In this article, I argue,inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition ofReine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance in the shape of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought. I also consider the possibility that in his post‐1960 phase Kelsen abandoned metaethical relativism for moral fictionalism, but argue that, on the whole, a relativist interpretation (...) of Kelsen’s late legal philosophy is to be preferred to a fictionalist interpretation. (shrink)

Hybrid logics are a principled generalization of both modal logics and description logics, a standard formalism for knowledge representation. In this paper we give the first constructive version of hybrid logic, thereby showing that it is possible to hybridize constructive modal logics. Alternative systems are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated version of intuitionistic hybrid logic and prove essential proof-theoretical results for a natural deduction formulation of it. Our natural deduction system is also extended with additional inference (...) rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations expressed by so-called geometric theories. Thus, we give natural deduction systems in a uniform way for a wide class of constructive hybrid logics. This shows that constructive hybrid logics are a viable enterprise and opens up the way for future applications. (shrink)

Providing an alternative to pyschoanalytically based descriptions, this major study presents a unique, new theoretical account of the way emotions and thought patterns interact in creating aesthetic effects in films. Using diverse examples, Torben Grodal shows how films activate effects in the viewer and how these effects are moulded by genres which determine the way in which characters will react in given situations.

In the paper (Braüner, 2001) we gave a minimal condition for the existence of a homophonic theory of truth for a modal or tense logic. In the present paper we generalise this result to arbitrary modal logics and we also show that a modal logic permits the existence of a homophonic theory of truth if and only if it permits the definition of a socalled master modality. Moreover, we explore a connection between the master modality and hybrid logic: We show (...) that if attention is restricted to bidirectional frames, then the expressive power of the master modality is exactly what is needed to translate the bounded fragment of first-order logic into hybrid logic in a truth preserving way. We believe that this throws new light on Arthur Prior's fourth grade tense logic. (shrink)

This is a companion paper to Braüner where a natural deduction system for propositional hybrid logic is given. In the present paper we generalize the system to the first-order case. Our natural deduction system for first-order hybrid logic can be extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations and the quantifier domains expressed by so-called geometric theories. We prove soundness and completeness and we prove a normalisation theorem. Moreover, we give an axiom system first-order hybrid logic.

In his new book, The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that law has no necessary properties, and that therefore jurisprudents should not assume that an inquiry into the nature of law has to be a search for such properties. I argue, however, that Schauer's attempt to show that legal anti-essentialism is a defensible position fails, because his one main argument is either irrelevant or else incomplete, depending on how one understands it, and because the other main argument is false.

In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis (...) deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound. (shrink)

This is primarily a conceptual paper. The goal of the paper is to put into perspective the proof-theory of hybrid logic and in particular, try to give an answer to the following question: Why does the proof-theory of hybrid logic work so well compared to the proof-theory of ordinary modal logic?Roughly, there are two different kinds of proof systems for modal logic: Systems where the formulas involved in the rules are formulas of the object language, that is, ordinary modal-logical formulas, (...) and systems where the formulas involved in the rules are metalingustic formulas obtained by attaching labels representing possible worlds to ordinary modal-logical formulas. Systems of the second kind often also involve an explicit representation of the accessibility relation. From a proof-theoretic point of view, modal-logical systems of the first kind are less well-behaved than systems of the second kind.It turns out that this can be remedied by hybridization, that is, hybridization of modal logics enables the formulation of well-behaved proof systems without involving metalinguistic machinery. What has happened is that the metalinguistic machinery has been internalized in the object language. This gives an answer to the initial question, which is that the proof-theory of hybrid logic works so well because the metalinguistic semantic machinery has been internalized in the object language. (shrink)

How and from where can power be criticized and resisted? The advent of new managerial forms of power has brought the question once more to the fore. One of the salient issues is whether the ubiquity and apparent omnipotence of contemporary forms of managerial power renders critique and resistance difficult. This article compares the critical potential of French pragmatic sociology and Foucauldian-inspired genealogy. We argue that both approaches offer viable critiques of contemporary forms of power. Yet, whereas the critique of (...) pragmatic sociology hinges on the position of those who exercise critique and/or resist, genealogical critique depends on the concrete form of power that is being scrutinized. We argue that even though we see critique as modus as more convincing than critique as locus, the two approaches can inspire each other in order to advance effective critique. (shrink)

