The paper deals with a generalization of the notion of partition for wider classes of binary relations than equivalences: for quasiorders and tolerance relations. The counterpart of partition for the quasiorders is based on a generalization of the notion of equivalence class while it is shown that such a generalization does not work in case of tolerances. Some results from [5] are proved in a much more simple way. The third kind of “partition” corresponding to tolerances, not occurring in (...) [5], is introduced. (shrink)

This study analyses the attitudes of university students towards unethical behaviour in the individual and organisational environments, and relates these attitudes to tolerance of corruption in their future professional lives. The results show a positive relationship between attitudes towards unethical behaviour in both environments, as well as tolerance towards acts of corruption, based on a virtual perception survey. Despite the general rejection attitude by students of such behaviour and acts, the rejection diminishes as their degree programme progresses. This (...) study contributes to our understanding of the tolerance of university students towards corruption, and to revealing how this attitude could explain tolerance towards this phenomenon in their future professional lives. (shrink)

I outline what I call a relational account of toleration. This relational account helps explain the apparent paradox of toleration in that it involves two competing moral stances, of acceptance and disapproval, towards the tolerated. It also helps clarify the way toleration is a normative ideal, and not a position one is forced into out of the practical need to accommodate or accept. Specifically, toleration is recommended out of respect for that which the tolerant agent also disapproves of. This combination (...) of respect entangled with disapproval results from two different evaluative perspectives of the tolerant agent. The relational account explains how an agent can hold these competing evaluative perspectives. I also discuss the proper scope of state toleration under this relational account. (shrink)

In this article we examine Kant’s understanding of toleration by including a study of all instances in which he directly uses the language of toleration and related concepts. We use this study to resolve several key areas of interpretative dispute concerning Kant’s views on toleration. We argue that Kant offers a nuanced and largely unappreciated approach to thinking about toleration, and related concepts, across three normative spheres: the political, the interpersonal and the personal. We examine shortcomings in earlier interpretations and (...) conclude by arguing that the theme of toleration in Kant’s work, while coherent and important, is neither as central nor as peripheral as suggested by previous interpretations. Further, while Kant is critical of the arrogance of toleration in the political sphere, he is more positive toward the role of toleration in the interpersonal and personal spheres since it promotes virtue. (shrink)

A sample of college women and men responded to a survey assessing attitudes, beliefs, experiences, and behaviors relevant to sexual harassment and assault. Men were more tolerant of sexual harassment, more likely to believe that heterosexual relationships were adversarial, more likely to subscribe to rape myths, and more likely to admit that they might sexually assault someone under some circumstances. Data from the present study support the proposition that relevant affective, cognitive, and behavioral indices of hostile sexuality directed against women (...) are linked, supporting the assumption of a continuum of misogyny. Significant positive correlations were predicted and found among men's self-reported tolerance for sexual harassment, adversarial sexual beliefs, rape-myth acceptance, likelihood to rape, and experience as a sexual victimizer. Among women, belief and attitude measures were positively correlated but, as predicted, experience of sexual victimization was not reliably related to any other measure, supporting the conclusion that personal characteristics are not relevant to college women's sexual victimization. (shrink)

This article presents a general overview of the contacts between Polish Socinians and Dutch Remonstrants during the seventeenth century. Many contemporaries regarded Socinianism and Remonstrantism as similar or related confessions and some worked to forge ties between them. At the same time however the Remonstrant leadership opposed such moves for fear that they would confirm a link that was already being exploited by the Remonstrants’ opponents to smear their reputation. In the circumstances the Remonstrants as a group saw no alternative (...) than to copy the widely prevailing intolerant attitude towards Socinianism. By the mid-seventeenth century fears of an influx of Socinian immigrants and ideas led to calls for measures against Socinian immigration and actual ban on Socinian printing in the Dutch Republic. Nevertheless some immigration took place and Amsterdam and Rotterdam became important centres of Socinian printing for some time. (shrink)

