Apoha, a Sanskrit term meaning exclusion, was used by the late fifth- to early sixth-century Buddhist philosopher Dignā ga as a keystone in his theory of denotation. According to Dignā ga, a word denotes its meaning through the exclusion of what is other (anyā poha). This idea provoked celebration and controversy that would last through the end of Sanskritic Indian Buddhism. In the hands of Dignā ga’s successor Dharmakīrti (seventh century), who developed what became the normative version of this (...) theory, apoha leverages the fact that a causally efficacious real thing is different from everything else to describe how the interaction between living beings and their worlds produces judgements that are either shared or not in accord with the various factors contributing to the judgement’s formation. Dharmakīrti argues that there’s an infinite number of ways that a real thing could be conceptualised since each real thing is different from the infinite expanse of other real things. Acting toward a real thing requires delimiting the scope of what one ignores so that just some of the differences are left over. A living being can afford to ignore the differences between the differences that are left over in this exclusion because these differences don’t impact the specific goal based on which the living being judges an object to be efficacious or not. (shrink)

When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone to use the word "pot" or to see something as _a_ pot. The Buddhist apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the element uniting all pots is their very difference from all (...) non-pots. In other words, when we seek out a pot, we select an object that is not a non-pot, and we repeat this practice with all other items and expressions. Writing from the vantage points of history, philosophy, and cognitive science, the contributors to this volume clarify the nominalist apoha theory and explore the relationship between apoha and the scientific study of human cognition. They engage throughout in a lively debate over the theory's legitimacy. Classical Indian philosophers challenged the apoha theory's legitimacy, believing instead in the existence of enduring essences. Seeking to settle this controversy, essays explore whether apoha offers new and workable solutions to problems in the scientific study of human cognition. They show that the work of generations of Indian philosophers can add much toward the resolution of persistent conundrums in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. (shrink)

Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition. Edited by Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Pp. viii + 333. $95 ; $32 ; $31.99.

In this essay, I investigate how Chinese Yogācāra scholars of the Tang dynasty explicated and supplemented the theory of apoha (exclusion) propounded by the Indian Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga, according to which a nominal word functions by excluding everything other than its own referent. I first present a brief exposition of the theory. Then, I show that although they had very limited access to Dignāga’s theory, Kuiji and Shentai provide constructive and significant explanations that supplement the theory. I also show (...) that the term zhequan has been construed in Chinese Buddhism in at least three different senses to mean: an expression that both excludes and signifies, an expression that merely excludes and does not signify, and a negative expression that merely excludes. The notion of apoha is related to the first two senses but not the third. (shrink)

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)

The paper concentrates on the most pressing question of Indian philosophy: what is the exact connotation of a word or what sort of entity helps us to identify the meaning of a word? The paper focuses on the clash between Realism (Nyāya) and Apoha vāda (Buddhist) regarding the debate whether the meaning of a word is particular/universal or both. The paper asserts that though Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas challenged against Buddhist Apoha vāda, yet they realized that to establish an (...) opinion in support of a word that conceptually denotes a negative meaning first would be a very difficult task. (shrink)

Pramāṇavādins are antirealists on the problem of universals by virtue of the fact that they deny the existence of real universals. Dignāga, therefore, offered apoha theory to explain how the denotation of objects is possible without postulating real universals. According to Apohavāda, a word, for instance “cow”, denotes a cow not by referring to a real universal “cowness,” but by excluding it from those which are non-cows, such as horses. In recent years, there is a discussion about what the (...) genuine cause of exclusion in Dignāga’s apoha theory is. One line of interpretation suggests that, in the case of the word “cow,” the cause of exclusion is _sāsnādidarśana_ (perception of dewlap, etc.). On the other hand, some scholars maintain that it should be _adṛṣṭ__i_ (non-observation) or _adarśanamātra_ (mere non-observation) instead of _sāsnādidarśana_. The present paper consists of two parts. The first part will be an elaboration on the philosophical implications of the abovementioned philological inquiry. I will show that if the cause of exclusion is _sāsnādidarśana_, then Dignāga should be considered as a conceptualist about universals and a foundationalist about human cognitions. On the contrary, if it is _adṛṣṭ__i_, then Dignāga should be characterized as a nominalist as well as an antifoundationalist. In the second part, l will explore what the cause of exclusion is through a Mādhyamika critic of Dignāga, namely Bhāviveka. I will demonstrate that the critique of apoha theory launched by Bhāviveka indicates that Dignāga does not regard _sāsnādidarśana_ as the cause of excluding non-cows. (shrink)

