T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) was not only an active protagonist in the religious and scientific upheaval that followed the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution but also a harbinger of the sociobiological debates about the implications of evolution that are now going on. His seminal lecture Evolution and Ethics, reprinted here with its introductory Prolegomena, argues that the human psyche is at war with itself, that humans are alienated in a cosmos that has no special reference to their needs, and (...) that moral societies are of necessity in conflict with the natural conditions of their existence. Seen in the light of current understanding of the mechanisms of evolution, these claims remain as controversial today as they were when Huxley proposed them. In this volume George Williams, one of the best-known evolutionary biologists of our time, asserts that recent biological ideas and data justify a more extreme condemnation of the "cosmic process" than Huxley advocated and more extreme denial that the forces that got us here are capable of maintaining a viable world. James Paradis, an expert in Victorian studies, has written an introduction that sets the celebrated lecture in the context of cultural history, revealing it to be an impressive synthesis of Victorian thinking, as well as a challenge to eighteenth-century assumptions about the harmony of of nature. With Huxley's lecture as a focal point, the three parts of this book unite philosophy and science in a shared quest that recalls their common origins as systems of knowledge. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This book develops a general theory of law, inclusive legal positivism, which seeks to remain within the tradition represented by authors such as Austin, Hart, MacCormick, and Raz, while sharing some of the virtues of both classical and modern theories of natural law, as represented by authors such as Aquinas, Fuller, Finnis, and Dworkin. Its central theoretical questions are: Does the existence or content of positive law ever depend on moral considerations? If so, is this fact consistent with legal positivism? (...) The author shows how inclusive positivism allows one to answer yes to both of these questions. In addition to articulating and defending his own version of legal positivism, which is a refinement and development of the views of H.L.A. Hart as expressed in his classic book The Concept of Law, the author clarifies the terms of current jurisprudential debates about the nature of law. These debates are often clouded by failures to appreciate that different theorists are offering differing kinds of theories and attempting to answer different questions. There is also a failure, principally on the part of Ronald Dworkin, to characterize opposing theories correctly. The clarity of Waluchow's work will help to remove the confusion which has hitherto marred some jurisprudential debate, particularly about Dworkin's work. (shrink)

In 1954 H. L. A. Hart wrote that Austin's work has ‘never, since his death … been ignored’. If it never has been completely ignored, interest in it has periodically waxed and waned. The interest definitely waxed in the 1980s. More books were published about Austin in this period than in any other decade since his death in 1859. Although this literature contains discussions of some of the nineteenth-century responses to his work, they are not the focus of it. Certain (...) of the responses remain completely in the dark, while there is more light to shed on at least some of the others. In short, our knowledge of nineteenth-century interpretations of Austin's legal philosophy is very incomplete. (shrink)

The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic (...) agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address. (shrink)

Dieses Buch widmet sich der ebenso alten wie aktuellen Frage, wie das Handeln des Menschen plausibel und nachvollziehbar erklärt werden kann. Es wird das Ziel verfolgt, dieses brisante und immer noch kontrovers diskutierte Problem der Handlungserklärung philosophisch zu bedenken und adäquate Losungen zu entwickeln. Dabei wird zunächst ein Umweg eingeschlagen, der sich jedoch als besonders lohnenswert erweist, nämlich den über die philosophische Handlungstheorie von Wilfrid Sellars, die untrennbar mit seiner weitbekannten Philosophie des Geistes verknüpft ist und, obgleich bereits zur (...) traditionellen Handlungstheorie gehörend, von bemerkenswerter Aktualität ist. Seine Handlungstheorie wird in diesem Buch erstmalig systematisch, vollständig und kritisch rekonstruiert. Über Sellars hinausgehend wird anschließend der anspruchsvolle Versuch unternommen, alternative Wege zur Lösung des Problems der Handlungserklärung aufzuzeigen, die sich besonders dadurch auszeichnen, dass sie die bekannten Unzulänglichkeiten traditioneller Grunde- und Kausalerklärungen von Handlungen überwinden. (shrink)

