Systems biology is largely tributary to genomics and other “omic” disciplines that generate vast amounts of structural data. “Omics”, however, lack a theoretical framework that would allow using these data sets as such (rather than just tiny bits that are extracted by advanced data-mining techniques) to build explanatory models that help understand physiological processes. Systems biology provides such a framework by adding a dynamic dimension to merely structural “omics”. It makes use of bottom-up and top-down models. The former are based (...) on data about systems components, the latter on systems-level data. We trace back both modeling strategies (which are often used to delineate two branches of the field) to the modeling of metabolic and signaling pathways in the bottom-up case, and to biological cybernetics and systems theory in the top-down case. We then argue that three roots of systems biology must be discerned to account adequately for the structure of the field: pathway modeling, biological cybernetics, and “omics”. We regard systems biology as merging modeling strategies (supplemented by new mathematical procedures) from data-poor fields with data supply from a field that is quite deficient in explanatory modeling. After characterizing the structure of the field, we address some epistemological and ontological issues regarding concepts on which the top-down approach relies and that seem to us to require clarification. This includes the consequences of identifying modules in large networks without relying on functional considerations, the question of the “holism” of systems biology, and the epistemic value of the “systeome” project that aspires to become the cutting edge of the field. (shrink)

Looking for an adequate explication of the concept of a biological function, several authors have proposed to link function to design. Unfortunately, known explications of biological design in turn refer to functions. The concept of general design I will introduce here breaks up this circle. I specify design with respect to its ontogenetic role. This allows function to be based on design without making reference to the history of the design, or to the phylogeny of an organism, while retaining the (...) normative aspect of function ascriptions. The concept is applicable to the function and design of technical artifacts as well. Several problems well known with other definitions can be overcome by this approach. (shrink)

We show how to extract effective bounds Φ for $\bigwedge u^1 \bigwedge v \leq_\gamma tu \bigvee w^\eta G_0$ -sentences which depend on u only (i.e. $\bigwedge u \bigwedge v \leq_\gamma tu \bigvee w \leq_\eta \Phi uG_0$ ) from arithmetical proofs which use analytical assumptions of the form \begin{equation*}\tag{*}\bigwedge x^\delta\bigvee y \leq_\rho sx \bigwedge z^\tau F_0\end{equation*} (γ, δ, ρ, and τ are arbitrary finite types, η ≤ 2, G0 and F0 are quantifier-free, and s and t are closed terms). If τ (...) ≤ 2, (*) can be weakened to $\bigwedge x^\delta, z^\tau\bigvee y \leq_\rho sx \bigwedge \tilde{z} \leq_\tau z F_0$ . This is used to establish new conservation results about weak König's lemma. Applications to proofs in classical analysis, especially uniqueness proofs in approximation theory, will be given in subsequent papers. (shrink)

This paper explores John Maynard Smith’s conceptual work on animal signals. Maynard Smith defined animal signals as traits that (1) change another organism’s behaviour while benefiting the sender, that (2) are evolved for this function, and that (3) have their effects through the evolved response of the receiver. Like many ethologists, Maynard Smith assumed that animal signals convey semantic information. Yet his definition of animal signals remains silent on the nature of semantic information and on the conditions determining its content. (...) I therefore compare three ways to specify the semantic content of animal signals. The first suggestion models semantic content on Maynard Smith’s theory of genetic information. On the second proposal, semantic content is equated with a condition identified by conventional content ascriptions. The third suggestion is to explain semantic content in terms of consumer-based teleosemantics. I show how these accounts equate semantic content with distinct kinds of conditions and how they differ with respect to the kinds of traits that qualify as carrying semantic information. (shrink)

Reliabilist philosophy of science considers scientific misconduct a transgression against the principles of good cognitive practice. Good practice in research is characterised by the reliability, efficiency and fertility of the cognitive processes involved. The reliabilist approach is closely connected to the idea of mutual cognitive dependency of the research community. Trust in the testimony of others is not an inevitable but a favouring factor of scientific progress — and misconduct damages the testimonial chain, respectively the principle of trustworthiness. Within the (...) reliabilist framework, the main focus on questionable research is not on whether or not there are fraudulent intentions , but on recognisable consequences for the research community. Criticising the constructivist modeling of questionable research, we reconstruct certain contributions by Emil Abderhalden, Richard Goldschmidt, Franz Moewus, and Ernst Waldschmitz-Leitz as serious misconducts respectively frauds. We also show that specific social factors — often regarded as “apologising” conditions — decisively interfere with the principle of trustworthiness in the scientific community. (shrink)

