Die in diesem Band als 'Beilagen' wiedergegebenen Manuskripte gehören formal wie systematisch zu demselben Konvolut aus dem Nachlaß, dessen grundlegenden Teil über Basisphänomene (s. ECN 1) Cassirer ebenfalls in seiner Schrift über Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis (s. ECN 2) nutzt. Cassirers wechselseitige interne Verweisungen vom Manuskript zur Geschichte auf einzelne dieser Lagen und vice versa rechtfertigen den Abdruck dieser Manuskripte zu einzelnen Kategorien des in den Geschichts- und Mythos-Manuskripten behandelten Zusammenhangs. Inhalt: Der Begriff der Form als Problem der Philosophie (...) (Vortrag, Berlin 1924); Über Sprache und Denken (Vortrag, London 1927); Entwürfe und Vorarbeiten zur Philosophie der symbolischen Formen: a) Prägnanz, symbolische Ideation; b) Präsentation und Repräsentation; c) Allgemeines zur Gestaltpsychologie (1927-1929); Zum Symbolproblem (Vortrag, Zürich 1932 / Utrecht 1935); Vom Einfluß der Sprache auf die naturwissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung (Vortrag, London 1935); Beilage: Grundprobleme der Sprachphilosophie (Vorlesung, Hamburg SS 1922, Nachschrift von Dr. Willi Meyne). (shrink)

1) vgl.,,50phistes" 248c4 - 253c3 und 254b7-257aI2. 2) Heidegger, Brief über den "Humanismus"; s. in "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit", Bern 1947,5.53. 3) 5. Diels "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker"6, Berlin 1951; Parmenides B l. 4) Reinhardt "Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie", Bonn 1916, 5.32 ff.; zu dem Verhältnis der beiden "Teile" des Gedichts ist u.a. zu vergleichen: Fränkel "Parmenidesstudien" (Götting. Nachr. 1930, 5.153 ff.), Abschnitt IV und V; Calogero, 5tudi sull' Eleatismo, Rom 1932; Riezler "Par­ menides", Frankfurt 1934 (dazu (...) die Rezension von Gadamer in "Gnomon" XII 1936,5.77 ff.); Jaeger "Die Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker", 5tutt­ gart 1953,5.123 f.. 5) B 8,1 '"!J.6~o~ i3't;,~ t-'"ü'&?~ o~?,Io AeL7tE'Tct,L w~, e,O'''n~.. ~., 6) B 8,2... "t"lXu··nJI Il zm. (shrink)