The present paper, ‘Theory of Apoha on the basis of the Pramanasamuccaya’, is based upon Dingnaga's principal philosophical treatise called Pramanasamuccaya and its commentary vritti . The main aim of this paper is to come to an understanding of Dingnåga's views on the doctrine of apoha (anyapoha), which seems to be most important to interpret the conventional signs that are of the words and sentences of human speech which are used by man conventionally. Thus the central concern of (...) this doctrine of apoha is the interpretation of the process of the import of word. (shrink)

On the negative theory of meaning (Apohavāda) in Buddhist logic; critical edition with text and translation.

This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” ( apoha ), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this (...) paper two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists. (shrink)

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha ” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The (...) present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenagaṇi. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities. (shrink)

These supporting concepts enable us to much more adequately understand the meaning of apoha. First, a sharp distinction is drawn between the real and the conceptual; the real is particular, unique, momentary and the basis of perception, while the conceptual is universal, general, only supposedly objective and the basis of language. Second, the complex nature of negation discloses the kind of negation meant by apoha. Negation by implication is seen as disclosing the necessary relation between simple affirmations and (...) simple negations. It is in this sense that Dignaga asserts that the meaning of words lies in the negation of the opposite. Third, the idea of apoha as the differentiation of concepts is to be distinguished from the Nyāya-Vaiśe $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ika notion of exclusion as a materially present quality in objects.Ratnakirti, and Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta following him, use the idea of negation by implication to explain apoha as the simultaneity of and logical relation between a positive assertion concerning an epistemological object and a negative assertion concerning all things which are not that epistemological object. For example, Ratnakirti in accordance with the theory of apoha explains that the term cow “harbors” the negation of non-cow in the same way that blue is harbored in the term blue lotus. The exclusion of the other, i.e., the negation of the non-cow, is held by Ratnakirti to be an actually apprehended attribute of the cow cognized (as distinct from the cow in itself). He says “... discrimination of non-cow inevitably arises simultaneously with the perception of the cow, for (the negation of non-cow) is the qualifier (of the individual).” This interaction between the positive and the negation of the other, i.e., the relation of negation by implication, as a simultaneous interaction is necessary lest when, e.g., asked to tie up a cow one ties up a horse instead.Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta denies three possible interpretations of apoha before putting forth his own definition. The first is that when an external object is conceptualized this is done as “the other (the dissimilar) is discriminated from this.”The second is much the same, only it is in terms of the mental image, i.e., the epistemological object rather than the ontological object as in the first. The third is that apoha means the negation of an assertion, i.e., the simple absence of the other. All three of these interpretations are unacceptable to Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta. He defines apoha as “the affirmation (of a positive entity) qualified by discrimination (of it from all other entities).”Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta goes on to explain this simultaneity more fully: ... those who stress affirmation think that after we have known the cow, we consequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow; those who stress the negative function of apoha are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz., the cow. Thus (both interpretations) are wrong. For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which (negation or affirmation) occurs first. In fact, it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication, or that one having understood the negation later confirms what is discriminated (from the dissimilar). Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.We can see from this that for Ratnakirti and Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta apoha meant the simultaneous affirmation of and negation of the dissimilar from the (epistemological) object. Mok $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ākaragupta's concern with the “time of judgment” also shows that the idea of apoha was understood by them as being psychologically descriptive. In the process of identifying an epistemological object as some particular thing, neither the negative nor the positive function have priority but are, rather, complementary one to the other. This simultaneity and complementarity are supported by the examination of mind “at the time of judgment,” i.e., it is a psychological description of the process of identification of an epistemological object as some particular thing.It is this fact of apoha describing the process of identification which, as described above, places apoha in the inference category of sources of truth. Apoha is clearly, therefore, involved with words and concepts rather than being on the perception side where it would have to be a metaphysical concept describing the real or absolute.Putting the idea of apoha into contemporary terms we can say that it is a psychological descriptor for the bipolar relation of concepts. Dignaga and the other Buddhist logicians are then to be understood here as being involved in producing a phenomenological description of linguistic thought processes. More broadly, as in the discussion of perception, they are involved in the phenomenological description of consciousness, a favorite Buddhist undertaking. As such, the work of the Buddhist logicians fits into the larger soteriological intention of all Buddhist thinkers, since enlightenment is understood to follow from insight into the nature of consciousness as productive of suffering.Some authors have criticized the logicians as being overly concerned with the un-Buddhist occupation of arguing. However, when their work is seen as expanding our understanding of the nature and working of consciousness, the logicians are certainly worthy of our respect. (shrink)