The ‘agents’ of toleration can be divided into three categories: public institutions, groups and individuals. If it is mostly accepted that both public institutions and individuals are capable of toleration, it is not clear that such a capacity can be attributed to groups, although in daily discourse we seem ready to say that a certain social group is (in)tolerant. This article aims to address this issue by investigating the relationship between collective agency and social groups. Formal groups (e.g. corporations) have (...) internal rules and collectively recognized decision-making procedures that constitute a collective behaviour. However, it is not clear if and in what sense such a capacity is also upheld by informal groups. This article discusses some competing criteria to define informal groups and proposes the shared convictions criterion. In conclusion, this criterion is applied to toleration-related issues, so as to reconcile our ordinary understanding of groups’ toleration with a more technical analysis. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Peter Balint’s recent account of the value of toleration as an instrument for securing freedom-maximising outcomes in pluralistic societies. In particular, I question the extent to which the ideal of toleration can be entirely reduced to someone’s intentional withholding of negative interference whose value lies in the protection of individual negative freedoms. I argue that couching the value of toleration entirely in these freedom-maximising terms fails to do justice to the relational value of (...) toleration. To see this value, we must also have in sight the drastic changes that appeals to toleration make to the nature of what goes on between the tolerator and the tolerated, not only to the state of affairs that is created by their relation. (shrink)

This book traces the growth of philosophical justifications of toleration. The contributors discuss the grounds on which we may be required to be tolerant and the proper limits of toleration. They consider the historical and conceptual relation between toleration and scepticism and ask whether toleration is justified by considerations of autonomy or of prudence. The papers cover a range of perspectives on the subject, including Marxist and Socialist as well as liberal views. The editor's introduction prepares the ground by (...) discussing the essential features of the subject and offers a lucid survey of the theories and arguments put forward in the book. The collection arises out of the Morrell Toleration Project at the University of York and all the papers were written as contributions to that project. The discussion will be of interest to specialists in philosophy, in political and social theory and in intellectual history. (shrink)

The problem of religious tolerance is of supreme importance in the contemporary world. Just as, a few centuries ago, many wars were provoked by religious motifs, so today clashes on religious grounds provoke military conflicts that have long overgrown the walls of churches and mosques and keep growing in spite of the sacred traditions of the religions themselves. Orientation to love fails to work, and the ìneighborî becomes an enemy if he does not confess the same religion. Where shall (...) we search for the reason behind religious hostility? What is the history of intolerance? Who was the first to throw the stone that shook the foundations of peaceful coexistence of particular families and whole states? We propose to turn to the following themes: 1. World religions and relations between them (on the question of Christian- Judeo-Islamic dialogue) 2. Relations inside world religions (on the example of Christian confessions) 3. Interrelations between world religions and new religious movements. (shrink)

Selon une certaine tradition phénoménologique (Levinas, Marion, et Sartre en particulier), la relation sociale soumise à la convenance de la civilité et de la mondanité est considérée comme intrinsèquement intolérante par rapport à une expérience plus bouleversante et authentique de l’altérité. « Nous avons affaire à des êtres habillés », comme l’écrit Emmanuel Levinas dans De l’existence à l’existant (1947). Selon Levinas et Marion, la civilité et la mondanité reconduiraient phénoménologiquement le primat de l’individualisme et nous condamneraient à une (...) intolérance transcendantale (contrairement au mouvement de la « charité » selon Marion, dont la phénoménologie prolonge à cet égard la distance pascalienne entre civilité et charité). Ce texte a pour objet de montrer, en s’appuyant sur une réinterprétation phénoménologique de certaines dimensions de la civilité humaniste (telle qu’elle se déploie notamment dans l’œuvre de Baldassar Castiglione, Le Livre du courtisan ), qu’une autre phénoménologie de la civilité et de la mondanité est possible. Cette autre phénoménologie a pour objet de dépasser l’alternative entre une expérience « non-civile » de l’altérité (qui tend par ailleurs à prendre une forme théologique étrangère au champ de la civilité traditionnellement fondé sur une relation d’égalité) et un enfermement allergique dans la solitude du moi. Selon cette perspective, la mondanité n’est pas conçue comme une conjuration de l’altérité ou de l’extériorité matérielle, mais comme une dimension de l’existence et de la phénoménalité qui intègre le rapport à la transcendance et le dessaisissement de la subjectivité. (shrink)

