The COVID-19 pandemic has witnessed an increase and amplification of anti-Asian racism and violence across the globe. Stop AAPI Hate1 in the United States and the COVID-19 Racism Incident Report2 i...

3. Han-Chung kŭnse chŏngch'i sasangsa pigyo.

P'ŭrollogŭ : t'ongil ŭi sahoe iron ŭrosŏ hana nolli -- 1. Huch'ŏn chŏngsin kaebyŏk kwa ch'ŏnjiin habil : hana nolli ŭi ironjŏk paegyŏng kwa chŏnmang -- 2. Hana nolli ŭi hyŏngsŏng : na ŭi ironsajŏk maengnak -- 3. Hana nolli ŭi kuch'uk : charyo, kach'i chŏnje, punsŏkt'ŭl -- 4. Hana nolli ŭi Tong Asiajŏk t'odae -- 5. Hana nolli ŭi ironjŏk t'ŭksŏng kwa chihyang -- 6. Munmyŏng chŏnhwan ŭi kil : huch'ŏn chŏngsin kaebyŏk ŭl nŭkkyŏ poja -- Ep'illogŭ : (...) kurŭm yori wa sinsŏn norŭm. (shrink)

Past interpretations of the debate between Confucian meritocrats and Confucian democrats tend to center around abstract discussions of meritocratic versus democratic values. Yet, given the difficulties involved in settling on a common definition of “democracy” or “meritocracy,” such abstract discussions often end up talking past each other. In this article, I seek to offer a more precise framing of the debate by surveying the preferred institutional arrangement of one Confucian democrat, Sungmoon Kim, and that of two Confucian meritocrats, Daniel Bell (...) and Tongdong Bai. What I find is that contrary to the claim made by Kim’s theory of pragmatic Confucian democracy, the electoral representative government he favors does not enjoy a legitimacy premium over the kind of hybrid regime envisioned by Bell or Bai under pluralistic societal circumstances. I further demonstrate that it is also difficult for Confucian democrats to justify electoral representative government through either the Confucian ideal of political relationship marked by the public’s willing endorsement of their rulers, or a notion of political equality reconstructed from Mencius’s inclusionary ideal of sagehood. (shrink)

"No human now gathers for himself or herself the essential resources for life: food, shelter, clothing, and the like. Humans are obligate co-operator, and this has been true for tens of thousands of years; probably much longer. In this regard, humans are very unusual. Cooperation outside the family is rare: though it can be very profitable, it is also very risky, as cooperation makes an agent vulnerable to incompetence and cheating. This book presents a new picture of the emergence of (...) cooperation in our lineage, developing through four fairly distinct phases from a baseline that was probably fairly similar to living great apes, who cooperate, but in fairly minimal ways. As adults, they rarely depend on others when the outcome really matters. This book suggests that cooperation began to be more important for humans through an initial phase of cooperative foraging generating immediate returns from collective action in small mobile bands. This established in our lineage about 1.8 million years ago, perhaps earlier. Over the rest of the Pleistocene, cooperation became more extended in its social scale, with forms of cooperation between bands gradually establishing, and in spatial and temporal scale too, with various forms of reciprocation becoming important. The final phase was the emergence of cooperation in large scale, hierarchical societies in the Holocene, beginning about 12,000 years ago. This picture is nested in a reading of the archaeological and ethnographic record, and twinned to an account of the gradual elaboration of cultural learning in our lineage, making cooperation both more profitable and more stable"--. (shrink)

Businesses increasingly rely on algorithms that are data-trained sets of decision rules (i.e., the output of the processes often called “machine learning”) and implement decisions with little or no human intermediation. In this article, we provide a philosophical foundation for the claim that algorithmic decision-making gives rise to a “right to explanation.” It is often said that, in the digital era, informed consent is dead. This negative view originates from a rigid understanding that presumes informed consent is a static and (...) complete transaction. Such a view is insufficient, especially when data are used in a secondary, noncontextual, and unpredictable manner—which is the inescapable nature of advanced artificial intelligence systems. We submit that an alternative view of informed consent—as an assurance of trust for incomplete transactions—allows for an understanding of why the rationale of informed consent already entails a right to ex post explanation. (shrink)