In this paper, we present another case study in the general project of proof mining which means the logical analysis of prima facie non-effective proofs with the aim of extracting new computationally relevant data. We use techniques based on monotone functional interpretation developed in Kohlenbach , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 225–260) to analyze Cheney's simplification 189) of Jackson's original proof 320) of the uniqueness of the best L1-approximation of continuous functions fC[0,1] by polynomials pPn of degree n. Cheney's (...) proof is non-effective in the sense that it is based on classical logic and on the non-computational principle WKL . The result of our analysis provides the first effective uniform modulus of uniqueness . Moreover, the extracted modulus has the optimal ε-dependency as follows from Kroó 331). The paper also describes how the uniform modulus of uniqueness can be used to compute the best L1-approximations of a fixed fC[0,1] with arbitrary precision. The second author uses this result to give a complexity upper bound on the computation of the best L1-approximation in Oliva 66–77). (shrink)

I understand the claim that there is a right to work as the claim that involuntary unemployment is an injustice that requires of justice enforcement institutions to stop it. I argue that in present conditions of high productivity it is more consistent with the liberal tradition to proclaim a right to develop one’s capabilities than a right to work. The steps of my argument are: (1) An important though not the only reason for considering unemployment unjust has been what I (...) call the Promethean idea of society. (2) The Promethean idea is implied by the liberal idea of rights. (3) There are two conceptions of the Promethean idea, the centralist and the autonomous one. (4) Only the latter is acceptable. (5) Involuntary unemployment is unjust even if the dole is decently high. (6) The injustice of unemployment can be stopped only by institutions that enable everyone to use their capabilities in realizing the Promethean idea. (7) One such institution is basic income. (8) As employment is not necessary for survival, we should replace the right to work with a right to develop one’s capabilities. (shrink)

Technical artifacts are embedded in social systems and, to some extent, even shape them. This chapter inquires, then, whether designing artifacts may be regarded as a contribution to social design. I explicate a concept of general design that conceives design as the type fixation of a complex entity. This allows for an analysis of different contributions to the design of social systems without favoring the intended effects of artifacts on a system over those effects that actually show up. First, the (...) clear-cut case of socio-technical systems is considered. Here, functions of artifacts can be planned fairly precise. In societies, in contrast, the actual functions of an artifact can hardly be predicted, which is due to strong self-organizing processes. Nevertheless artifact design can be shown to contribute to the design of the system also in this case. (shrink)

In an illuminating article A. Kamlah considers philosophy of science as an activity leading step by step from neutral descriptions to rational prescriptions. What his remarks do not offer us is a way of dealing with the troublesome ambiguities we find in the analyses provided by those philosophers of science who refuse to say whether they legislate how scientists should behave or describe how they do. In this context I want to draw attention to a helpful distinction H. A. Simon (...) has made. (shrink)

ArgumentThe article retraces the shifting conceptualizations of psychological trauma in experimental psychopathological research in the middle decades of the twentieth century in the United States. Among researchers studying so-called experimental neuroses in animal laboratories, trauma was an often-invoked category used to denote the clash of conflicting forces believed to lead to neurotic suffering. Experimental psychologists, however, soon grew skeptical of the traumatogenic model and ultimately came to reject neurosis as a disease entity. Both theoretical differences and practical circumstances, such as (...) the technical challenge of stabilizing neurotic symptoms in rats, led to this demise. Yet, despite their reservations, experimental psychologists continued to employ traumatic stimuli to produce psychopathological syndromes. In the 1960s, a new understanding of trauma evolved, which emphasized the loss of control experienced by traumatized animal subjects. These shifting ideas about trauma, I argue, reflect both varying experimental cultures, epistemic norms as well as changing societal concerns. (shrink)

