This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they smack of the totalitarian linguistic tactics (...) of the Party in Orwell’s 1984 and b) because they dehumanize the opposition by portraying them as mere spouters of gibberish; 2) that they are profoundly illiberal since if true, they would undermine Mill’s arguments for free speech; 3) that such theories are prone to self-contradiction, pragmatic and otherwise; 4) that they often turn against their creators including what they were meant to exclude and excluding what they were meant to include; 5) that such theories are susceptible to a modus tollens pioneered by Richard Price in his Review Concerning the Principle Questions of Morals(1758); and 6) that such theories are prima facie false since they fail to ‘predict’ the data that is it their business to explain (or, in the case of criteria, fail to capture the concept that they allegedly represent). The butcher’s bill is quite considerable: some of Hobbes, a fair bit of Locke, half of Berkeley, large chunks of Hume, Russell's Theory of Types, verificationism in its positivist and Dummettian variants, much of pragmatism and most of Wittgenstein - all these have to be sacrificed if we are to save our souls as philosophic liberals. (shrink)

Why Law Matters argues that public institutions and legal procedures are valuable and matter as such, irrespective of their instrumental value. Examining the value of rights, public institutions, and constitutional review, the book criticises instrumentalist approaches in political theory, claiming they fail to account for their enduring appeal.

Progress -- Loss -- Return -- Amenability -- Citation tactics -- Affective subjects.

George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four remains a book of the moment. This Companion builds on successive waves of generational inheritance and debate in the novel's reception by asking new questions about how and why Nineteen Eighty-Four was written, what it means, and why it matters. Chapters on a selection of the novel's interpretative contexts, the literary histories from which it is inseparable, the urgent questions it raises, and the impact it has had on other kinds of media, ranging from (...) radio to video games, open up the conversation in an expansive way. Established concerns are presented alongside newer ones. Individual essays help us see in new ways how Orwell's most famous work continues to be a novel for our times. (shrink)

Observation is described as that which is informationally linked to the observed with the help of its being characterized both internally and externally. The external characterization refers to what perception really is (exemplified by seeing) in the manner semantic externalism treats natural kinds. Observable predicates are treated as reducible to appearance behaviour thus characterized. Referring to this way of semantical reduction distinguishes cultures of knowledge from cultures which acknowledge linguistic utterances as truthmakers. Introductory Remarks Theories of the sciences have mainly (...) dealt with how observation confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis. The question why observation matters at all has hardly been dealt with. Instead of giving empirical evidence one could consider looking for evidence in books. Indeed, we use books in order to gain knowledge but in the sciences this is commonly justified for the reason that scientific books refer to formerly published empirical data utilized in current theories—because of their reference to observation. Imagine a text contains only true statements. Why not consider referring to it in order to decide upon the truth of a hypothesis? It does not matter whether I know for certain that its statements are true. Our concern is what I am justified to infer from the text, presupposing that its statements are true. A striking peculiarity is that in the sciences I am not justified to infer anything from it, even if the text leads me to true conclusions only. Obviously, the evidence I am finally allowed to rely on in the sciences is not a linguistic utterance be it a spoken or a written one. It seems that linguistic utterances do not count as reasonable truthmakers in the sciences as some utterances do in religion. (Quotes from the Bible or the Koran are examples.) It has traditionally been presupposed rather than justified that observation is basic in the sciences. To stress the role of observation seems trivial. How is observation related to scientific statements? (shrink)

Introduction, Machiavelli in his time -- The secretary -- Machiavelli as political philosopher -- Machiavelli and republican virtue -- Machiavelli and the realm of fortune -- Machiavelli the writer -- Conclusion why Machiavelli matters.