This important book examines how the growing field of cybernetic psychology - the study of the creative complexity of the mind - can be applied to a range of different realms, tapping into the unconscious potential within us all. Cybernetic psychology integrates theories from various schools of thought, bringing them together in one unified theory. First developed and described by Danish author and psychotherapist Ole Vedfelt. It can be used in therapeutic practice, in relation to learning and pedagogics, and as (...) a tool for better leadership. The 15 chapters within this volume apply the theory to these as well as other areas, including ecology, creativity, mindfulness and scientific enquiry itself. Insightful and wide-ranging, the book will appeal to psychotherapists and those working within mental health, as well as students and researchers across Education, Psychology and beyond. (shrink)

This article explores the differences between two strategies of persuasion. The first strategy, called drawing things together, is Actor-Network Theory's classic analysis of how modern science has gained tremendous persuasive powers through systematic inscription and centralized accumulation of information traces. The second strategy, called drawing contrasts together, is derived from the author's empirical analysis of the rhetorics and materialities of a Scandinavian New Economy firm. The persuasive powers of this firm, it is argued, are based on its ability to evoke (...) and articulate a series of pointed contrasts between the attractive working life within the firm and the ordinary and problematic work life elsewhere. The article argues that both persuasive strategies work in a pragmatic sense. But where “drawing things together” enacts a relatively stable and knowable world, the persuasive strategy of “drawing contrasts together” depends on, and enacts, a world of dramatic epochal changes. (shrink)

In this short paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more than they have done so far on problems of legal reasoning. Not only is this a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but it is also, in my estimation, the field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to both the study and the practice of law. For even though reasoning and interpretation are at the center of what legal practitioners and legal scholars do, (...) neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the possible relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning in general. The second is the question of how to analyze legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, or as inductive arguments, or both, and if so how. (shrink)

Robert Alexy's claim that law of necessity has a dual nature raises many interesting philosophical questions. In this article, I consider some of these questions, such as what the meaning of the correctness thesis is, whether Alexy's discourse theory supports this thesis, and whether the thesis is defensible; whether Alexy's argument from anarchy and civil war supports the claim that law of necessity has a real dimension; and what the implications are of the use of moral arguments, such as the (...) argument from injustice, for the status of Alexy's inquiry. (shrink)

Avant-propos -- L'œil énucléé -- L'œil du Dieu caché -- L'œil originel -- L'œil silencieux -- L'œil du non-savoir -- L'œil météorologique -- L'œil maternel -- L'œil incestueux -- L'œil persuasif -- L'œil orgiastique -- L'œil obscurci -- L'œil sociologique -- L'œil testamentaire -- L'œil transversal -- L'œil sacré -- L'œil artaudien -- L'œil du flâneur -- L'œil urbain -- L'œil méditatif -- L'œil éclaboussé -- En guise de vision : l'œil laminé.

This article aims to outline a perspective on democratic ideology centred on orientation and justification, which is discussed in relation to the right?left dyad and public reason. Ideology is approached in terms of the orientational structuring of identification processes, which is discussed in relation to the articulation between four pairs of orientational metaphors (up?down, in?out, front?back and right?left), which shape the political terrain and the terms of political justification. The latter is expressed in public reason based on political equality, pluralism (...) and contingency as opposed to hierarchy, monism and objectivism. A modern democratic ideology is based on right/left orientation to underpin the autonomy of the political symbolic order vis?à?vis cultural and religious orders, and on public reason as freestanding in relation to comprehensive reasons, which is a political justification of the priority of right/left in matters of common concerns. (shrink)

Artikelen over aspecten van het gedachtegoed van de Duitse filosoof en de huidiger betekenis daarvan.