The problem of tolerance is analyzed against the background of the acute challenges of today and transformation of humanities from antiquity to postmodernism. Tolerance-related definitions arose in philosophy are examined retrospectively: patience, tolerance, respect, trust, harmony in diversity. The methodological significance of the integrative interdisciplinary prism in consideration of the phenomenon of tolerance is shown. Three leading sociocultural and communicative strategies of tolerance in social agreements have been identified: tolerant internal dialogue, tolerant communication with the (...) world, tolerant interpersonal communication. The limits of tolerance are outlined, beyond which it becomes quasi-tolerance, because behind the simulacrum of tolerance hides indifference, conformism of communicators, or sprouts of intolerance, aggression, mobbing. With the help of sociological and synergetic theories the idea of balance of tolerance in psychological, mental and spiritual, physical aspects of human existence is defended. Autotolerance is due to human self-knowledge, sound self-esteem, developed mental and emotional quotient, and under such conditions it strategically determines a tolerant dialogue with the world, a constructive worldview. In turn, it needs critical thinking and an ecological attitude to information, especially in the context of media manipulation and phubbing. The simulacrum of modern pop literature on positive thinking is outlined, in contrast to which the life-creating potential of practical philosophy is revealed, which contributes to creation of socio-cultural and communicative communities. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate a semantics for first-order logic originally proposed by R. van Rooij to account for the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, that is, for the principle that if x is P, then y should be P whenever y is similar enough to x. The semantics, which makes use of indifference relations to model similarity, rests on the interaction of three notions of truth: the classical notion, and two dual notions simultaneously defined in terms of it, (...) which we call tolerant truth and strict truth. We characterize the space of consequence relations definable in terms of those and discuss the kind of solution this gives to the sorites paradox. We discuss some applications of the framework to the pragmatics and psycholinguistics of vague predicates, in particular regarding judgments about borderline cases. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Fault Lines of Toleration in the Context of Education Toleration and Mutual Respect Toleration and an Autonomy Facilitating Education Appreciation Instead of Non‐Bigoted Acceptance Restrained Manifestation Limited Associational Liberty Implications Conclusion Notes References.

The principle of tolerance characteristic of vague predicates is sometimes presented as a soft rule, namely as a default which we can use in ordinary reasoning, but which requires care in order to avoid paradoxes. We focus on two ways in which the tolerance principle can be modeled in that spirit, using special consequence relations. The first approach relates tolerant reasoning to nontransitive reasoning; the second relates tolerant reasoning to nonmonotonic reasoning. We compare the two approaches and examine (...) three specific consequence relations in relation to those, which we call: strict-to-tolerant entailment, pragmatic-to-tolerant entailment, and pragmatic-to-pragmatic entailment. The first two are nontransitive, whereas the latter two are nonmonotonic. (shrink)

Examines the meaning of tolerance, its importance in modern society, and the kinds of intolerance or prejudice that may prevent people from respecting differences in others.

We expand first order models with a tolerance relation on thedomain. Intuitively, two elements stand in this relation if they arecognitively close for the agent who holds the model. This simplenotion turns out to be very powerful. It leads to a semanticcharacterization of the guarded fragment of Andréka, van Benthemand Németi, and highlights the strong analogies between modallogic and this fragment. Viewing the resulting logic – tolerance logic– dynamically it is a resource-conscious information processingalternative to classical (...) first order logic. The differences areindicated by several examples. (shrink)

Our aim is to overview and discuss some of the most popular approaches to the notion of a tolerance relation in algebraic structures with the special emphasis on lattices.

Toleration is becoming an increasingly questioned issue in modern democratic and multicultural societies and is debated within the academic disciplines of politics, history and cultural and literary studies. In this book Glen Newey systematically analyses toleration in relation to broader issues in meta-ethical theory and offers a new, rigorous philosophical theory of toleration as a virtue. A wide range of questions in ethical theory is addressed, including ethical responsibility, character and virtue, the nature of reasons for action, the acts/omissions (...) doctrine, and the nature of normativity itself. This analysis offers a new understanding of the limits of moral theory, and reveals problems with understanding toleration philosophically and with implementing it politically. As a unique contribution to the toleration debate, this book will be of importance to all those with an interest in political theory, philosophy and ethics.* An original and highly sophisticated analysis of toleration* Unique in applying toleration to meta-ethical theory* Covers a broad range of questions in ethical theory* Toleration is a key issue in political theory and also outside the academy - issues of censorship and political correctness, etc. remain strongly to the fore. (shrink)