Here is a question as intriguing as it is brief: what are we? The animalist’s answer is equal in brevity: we are animals. This stark formulation of the animalist slogan distances it from nearby claims—that we are essentially animals, for example, or that we have purely biological criteria of identity over time. Is the animalist slogan—unburdened by modal or criterial commitments—still interesting, though? Or has it lost its bite? In this article we address such questions by presenting a positive case (...) for the importance of animalism and applying that case to recent critiques. (shrink)

_A passionate and moving tribute to the captivating power of dance, not just as an art form but as a language that transcends barriers__ “[A] smart, bracing book of reflection, analysis, memoir and history.”—Willard Spiegelman, ___Wall Street Journal___ “A veritable master class.”—Anne Doventry, _Booklist__ Mindy Aloff, a journalist, an essayist, and a dance critic, analyzes dance as the ultimate expression of human energy and feeling. From her personal anecdotes, her engaging collection of stories about dance from around the world, or (...) her description of the captivating photograph by Helen Levitt of two children dancing, which she sees as one embodiment of the mystery and joy that dancing can evoke, Aloff’s exploration of the aesthetic, social, and spiritual impacts of dance will prove spellbinding. Aloff takes us on a journey through various forms of dance—rituals, religious observances, storytelling, musical interpretations—to show why dance matters to human beings. Interlaced with personal experiences, this book builds on analysis to reveal the intimate relationship we have with dance—personal, spiritual, soul-searching, medicinal, and entertaining. The ideas speak to both specialist and general readers. (shrink)

In _Why Knowledge Matters_, influential scholar E. D. Hirsch, Jr., addresses critical issues in contemporary education reform and shows how cherished truisms about education and child development have led to unintended and negative consequences. Hirsch, author of _The Knowledge Deficit_, draws on recent findings in neuroscience and data from France to provide new evidence for the argument that a carefully planned, knowledge-based elementary curriculum is essential to providing the foundations for children’s life success and ensuring equal opportunity for students of (...) all backgrounds. In the absence of a clear, common curriculum, Hirsch contends that tests are reduced to measuring skills rather than content, and that students from disadvantaged backgrounds cannot develop the knowledge base to support high achievement. Hirsch advocates for updated policies based on a set of ideas that are consistent with current cognitive science, developmental psychology, and social science. The book focuses on six persistent problems of recent US education: the over-testing of students; the scapegoating of teachers; the fadeout of preschool gains; the narrowing of the curriculum; the continued achievement gap between demographic groups; and the reliance on standards that are not linked to a rigorous curriculum. Hirsch examines evidence from the United States and other nations that a coherent, knowledge-based approach to schooling has improved both achievement and equity wherever it has been instituted, supporting the argument that the most significant education reform and force for equality of opportunity and greater social cohesion is the reform of fundamental educational ideas. _Why Knowledge Matters _introduces a new generation of American educators to Hirsch’s astute and passionate analysis. (shrink)

A major figure in women's studies and a long-term activist for women's issues, Gerda Lerner is a pioneer in the field of Women's History and one of its leading practitioners. "Why History Matters" is a summation of her work which includes pieces on the author's early life as a Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany and on her slow assimilation into American life.