The essays in philosophical logic collected in this volume are dedicated to Henry S. Leonard who was one of the first American philosophers to urge the application of modern logic to non-mathematical areas. Leonard also inspired the development of certain areas of contemporary philosophical logic discussed in some of the papers of this volume. This is especially clear in the case of free, or presupposition free, logics which Leonard's early work on a logic of existence inspired. In one essay of (...) this volume Bas C. Van Frassen further develops his work on the semantics of free logic. In another, Milton Fisk relates free logic to modal logic, suggesting a new semantics of strength to deal with various problems in the area and in a third essay, Karel Lambert relates free logic to certain logical puzzles about quantum theory. Leonard was also one of the first to entertain the idea of and discuss a logic of questions and an erotetic logic or logic of interests. The volume contains essays on these topics by Nuel D. Belnap and David Harrah. Leonard's interest in modal logic is reflected in Fisk's article as well as in an article by Richmond Thomason on modal logic and metaphysics. His interest in epistemic logic is seen in an essay on the logic of belief by Jon Vickers and an essay by Hintikka applying the logic of belief and knowledge to problems about the ontological argument. In addition to these essays, there are five others of high quality on diverse topics: R. M. Martin on intentions, Wilfrid Sellars on the metaphysics of the person, R. M. Chisholm on agency, Frederick Fitch on combinatory logic and negative numbers, and H. E. Hendry and G. J. Massey on Sheffer functions. This is a worthy memorial to a quietly influential American philosopher.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Many different analyses of the concept of de re belief have been proposed in recent years. Most of these analyses may be called ‘reductionist’ since they attempt to “reduce” de re belief to de dicta belief or to analyze de re belief in terms of de dicta belief. Some reductionist analyses are extremely liberal in their attribution of de re beliefs — they imply that people have de re beliefs in a variety of situations in which more restrictive analyses have (...) no such implication. In this paper I will show that the most liberal of the reductionist theories, those Roderick Chisholm calls “latitudinarian theories”, are unacceptable.Latitudinarian analyses have been proposed by many philosophers, including Ernest Sosa, Mark Pastin, and also, perhaps, W. V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception:A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka PratyakṣaStephen H. PhillipsIn the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West (January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why Nyāya should jettison "indeterminate perception" and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, (...) Chakrabarti invites a reply "so that," as he says, "I may know why immaculate perception is needed by Nyāya after all." The following is a response that shows not so much why indeterminate perception is needed by Nyāya but why it is identified as a causal factor necessary to the arising of some (not all) determinate perception defined as "perception of an entity as qualified." Here I follow Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the fourteenth-century founder (with the help of a few less well known predecessors and contemporaries) of "New Logic," Navya Nyāya. Gaṅgeśa devotes an entire section (about one eighteenth) of the perception chapter of his monumental Tattvacintāmaṇi (Jewel of Reflection about Epistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa,1 and he is a chief target of Chakrabarti's chastisement.2Now, first of all, I want to follow Gaṅgeśa's ground rules. The Naiyāyika is not concerned with strategies about how to look good in debates (with Buddhists or anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not eristic, and thus no reply will be given to Chakrabarti's agonizing about how best to show ourselves in controversies with (in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars). Gaṅgeśa's reflections are vāda—and the section is rightly titled nirvikalpaka-vāda, vāda being "inquiries among friends"—directed to uncovering real causal factors, not to winning a debate or countering sophisms. Deception, or counter-deception, is sometimes appropriate—for instance, to protect a student or other judge from fallacies advanced by people of bad character. But not here. So I will lay out Gaṅgeśa's argument for identifying nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa, and then run through Chakrabarti's list of reasons for rejecting it with an eye to the objection's salience to Gaṅgeśa's project. In other words, Chakrabarti's objections will be taken up with an eye to the truth as it appears to a Naiyāyika, not with an eye to how our team should best present itself to outsiders. I have little to say about Chakrabarti's complaints about appearances—in fact, I find them delightful. Don't let him fool you. There's no greater Naiyāyika enthusiast than Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to distill a controversy to show the wisdom [End Page 104] of Nyāya in contrast to revealing a deficiency, as he appears to be doing here. He does this to make us think broadly about Nyāya in a contemporary context. And at the end I join him in making some very general comments about Nyāya's realism. First, Gaṅgeśa's argument and a rebuttal of Chakrabarti's seven reasons from Gaṅgeśa's point of view.There is no direct, apperceptive evidence for nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa; rather, it is posited by force of the following inference as the first step of a two-step argument. "The perceptual cognition, 'A cow' (for example), is generated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing), like an inference." The second step takes a person's first perception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the inference's subject (or pakṣa) such that the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood. The qualifier has to be available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to misinterpret the point... (shrink)