Existing explanations of political intolerance and partisanship highlight how individuals’ ideological commitments and the homogeneity of their political environments foster intolerance toward other political groups. This article argues that cultural, interactional conditions play a crucial role in how personal and environmental factors work – or do not work – in local groups. Based on a four-year ethnographic study and 12 focus group discussions with two culturally distinct civic associations of American libertarians, I show how groups’ varying patterns of interaction, or (...) “styles,” establish distinct cultural settings, in which different attitudes and behaviors seem sensible and appropriate, particularly regarding other political groups. Thus, when libertarian groups established a “community style” of interaction, viewing the relationship among members in terms of friendship and community bonds, they also opened their social activities to non-libertarians, collaborated with them in political projects, and viewed politics as a matter of advancing shared interests with people from other political groups. Comparisons across and within field sites show how this relationship between style and political tolerance works in different libertarian groups and different social environments. These findings highlight the role of local factors in explaining variations in groups’ levels of political tolerance and present a key mechanism—centered on interaction patterns—to supplement existing analyses of the relationship between political intolerance and changing forms of civic organizing in the US. (shrink)

Concepts and experimental results taken frombehavioral pharmacology, functional brain imaging,brain physiology, and behavioral neuroscience, wereused to develop the hypothesis that behavioraltolerance can, in part, be attributed to cellulartolerance. It is argued that task specific activationof circumscribed neuronal populations gives rise tocorresponding increases in regional cerebral bloodflow such that neurons related to task performance areexposed to higher effective doses of blood-borne drugthan neuronal groups not highly activated by thebehavioral task. Through this cerebral hemodynamicregulatory mechanism cellular tolerance phenomena canat least partially (...) account for behavioral tolerance(i.e., tolerance conferred through drugged practice). (shrink)

Tolerance is an aspect of the balance between power and freedom. This contribution starts from a decision taken by the general synod of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, in 1914, on the issue of church members who did not recognise infant baptism. The synod decided that – on certain conditions – ‘tolerance can be practiced’ towards such members. This contribution analyses and evaluates this decision, with particular attention for the distinction made between fundamental and non-fundamental faith issues. (...) It shows how this decision is related to the broader context of early twentieth century political life in the Netherlands, and it concludes with some thoughts on the costliness of true tolerance. (shrink)

Toleration has a rich tradition in Western political philosophy. It is, after all, one of the defining topics of political philosophy—historically pivotal in the development of modern liberalism, prominent in the writings of such canonical figures as John Locke and John Stuart Mill, and central to our understanding of the idea of a society in which individuals have the right to live their own lives by their own values, left alone by the state so long as they respect the similar (...) interests of others. -/- Toleration and Its Limits, the latest addition to the NOMOS series, explores the philosophical nuances of the concept of toleration and its scope in contemporary liberal democratic societies. Editors Melissa S. Williams and Jeremy Waldron carefully compiled essays that address the tradition's key historical figures; its role in the development and evolution of Western political theory; its relation to morality, liberalism, and identity; and its limits and dangers. -/- Contributors: Lawrence A. Alexander, Kathryn Abrams, Wendy Brown, Ingrid Creppell, Noah Feldman, Rainer Forst, David Heyd, Glyn Morgan, Glen Newey, Michael A. Rosenthal, Andrew Sabl, Steven D. Smith, and Alex Tuckness. (shrink)

Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, (...) provided that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi-dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect-based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

Recognition and toleration are ways of relating to the diversity characteristic of multicultural societies. The article concerns the possible meanings of toleration and recognition, and the conflict that is often claimed to exist between these two approaches to diversity. Different forms or interpretations of recognition and toleration are considered, confusing and problematic uses of the terms are noted, and the compatibility of toleration and recognition is discussed. The article argues that there is a range of legitimate and importantly different conceptions (...) of both toleration and recognition that are often not clearly distinguished, and that compatibility varies across this range and depending on what one considers the conceptions in relation to. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a critical map of toleration as it is displayed in contemporary democracy. It does so by presenting three conceptions of toleration to which current practices of toleration can be traced, and, precisely, these are the standard notion, the political conception based on the neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition. The author argues that the latter is the appropriate conception to address the politically relevant issues of toleration arising in pluralistic democracy, while the first is adequate (...) only for social relations. In order to illustrate this argument, she presents a case of a contested and never solved request for a place of worship by the Muslims of Vercelli which represents an example of a very restricted and minimal interpretation of the standard notion, labeled ‘disrespectful tolerance’. The case is meant to show that unacceptable forms of toleration are still practised, and that the standard notion, here interpreted in the most minimal and negative way, is inappropriate for democratic politics. (shrink)