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is (...) sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Why Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa by Thomas A. LewisAndrew ForsythWhy Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa Thomas A. Lewis OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015. 177 PP. $34.95Thomas Lewis's emphasis in Why Philosophy Matters for the Study of Religion—and Vice Versa is chiefly the "Vice Versa" of his book's title. Philosophy of religion (untenably tied to Christianity and (...) Judaism, he claims, and unduly limited to well-worn questions of theism's rationality and the like) must learn from the field of religious studies, and most particularly from its pluralism and twenty-first-century attention to the historical and cultural construction of the category of "religion." Philosophers of religion fail today if they treat as self-evident the building blocks of their discipline.In a series of essays, Lewis diagnoses the malaise, ably sketches "promising signs" of a different paradigm, and prods the discipline to "belong more clearly in religious studies" (vii). More specifically, he treats normativity in religious studies; the place of history (and the history of "religion") in philosophy of religion; the centrality of comparison in religious ethics and philosophy of religion; and the proper—self-conscious—use of categories in the study of religion. Taken one by one, Lewis's essays are elegant and thought-provoking. "On the Role of Normativity in Religious Studies," for example, merits inclusion in any Theories and Methods syllabus, teasing out, as it does, problematic presuppositions that only theology makes normative claims, and that "faith" is juxtaposed with "reason."Taken as a whole, however, Lewis's book will trouble Christian ethicists committed to conversation with religious studies. To begin, philosophy of religion most often "matters," in Lewis's telling, when it clarifies current trajectories of scholarship in religious studies. As a result, the organizing disciplinary presuppositions of religious studies go mostly unchallenged. Second, in Lewis's telling, religious studies becomes a surprisingly narrow enterprise. While the whole sweep of "religious thought, people, movements, practices, materials, etc." (7) is the apparent purview of religious studies, the golden thread running through Lewis's various essay interventions is scholarship on "religion" as a constructed, nonnatural category. This has been a generative pursuit for two decades, but scholarly concern for "religion" risks becoming tediously in-house, despite Lewis's fine articulation of the negative public policy ramifications of simplistic alternatives. No doubt Lewis uses the category of "religion" as just one example of potential work in religious studies, but the example's ubiquity in [End Page 209] the book flows from Lewis's vision of the field: religious studies shares the same kinds of evidence as those used throughout the humanities and social sciences, and excludes work reliant on unassailable authorities (scriptures, traditions) or private forms of justification (experience). Neither tracking a particular natural phenomenon, then, nor employing its own particular methods, discourse on the use of the category of "religion" becomes ever more central.Finally, the relationship between what might be called Lewis's "broader" and "narrower" visions of philosophy of religion is left somewhat unclear. Lewis's broader position is inclusive of positions he does not hold but that are not excluded by his understanding of the boundaries of the field. His narrower position is a take on Hegel, its details outlined in the concluding essay. Hegel's thought, Lewis tells us, offers the greatest potential for "simultaneously acknowledging the historical situatedness of our own viewpoint, exposing the hidden operation of power, and providing a rational justification for our normative commitments" (159–60). While Lewis's impulse throughout Why Philosophy Matters is for wider, broader work in philosophy of religion, his narrower Hegelian vision of the field, it turns out, has no place for "extra-conceptual grounding, whether in empiricist or transcendent accounts" (156). Are only Hegelian and pragmatist accounts sufficient? Philosophers must make a case for what they think is true, of course, but there is still some irony that a work that helpfully seeks to expand philosophy of religion beyond the "parochial" (23, 28) ends by excluding so much.Andrew ForsythYale UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

An introductory article on metaethics and why it matters. I discuss why we should care about metaethics, what metaethics is and how it differs from normative ethics. This article is for a general audience.

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section (...) one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one’s capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection. (shrink)

In this book, David M. Black asks questions such as 'why do we care?' and 'what gives our values power?' using ideas from psychoanalysis and its adjacent sciences such as neuroscience and evolutionary biology in order to do so. _Why Things Matter_ explores how the comparatively new scientific discipline of consciousness studies requires us to recognize that subjectivity is as irreducible a feature of the world as matter and energy. Necessarily inter-disciplinary, this book draws on science, philosophy and the history (...) of religion to argue that there can be influential values which are not based exclusively on biological need or capricious life-style choices. It suggests that many recent scientific critics of religion, including Freud, have failed to see clearly the issues at stake. This book will be key reading for psychoanalysts and psychotherapists as well as counsellors with an interest in the basis of religious feeling and in moral and aesthetic values. The book will also be of interest to scholars of psychoanalysis, philosophy and religion. (shrink)

The capability approach, originated by Amartya Sen is among the most comprehensive and influential accounts of justice that applies to issues of health and health care. However, although health is always presumed as an important capability in Sen’s works, he never manages to fully explain why health is distinctively valuable. This paper provides an explanation. It does this by firstly laying out the general capability-based argument for health justice. It then discusses two recent attempts to justify why health is distinctively (...) valuable from within a capability framework – these are Sridhar Venkatapuram’s conception of health as the central human meta-capability and, respectively, Norman Daniels’ embrace of the capability metric in his use of Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity. The paper argues that none of these accounts succeed in providing a plausible justification of the value of health. Finally, the paper suggests an alternative more complex justification, closely tied to different but central element of the capability view, that captures the core intuitions of both Venkatapuram and Daniels’ accounts but without being vulnerable to the objections raised against each of them. This, the paper concludes, provides a promising ground on which the capability view on health justice should be founded. (shrink)

This article examines Huston Smith's critique of and remedy for modernity from the perspective of a college professor who adopted “Why Religion Matters” as required reading for undergraduates. Smith's heartfelt plea to consider, if not embrace, the common wisdom of traditional religious worldviews deserves a hearing. But Smith's approach is also in need of qualification, supplementation, and critique. This article, ironically, finds the needed qualification, supplementation, and critique in Huston Smith's much earlier publication, The Purposes of Higher Education . (...) This article provides the dialogue. (shrink)

The first comprehensive philosophical examination of our duties to future generations, Dr de-Shalit argues that they are a matter of justice, not charity or supererogation.

