This is a commentary on the Aesthetic and Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason with frequent reference to the much neglected Methodology and a very brief discussion, in the final chapter, of the Dialectic. Dryer insists that the fundamental question of the Critique is how metaphysical judgments, i.e., judgments about how things are in general, can be verified; that it is neither a theory of knowledge or experience nor the exposition of a system of metaphysical principles except insofar as (...) such concerns are ancillary to the primary task; and that the literature on the first Critique, including Paton's and Kemp Smith's interpretations of it as a "metaphysic of experience," fails to understand Kant's argument by failing to accept Kant's description of his task. In the central chapter, "Verification in Geometry and Metaphysics," Dryer gives a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of verification in geometry and the way in which this is related to his final answer to the question of verification in metaphysics, with emphasis on imagination and the discussions of the Methodology. Chapters devoted to the First and Second Analogies and the Axioms of Intuition follow for the sake of illustration. The emphasis on verification and a large measure of freedom from Kantian terminology give the analyses a freshness which is only partially destroyed by the highly repetitious style. With minor exceptions Kant's arguments are defended throughout.—M. W. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 139 twenty years ago has slowly given way to an awareness that cross-cultural differences are real enough to call for different rules of behavior and different sets of values. Several possibilities are still open to the ethicist concerned with the problem of relativism. We may want to reconsider more carefully than ever before the connotations of "relative," of "action" and of "culture" in the context of those (...) anthropologists whose claims are said to be detrimental to ethics. Of these terms so crucial for what Moser calls relativism of right, only the first has been analyzed from opposite perspectives by Stevenson and Berlin. So far as I know, no one has treated "relative" as a relational term in the fruitful way suggested by Berlin.19 We may also come to realize that the issue of relativism is too much imbedded in historical and metaphysical tenets and thus is not amenable to the ahistorical treatment of the logical status of moral judgment. Thus we may want to rewrite its whole history by exploiting one of the best facets of Moser's essay. That is, a comparative study of the sociology of knowledge with the organic model of cultural anthropology. Lastly we may agree with A. Edel and consider the whole issue a closed chapter in the history of philosophy, and move on to the philosophically more fruitful investigation of the why and wherefore of moral change between generations and between historical periods. L. M. PALMER University of Delaware Ernst Cassirer: Scientific Knowledge and the Concept of Man. By Seymour W. Itzkoff. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. xi +286. $9.95) There is a sense in which the title of this book is misleading. To be sure, Dr. Itzkoff does deal with Cassirer and with Cassirer's neo-Kantian conception of scientific knowledge and of man. But there is more to the book than this. The first seven chapters are, in effect, a demonstration that "Cassirer left us with a difficult theoretical dilemma: the existence of two contrasting and opposed views of human nature" (p. 172). The last two chapters (pp. 172-252) are the author's attempt to bring those two views into harmony within the framework of contemporary science and philosophical analysis. The first two chapters (pp. 1-37) trace briefly the development of philosophical thought from the time of "the intellectual revolution set in motion by Galileo" to Kant's "Copernican revolution"--to the Kantian thesis, that is, that "the fundamental act of perception and the structuring of experience itseLf depend upon... 'transcendental apperception' as a 'condition of the possibility of perception itself'" (p. 27). It is the concern with "form and function" rather than with "substance and reality," which the Marburg neo-Kantians, and with them Cassirer, accepted as the lasting achievement of Kant's "critical philosophy." But Cassirer found in Kant also a "parallel concern... for humanistic disciplines" (p. 33) and, as "a central theme," the assertion of the "autonomy of human nature" (p. 35). The survey is suggestive but, in some respects, it is also inaccurate. For example, Kant's presumed "lapse into a radical subjectivism" cannot be justified by the reference, in passing, as it were, to the Opus postumum (p. 29)--although the fault is here perhaps that of Norman Kemp Smith rather than that of the author. A more ~o I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), pp. 96-106. 140 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY serious misrepresentation of Kant may be found in the author's acceptance of T. D. Weldon's statement that "the categories... supply principles which are... essential to the existing of a unitary self-consciousness" (p. 32), for this is precisely the reverse of the Kantian position. Also, it is hardly accurate to speak of "Kant's postulation of laws of ethical behavior" (p. 36), for, surely, the various formulations of the categorical imperative are not "laws of ethical behavior" but criteria of such laws. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 38-98) are devoted to discussions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Kant's initial commitment to Newtonian mechanics is, of course, a wellknown fact; but Professor Itzkoff quite correctly points out... (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: -- Introduction: Civil Society and Human Flourishing -- City States and Republics, c.400 BCE-400 -- Heavenly Mandates, 400-1500 -- The Emergence of the Sovereign State, 1500-1700 -- From Subject to Citizen, 1700-1815 -- Ideology and Equality, 1815-1914 -- Breakdown and Uncertainty, 1914-2010 -- Conclusion -- Endnotes -- Index.

In 1371 Edward III appealed to Parliament for a grant of taxation in order to support the war recently reopened against the French. The resulting lay subsidy, levied in each parish throughout the country and designed to contribute a total of £50,000 to the royal coffers, marked a change in the taxation procedures used in England since the 1330s and opened a period of experimentation which was to culminate in the three poll taxes of 1377, 1379, and 1380. It has (...) long been appreciated that the dramatic increase in royal financial demands in the 1370s, coinciding with the decline of English fortunes on the Continent, produced widespread disaffection in the country, which manifested itself in the Good Parliament of 1376 and the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. The 1371 Parliament and the tax which it granted therefore have much to tell us about the attitudes of political society in England to the military and domestic policies of the Crown during Edward III's last years. (shrink)

The Research Excellence Framework of the Higher Education Funding Council for England is taking place in 2013, its three key elements being outputs, impact, and “quality of the research environment”. Impact will be assessed using case studies that “may include any social, economic or cultural impact or benefit beyond academia that has taken place during the assessment period.”1 Medical ethics in the UK still does not have its own cognate assessment panel—for example, bioethics or applied ethics—unlike in, for example, Australia. (...) Several researchers in medical ethics have reported to the Institute of Medical Ethics that during the internal preliminary stage of the Research Excellence Framework several medical schools have decided to include only research that entails empirical data gathering. Thus, conceptual papers and ethical analysis will be excluded. The arbitrary exclusion of reasoned discussion of medical ethics issues as a proper subject for medical research unless it is based on empirical data gathering is conceptually mistaken. “Empirical ethics” is, of course, a legitimate component of medical ethics research, but to act as though it is the only legitimate component suggests, at best, a partial understanding of the nature of ethics in general and medical ethics in particular. It also mistakenly places medicine firmly on only one side of the science/humanities “two cultures” divide instead of in its rightful place bridging the divide. Given the emphasis by the General Medical Council on medical ethics in properly preparing “tomorrow’s doctors,” we urge medical schools to find a way of using the upcoming Research Excellence Framework to highlight the expertise residing in their ethicist colleagues. We are confident that appropriate assessment will reveal work of high quality that can be shown to have social and cultural impact and benefit beyond academia, as required by the framework. (shrink)