Tolerance has its arguments, both in morality and in law. It also has its sources, not only in the sense of the origins from which it springs, but also in the sense of that which actuates it and gives it life, that which encourages it and sanctions it - profoundly. Religions take part of these sources, but also take part of this reflexive aspect of ethics that puts into play the final legitimation, the ultimate justification of the norms of (...) our public and private actions. It is with respect to this recourse to the ultimate that religion and ethics intersect without becoming one. Yet it is also in this recourse to the ultimate that one and the other greatly face the danger of temptation. This is particularly the case with religion. It is indeed not enough to simply say that it is the political use of religion that is to blame, and not religion as such, in the long and unfinished history of religious intolerance. We must trace the source of the temptation of intolerance to the very heart of the certainty of religious faith. Any belief, as soon as it defines itself in relation - a relation of any kind, whether of distance or proximity, of alterity or fusion - to an absolute, must be on guard against its own penchant for intolerance. It is not enough, in an opposite sense of the preceding warning, to rely on the critical resources borrowed from sources outside of religion: it is at that same heart of certainty of all religious faith that we must seek the reason for the conviction that it is unjust to look to impose on adherents of other religions, on agnostics and atheists, the truth as it is admitted in good faith by the community of believers of one or another religious confession. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is a comprehensive analysis of basic reasoning patterns that are characteristic of vague predicates. The analysis leads to rigorous reconstructions of the phenomena within formal systems. Two basic features are dealt with. One is tolerance: the insensitivity of predicates to small changes in the objects of predication (a one-increment of a walking distance is a walking distance). The other is the existence of borderline cases. The paper shows why these should be treated as different, (...) though related phenomena. Tolerance is formally reconstructed within a proposed framework of contextual logic, leading to a solution of the Sorites paradox. Borderline-vagueness is reconstructed using certain modality operators; the set-up provides an analysis of higher order vagueness and a derivation of scales of degrees for the property in question. (shrink)

This article reviews and comments on the five categories of arguments used to defend zero tolerance with regard to sexual contacts resulting from the physician-patient relationship as summarised by Cullen. In addition it puts forward a hypothesis—“fear of loss by third party”—as a psychological explanation for the collective insistence on a zero tolerance policy.

Toleration and respect are types of relations between different agents. The standard analyses of toleration and respect are attitudinal; toleration and respect require subjects to have appropriate types of attitudes towards the objects of toleration or respect. The paper investigates whether states can sensibly be described as tolerant or respectful in ways theoretically relevantly similar to the standard analyses. This is a descriptive question about the applicability of concepts rather than a normative question about whether, when and why states should (...) be tolerant or respectful. The problem of institutional application is that institutions in general and the state in particular arguably cannot have attitudes of the required kind. This problem is distinct from, and broader than, well‐known problems about whether political toleration is normatively legitimate. To make sense of political toleration or respect, the paper proposes that the analysis of institutional toleration and respect should not be solely agent‐centred (as in attitudinal analyses) or patient‐centred (as in explanations of the good of toleration or respect in terms of the effects of being tolerated or respected). The analysis should also include features about the relation itself. We can describe institutions as tolerant or respectful in a sense relevantly similar to the standard analyses if we focus on the public features of the relation between institutions and citizens or groups, without ascribing attitudes in the problematic sense. (shrink)

This paper deals with the principle of tolerance in our contemporary society in the attempt to highlight limits and paradoxes in the various aspects of minority issues. From this point of view, the first part of the paper discusses Kymlicka’s contribution to multiculturalism with regard to national minorities and immigrant communities, while the second part confronts his Theory of Minority Rights with Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and circle of humanity. Therefore, this paper aims at shifting the discourse over (...) tolerance-related minority issues from a top-down approach toward an analysis of how tolerance is allowed to be performed. Thus, Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis is employed to disentangle moral and cultural set of values and norms within which both principle of tolerance and performativity of toleration are established and, in parallel, to reflect on reasons why others are not allowed to be performed. (shrink)

In a previous paper (see ‘Tolerant, Classical, Strict’, henceforth TCS) we investigated a semantic framework to deal with the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, namely that small changes do not affect the applicability of a vague predicate even if large changes do. Our approach there rests on two main ideas. First, given a classical extension of a predicate, we can define a strict and a tolerant extension depending on an indifference relation associated to that predicate. Second, we can (...) use these notions of satisfaction to define mixed consequence relations that capture non-transitive tolerant reasoning. Although we gave some empirical motivation for the use of strict and tolerant extensions, making use of them commits us to the view that sentences of the form ‘ p∨¬p ’ and ‘ p∧¬p ’ are not automatically valid or unsatisfiable, respectively. Some philosophers might take this commitment as a negative outcome of our previous proposal. We think, however, that the general ideas underlying our previous approach to vagueness can be implemented in a variety of ways. This paper explores the possibility of defining mixed notions of consequence in the more classical super/sub-valuationist setting and examines to what extent any of these notions captures non-transitive tolerant reasoning. (shrink)