Experimental philosophers often seem to ignore or downplay the significance of demographic variation in philosophically relevant judgments. This article confirms this impression, discusses why demographic research is overlooked in experimental philosophy, and argues that variation is philosophically significant.

Sufficientarians claim that what matters most is that people have enough. I develop and defend a revised sufficientarian conception of justice. I claim that it furnishes the best specification of a general humanitarian ideal of social justice: our main moral concern should be helping those who are badly off in absolute terms. Rival humanitarian views such as egalitarianism, prioritarianism and the difference principle face serious objections from which sufficientarianism is exempt. Moreover, a revised conception of sufficientarianism can meet the (...) most prominent undefeated challenges to the view. I contend that prevailing versions of sufficientarianism have not satisfactorily defined the sufficiency threshold, and so I offer an original specification of the threshold. I also address perhaps the most common objection to sufficientarianism, namely that sufficientarian regimes will channel all of society's resources towards elevating people to the sufficiency threshold regardless of the gains foregone by those above the threshold. (shrink)

Do fetuses have a right to life in virtue of the fact that they are potential adult human beings? I take the claim that the fetus is a potential adult human being to come to this: if the fetus grows normally there will be an adult human animal that was once the fetus. Does this fact ground a claim to our care and protection? A great deal hangs on the answer to this question. The actual mental and physical capacities of (...) a human fetus are inferior to those of adult creatures generally thought to lack a serious right to life, and the mere fact that a fetus belongs to our species in particular seems morally irrelevant. Consequently, a strong fetal claim to protection rises or falls with the appeal to the fetus's potentiality, for nothing else can justify it. (shrink)

Are women's requests for aid in dying honored more often than men's, or less? Feminist arguments can support conclusions either that gendered perceptions of women as self‐sacrificing predispose physicians to accede to women's requests to die — or that cultural understandings of women as not fully rational agents lead physicians to reject their requests as irrational.

The article seeks to explain why spontaneity, a concept that political theorists have given scant attention to, matters. It argues that it matters because it delivers a capacity for producing democratic change that is urgent to reflect on amidst a prevailing mood of grief over a democracy lost. To stimulate this reflection, the article engages with Rosa Luxemburg’s work, showing how her understanding of spontaneity as an initiative that delivers something for democracy lays the groundwork for a theoretical (...) orientation that allows us to notice the effects of spontaneity on democracy without overplaying its short-lived nature. (shrink)

Reinhold Niebuhr was a Protestant preacher, an influential religious thinker, and an important moral guide in mid-twentieth-century America. But what does he have to say to us now? In what way does he inform the thinking of political leaders and commentators from Barack Obama and Madeleine Albright to David Brooks and Walter Russell Mead, all of whom acknowledge his influence? In this lively overview of Niebuhr's career, Charles Lemert analyzes why interest in Niebuhr is rising and how Niebuhr provides the (...) answers we ache for in the face of seismic shifts in the global order. In the middle of the twentieth century, having outgrown a theological liberalism, Niebuhr challenged and rethought the nonsocialist Left in American politics. He developed a political realism that refused to sacrifice ideals to mere pragmatism, or politics to bitterness and greed. He examined the problem of morality in an immoral society and reimagined the balance between rights and freedom for the individual and social justice for the many. With brevity and deep insight, Lemert shows how Niebuhr's ideas illuminate our most difficult questions today. (shrink)