O contraste entre o espaço das razões e o reino da lei ao qual Sellars implicitamente apela não estava disponível antes dos tempos modernos. Os filósofos modernos não sentiram uma tensão entre a ideia de que o conhecimento tem um status normativo e a ideia de um exercício de poderes naturais. Porém, a ascensão da ciência moderna tornou disponível uma concepção de natureza que faz a advertência de uma falácia naturalista na epistemologia inteligível. Por isso o contraste que Sellars traça (...) pode estabelecer uma agenda para a filosofia hoje. Eu quero distinguir duas maneiras de empreender tal projeto. A ideia é a de que a organização do espaço das razões não é, como Sellars sugere, estranha ao tipo de estrutura que a ciência natural descobre no mundo. Pensar e conhecer são parte de nossa maneira de ser animais. Para mostrar isso, vou distinguir entre dois tipos de naturalismo: um naturalismo restritivo e um naturalismo liberal. Quero sugerir que o argumento de Millikan em favor de um naturalismo restritivo ao criticar a semântica fregiana está contaminado pela adesão a um cartesianismo residual. Esse é o resultado de uma troca familiar; o preço de descartar o imaterialismo cartesiano, enquanto se permanece no interior do naturalismo restritivo, é o de que a parte que se escolheu da natureza não é mais especial o suficiente para ser creditada com poderes de pensamento. Vou argumentar que o lugar próprio à ideia de “apreender sentidos” está em descrever padrões em nossas vidas – nossas vidas mentais, nesse caso – que são inteligíveis somente em termos das relações que estruturam o espaço das razões. Essa padronização envolve racionalidade genuína, não apenas “racionalidade mecânica”. O naturalismo liberal não precisa nada mais, para fazer a ideia de “apreender sentidos” não-problemática, do que uma insistência perfeitamente razoável em que tais padrões realmente moldam as nossas vidas. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that many criticisms of McDowell’s naturalism of second nature are based on what I call ‘the orthodox interpretation’ of McDowell’s naturalism. The orthodox interpretation is, however, a misinterpretation, which results from the fact that the phrase ‘the space of reasons’ is used equivocally by McDowell in Mind and World. Failing to distinguish two senses of ‘the space of reasons’, I argue that the orthodox interpretation renders McDowell’s naturalism inconsistent with McDowell’s Hegelian thesis that the conceptual (...) is unbounded. My interpretation saves McDowell from being inconsistent. However, the upshot of my interpretation is that what is really at work in McDowell’s diagnosis of the dualism between nature and reason is the Hegelian thesis, not the naturalism of second nature. (shrink)

I argue that in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Wilfrid Sellars significantly misconstrued the early twentieth-century empiricists he was criticizing (empiricists such as Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price and C.I. Lewis). Because these philosophers and their theories were becoming passé (partly due to EPM itself but also due to broader trends), this misconstrual was not noted. As a result, Sellars’s most influential claim – that the given is a myth – did not receive the critical scrutiny that it should (...) have received prior to its widespread acceptance. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" begins with an argument against sense-datum epistemology. There is some question about the validity of this attack, stemming in part from the assumption that Sellars is concerned with epistemic foundationalism. This paper recontextualizes Sellars's argument in two ways: by showing how the argument of EPM relates to Sellars's 1940s work, which does not concern foundationalism at all; and by considering the view of H.H. Price, Sellars's teacher at Oxford and the only (...) classical datum theorist to receive substantive comment in EPM. Timm Triplett has claimed that Sellars's discussion simply begs the question against Price, but this depends on the mistaken assumption that Sellars's concern is with foundationalism. On the contrary, Sellars's argument concerns the assumption that the innate capacity for sensory experience counts as "thinking in presence" in the way needed for empiricist accounts of content acquisition. Price's distinction between noticing universals and being aware of them encapsulates the tensions empiricists face here. (shrink)

