이 글의 목적은 중국 법상유식의 논서 『成唯識論』에 나타나는 행상(行相, ākāra)을 견분과 요별(vijñapti)과의 관계를 중심으로 살펴보는 것이다. ākāra에 대한 현장 역어인 行相의 경우 行은 주관의 역할, 相은 객관의 역할을 담당하고 있는 용어이다. 유부의 경우 심 · 심소의 이명으로 불리는 유행상의 정의에서 행상은 심 · 심소의 역할을 담당한다. 식 상에 외부대상의 행상이 나타나는 것 자체를 인식성립으로 여기는 경량부의 행상은 인식의 조건이자 내용이다. 유식 논서 『성유식론』에 의하면 식자체로부터 식 상에 주관에 속하는 行相(ākāra)과 객관에 속하는 行相(ākāra)이 나타난다. 이때에 주관에 속하는 행상은 법상용어로 見分이고 객관에 (...) 속하는 행상은 相分이다. 따라서 행상과 견분은 주관 역할을 담당하고 있는 용어이다. 이런 견분 행상은 상분 행상을 요별(vijñapti)한다. 요별은 실재하는 주관이 객관을 안다는 것이 아니라 식으로부터 주관이나 객관과 유사한 행상으로 현현(pratibhāsa)한다는 것을 의미한다. 내부 식으로부터 견분 행상과 상분 행상이 식 상에 현현한다는 인식은 아는 것이 아니라 표상되는 것(vijñapti, 了別)을 특징으로 삼는다. 이로써 외부대상은 존재하지 않고 오직 식(vijñapti)만이 존재한다는 유식(vijñaptimātratā)이 구체적으로 논증된다. 용어적으로 행상=견분이고 내용적으로 행상=요별(vijñapti)이 성립한다. 유부에서 주관적 역할로서의 행상이 단초적으로 시사된 이후 경량부에서 행상은 주요 인식근거로서 작용하며 중국 법상유식의 경우에는 용어적, 이론적으로 보다 완비된 형태를 지닌 술어로 정착한다. (shrink)

This paper aims at examining the arguments between Śubhagupta (c.720–780) and Śāntarakṣita (c.725–788) over the Buddha’s cognition of other minds and shows how the question of the Buddha’s cognition of other mindsis incorporated into the proof of vijñaptimātratā or “consciousness-only” by Śāntarakṣita. According to Śāntarakṣita, Śubhagupta assumes that the Buddha’s cognition, which is characterized as “the cognition [of the Blessed One] which follows the path of cognition” (aupalambhikadarśana), grasps other minds when the Buddha’s cognition is similar (sārūpya) to other minds. (...) For Śāntarakṣita, the Buddha’s cognition cannot be aupalambhika. If the Buddha’s cognition were similar to the other minds, it would follow that the Buddha, whose cognition erroneously grasps other minds as something distinct from it, has not yet removed the hindrance constituted by objects of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa). But if it is accepted that the Buddha’s cognition is beyond the grasped-grasper duality, can the Buddha, who does not know other minds, be called sarvajña “omniscient”? According to Śāntarakṣita, even though the Buddha has no seeing (adarśana), the Buddha causes all sentient beings to gain benefits by virtue of seeing other minds and hence deserves to be called sarvajña. What underlies this argument is that the Buddha knows other minds without making a distinction between his own mind and other minds, which is possible only on the basis of self-cognition (ātmasaṃvedana). (shrink)

In our study of the development of Buddhist ideas over time, one of the major problems is the absence of the links, connecting different strata, strands or schools of the Buddhist thought. Perhaps, the most extreme example of this is the origin of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, a complex teaching that emerged almost “full-grown” in the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_. Our knowledge of the historical antecedents of Yogācāra is very scarce and, what concerns the school Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika, contradictory. The _Māyājāla-sūtra_ very likely reveals important details (...) regarding the very origin of the Yogācāra tradition and is, therefore, a long-sought- for source. _Māyājāla-sūtra_ is a _sūtra_ in the recently recovered Sanskrit _Dīrgha-āgama_. It stands out from the other _Dīrgha-āgama sūtras_ by its diction and unique compositional and doctrinal features. One of its unique features is that its core terminology, its passages and similes are used extensively in the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika-Yogācāra sources, especially in the _Yogācārabhūmi_ and the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_. In the article, I summarize the _sūtra_, overview these features and show that the central message of the _sūtra_ is the so-called _darśana-mārga_, a path of seeing, which is accompanied by supramundane insight (lokottara-prajñā), which enables a Buddhist adept to directly perceive the true reality and become an _ārya_, noble person. I argue that this central idea of the _sūtra_ is textually and doctrinally (or philosophically) interwoven with the specifically Yogācāra understanding of the _darśana-mārga_. Moreover, I show that one of the main ideas of the _sūtra_, the ambivalence of the sense objects, realized at the _darśana-mārga_, is likely an antecedent of the specifically Yogācāra teaching on the possibility of the same object to cause opposite types of experience, and, as such, an antecedent of the cornerstone Yogācāra principle of _vijñaptimātratā_ (the teaching that the objects of perception are mere representations of/in the mind). Another important aspect explored in this paper is the intertextuality of the _Māyājāla-sūtra_, its parallels and the first chapters of the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_, which sheds important light on the origin of the latter text. I argue that these parallels to the Yogācāra teachings are, at the very least, their earlier precedents, and, because of that the _Māyājāla-sūtra_ may be called a proto-Yogācāra _sūtra_. (shrink)