Andrew Sayer undertakes a fundamental critique of social science's difficulties in acknowledging that people's relation to the world is one of concern. As sentient beings, capable of flourishing and suffering, and particularly vulnerable to how others treat us, our view of the world is substantially evaluative. Yet modernist ways of thinking encourage the common but extraordinary belief that values are beyond reason, and merely subjective or matters of convention, with little or nothing to do with the kind of beings (...) people are, the quality of their social relations, their material circumstances or well-being. The author shows how social theory and philosophy need to change to reflect the complexity of everyday ethical concerns and the importance people attach to dignity. He argues for a robustly critical social science that explains and evaluates social life from the standpoint of human flourishing. (shrink)

Most people care about animals, but only a tiny fraction are vegan. The rest often think of veganism as an extreme position. They certainly do not believe that they have a moral obligation to become vegan. Gary L. Francione—the leading and most provocative scholar of animal rights theory and law—demonstrates that veganism is a moral imperative and a matter of justice. He shows that there is a contradiction in thinking that animals matter morally if one is also not vegan, and (...) he explains why this belief should logically lead all who hold it to veganism. Francione dismantles the conventional wisdom that it is acceptable to use and kill animals as long as we do so “humanely.” He argues that if animals matter morally, they must have the right not to be used as property. That means that we cannot eat them, wear them, use them, or otherwise treat them as resources or commodities. Why Veganism Matters presents the case for the personhood of nonhuman animals and for veganism in a clear and accessible way that does not require any philosophical or legal background. This book offers a persuasive and powerful argument for all readers who care about animals but are not sure whether they have a moral obligation to be vegan. (shrink)

This book discusses deep problems about our place in the world with a minimum of jargon. It argues that 'absolutist' ideas dating back to Plato continue to mislead generations of mathematicians, physicists and theologians, and reveals the underlying reasons for the current conflicts between science and religion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Why People Matter: A Christian Engagement with Rival Views of Human Significance ed. by John F. KilnerLaura AlexanderWhy People Matter: A Christian Engagement with Rival Views of Human Significance Edited by John F. Kilner grand rapids, mi: baker academic, 2017. 240 pp. $26.99Although Why People Matter does not use the word, it is an apologetic for the Christian faith and ethical tradition. Its argument begins with a moral (...) intuition that the authors take to be near universal: "people matter." If Christian theological and ethical thought can be shown to explain and shore up the notion that [End Page 190] "people matter" better than other ethical outlooks—and the authors believe it can—then the work will have (1) established a proper moral foundation for holding and acting on the conviction that people matter and (2) provided a reasoned argument for why Christianity as a fundamental belief system is better and truer than the other ethical systems examined.The text of Why People Matter is accessible and well written. The essays weave together coherently around two central ideas: each human person has inherent, inalienable dignity, and Christianity is the truest way of understanding and acting on that conviction. To demonstrate what Christianity has to offer, the book begins (after a summative introduction by Kilner) with a set of essays describing five ethical outlooks: utilitarianism, collectivism, individualism, naturalism, and transhumanism. In each, a different author lays out an ethical foundation and concept of the outlook, shows how the concept illuminates why "people matter," explains why it may seem compelling, and argues that it fails to grasp something crucial about why people matter and how to live as if they matter. As Kilner puts it, "each [outlook] recognizes and champions something important that is missing in other ways of thinking. However, each is dangerously reductionistic by making that missing element the all-encompassing focus of its approach" (190).Next, Kilner examines the Christian conviction that every human being is made in the image of God. He argues that this conviction, rightly understood, provides the only adequate foundation for the idea that "people matter." Respect for the image of God leads to proper respect for the human rights of others. Following this, David Gushee analyzes biblical passages and themes to argue that encounters with human beings are always also encounters with God; thus, we must treat people accordingly.Why People Matter accomplishes its purpose as an apologetic, and it seems especially likely to help committed Christians understand how their moral convictions can hold up in debates with common Western philosophical ethical outlooks. A wise friend once described C. S. Lewis (referenced several times in the work) as "a master of convincing Christians that what they already believe is true." That sort of persuasion is one of the appropriate goals of apologetic, and Why People Matter seems likely to achieve it.I have two comments on areas where readers may come away unsatisfied. First, the contributors' descriptions of the ethical outlooks they discuss are necessarily brief; those who hold these outlooks would likely wish to quibble with or nuance their arguments. Second, the work addresses only Western philosophical outlooks; the authors do not engage non-Christian religious traditions. In the spirit of interreligious cooperation, this is an excellent decision: frankly, I would not want to read a work that spent several chapters explaining why Christian ethical thought is superior to the ethical thought of, say, Hinduism or Judaism. But the work does leave unanswered, and unasked, the question [End Page 191] of whether a reader who does come to reject individualism, transhumanism, and so on might not just as well embrace Islam or Buddhism as Christianity.That said, this is an engaging work on the title question. It traces the basic contours of certain ethical outlooks, shows their strengths and potential weaknesses, and argues for a deep understanding, based in Christian Scripture and ethical thinking, of why people matter.Laura AlexanderUniversity of Nebraska at OmahaCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

