its highest goal. But the resurrection of the body is a central dogma of the Christian faith, so the main question of this essay concerns the manner in which the resurrected body of the blessed benefits from the soul’s apprehension of the beatific vision. For St. Thomas, the physical eyes do not see the (...) beatific vision, since they can only see magnitude and proportion, and God is beyond both. The soul is the body’s substantial form, and a person is not fully a person without the union of soul and body. As the body’s substantial form, the soul/intellect has the beatific vision as its substantial form. The result of the enlightened intellect with the resurrected body will be that the physical eyes will be able to see more readily the glory of God in creation and in redeemed humanity, and more supremely in the incarnate Christ himself. (shrink)

This essay examines the funeral sermon given by the Baptist theologian Andrew Fuller (1754–1815) for his friend and deacon Beeby Wallis in 1792 as a vantage-point from which to pursue reflection on Fuller’s concept of heaven and the beatific vision. The sermon has two main themes: the rest and rewards of those who die in Christ. The essay examines how Fuller interprets both of these phrases and then, looking at the rest of Fuller’s corpus, notes that ultimately God himself is (...) the believer’s reward. (shrink)

Love in general and the order of the passions -- Rational love: in itself, natural dilection as root of choice, and love's twofold structure -- Twofold beatitude and the love thereof -- Dilection for others -- Charity and love of beatitude -- Charity in faith -- Charity in glory -- An Aporia? -- Towards a resolution.

Un court extrait d’une lettre d’Épicure à son disciple Colotès en dit long sur la mystique de l’amitié telle qu’elle était pratiquée dans le Jardin par les premiers Épicuriens. Cet extrait pourrait être révélateur de certaines pratiques rituelles peu connues, plutôt étranges et certainement cachées du public. C’est moins l’acte de vénération du maître par ses disciples que la pratique qui se veut réciproque d’un Épicure vénérant et adorant lui-même ses propres disciples qui pose question. On connaît quelque peu ces (...) pratiques grâce à la trahison d’un ancien membre qui a tout fait pour ébruiter les secrets intimes de la secte. Mais leur signification reste encore à élucider. Comment les comprendre ? Comment les intégrer dans l’ensemble de la doctrine ? Ce surgissement du pathos mystikos au sein d’un logos peri physeôs ne serait-il pas révélateur d’une philosophie qui serait apparue autant, sinon plus, comme une nouvelle religion des mystères, que sous l’aspect d’un système philosophique achevé ? Sans prétendre répondre à toutes ces questions, cette étude tente d’analyser ce qui nous reste de cette lettre d’Épicure à son disciple pour dégager quelques pistes. (shrink)

Lo studio prende in esame sei questioni di Thomas Wylton sulla visione beatifica e una questione dal Quodlibet di Siberto di Beka, carmelitano, contemporaneo di Wylton. Il saggio confronta in modo analitico le posizioni dei due autori sul ruolo e la necessità del lumen gloriae nella visione beatifica nelle singole questioni di cui si dà a seguito l'edizione. I codici sono V’ = Vat. Borgh. 36; T' = Tortosa 88; S' = Vat. Borgh. 39. L'edizione, posta in appendice allo studio, (...) riguarda le seguenti porzioni testuali: Thomas Wylton, q. 2 [V', ff. 55va-56va]; q. 3 [V', ff. 56va-58ra]; q. 4 [V', ff. 58ra-va] T16 [T', ff. 46ra-48rb]; T19 [T', ff. 50ra-61vb]; T20 [T', ff. 61vb-62vb]; Siberto di Beka, Quodlibet, q. 16 [S', ff. 270va-272vb]. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to give a high-level overview of Irenaeus’s beatific vision, and to suggest that for him, the beatific vision has a temporal dimension (now and future) and a dimension of degree (lesser now, greater in the future). His beatific vision is witnessed as it intersects with at least four main ideas in his writing—the Trinity, anthropology, resurrection, and his eschatology. Irenaeus famously held that ‘the glory of God is living man, and the life of man (...) is the vision of God’ (AH 4.20.7), which speaks to the reality of seeing God in the present, but he could also look forward in anticipation to beholding the face of God in the resurrected body in the new creation. What made the latter possible is the gradual beholding of God in the present that makes one prepared to see God’s glory in the future. Additionally, the visio Dei is Trinitarian. We behold God in Christ, since God the Father is invisible, and it is the Holy Spirit who prepares us incrementally to see God. (shrink)

The understanding of the human person as a natural desire for the beatific vision prompted fierce and convoluted debate between those who, like de Lubac, espoused la nouvelle théologie, and those who sought to maintain the standard view of the nature-grace relationship. This paper attempts to draw attention to the criticisms which Rahner addressed towards la nouvelle théologie, and to suggest that the distinction which Emmanuel Levinas makes between need (besoin) and desire (désir) offers a useful way of progressing the (...) debate and articulating the understanding of the person as desiderium naturale beyond the language of logical and ontological coherence, and in the language of proximity, ethical summons, and responsibility. (shrink)