This investigation addresses the internal experience as a spatial phenomenon. Ascertaining the difference between internal and external experience as a space metaphor leads to the question of the source of the space metaphors in principle. The analogy between time and space and the space metaphors in Husserl’s conception of time are considered. The question of the temporality of consciousness, evidence, and internal experience are brought to the fore by comparing Brentano’s and Husserl’s conceptions. The difference between the direct and indirect (...) modes of consciousness by Brentano, his conception of time as the boundary in the continuum, and his concept of the proteraesthesis proves to be relevant for the concept of internal experience as a spatial phenomenon. The essay calls in question the self-sufficiency of time-experience and the traditional correspondence of time to the internal experience and of space to the external one. The relation of the Here/There- and Now/Then-experience is discussed. I intend to elucidate the experience of boundary as a primary internal experience from which the space-experience arises. In its turn the boundary-consciousness has its origin in the differentiation-experience. In the latter there is no time, the internal one included, but there is a boundary-experience as a primary and indirect experience. Time is s shadow of space; it originates from the manifold of human spaces.Esta investigación aborda la experiencia interna como un fenómeno espacial. Determinar la diferencia entre la experiencia interna y externa como una metáfora del espacio conduce a la cuestión de la fuente de las, en principio, metáforas espaciales. Aquí se atiende la analogía entre el tiempo y el espacio y las metáforas espaciales en la concepción del tiempo de Husserl. Se ponen de relieve la cuestión de la temporalidad de la conciencia, la evidencia y la experiencia interna, comparando las concepciones de Brentano y Husserl. La diferencia entre los modos de conciencia directos e indirectos de Brentano, su concepción del tiempo como el límite en el continuo, y su concepto de la proteroestesis, son relevantes para el concepto de experiencia interna como un fenómeno espacial. El ensayo cuestiona la autosuficiencia de la experiencia del tiempo y la correspondencia tradicional del tiempo con la experiencia interna y del espacio con la externa. Se discute la relación de la experiencia Aquí/Ahí y de la experiencia Ahora/Luego. Mi in-tención es esclarecer la experiencia de la frontera como una experiencia interna primaria de la cual surge la experiencia espacial. A su vez, la con-ciencia de frontera tiene su origen en la experiencia de diferenciación. En esta último no hay tiempo —incluso el interno—, pero hay una experiencia límite como experiencia primaria e indi-recta. El tiempo es la sombra del espacio; se origina en la multiplicidad de espacios humanos.. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s models of self-consciousness and their specific relation to time. It aims to show that genuine philosophical theories can explain the idiosyncratic relation between ourselves and the world without relying on pure metaphysical speculations or strictly empirical and phenomenally oriented conceptions, as many contemporary proponents of analytic philosophy entail. The first groundbreaking doctrine in this regard is Kant’s transcendental theory of apperception, which unfolds a new theoretical dimension of thinking, grounding the logical unity of (...) thought in the pure, originally synthetic unity of the subject itself. In order to constitute a structural order within the appearing phenomenal world, Kant conceptualizes a theory of self-affection in the second edition of the Critique of pure reason, positing a dynamic relation between the spontaneously acting intellect and the purely receptive inner sense of time as a result of productive transcendental imagination. The problematic relation between self-reliance and empirical consciousness that Kant did not resolve completely led to various subsequent transformations of Kant’s transcendental principles, one of which boasts Schopenhauer as a prominent but rarely considered representative. Schopenhauer’s systematic approach consists in a modified version of Kant’s transcendental idealism, which ties the Kantian subject of logical and transcendental unity to an intuitive corporeal individual that can only conceptualize itself as an original, willing subject. The Schopenhauerian subject unfolds its empirical character in accordance with its own inner impulses and motivations, which manifest themselves in time but can only be interpreted as a phenomenal representation of a higher, metaphysical unity, which Schopenhauer calls the will as a thing in itself. Schopenhauer reaches his final metaphysical conclusion via a problematic analogy, positing another perspective on the corporeal nature of the individual which, by means of abstraction, can be extended to the whole phenomenal world. Therefore, Schopenhauer interprets the underlying character of the subject and the phenomenal world as a whole as a timeless, omnipresent will to live which can be temporally experienced within the nature of our own subjectivity. (shrink)

The entire corpus of Proust’s Recherche is permeated by philosophical digressions, reflections, aphorisms, dialogues and monologues. These are presented by a number of different and often divergent voices – that of the narrator who is the fictive author of the novel, that of the young Marcel on his long way to become this writer, those of many other figures, with whom Marcel interacts, that of the real author, who has permanently rewritten the text and finally the authority of the text (...) as a whole. The interplay of these perspectives is an essential part of the drama the novel displays. Their contrast cannot, must not and should not be overcome in favour of an integrated and justified point of view of the kind professional philosophy is aiming at. Following this observation, the essay highlights a number of intertwined strands of philosophical motives in the Recherche in order to explore a basic relationship as well as tension between philosophy and literature. Proust’s novel – like other instances of literature and the arts – is not primarily made for a veridical but primarily for a processual thinking. It invites its readers to get involved and to linger in open ended mind games. Philosophising in and with the Recherche means doing philosophy without heading at a philosophy. (shrink)

La pregunta por el alcance y la relevancia de la angustia en la obra escrita de Martin Heidegger es uno de los problemas fundamentales del debate contemporáneo, y no solamente en cuanto a sus declinaciones filosofizantes. En este trabajo se delimita el lugar de ¡a angustia en Ser y Tiempo, centrándose, en un primer momento, en contextualizar la temática al interior del proyecto inconcluso de Ser y Tiempo, para luego introducir la noción de la angustia en tanto apertura distinguida o (...) destacada del Dasein. The question about the extent and relevance of the concept of anxiety inside the written work of Martin Heidegger is one of the fundamental problems not only the p h i l o s o p h i c al declinations of the contemporary debate turn around. In the present article the place of anxiety in Being and Time is delimitated, focusing the discussion, in first place, on locating the thematic in the context of the unconcluded project of Being and Time, followed by the introduction of the notion of anxiety as distinguished or outstanding aperture of the Dasein. (shrink)