H´ector-Neri Casta˜neda-Calder´on (December 13, 1924–September 7, 1991) was born in San Vicente Zacapa, Guatemala. He attended the Normal School for Boys in Guatemala City, later called the Military Normal School for Boys, from which he was expelled for refusing to fight a bully; the dramatic story, worthy of being filmed, is told in the “De Re” section of his autobiography, “Self-Profile” (1986). He then attended a normal school in Costa Rica, followed by studies in philosophy at the University of San (...) Carlos, Guatemala. He won a scholarship to the University of Minnesota, where he received his B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952), and Ph.D. (1954), all in philosophy. His dissertation, “The Logical Structure of Moral Reasoning”, was written under the direction of Wilfrid Sellars. He returned to teach in Guatemala, and then received a scholarship to study at Oxford University (1955–1956), after which he took a sabbatical-replacement position in philosophy at Duke University (1956). His first full-time academic appointment was at Wayne State University (1957– 1969), where he founded the philosophy journal Noˆus (1967, a counter-offer made to him by Wayne State to encourage him to stay there rather than to take the chairmanship of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania). In 1969, he moved (along with several of his Wayne colleagues) to Indiana University, where he eventually became the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy and, later, its first Dean of Latino Affairs (1978–1981). He remained at Indiana until his death. He was also a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin (1962–1963) and a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1981–1982). He received grants and fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation (1967–1968), the T. Andrew Mellon Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Science Foundation. He was elected President of the American Philosophical Association Central Division (1979– 1980), named to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1990), and received the Presidential Medal of Honor from the Government of Guatemala (1991). Casta˜neda’s philosophical interests spanned virtually the entire spectrum of philosophy, and his theories form a highly interconnected whole.. (shrink)

Studies in Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy: Aune, B. Sellars on practical reason.--Castañeda, H.-N. Some reflections on Wilfrid Sellars' theory of intentions.--Donagan, A. Determinism and freedom: Sellars and the reconciliationist thesis.--Robinson, W. S. The legend of the given.--Clark, R. The sensuous content of perception.--Grossmann, R. Perceptual objects, elementary particles, and emergent properties.--Rosenberg, J. F. The elusiveness of categories, the Archimedean dilemma, and the nature of man: a study in Sellarsian metaphysics.--Turnbull, R. G. Things, natures, and properties.--Wells, R. The indispensable word (...) "now."--Van Fraassen, B. C. Theories and counterfactuals.--Harman, G. H. Wilfrid Sellars' Theory of induction.--Sellarsiana: Sellars, W. Autobiographical reflections.--Sellars, W. The structure of knowledge. Lecture I, perception. Lecture II, minds. Lecture III, epistemic principles.--Wilfrid Sellars' Philosophical bibliography. (p. 349-353). (shrink)

Résumé Cet article vise à restituer le contexte historique dans lequel la notion de donné a été introduite avant que Sellars n’en propose la critique systématique. À travers l’étude des textes fondateurs de C. I. Lewis et H. H. Price et des objections auxquelles ils se sont efforcés de répondre, on exposera la nature des débats à la fois métaphysiques et épistémologiques qu’a, dès les années 1930, suscité la thèse selon laquelle l’expérience fournirait à la connaissance un donné fondamental qui (...) seul permettrait d’en assurer la validité empirique. Parce que le donné pur, indépendant de tout ce que l’esprit peut lui adjoindre lorsqu’il lui applique ses concepts, semble devoir demeurer ineffable et inconnaissable pour nous, il était dès l’origine tout à fait problématique non seulement d’en reconnaître l’existence, mais encore plus de chercher à bâtir sur une telle base – comme bien des empiristes ont pourtant prétendu le faire au vingtième siècle – une conception réaliste des rapports entre l’esprit et le monde (insistant sur leur indépendance réciproque) et une conception fondationnaliste de la structure de la connaissance. C’est néanmoins à Sellars qu’il reviendra de démontrer la vacuité d’un tel projet. (shrink)