From the modern scientific perspective, Olympia is a ruin at the far end of a fading sense of history that represents little more than the origins from which sport has continuously evolved. Quantitative measurements show continued increases in human performance, equipment efficiency and funding. But some question this athletic evolution. We worry about qualitative issues, such as virtue, meaning and beauty. The source of this contrast is a difference in values: Olympic vs. Efficiency values. Such values establish an ethos in (...) sporting communities that influences how we behave, explain and even conceptualize our activities. I argue from the perspectives of metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics and politics, that Olympic Ethos is needed to balance out the modern Efficiency Ethos, which threatens to dehumanize sport. (shrink)

Nietzsche tells us at the end of Beyond Good and Evil that ‘I would go so far as to venture an order of rank among philosophers according to the rank of their laughter’. Nietzsche violently dislikes those philosophers who, as he puts it, have ‘sought to bring laughter into disrepute’. He particularly singles out Thomas Hobbes for this offence, adding that Hobbes's puritanical attitude is just what you would expect from an Englishman. Nietzsche's accusation is based, as it happens, on (...) a misquotation of what Hobbes says about laughter in philosophy. But Nietzsche was undoubtedly right to point out that Hobbes — in common with most thinkers of his age — took it for granted that laughter is a subject in which philosophers need to be seriously interested. My aim in what follows will be to investigate the grounds and origins of this belief, and then to seek to explain it. (shrink)

The question of the value of painting—why paintings should matter to us—has been addressed by a number of Phenomenological philosophers. In this paper, I critically review recent discussions of this topic by Simon Crowell and Paul Crowther—while also looking back to work by Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry. All the views I discuss claim that painting is important because it can make manifest certain philosophically important truths. While sympathetic to this approach, I discuss various problems with it. Firstly, are these truths (...) verbally explicable, or only communicable through the artwork itself? Secondly, if its truthfulness is the reason why we value painting, can this criterion track our intuitive judgements about relative artistic merit? Thirdly, can the truthfulness of painting be a reason for valuing it if that truth is divorced from its traditional association with Beauty and Goodness? I suggest ways in which the first and second problems could in principle be solved, but argue in response to the third that truth must indeed be seen in the context of other values if it is to explain why painting matters. (shrink)

We argue that there is a marked shift in the moral weight of an increment in a person's well-being when one moves from a case involving only intra-personal trade-offs to a case involving only inter-personal trads-offs. This shift, we propose, is required by the separateness of persons. We also argue that the Priority View put forward by Parfit cannot account for such a shift. We also outline two alternative views, an egalitarian view and a claims-based view, that can account for (...) this shift. (shrink)

This work argues for the need to close the gap between the fields of the philosophy of religion and religious studies. Thomas A. Lewis takes up what, in recent years, has often been seen as a fundamental reason for excluding religious ethics and philosophy of religion from religious studies: their explicit normativity. Against this presupposition, Lewis argues that normativity is pervasive--not unique to ethics and philosophy of religion--and therefore not a reason to exclude them from religious studies. He bridges more (...) philosophical and historical subfields by arguing for the importance of history to the philosophy of religion. He considers the future of religious ethics, explaining that the field as whole should learn from the methodological developments associated with recent work in comparative religious ethics and 'comparative religious ethics' should no longer be conceived as a distinct subfield. The concluding chapter engages broader, post-9/11 arguments about the importance of studying religion, arguing that prominent contemporary notions of 'religious literacy' actually hinder our ability to grasp the significance of religion and impact in the world today. (shrink)

