In some works of Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), there is a discourse related to the claim that textual evidence produces uncertainty. This claim was put forward as a theory based on approximately eleven premises although this number varies in some of his works. According to this theory, textual evidences are not convenient for drawing definite conclusions about the meanings indicated by these evidences due to the situations which is caused by (ⅰ) the language itself and (ⅱ) the use of (...) the speaker of the language and (ⅲ) understanding of listener respectively. There is an additional phrase “This claim is not valid absolutely” in some of the works that mention this theory. Even though that is the case, this addition is not enough -at first glance- to solve the problem. If the problem of the uncertanity of textual evidence, which was put forward systematically for the first time by Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī as far as is known, is accepted in the borad sense it might cause some critical problems concerning the science of Kalām. The most important one among these problems can be presented in this way: In the science of Kalām, it is claimed that the certain (yakīnī) propositios and certain evidences are used in the issues that Kalām deals with and substantiates. On the other hand, the true narrative (al-khabar al-sādiq) is counted as one of the sources of knowledge in this science. The true narrative has subsections in the form of narratives transmitted from so many groups of people that are almost impossible to agree on a lie. Because all of these have reached us by way of words and narration, the issue of the uncertanity of textual evidence renders these subsections problematic. Consequently, one of the sources of knowledge in the science of Kalām happens to lose its reliability. In the present work, the following problem is analyzed: The problem of the uncertanity of textual evidence in that it causes one fundamental source of knowledge to be eliminated in the science of Kalām. [In the present paper] Two solutions will be offered to solve the problem: (a) Questioning how the issue was discussed after Rāzī and how Rāzī was understood, then showing which understanding is in accordance with Rāzī's statements. For, in order to reach the most accurate conclusion about a problem, how the issue is understood and explained in the historical process has a very important position. To solve a problem regarding a scholar like Rāzī, who left many works that must be examined from a holistic point of view, it is extremely important to consider first-hand his students, close followers and critics. (b) Showing the field and issues in which the textual evidence can be used epistemologically" through "the tripartite division of the issues whose knowledge is sought to be attained, as known only by reason, known only by transplantation, and known by both" in Kalām. Because the division of the issues according to the ways and sources of knowledge will reveal which information sources can be used in what kind of issues and where they will pose a problem when used. Accordingly, the power or consistency of an information source should be examined through issues that are not objectionable in their epistemological use. The aim of this study is to solve the problem in two ways to have been mentioned. (shrink)

Fahreddin er-Râzî (öl. 606/1210) bazı eserlerinde dile getirdiği naklî/lafzî delillerin zannîliği meselesini temellendirirken zikrettiği öncüllerden en önemlisi “naklî delile muârız olacak aklî bir delilin bulunması ihtimali vardır” şeklindedir. Bu öncül aklî delilin kesinlik verdiği üzerine kuruludur. Şöyle ki naklî bir delilin aklî bir delille teâruz etmesi hâlinde ya ikisinden birisi kabul edilip diğeri reddedilir ya her ikisi de kabul edilir ya da hiçbirisi kabul edilmez. Son iki ihtimal çelişiklerin aynı anda bir arada olması veya aynı anda olumsuzlanması imkânsız olduğundan uygulanamaz. (...) Akıl naklin aslı olduğundan ve aklî delil kesinlik bildirdiğinden naklî delil kabul edilip aklî delil reddedilemez. Öyleyse aklî delil kabul edilir ve naklî delil ret ya da tevil edilir. Sonuç olarak naklî delilin kesinliği ortadan kalkar. Bu söylem günümüzde kendisine nispet edilen bazı iddialar sebebiyle Râzî özelinde önemli bir probleme sebep olmaktadır. Zira özellikle el-Metâlibü’l-ʻâliye isimli eserinin mukaddimesindeki ifadeleri delil gösterilerek Râzî’ye “aklın metafizikte kesinliğe ulaşamayacağı” görüşü nispet edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Râzî görünürde akıl ve aklî delil hakkında iki çelişik hüküm vermektedir. Bu çalışmada yukarıda tasvir edilen problem çözüme kavuşturulmaya çalışılacaktır. Öncelikle Râzî’nin aklın sınırından bahseden ifadeleri bağlamı içinde aktarılacak ardından bu ifadeler tahlil edilecektir. Temel iddiamız Râzî’nin gerçekte akıl hakkında iki zıt söylemi olmadığı şeklindedir. (shrink)