This article proposes to elucidate Wilfrid Waluchow’s notion of constitutional morality by explaining how it relates to the classical common law idea of artificial reason. It examines how Waluchow’s effort to reconcile insights from the thought of H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin through the idea of constitutional morality is both reminiscent of the artificial reason of the common law and distinct from it. It shows that constitutional morality evokes the subtle union of custom and reason found in artificial reason, (...) but also that it proposes, under the influence of Hart’s notion of rule of recognition, a narrower understanding of law’s foundation in established practices, and that it gives, consistent with Dworkin’s vision of law as integrity, a greater theoretical scope to law’s rationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Case for Hume's Nonutilitarianism ARYEH BOTWINICK IN MANY HISTORIES OF WESTERN THOUGHTI--as well as in those devoted more specifically to the history of Western political thought2--the designation of Hume as a utilitarian in his ethical and political theory is taken for granted. The word "utility" occurs frequently in both the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and this has led most commentators to posit a (...) natural continuity between Hume's invocation of the term and later philosophical elaboration of it. However, more is involved here than simply a repetition of a key word or phrase. The doctrine of sympathy that plays a crucial role in nineteenth-century utilitarian thought 3 also appears to be central to Hume's ethical and political thought. Moreover, Hume's views on such a fundamental question as political obligation would appear to have been adopted directly by the utilitarians. Bentham, for example, when dealing with the question of the ground of political obligation, cites Hume directly in order to reaffirm his position," which seems to suggest that degree of shared assumptions and insight among thinkers that goes to constitute a particular tradition. Yet, it is my contention s that the historical categorization described in the previous paragraph 6is too facile in that it overlooks important discontinuities separating Hume from utilitarian thought. Although many interpreters have claimed that Hume was not a utilitarian simply because he was a noncognitivist, the theories of morals and politics often attributed to him are extensionally equivalent with I am grateful to Professor Thomas Scanlon of the Department of Philosophy at Princeton for his comments on earlier drafts of this paper. ' See, for instance, J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1960), p. 475. 2 See, for example, George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 602, where, however, Hume's utilitarianism is regarded as having more in common with John Stuart Mill's than with Bentham's. 3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1971), pp. 183-194. 4 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment of Government, ed. Wilfrid Harrison (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 49-56. 5Rawls, to some extent, supports an interpretation of Hume as a nonutilitarian. See, for instance, how he construes Hume's rejection of an original contract (Theory of Justice, pp. 32-33). Yet on the crucial question of a doctrine of sympathy he posits a continuity between Hume and utilitarian thought, which I find unacceptable. 6 John Plamenatz, in his history of utilitarian thought, specifically supports this categorization (The English Utilitarians [Oxford: Basil Blackwell], pp. 22-45). See below, final pages, for a further discussion of Plamenatz's scheme of categorization. [4231 424 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY utilitarianism. 7 It is precisely this claim that I wish to dispute. With regard to the doctrines of utility and sympathy, I shall try to pinpoint the import they carried for Bentham and his followers and compare this with the meanings these doctrines have in the context of Hume's thought. I shall also attempt to relate his thought to the important English philosophers in the social contract tradition--Hobbes and Locke-exploring the possibility that Hume's deepest affinities might lie with his contractarian predecessors, rather than with his utilitarian successors. As a preliminary question we might consider how Hume defines the concept of utility. It seems that for him the term remains a fairly vacuous one to be identified with an unspecified tendency of an action "to the good of mankind. ''8 He does not appear to connect the notion of utility with that of pleasure the way the utilitarians do. 9 Hume's invocation of the concept of utility outside the context of its association with pleasure would not necessarily prevent our considering him a utilitarian if in the structure of his theory of moral judgment (where he supplies some content to the notion of "the good of mankind") the notion of "pleasure" serves as the common denominator in terms of which a balancing process can be carried out. However, an examination of the arguments where Hume makes use... (shrink)