part 1. An annotated translation of Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 24,16-45,20 (Pramāṇavārttika 1.40-91.

“...a theory of meaning for a particular language should be conceived by a philosopher as describing the practice of linguistic interchange by speakers of the language without taking it as already understood what it is to have a language at all: that is what, by imagining such a theory, we are trying to make explict." – Michael Dummer (2004: 31).

Contemporary scholars have begun to document the extensive influence of the sixth to seventh century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti on Pratyabhijñā Śaiva thought. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta’s adaptation of Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory provides a striking instance of the creative ways in which these Śaivas use Dharmakīrti’s ideas to argue for positions that Dharmakīrti would emphatically reject. Both Dharmakīrti and these Śaivas emphasize that the formation of a concept involves both objective and subjective factors. Working within a certain perceptual environment, factors such (...) as a subject’s desires, habits, and conditioning lead him or her to form a concept based on excluding what is not relevant to the accomplishment of his or her goal. However, the two differ in their account of the relationship between concepts and subject/object duality itself. While Dharmakīrti claims that the division of a cognition into subject, object, and awareness is nonconceptual, the subtly shifted definition of a concept that these Śaivas employ allows them to claim that the error of subject/object duality is actually conceptual. This seemingly small difference in their respective evaluations of the nature of subject/object error has surprisingly large consequences. If, as these Śaivas claim, any awareness involving a duality is conceptual, then subject and object are concepts. Moreover, if the formation of a concept requires desire, then some kind of desire must be inherent to consciousness itself before the formation of a limited subject/object pair. In short, ultimate consciousness must be Śiva, who possesses the freedom to will any and all possible realities. (shrink)

A number of contemporary philosophers think that the unqualified statement “X is unspeakable” faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this statement is true, it must simultaneously be false, given that X is speakable by the predicate word “unspeakable.” This predicament is in this chapter formulated as an argument that I term the “ineffability paradox.” After examining the Buddhist semantic theory of apoha (exclusion) and an apoha solution to the issue, I resort to a few Chinese Buddhist and (...) Hindu philosophical materials to rationally reconstruct a strategy for resolving the paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed “indication,” together with the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I show that expressing the ineffable does not necessarily involve irresoluble contradiction. It is also suggested that philosophers may need to acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ineffability for contemporary philosophizing. (shrink)

If we distinguish phenomenal effects from their noumenal causes, the former being our conceptual(ized) experiences, the latter their grounds or causes in reality ‘as it is’ independent of our experience, then two contradictory positions with regards to the relationship between these two can be distinguished: either phenomena are identical with their noumenal causes, or they are not. Davidson is among the most influential modern defenders of the former position, metaphysical non-dualism. Dharmakīrti’s strict distinction between ultimate and conventional reality, on the (...) other hand, may be one of the most rigorously elaborated theories of the opposite position, metaphysical dualism. Despite this fundamental difference, their theories about the connection between phenomena and their noumenal causes are surprisingly similar in important respects. Both Dharmakīrti in his theory of ‘apoha’ and Davidson in his theory of ‘triangulation’ argued that the content of words or concepts depends on a process involving at least two communicating beings and shared noumenal stimuli. The main point of divergence is the nature of classification, but ultimately Dharmakīrti’s and Davidson’s conclusions on the noumenal-phenomenal relationship turn out to be complementary more than contradictory, and an integrative reconstruction suggests a ‘middle path’ between dualism and non-dualism. (shrink)