Form follows function, but it does not follow from function. Form is not derivable from the latter. To realize a desired technical function, a form must first be found that is able to realize it at all. Secondly, the question arises as to whether an envisaged form realizes the function in an appropriate way. Functions are multiply realizable—various different forms can bear the very same function. One needs to find a form of a technical artifact that realizes an envisaged function (...) sufficiently efficient, robust, or whatever criteria might be imposed. This paper scrutinizes biomimetics as one way to find a good solution to the realization problem. Drawing on an approach from the philosophy of simulations, it reconstructs the biomimetic relation as being mediated by a theoretical model. It is shown that the robustness of the functioning system is usually reached in different ways in biological and in technological systems, which explains differences in morphogenetic mechanisms or principles found in these fields. This reconstruction helps to understand problems with robustness in synthetic biology that occur when technical design principles are implemented in a biological system. The mimetic relation between the biological and the technical realm is found to be asymmetric. (shrink)

Existe uma tendência evidente de computadorizar cada vez mais atividades do dia-a-dia. Ferramentas de IA, de tomada de decisão e aprendizado de máquina são algumas destas tecnologias. Neste artigo analisamos como a modelagem de aplicações de bancos de dados deve evoluir para atender a estes requisitos. Coisas estruturais e ocorrêncais adequadas são consideradas e, para cada conceito, têm que ser definidas regras que garantem a integridade do sistema como um todo. Caracteristicas específicas de sistemas complexos ativos e/ou reativos, questões de (...) autonomia, aspectos espaciais e temporais, assim como informações imprecisas, devem ser levados em consideração. (shrink)

Our understanding of epithelial development in Drosophila has been greatly improved in recent years. Two key regulators of epithelial polarity, Crumbs and DE‐cadherin, have been studied at the genetic and molecular levels and a number of additional genes are being analyzed that contribute to the differentiation of epithelial cell structure. Epithelial architecture has a profound influence on morphogenetic movements, patterning and cell‐type determination. The combination of embryological and genetic/molecular tools in Drosophila will help us to elucidate the complex events that (...) determine epithelial cell structure and how they relate to morphogenesis and other developmental processes. (shrink)

For the first time in his Doctrine of Right, Kant employs an expanded, three dimensional concept of public law. In addition to constitutional law, it also includes international law and cosmopolitan law. Each of these concepts of law is assigned its own principle of reason: constitutional law declares that a republic is the only rightful constitution for an individual state; international law requires at least an association of states with higher level instruments of coercion; and cosmopolitan law primarily defines the (...) basic rights of stateless peoples or individuals with respect to existing states. For the principles of reason for constitutional and international law, Kant formulates permissive laws, which allow for imperfections in an effort to promote the optima which the legal principles of reason dictate. Kant justifies these less perfect solutions not only with pragmatic considerations but also with reasons relating to the theory of the sovereignty of nations. Kants Rechtslehre verwendet erstmals einen erweiterten, dreidimensionalen Begriff des öffentlichen Rechts, der neben dem Staatsrecht nun auch das Völkerrecht und das Weltbürgerrecht umfaßt. Jeder dieser Begriffssphären wird ein eigenes vernunftrechtliches Prinzip zugeordnet: das Staatsrecht erklärt die Republik zur einzig rechtmäßigen Verfassung, während das Völkerrecht mindestens eine Staatenassoziation mit höherstufiger Zwangsgewalt erfordert und das Weltbürgerrecht in der Hauptsache die elementaren Rechte von staatslosen Völkern oder Einzelpersonen gegenüber Staaten definiert. Für das staatsrechtliche und das völkerrechtliche Prinzip formuliert Kant Erlaubnisgesetze, die zur Beförderung der vernunftrechtlichen Optima Minderformen zulassen, zu deren Rechtfertigung Kant nicht allein pragmatische, sondern ebenso volkssouveränitätstheoretische Gründe anführt. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that protestant scholasticism influenced Kant’s thinking on the question of Divine Providence. But the nature and extent of that influence have never been explored in detail. This is the scholarly lacuna the present volume seeks to fill.

I thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful objections and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge the permissions granted by Elsevier, The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, and the Wellcome Collection to reproduce copyrighted material. Open access via the Springer Compact Agreement.