In Le mythe de Sisyphe Camus deals with the problem of suicide because of the absurdity of life. He sees people committing suicide because they think life, being absurd, is no longer worthwhile. But does the absurdity of life imply that life is not worthwhile? He argues this is not the case. The logic of the absurd leads to revolt, freedom and passion for life. These make life worthwhile. So suicide is not the conclusion of the logic of the absurd. (...) However, his argument, though inspiring, fails to recognize the problem of suicide. Why do people who commit suicide because of the absurd believe life is no longer worthwhile? In my article I try to answer this question. In L’homme révolté Camus states that revolt can be contaminated by ressentiment. I think this contamination can explain why people believe life in an absurd world is no longer worthwhile. Based on Scheler’s analysis of ressentiment in Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen I try to describe the process of this contamination. It is argued first that ressentiment is a consequence of the final impotence of revolt to protect what is valuable, second that revolt will not transform in ressentiment only when it is capable of overcoming itself in resignation. (shrink)

Explains the concept of legal competence (or power). This book then discusses the analysis and definition of legal concepts in general; the relation between the concept of competence and (in)validity; what it means to exercise competence; different types of competence; and competence norms.

Braüner, Blackburn and Polyanskaya relate children’s being deceived to their theory of mind skills. Second‐order false‐belief tasks are often used to test children’s second‐order theory of mind development. The article gives a logical analysis of the reasoning needed to solve four types of second‐order false belief tasks, distinguished on whether a story character is deceived, and on whether the story hinges on facts in the world changing. The principle of inertia plays an important role. [74].

This is the first book-length treatment of hybrid logic and its proof-theory. Hybrid logic is an extension of ordinary modal logic which allows explicit reference to individual points in a model. This is useful for many applications, for example when reasoning about time one often wants to formulate a series of statements about what happens at specific times. There is little consensus about proof-theory for ordinary modal logic. Many modal-logical proof systems lack important properties and the relationships between proof systems (...) for different modal logics are often unclear. In the present book we demonstrate that hybrid-logical proof-theory remedies these deficiencies by giving a spectrum of well-behaved proof systems for a spectrum of different hybrid logics. (shrink)

In this paper various branching time semantics are compared with the aim of clarifying the role of true futures of counterfactual moments, that is, true futures of moments outside the true chronicle. First we give an account of Arthur Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics where truth of a formula is relative to a moment and a chronicle. We prove that this is equivalent to a version of a semantics put forward by Thomason and Gupta where truth is relative to a moment and (...) what is called a chronicle function which assigns a chronicle to each moment. Later we discuss how a semantic theory considered by Belnap and Green may be formalised. It comes about by assuming a chronicle function to be given once and for all. However, this semantics invalidates an intuitively valid formula, so we present an alternative semantics where the formula in question is valid. Furthermore, we shall exhibit an intuitively invalid formula which is invalid in our alternative semantics, but which is valid in Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics. So we can conclude that Prior’s Ockhamistic validity does not imply validity in the alternative semantics. On the other hand, the converse implication does hold, as we shall prove. Summary of mathematical results: We have proved that Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics has the same valid formulas as Thomason and Gupta’s semantics, and we have proved that Prior’s Ockhamistic semantics has strictly more valid formulas than the alternative semantics. (shrink)

The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly the same underlying logical structure. (...) We also consider the Sally-Anne task, having a more complicated logical structure, presupposing a “principle of inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time, unless there is belief to the contrary. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this endeavour. I argue, inter alia, that we should distinguish between the problem of accounting for the normativity of law, conceived as a necessary property of law, and the problem of accounting for the use of normative legal language on the part of legal actors; (...) that the debate about the normativity of law, which mainly concerns, is more or less identical to the debate between legal positivists and non-positivists; that one cannot account for the normativity of law, conceived along the lines of, within the framework of legal positivism, and that the question of the normativity of law considered within the framework of legal positivism is not an open question. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study (...) of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence . I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law . I proceed to argue that legal decision‐making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision‐making thus conceived . Having done that, I discuss law's normativity , the normative force of legal justification , and the relation between the former and the latter . I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz’ understanding of the question of law's normativity. (shrink)

The article looks critically at the Schmitt revival among radical leftists, how they try to insulate his work from his political conviction and make a problematic distinction between liberalism and democracy, which undercuts the specificity of modern democracy and plays into reactionary identity politics. I then turn to how Schmitt conceptualizes the political and argue that the structure of his argument is antithetic to modern democracy. Against those who hold that it is possible to use Schmitt against himself, I argue (...) that to adopt Schmitt for the purpose of strengthening liberal democracy runs into serious difficulties, because the whole set-up is geared to combat this regime form. Finally, I show that the political undermines right/left orientation because it is structured in terms of other orientational metaphors, which sustain a restrictive view on membership (in/out), unconditional loyalty to the state (up/down) and a strong sense of belonging and destiny (front/back). (shrink)