Apoha theory could perhaps be understood as a part of the Buddhist program of emancipating people from the clutches of attachment. Diṅnāga and thereafter Dharmakīrti, when they developed their epistemology of perception, inference, and language, pointed out that through perception we are associated with unique particulars, which are momentary. We try to give an enduring status to them through thought and language by constructing universals. Thus, thought and language amount to false constructions, and they also mark our attachment to (...) the world. Hence, the realization that helps in preventing such an attachment would imply that inference and language do not really ‘refer to’ or ‘associate themselves with’ what is .. (shrink)

Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory of concept formation aims to provide an account of intersubjectivity without relying on the existence of real universals. He uses the pan-Yogācāra theory of karmic imprints to claim that sentient beings form concepts by treating unique particulars as if a certain subset of them had the same effects. Since this judgment of sameness depends on an individual's habits, desires, and sensory capacities, and these in turn depend on the karmic imprints developed over countless lifetimes and continuously (...) reshaped by ongoing actions, the extent to which individuals experience themselves as acting within a shared world depends on these imprints. However, a number of critics—traditional and contemporary—have expressed compelling doubts about whether or not apoha can be successful given Dharmakīrti's ontology which, in addition to denying universals, eventually denies the reality of even the most basic structure of conventional experience: subject/object duality. In line with the tradition he inherits, Dharmakīrti considers even the mere division of a moment of awareness into defined structures of subject and object to be a distortion shaped by beginningless karmic imprints. While this initial moment of awareness is nonconceptual, the experience of a certain world is always already shaped by the previous actions of sentient beings trapped within the web of saṃsāra, in a process driven by ignorance. Dharmakīrti’s reliance on karmic imprints on two distinct levels—one within the conventional world, and one which constitutes the conventional world—may thereby provide a compelling account of intersubjectivity without relying on universals. (shrink)

The influential apoha theory of concept formation of the seventh-century Buddhist Dharmakīrti stands as a philosophically powerful articulation of how language could work in the absence of real universals. In brief, Dharmakīrti argues that concepts are constructed through a goaloriented process that delimits the content of an experience by ignoring whatever does not conform to one's conditioned expectations. There are no real similarities that ground this process. Rather, a concept is merely what's left over once one has glossed over (...) enough of the differences between elements of one's awareness that one can judge the remainder to have the same effects as what one... (shrink)

언어의 대상은 ‘타자의 배제’이고 선명하게 현현하는 감관의 대상일 수 없다는 점에서 쁘라즈냐까라굽따(Prajñākaragupta ca. 780-840)의 언어의미론 또한 불교인식론논리학파(佛教認識論理学)의 아뽀하(apoha)론에서 벗어나지 않는다. 다만 쁘라즈냐까라굽따는 개념지의 영상(影像, pratibimbaka) 자체가 언어의 대상으로 타자의 배제인 것은 있을 수 없지만 배제는 반드시 형상을 갖는 지(知)와 결합하는 것이라고 하는 유형상지식론(有形相知識論)에 기반 해서 아뽀하론을 전개한다. 또한 그는 외계의 본질인 ‘배제’를 인정하지 않는다. 개념지의 영상(pratibimbaka) 자체가 언어의 대상으로 타자의 배제는 아니지만 언어의 대상은 동일한 결과를 갖지 않는 것(atatkārya)으로부터 배제된 공통성(sāmānya)이고 그 공통성을 본질로 하는 형상은 실재가 아니라 잠재인상(潛在印象, vāsanā)을 (...) 원인으로 하기 때문이다. 쁘라즈냐까라굽따는 이와 같이 언어의 개념적 기능에 아뽀하론의 중심을 두고 있다. (shrink)