The paper notices that different readings have been provided as for the connections between Wittgenstein and pragmatism, such as for example H. Putnam’s picture as opposed to R. Rorty’s description that packages Wittgenstein and Dewey together as ‘postmodern’ pragmatists. Joseph Margolis tries to broaden the discussion by including an examination of Wilfrid Sellars, Gottlob Frege, Robert Brandom, and Huw Price. His aim it to review the newer challenges of naturalism and deflationism, which, by their own instruction, should bring us (...) to the decisive contest between the ‘pragmatism’ of the Investigations and that of Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing. The larger purpose of this exercise is to assess pragmatism’s best prospects currently, in meeting the gathering challenges of the day. (shrink)

Die Frage nach der Seele der Tiere ist so alt wie die Frage nach der Seele des Menschen und die nach der Welt. Die 18 Beitrage des Bandes geben einen Uberblick von der Antike bis in das 20. Jahrhundert, beschreiben den Stand der Forschung zu philosophischen sowie rechtsphilosophischen Fragen nachder Seele der Tiere und werfen zugleich die Frage nach dem Recht der Tiere auf.Aus dem InhaltJ.-C. Wolf, Haben Tiere Rechte?J.-H. Michel, Le droit romain et les animauxH. Schmidt-Glintzer, "Seid freundlich zu (...) den Tieren!". Tier, Mensch und Individualitat in ChinaE. Hornung, Die Vieldeutigkeit der Tiere im alten AgyptenE. Nicolay, Homere et l'ame des betesC. Frenzel, Tier, Mensch und Seele bei den VorsokratikernU. Perez-Paoli, Porphyrios' Gedanken zur Gerechtigkeit gegenuber TierenA. Giese, "Vier Tieren auch verheissen war, ins Paradies zu kommen" - Betrachtungen zur Seele der Tiere im islamischen MittelalterWeitere Beitrage von: D. Arendt, H. Breger, G. Boros, J.-L. Seban, G. Frank, M. Kowalewicz, H.W. Ingensiep, H. Baranzke, M. Linnemann, R. D. Precht. (shrink)

This paper defends a 'punctivist' conception of consciousness from recent attacks by Ian Phillips and Matthew Soteriou. As we intend it, 'punctivism' is the view that a subject's experience over some interval is determined by their experiential states at each instant during it. Phillips and Soteriou both offer ingenious arguments purporting to show that the punctivist is unable to make sense of motion perception; and that only by adopting an 'holistic' conception -- whereby a subject's instantaneous experiences are determined by (...) their experience over the interval -- can we make sense of the puzzles such phenomena pose. We contend that both arguments invoke dubious claims, their proffered solutions come with highly controversial commitments, and, if we take punctivism seriously, it is difficult to see why the so-called puzzles should be puzzling in the first place. A punctivist model of motion perception is proposed in response, and objections anticipated. (shrink)

Muchas personas pobres y oprimidas dejan sus paísesen el tercer mundo para veniralas ricas sociedades occidentales. Este artículo sostiene que hay pocas justificaciones para mantenerlos fuera. Su inspiración abreva de tres aproximaciones contemporáneas a la teoría política-la de Rawls, la de Nozick y el utilitarismo para construir argumentos a favor de la apertura de fronteras. El hecho de que, a pesar de sus significativos desacuerdos en otros temas, en esta materia las tres teorías converjan en las mismas conclusiones, fortalece el (...) argumento a favor de la apertura de fronteras y revela su fundamentación en nuestro compromiso en respetar a todos los seres humanos como personas morales libres e iguales. La parte final del ensayo considera los argumentos comunitaristas que objetan la anterior conclusión, en especial los formulados por Michael Walzer. (shrink)