Dr Thrane makes an original contribution to one of the central topics in syntax and semantics: the nature and mechanisms of reference in natural language. He makes a fundamental distinction between syntactic analyses that are internal to the structure of a language and analyses of the referential properties that connect a language with the 'outside world' - and therefore derive in some sense from common human capacities for perceptual discrimination. Dr Thrane argues that the failure to make this distinction and (...) to attend separately to both kinds of analysis has vitiated previous general accounts of linguistic structure. The book focuses particularly on pronouns and on the role of determiners, quantifiers and other components of the noun phrase. Most of the data come from the modern Germanic languages, especially English, but Dr Thrane considers also the structural peculiarities of 'classifier languages' like Vietnamese. The book will be important for students of English language as well as for general linguists. (shrink)

reply to 'Project for a Scientific Film Theory' by Eric Parkinson.

Warren Buckland _The Cognitive Semiotics of Film_ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 ISBN: 0-521-78005-5 (hb) xi +174 pp.

Kelsen defends monism, that is, the view that international law and the various state legal systems taken together constitute a unified normative system, and the primacy of international law over state law within the monistic framework. He argues in support of the -claim that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, according to which cognition requires the unity of the object of cognition, that the norm conflicts that are said by the critics of monism to undermine monism are harmless (...) because they are not norm contradictions, but only norm contrarieties, and that the doctrine of dualism collapses into solipsism due to its dependence on the doctrine of recognition. And he argues in support of the -claim that the idea of the primacy of international law within the monistic framework is necessary to account for the existence of states that are legally coordinated and separated from one another in their spheres of validity. In this article, I discuss critically claims and and the arguments - that Kelsen adduces in support of these claims. I argue, more specifically, that while Kelsen is right that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, the claim is unpersuasive that norm contrarieties, as distinguished from norm contradictions, are harmless from the point of view of this postulate, and that in any case not all the norm conflicts identified by the critics of monism are norm contrarieties. I also argue that if the above-mentioned claim had been persuasive, the dualists, too, might have invoked it and avoided Kelsen’s criticism of dualism via the criticism of the doctrine of recognition, and that Kelsen’s claim is well founded that dualism collapses into solipsism because of the collapse of the doctrine of recognition. Finally, I suggest that contrary to what Kelsen appears to think, the epistemological postulate rules out locating law in a higher realm of norms and values that is sharply separated from the world of time and space. (shrink)

This book offers a critical appraisal of Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy. Based on Olivecrona's critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, the book argues that Olivecrona's legal philosophy is a unique contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. It shows how Olivecrona's philosophy can be used in the assessment of contemporary theories of law, such as those put (...) forward by Hart, Raz, Dworkin, and Alexy. In addition, the book argues that Olivecrona's various discussions of theories defended by key people in the history of legal and political philosophy are highly interesting contributions. They not only increase our understanding of the legal and political philosophy of previous generations, but also enhances our insight into legal-philosophical questions that remain with us today. (shrink)

Legal positivism is one of the fundamental theories of jurisprudence studied in law and related fields around the world. This volume addresses how legal positivism is perceived and makes the case for why it is relevant for contemporary legal theory. The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism offers thirty-three chapters from leading scholars that provide a comprehensive commentary on the fundamental ideas of legal positivism, its history and major theorists, its connection to normativity and values, its current development and influence, as (...) well as on the criticisms moved against it. (shrink)

The Scandinavian Realist Karl Olivecrona did not pay much attention to questions of legal reasoning in his many works. He did, however, argue that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explained, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. Olivecrona's line of argument is problematic, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term "evaluation" in a sense that is broad enough (...) to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide whether a case is false. (shrink)

The emergence of shared symbol systems is considered to be a pivotal moment in human evolution and human development. These changes are normally explained by reference to changes in people's internal cognitive processes. We present 2 experiments which provide evidence that changes in the external, collaborative processes that people use to communicate can also affect the structure and organization of symbol systems independently of cognitive change. We propose that mutual‐modifiability—opportunities for people to edit or manipulate each other's contributions—is a key (...) constraint on the emergence of complex symbol systems. We discuss the implications for models of language development and the origins of compositionality. (shrink)

I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and (...) the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy. (shrink)