The problem of empty terms is one of the focal issues in analytic philosophy. Russell’s theory of descriptions, a proposal attempting to solve this problem, attracted much attention and is considered a hallmark of the analytic tradition. Scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy, e.g., McDermott, Matilal, Shaw and Perszyk, have studied discussions of empty terms in Indian and Buddhist philosophy. But most of these studies rely heavily on the Nyāya or Navya-Nyāya sources, in which Buddhists are portrayed as opponents to (...) be defeated, and thus do not truly reflect Buddhist views on this issue. The present paper will explore how Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist logic, deals with the issue of empty subject terms. His approach is subtle and complicated. On the one hand, he proposes a method of paraphrase that resembles Russell’s theory of descriptions. On the other, by relying on his philosophy of language—the apoha theory, he tends to fall into a panfictionalism. Through the efforts of his follower Dharmakīrti, the latter approach would become more acceptable among Indian and Tibetan Buddhists. Dignāga’s Chinese commentators, who were free from the influence of Dharmakīrti, dealt with the empty term issue in three ways: (1) by adhering to Dignāga’s method of paraphrase; (2) by allowing exceptions for non-implicative negation; and (3) by indicating the propositional attitude of a given proposition. Among these, the third proved most popular. (shrink)

Development of Buddhist thought in India; 1. The Buddha’s suffering; 2. Practice and theory of no-self; 3. Kleśas and compassion; 4. The second Buddha’s greater vehicle; 5. Karmic questions; 6. Irresponsible selves, responsible non-selves; 7. The third turning: Yogācāra; 8. The long sixth to seventh century: epistemology as ethics; I. Perception and conception: the changing face ofultimate reality; II. Evaluating reasons: Naiyāyikas and Diṅnāga. III. Madhyamaka response to Yogācāra IV. Percepts and concepts: Apoha 1 ; V. Efficacy: Apoha (...) 2 ; VI. The path of the Bodhisattva; Epilogue; Background information; Appendix 1: The languages of Buddhism; Appendix 2: Intellectual context; Appendix 3: The Abhidharma. (shrink)

Conventional truth describes things as delivered by ordinary experience; ultimate truth captures the way that things are independent of our interests, practices, and cognitive faculties. It is notoriously difficult to provide an adequate analysis of either conventional or ultimate truth, however. This chapter develops a previous scholarly suggestion to understand conventional truth in Madhyamaka as deflationary truth. It points out that this suggestion is a good one only if a supplementary theory of meaning, which the deflationary theory of truth presupposes, (...) can be given in a way that is consistent with both the limitations of the deflationary theory of truth and with Madhyamaka antirealist metaphysics. It then offers a presentation of Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha in order to argue that the resources necessary to give the required account of meaning can be found in Dharmakīrti’s account of intentional mental content. (shrink)

Intro -- Title -- Contents -- Publisher's Acknowledgment -- Introduction -- Madhyamaka's Promise as Philosophy -- 1. Trying to Be Fair -- 2. How Far Can a Mādhyamika Reform Customary Truth? Dismal Relativism, Fictionalism, Easy-Easy Truth, and the Alternatives -- Logic and Semantics -- 3. How Do Mādhyamikas Think? Notes on Jay Garfield, Graham Priest, and Paraconsistency -- 4. "How Do Mādhyamikas Think?" Revisited -- 5. Prasaṅga and Proof by Contradiction in Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, and Dharmakīrti -- 6. Apoha Semantics: (...) What Did Bhāviveka Have to Do with It? -- 7. What Happened to the Third and Fourth Lemmas in the Tibetan Madhyamaka? -- Ethics and the Spiritual Path -- 8. Madhyamaka Buddhist Ethics -- 9. Reason, Irrationality, and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections upon Śāntideva's Arguments with Himself -- 10. Yogic Perception, Meditation, and Enlightenment: The Epistemological Issues in a Key Debate between Madhyamaka and Chan -- Madhyamaka in Contemporary Debates -- 11. On Minds, Dharmakīrti, and Madhyamaka -- 12. Serious, Lightweight, or Neither: Should Madhyamaka Go to Canberra? -- Notes on the Articles -- Abbreviations -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism Titles Previously Published -- About Wisdom Publications -- Copyright. (shrink)

Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is (...) non- relational and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana. (shrink)

(First paragraph.) Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques (...) Derrida, Dharmakīrti, and Dōgen. Prima facie, these philosophers have little in common, and indeed the differences are vast. Even in case of the two Western thinkers there is a fundamental difference between Davidson’s anti-dualist identification of phenomenal, experienced reality with the noumenal, real, external world on the one hand, and the bracketing or elimination of noumenal reality at the base of Derrida’s thought on the other, which lead to radically different ideas with regards to (the possibility and nature of) objectivity and our linguistic access to the real/external/noumenal world. Nevertheless, there are important similarities between Dharmakīrti’s theory of apoha and Davidson’s and Derrida’s theories of triangulation and différance respectively, and these similarities can be exploited to bridge some of the differences and attempt a constructive engagement. (shrink)

The idea to work on this topic was come to my mind when I came across Masaaki Hattori’s comment that Dinnaga has accepted Bhartrhari’s views regarding the meaning of a sentence although their theories of word meaning are completely different from each other. According to Bhartrhari, in all phenomenal entities there are two elements viz. jati and vyakti; jati refers to the real element and vyakti to the unreal. Vyakti suffer changes, whereas jati remains constant. Again according to him the (...) real unit of language is a sentence, and not words or letters, because only a sentence conveys one full idea of the speaker. It’s meaning is also an instantaneous flash of pratibha or intuition, which has no parts. Dinnaga, on the other hand did not accept the reality of word‐ meaning (samanya),but maintained that words deal directly with conceptual images or vikalpas, which are purely subjective constructions of the mind, and therefore there can be no direct connection between words and external objects. The function of a word in a sentence is similar to the function of an inferential mark (linga) in the process of inference and it indicates its object through the exclusion of other things (apoha). Thus, there seems to be some contradictions in Dinnaga’s views on sentence meaning. But I think Dinnaga did not accept Bhartrhari’s views in toto. He could not possibly have done so. There is, however, a resemblance between Dinnaga and Bhartrhari in that each accepted that the primary unit of linguistic meaning is the entire sentence; the meaning of an individual word is abstracted from the whole meaning of the sentence. It is only in that respect that the two philosophers can be said to have roughly the same theory of sentential meaning. (shrink)

When I first encountered Indian philosophy after having studied Western philosophy, two examples of comparative interest caught my attention. One was Saussure's theory of meaning through difference (which led to the vibrant traditions of structuralism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism). I was immediately struck by the stark similarity between this theory and the Buddhist apoha theory of meaning. The other example was that of Hume, and in this case I was amazed at the sophistication of the Indian philosophical discussions on the (...) problem of induction compared to which Hume's analysis was quite pedestrian. My encounter with both these issues illustrated two problems in the history of ideas. In the case of .. (shrink)

The Buddhist philosopher Dignaga (around 500 CE) centers his philosophy of language on the theorem of verbal meaning as "exclusion of other referents" (anyapoha). This is the topic of the fifth chapter in his summarizing last work, the Pramanasamuccayavrtti. Since a word tells its hearer something about the object to which it refers in the same way that a logical reason tells its observer something about the object of which it is a property, Dignaga's apoha thesis is a crucial (...) complement to his theory of inference. The original Sanskrit text of this work is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments and two highly problematic Tibetan translations it is only the since recently available unique Sanskrit manuscript of the mid-8th century CE commentary, the Pramanasamuccayatika, by Jinendrabuddhi that allows for a faithful English translation. Jinendrabuddhi's text has been used throughout and, in parts, critically edited for the first time. On the basis of these sources it was possible to provide the translation with a restoration as far as possible of the original Sanskrit text of Dignaga's work. In his introduction, Pind surveys his methodology, discusses the sources, the context and historical position, and the character of this chapter, and he also deals with Jinendrabuddhi's commentary, his sources and its restoration. Moreover, he presents the essential features of the apoha thesis in detail. The translation of this rather difficult text is richly annotated and provides all philological information in support of the text's restoration as well as extensive explanations and discussions of the content. It is in the notes that Pind provides the background of Indian grammatical analysis and theory (Bhartrhari and others) and documents the context of the rival philosophical traditions such as those of the Nyaya and Mimasa. Pind is also particularly aware of the influences on Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation that derive from Dharmakirti's interpretation of Dignaga's tenets and consistently analyses the differences occurring. Several appendices conclude this study by presenting a number of notes separated because of their size. After Richard Hayes' study and translation of the first part of this chapter (1988), this is the first comprehensive presentation of Dignaga's philosophy of language. (shrink)

Treatise on the differentiative category (apoha) according to Buddhist logic and metaphysics.

