1. Pusan lok'ŏllit'i wa lok'ŏl munhwa yulli -- 2. Han'guk lok'ŏllit'i wa lok'ŏl munhwa yulli -- 3. Asia lok'ŏllit'i wa lok'ŏl munhwa yulli.

1. Chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak kwa chŏngsin punsŏkhak ŭi mannam -- 2. Han'gugin ŭi chamjae ŭisik kwa chŏngch'i pyŏngni.

The extant literature has examined the effects of ownership structures on corporate social responsibility, yet it has overlooked the non-linear and interactive effects among major shareholder groups. In this study, we examine the non-linear effects of insider and institutional ownerships on CSR. We also examine whether it is necessary to have both incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms or it is sufficient to have either mechanism to promote CSR. Using a sample of the U.S. Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that (...) insider and institutional ownerships have non-linear effects on CSR. We also find support for the complementary mechanisms view, in that the highest CSR rating is observed when both ownership levels are high. Therefore, firms need to maintain strong governance structures to realize synergistic effects in promoting CSR. Our findings provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationships between ownership structures and corporate social outcomes. (shrink)

Relatively little research has examined the effects of ownership on the firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). In addition, most of it has been conducted in the Western context such as the U.S. and Europe. Using a sample of 118 large Korean firms, we hypothesize that different types of shareholders will have distinct motivations toward the firm’s CSR engagement. We break down ownership into different groups of shareholders: institutional, managerial, and foreign ownerships. Results indicate a significant, positive relationship between CSR ratings (...) and ownership by institutions and foreign investors. In contrast, shareholding by top managers is negatively associated with firm’s CSR rating while outside director ownership is not significant. We conclude that different owners have differential impacts on the firm’s CSR engagement. (shrink)

v. 1. Insa p'yŏn -- v. 2. Ch'ŏnmun p'yŏn.

Ch'aek mŏri e -- 1. Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi sam kwa kŭ ŭi sidae -- 2. Silchŭng kwa siryong ŭi sirhakchŏk hangmun'gwan -- 3. Chujahak pip'an kwa Kihak ŭi hyŏngsŏng -- 4. Sŏyang kwahak kisul ŭi suyong kwa Kihakchŏk pyŏnyong -- 5. Insingnon ŭi chŏnhwan kwa kaekkwan insik ŭi pangbŏmnon -- 6. T'al Chujahakchŏk sayu ŭi chŏn'gae wa segye p'yŏnghwaron -- Kyŏllon : Chosŏn hugi Sirhak kwa Ch'oe Han-gi ŭi ch'ŏrhak.

1. Chŏngch'i ch'ŏrhak kwa chŏngsin punsŏkhak ŭi mannam -- 2. Han'gugin ŭi chamjae ŭisik kwa chŏngch'i pyŏngni.

1. Yŏhaeng e nasŏgi kkaji -- 2. Ch'ŏng cheguk ŭi sudo esŏ -- 3. Hangju se sŏnbi waŭi kyoyu -- 4. Chonmyŏng ŭisik kwa ujŏngnon -- 5. Sasangjŏk pyŏnhwa.

1. Sasŏ ŭi p'aerŏdaim chŏnhwan -- 2. Chuja ŭi 'Nonŏ chipchu' wa in kaenyŏm chusŏk -- 3. Tasan ŭi 'Nonŏ kogŭmju' wa in kaenyŏm chusŏk -- 4. Chuja ŭi 'Taehak' chusŏk kwa Tasan ŭi pip'yŏng -- 5. Chuja ŭi 'Chungyong' haesŏk -- 6. Tasan Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi 'Chungyong' haesŏk : Chuja haesŏk kwa pigyo -- 7. Tasan ŭi 'Maengja' simsŏngnon haesŏk : Chuja wa taebi rŭl t'onghae -- 8. Tasan ŭi Chujahakchŏk simsŏngnon pip'an : 'Maengja yoŭi' wa 'Tabi yŏhong' (...) ŭl chungsim ŭro. (shrink)

1. Sŏron -- 2. Kŭndae wa chonggyo, kŭrigo sinjonggyo -- 3. Han'guk kŭndae sinjonggyo ŭi t'ansaeng -- 4. Han'guk kŭndae sinjonggyo ŭi kyŏngjŏn kwa ŭirye -- 5. Kaebyŏk sasang kwa chisang ch'ŏn'guk -- 6. Kaebyŏk sasang ŭi chonggyobyŏl chŏn'gae -- 7. Kaebyŏk chonggyodŭl ŭi sahoesachŏk chŏn'gae -- 8. Kyŏllon kwa kŭndae ihu.