I argue that a comprehensive ontological assessment of the beatific vision suggests that an individual’s experience of God’s face is not merely dependent on a revelation of the divine energies, but that it requires a particular mode of reception on the part of the blessed individual grounded in the reality of their faith; lacking faith, what would otherwise be experienced as the blessed vision of God is instead received as a torturous punishment. Therefore, I contend that the beatific vision is (...) one of two possible phenomena resultant from seeing God’s face; the other is more commonly labeled “hellfire.” Consequently, the often-assumed bifurcated landscape of the Afterlife (into a Heaven suffused with God’s presence and a Hell deprived of it) must be reassessed. (shrink)

This essay traces the intellectualist position of Pierre Rousselot (1878–1915) as he developed it in reaction to neo‐Thomist scholasticism, and argues that at the heart of Rousselot's approach lay a sacramental ontology. Rousselot's 1908 dissertations on St. Thomas's intellectualism and on love in the Middle Ages are best understood in the context of the 1907 condemnations of Modernism. Rousselot questioned the firmly entrenched rationalist approach of the neo‐Thomist revival. While continuing in the Thomist intellectualist tradition, he argued for a chastened (...) epistemology in which the intellect aimed beyond discursive knowledge at union with God. The implication, for Rousselot, was that in its current condition, the human intellect could arrive at knowledge only in an indirect fashion. Accepting Thomas's view of the unity between love of desire and love of friendship, Rousselot emphasized the continuity between nature and the supernatural. Furthermore, his insistence that rational judgements of credibility were powerless without corresponding ‘eyes of faith’ implied a sacramental view of the natural order as pointing to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. His moderated intellectualism, with its implied sacramental ontology, would prove an attractive paradigm for the later movement of nouvelle théologie. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. The Concept of Beatific EnjoymentThe locus classicus for the medieval scholastic discussion of beatific enjoyment is the first distinction of Book I of Peter Lombard's Sentences. Lombard extracts three distinct formulations of the term "enjoyment" from Augustine's writings. The first formulation is borrowed from the first book of Augustine's treatise On Christian Learning . The formulation states that "to enjoy is to inhere with love in something for (...) its own sake." The other two formulations are taken from Book X of Augustine's work On the Trinity . The first reads as follows: "we enjoy the things that we know, when the will rests, by delighting in them for their own sake." The second says that "to enjoy is to use with gladness , not merely through hope, but already in reality." These truncated statements served as technical definitions of the concept of enjoyment in scholastic Sentences commentaries. It was thought that the definitions call attention to the various psychological factors required for enjoyment to occur. For instance, the theologian Alexander of Hales explains that the definitions reveal distinct aspects of enjoyment with respect to the subject experiencing it and with respect to the object motivating the enjoyment. The expression "to inhere with love" refers to the soul on the part of the subject and to God on the part of the object. The saying "to use with gladness" relates to the power of the soul on the side of the subject and to created beatitude on the side of the object. Finally, the phrase "we enjoy the things that we know" corresponds to the faculty of the will as well as to the uncreated divine persons. Alexander would thus say that an adequate treatment of Augustine's concept of enjoyment must take into account the subject involved in the activity of enjoyment – e.g., the human soul, the faculty of the will, the faculty of cognition, etc. – and the object or objects of an act of enjoyment – created beatitude, the persons of the Trinity, or simply God.A slightly different reading of Augustine's definitions of enjoyment is found in Thomas Aquinas's Sentences commentary. In his literal exposition of the first distinction of Lombard's Sentences, Thomas notes that a perfect definition of a thing must disclose all of its proper causes. He then offers an explanation of the way in which Augustine's three definitions aim to clarify the concept of enjoyment. According to Thomas, the statement "to inhere in something with love for its own sake" portrays the act of enjoyment in relation to the object as a thing worthy for its own sake and the habit of love causing the enjoyment. The second formulation – "we enjoy the things that we know, etc." – links the act of enjoyment with the faculty of cognition required for the activation of the will. The third formulation – "to enjoy is to use with gladness" – refers primarily to the property of delight , which accompanies the obtainment of the desired object and perfects the act of enjoyment. Thomas, thus, identifies three factors contributing to the occurrence of an act of enjoyment – habit, cognition, and delight . In the first article of the first question of his commentary on Book I of the Sentences, Thomas states that enjoyment is the ultimate happiness of a human being. Enjoyment requires the clear intellectual vision of God, it involves an union as well as a sort of a mutual penetration through love between the one who sees and the thing that is seen, and it culminates in supreme delight . Thomas also says that enjoyment is an act of the will manifesting the habit of charity. In his Summa theologiae Ia IIae, Thomas defines enjoyment as an act of the appetitive faculty , and.. (shrink)

New Blackfriars, Volume 102, Issue 1100, Page 587-589, July 2021.

Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous. I claim that one species of horrendous evil is what I call horrendous-difference disabilities. I distinguish two subspecies of horrendous-difference disabilities based in part on the temporal relation between one’s rational moral wishing for a certain human function F and its being thwarted by intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Next, I offer a theodicy for each subspecies of horrendous-difference disability. Although I appeal to some (...) claims made by Marilyn Adams for this theodicy, I reject one particular claim. I deny that one must be aware that one participates in a horrendous evil when the horrific event occurs. To develop this point and its relevance for a theodicy for horrendous-difference disabilities, I engage with Andrew Chignell’s work on infant suffering. In doing so, I show that what partly motivates the claim is a time-bias, i.e., near-bias. By rejecting this time-bias, I show how it is possible, given post-mortem life, for persons with profound cognitive disabilities to participate in horrendous evils and how these might be defeated by God. (shrink)

Paradise is often conceived as a place where suffering is not possible, so much so that the possibility of suffering in paradise has been used by various philosophers as a defeater for the possibility of paradise. [1] Employing a “reverse-engineered-theodicy,” I use Eleonore Stump’s morally-sufficient-reason for why God allows suffering in this earthly world to explore one condition that must obtain for suffering to remain impossible in paradise, namely, that internal fragmentation is not possible in paradise. After developing an intellectualist (...) explanation of the primal sin, I suggest one reason to believe that the internal fragmentation of redeemed humans in paradise is not possible. However, this reason does not extend to other non-human inhabitants of paradise, and so I suggest that it remains possible that these other inhabitants might yet become internally fragmented. Given that Christ-like consensual suffering that aids a third party’s internal integration is presumably morally justifiable, I conclude by suggesting that the suffering of the redeemed in paradise is in fact possible. Therefore, even in paradise, there is a place for hope that the redeemed do not suffer, and for trust in others that they do not bring such suffering into being. [1] For one example see. (shrink)

In Aquinas's account of the beatific vision, human beings are joined to God in a never-ending act of contemplation of the divine essence: a state which utterly fulfills the human drive for knowledge and satisfies every desire of the human heart. In this paper, I argue that this state represents less a fulfillment of human nature, however, than a transcendence of that nature. Furthermore, what’s transcended is not incidental on a metaphysical, epistemological, or moral level.

In this essay, I show how Thomas Aquinas circumscribes epistemological questions concerning both the possibility and character of our knowledge of God within a larger eschatological framework that acknowledges the beatific vision as the ultimate good that we desire as well as the ultimate end for which we were created. Thus, knowledge of God is possible and actual on Aquinas's view because it is eternally rather than merely temporally indexed—that is, properly attributable to the blessed in heaven and only derivatively (...) attributable to persons of faith. I further argue that interpreting Aquinas's account of faith in the light of his account of the beatific vision allows us to carve out polemical space for the theologically realist claim that there can be and in fact is objectivity in our knowledge of God, whether that knowledge comes through faith (in this life) or the beatific vision (in the next life). (shrink)

One vexed philosophical question that once enjoyed great esteem is this: in the Beatific Vision that the saints enjoy in heaven, does happiness (beatitudo) consist in the vision of God, in delight in God, or in a combination of the vision and the delight? The answer that one gives to this question apparently commits one to a view about what happiness is ultimately about. It has long been thought that Aquinas holds that happiness consists in the vision of God alone. (...) In this essay, I argue that, on this important issue, Aquinas actually maintains that happiness consists both in the vision of God and delight in God, but that—unlike some of his contemporaries—Aquinas unequivocally affirms that the vision is more important in happiness than the delight. After arguing for this interpretation, I consider the quite compelling account of perfect and imperfect happiness that seems to follow from it. (shrink)

I present an outline of the Omega Point theory, which is a model for an omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, evolving, personal God who is both transcendent to spacetime and immanent in it, and who exists necessarily. The model is a falsifiable physical theory, deriving its key concepts not from any religious tradition but from modern physical cosmology and computer science; from scientific materialism rather than revelation. Four testable predictions of the model are given. The theory assumes that thinking is a purely (...) physical process of the brain, and that personality dies with the brain. Nevertheless, I show that the Omega Point theory suggests a future universal resurrection of the dead very similar to the one predicted in the Judeo‐Christian‐Islamic tradition. The notions of “grace” and the “beatific vision” appear naturally in the model. (shrink)