In studies of Indian theories of meaning it has been standard procedure to examine their relevance to the ontological issues between Brahmin realism about universals and Buddhist nominalism. It is true that Kumārila makes efforts to secure the real existence of a generic property denoted by a word by criticizing Dignāga, who declares that the real world consists of absolutely unique individuals. The present paper, however, concentrates on the linguistic approaches Dignāga and Kumārila adopt to deny or to prove the (...) existence of universals. It turns out that in spite of adopting contrasting approaches they equally distinguish between the semantic denotation of a word and its pragmatic reference to a thing in the physical world. From a purely semantic viewpoint, Dignāga considers the exclusion of others by a word as the result of a conceptual accumulation of the sense-components accepted in the totality of worldly discourse. Among the three characteristics Dignāga held must be met by universals, Kumārila attaches special importance to their entire inherence in each individual. This is because he pragmatically pays attention to the use of a word in the discourse given in a particular context by analyzing a sentence into a topic and a comment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Meaning and Non-Existence: Kumārila’s Refutation of Dignāga’s Theory of Exclusion by Kei Kataoka and John TaberCharles A. Goodman (bio)Meaning and Non-Existence: Kumārila’s Refutation of Dignāga’s Theory of Exclusion. By Kei Kataoka and John Taber. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2021. Pp. 268. Paper $44.00, ISBN 978-3-7001-8641-0.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (seventh century CE) was a brilliant and highly original thinker, a master of Sanskrit style, and perhaps the most formidable philosophical (...) critic the Buddhist tradition has ever faced. Yet among philosophers trained in Western traditions, his work is today almost unknown. One key cause of this unmerited neglect may be that very little of Kumārila’s oeuvre has been available in Western languages. The present work, by two prominent experts on Mīmāṃsā, presents one of the most influential and difficult chapters of Kumārila’s most important work, the Commentary in Verses, in a clear and accurate English translation.As one of the greatest philosophical authors to have appeared in the traditions we now call Hinduism, Kumārila’s works in general are of considerable interest to specialists in Hindu thought. The particular chapter translated in this volume, however, may well be of broader significance than most of his writings. In that chapter, the Apohavāda, Kumārila offers a thorough and wide-ranging critique of the philosophy of language advocated by Dignāga, a key figure in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Many scholars maintain that it was this critique in particular that motivated Dharmakīrti, another major Buddhist epistemologist, to formulate a new version of this understanding of language, one that would be widely accepted and influential among Buddhists in India and Tibet. Thus, anyone interested in the history of Buddhist philosophy may also find much to ponder in this volume.Several traditions of South Asian philosophy, including the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Kumārila’s own Mīmāṃsā school, were realists about universals. They held that universals were permanent, mind-independent entities and that our understanding of the world was dependent on them. Kumārila’s views on the topic are especially uncompromising, as he holds that we can directly perceive universals in the ordinary things we encounter.These views were, however, rejected by Buddhist epistemologists, who sought to develop nominalist or conceptualist understandings of thought and language that could dispense with real universals. Their most important attempts to do so take the form of theories of apoha, a Sanskrit word literally meaning “exclusion.” In its most basic form, a doctrine of apoha maintains that a general [End Page 1] term such as “cow” manages to be meaningful by excluding all non-cows. But this deceptively simple formulation leads to a variety of interpretations, each facing its own difficulties. In his chapter, Kumārila is unstinting in pointing out a wide variety of objections that can be raised against the apoha view as expressed in the works of Dignāga.One way to think about the apoha theory is that it is fundamentally ontological in nature, seeking to avoid the problems with postulating real universals by arguing that the meanings of words, being exclusions, are negations or absences, not positive entities. Many scholars understand the theory in this way, but Kumārila points out fundamental flaws with this approach. One of the gravest of these flaws is that if absences are non-entities, it is unclear how they can be, at the level of ontology, any different from each other. As a result, the theory is in danger of entailing that all words are synonyms.Another possible way to understand the apoha theory is that it seeks mainly to offer an account of the psychological process by which human minds construct the meanings of words, understanding this process as fundamentally contrastive in nature. A form of this psychological interpretation also briefly comes in for critique by Kumārila, in the guise of the view that our ideas of distinct exclusions are produced by vāsanā-s, a difficult Sanskrit word referring to underlying psychological processes or tendencies that, according to Buddhists, shape our... (shrink)