Despite the National Science Foundation's recent clarification of the Broader Impacts Criterion used in grant evaluation, it is not clear that this criterion is being understood or applied consistently by grant writers or reviewers. In particular, there is still confusion about how to interpret the requirement for broadening the participation of under-represented groups in science and scepticism about the value of doing so. Much of this stems from uncertainty about why the participation of under-represented groups is desirable or beneficial in (...) the first place. This paper distinguishes three different rationales for the importance of diversity in science and draws out the implications for the kind of diversity that is desirable, as well as how the diversity requirement of the Broader Impacts Criterion should be applied and weighed against other criteria in reviewing particular grants. I argue that there are epistemic, as well as social, benefits to diversity that can help promote scientific progress. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Fantasy Matters Too MuchJack Zipes (bio)In September 1997 a fairy-tale princess and a holy saint, Princess Diana and Mother Teresa, died within a few days of each other. Millions of people openly and dramatically expressed their grief and mourning. Their pictures along with many different images of Diana and Mother Teresa were beamed all over the world through television and the Internet. The mass media carried all (...) sorts of stories and acclaimed the two of them as the fairy-tale princess and the saint, so that little was left to the imagination. Fantastic spectacle was all that mattered.We speculate with the fantastic. Fantasy is a celebrity and money-making machine. As a module in our brains, it has the capacity to transform plain junk into gold that glitters. Fantasy mobilizes and instrumentalizes the fantastic to form and celebrate spectacles that exist and have always existed—illusions of social relations of exploitation based on power. Spectacles violate and drain our imaginations by glorifying social relations of power that are made spectacular and involve the magic of fetishism. Generally, the results bring about delusion and acclamation of particular sets of social relations that are commodified, sold, and consumed. We acclaim commodities that we don’t know, products that are not of our own making and that we consume mentally and physically. We reproduce images consciously and unconsciously that are not of our own making. The media and the corporate world occupy our psyches and manipulate our fantasies even when we [End Page 77] dream. Our relations are mediated through fantastic spectacle and through fetish abetted by the latest technology that connects us to each other while also disconnecting us from our minds and feelings. Simultaneously, we seek to project our desires in the form of fantasies onto reality and endeavor to occupy a space in which our most profound wishes and desires can be realized. We seek cognition and recognition. In each instance—in the tension between corporate determination of the fantastic and individual projection of desire—we seem to anchor our understanding of reality in artworks dependent on the fantastic, such as the Bible and fairy tales. Hence, Mother Teresa the saint. Diana the fairy-tale princess.It is through fantasy that we have always sought to make sense of the world, not through reason. Reason matters, but fantasy matters more. Perhaps it has mattered too much, and our reliance on fantasy may wear thin and betray us even while it nourishes us and gives us hope that the world can be a better place. We have imagined gods, the kingdom of a single god, the miraculous feats of divine and semidivine characters, and the commandments that have been established to lead us to the good life, if not paradise. It is through the fictive projections of our imaginations based on personal experience that we have sought to grasp, explain, alter, and comment on reality. This is again why such staples as the Bible and the Grimms fairy tales have become canonical texts: unlike reality, they allegedly open the mysteries of life and reveal ways in which we can maintain ourselves and our integrity in a conflict-ridden world. They compensate for the constant violation of nature and life itself and for the everyday violation of our lives engendered through spectacle. They contest reality and also become conflated with reality.But our fantasy and the fantasies that we conceive have become desperate because they are outstripped by real existing conditions that instrumentalize them at every waking second of our day, and even when we slumber. It is a commonplace today that fiction, especially science fiction and what we label fantasy in the world of art, cannot keep pace with the devastating and disturbing fantastic of real occurrences, or what I call the incredible credibility of the real. When the normal is so fantastically abnormal, what role can fantastic artworks play in our lives? Is the violence that we encounter in our everyday lives so much more fantastic than in literature, film, and the arts that we seek to consume the fantastic like harmless junk food as quick fixes and consolation? Can our joys really and realistically... (shrink)