In this article I develop a big picture of the evolution of human cooperation, and contrast it to an alternative based on group selection. The crucial claim is that hominin history has seen two major transitions in cooperation, and hence poses two deep puzzles about the origins and stability of cooperation. The first is the transition from great ape social lives to the lives of Pleistocene cooperative foragers; the second is the stability of the social contract through the early Holocene (...) transition to complex hierarchical societies. The first of these transitions is driven, at least initially, by individual advantage: cooperation paid off for individual foragers, initially through mutualist interaction, then through reciprocation. This argument leads to a reanalysis of the role of violence and the nature of the freeriding threat to cooperation. But the conditions that select for cooperative individuals in the Pleistocene were eroded in the Pleistocene–Holocene transition. So we need an alternative account of the survival, and indeed the expansion, of cooperation in the Holocene. Group selection driven by intercommunal conflict really may well be central to this second transition. (shrink)

In the past two decades, scholars in China and beyond have vigorously demonstrated that the just war discourse is integral to classical Confucianism and that the classical Confucian idea of “punitive expedition” can be best understood in terms of humanitarian intervention. The sceptics, however, claim that in describing the ancient sage‐king's bloodless punitive expeditions, what classical Confucians really had in mind was not so much to endorse morally justified forms of aggressive war but to highlight the paramount importance of the (...) ruler's moral self‐cultivation and benevolent government. This paper examines closely the disagreement between the two positions and offers a more historically grounded justification for the just war interpretation of classical Confucianism. It pays special attention to the importance of ritual order in classical Confucian political theory and discusses how the Warring States political circumstances led thinkers such as Mencius and Xunzi to shift their attention from ritual order to the well‐being of the people. (shrink)

The concept of “unlearning” has been positively endorsed in both self-help literature and organizational research, but has yet to be discussed in the study of religions. Is there room for it in the conceptual space of religious socialization, pedagogy and spiritual seeking? Where does it occur in the spiritual journey, and what is its purpose? From the perspective of social learning, and drawing on a definition and model from organizational studies, the case for “unlearning” is considered with reference to those (...) leaving religion. Addressing research gaps identified by organizational-studies scholars, I consider how leavers experience the process of freeing themselves from previously held beliefs, practices and commitments. What is revealed is an iterative and emotionally fraught process in which even voluntary religious leavers struggle to move on, often feeling powerless, even coerced by others. Whilst there is a broad fit between the basic process model of unlearning and what leavers experience, that is not the full story. Furthermore, questions remain about whether “unlearning” is a necessary or suitable concept, not least because it is rarely used by scholars of religion or practitioners themselves, all of whom prefer other terms. (shrink)

Surprisingly little is known about what ancient Confucian thinkers struggled with in their own social and political contexts and how these struggles contributed to the establishment and further development of classical Confucian political theory. Leading scholar of comparative political theory, Sungmoon Kim offers a systematic philosophical account of the political theories of Mencius and Xunzi, investigating both their agreements and disagreements as the champions of the Confucian Way against the backdrop of the prevailing realpolitik of the late Warring States period. (...) Together, they contributed to the formation of Confucian virtue politics, in which concerns about political order and stability and concerns about moral character and moral enhancement are deeply intertwined. By presenting their political philosophies in terms of constitutionalism, Kim shows how they each developed the ability to authorize the ruler's legitimate use of power in domestic and interstate politics in ways consistent with their distinctive accounts of human nature. (shrink)

Attention can be oriented in space covertly without the need of eye movements. We used multivariate pattern classification analyses (MVPA) to investigate whether the time course of the deployment of covert spatial attention leading up to the observer’s perceptual decision can be decoded from both EEG alpha power and raw activity traces. Decoding attention from these signals can help determine whether raw EEG signals and alpha power reflect the same or distinct features of attentional selection. Using a classical cueing task, (...) we showed that the orientation of covert spatial attention can be decoded by both signals. However, raw activity and alpha power may reflect different features of spatial attention, with alpha power more associated with the orientation of covert attention in space and raw activity with the influence of attention on perceptual processes. (shrink)