Mahayana Buddhist philosophers’ attitude toward language is notoriously negative. The transcendental reality is often said to be ineffable. One’s obsession to apprehend the truth through words is an intellectual disease to be cured Attachment to verbal and conceptual proliferation enslaves oneself in the afflictive circle of life and death. Nevertheless, no Buddhist can afford to overlook the significance of language in preaching Buddhist dharmas as well as in day-to-day transactions. The point is not that of keeping silence. Rather, one should (...) understand and use language in such a way that one alludes to the unsayable reality and somehow escapes the bewitchment of language. Perhaps with this realization in mind, Mahayana Buddhist metaphysicians had fostered the penchant for using, at the sentential level, denials, negations and paradoxes to couch their views. In a similar vein but mainly at the word level, Dignaga (ca. 480-540 CE) the Yogacara epistemologist’ offered us a theory of language known as apoha doctrine in his landmark work Pramiinasamuccaya (henceforth PS). It is the purpose of this article to construe the doctrine. (shrink)

The proceedings of the Third International Dharmakirti Conference held in Hiroshima in 1997 collect a number of papers devoted to the study of the great seventh-century Buddhist philosopher, Dharmakirti, and his impacts upon the succeeding generations of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers in India and Tibet. The Second International Dharmakirti Conference was held in Vienna, and its proceedings, Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, have been published in this same series. The present volume contains the results of the important researches (...) made by the major Dharmakirtian scholars in the world since the last conference, so that the readers can discover the present state of affairs in the field of Buddhist epistemology and logic. Some papers are concerned with the epistemological topics, such as the notion of perceptibility, and others with the purely logical problems like an empty subject. Some deal with the Buddhist theory of language called apoha in comparison with the views of Nagarjuna, Bhartrhari and others, while others are devoted to the ontological questions, such as how to determine the causal relationship. Several papers discuss Dharmakirti in the light of criticism made by Jaina, Nyaya or Minamsa philosophers. And finally the most remarkable feature of the present volume is the increase of number of contributions devoted to the study of Tibetan tradition of Buddhist epistemology and logic which has been developed under the great influence of Dharmakirti. (shrink)

The recent discovery of a fragmentary manuscript of Utpaladeva’s long commentary (Vivṛti or Ṭīkā) on his own Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā (ĪPK) and Vṛtti enables us to assess the role of this work as the real centre of gravity of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy as a whole, though the later Śaiva tradition chose instead Abhinavagupta’s Vimarśinī as the standard text. This brilliant, and more compact and accessible, text was copied and copied again during the centuries and became popular in south India too, where a (...) number of manuscripts in the principal southern scripts are still available. The success of a particular commentary is very often the indirect cause of the decline of the others, which are less and less read and, consequently, copied, until their complete or almost complete loss. Of the lengthy and difficult Vivṛti by Utpaladeva—corresponding to the extent of 8,000 ślokas (hence the traditional denomination of Aṣṭasāhasrī)—the fragmentary śāradā manuscript that has come to light covers only the section ĪPK I.3.6 through I.5.3. Although the portion of the recovered text is comparatively short (33 folios), it proves to be particularly important in the economy of Pratyabhijñā philosophy due to the crucial points being dealt with there at great length, always in a hard-fought debate with the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism. (shrink)