This essay argues that the inherent value of Indigenous African Religions, which ensures that the belief in different gods does not eclipse the fact of common humanity might be of importance to contemporary Africa plagued by ceaseless conflicts. The IAR ideology contrasts, for example, with that of Christianity which views the Christian God as the one true God and regards those who worship a different God as pagans and gentiles. It also contrasts with the ideology of Islam, which views Allah (...) as the one true God and regards those who worship different God as infidels. The essay claims that social orientation in contemporary Africa is mostly influenced by the divisive ideologies of these two foreign religions that have come to dominate. These divisive ideologies are to a large extent, indirectly responsible for some of the violent conflicts on the continent. This divisive religious orientation bifurcates humanity into in and out-groups that are extended to the social sphere where people from different religious, ethnic and linguistic groups are treated as outsiders and are made targets for attacks like in South Africa and Nigeria today. Further, if we interpret such violent conflicts as evil and consider its source in light of the perennial problem of evil, what would be our response? Using the conversational method, the essay argues that both good and evil are part of the universe, and that if we want more good, then a change from a divisive to a complementary orientation based on the relational values of the IARs is imperative. (shrink)

The idea of toleration (or tolerance—the terms are mostly used interchangeably) plays a paramount role in liberal theorizing with regard to the normative characterization of the relations between the state and citizens and between majority and minority groups in society. Toleration occurs when an agent A refrains from interfering negatively with an agent B’s practice x or belief y despite A’s opposition to B’s x-ing or y-ing, although A thinks herself to be in the position of interfering. So, the (...) notion of toleration necessarily incorporates the three following elements: (1) negative judgment—whether grounded in moral disapproval or “mere” dislike; (2) power to interfere—whether actual, perceived, or counterfactual; (3) reasons for noninterference—whether epistemological (fallibilism, skepticism), practical (balance of forces), or moral (value commitments). Is the forbearance of what one finds objectionable a strong enough normative ideal when it comes to establishing what we owe to each other in circumstances of moral disagreement? Does the request that we (possibly grudgingly) put up with someone’s objectionable lifestyle and convictions render toleration a condescending concession rather than the consequence of the recognition of everyone’s equal rights? In response, some have argued that we should interpret demands of toleration not as mere claims for noninterference but for the public recognition of the equal legitimacy of someone’s lifestyles and convictions (toleration as recognition). A recent line of debate concerns the kinds of relation that the ideal of toleration is apt to inform: is toleration primarily a political ideal qualifying the way in which liberal institutions should treat those who live under them or should toleration be invoked also to characterize horizontal relations between citizens? Whatever response is given to this question, limits to toleration must be established. As toleration is required of us vis-à-vis what we find objectionable, does it entail relativism? Liberals tend to think that reference to the harm principle should work as a limit for toleration: but what does count as a relevant (physical or symbolic) harm? Such questions acquire importance as the domain of toleration extends from the realm of religious conflicts, out of which it originated in the 16th and 17th centuries, to include a number of culture and ethics-related issues: should a liberal state permit pornography? What is the appropriate response to such cultural practices as female circumcision? Should neutral institutions prohibit the exhibition of religious symbols in public spaces? (shrink)

The article analyzes the results of an author's survey among students from UNSS, Sofia and the University of Economics – Varna about the opinions, attitudes and perceptions of tolerance in the context of basic democratic values. The authors seek verification of three main hypotheses: (1) a high degree of tolerance among students regarding differences related to ethnicity, religion, race, political preferences, sexual orientation, regardless of their gender and university where they study; (2) supporting tolerance as a core (...) democratic value, along with freedom, equality, and justice, and (3) understanding tolerance is tied to the content students put into the other three values – freedom, equality, and justice. The results related to the understanding of tolerance, freedom, justice, equality are subject to interpretation; the self-assessment of tolerance; the assessment of the importance of tolerance in democracy. (shrink)

In this research, I tried to collect and study Qur’anic verses related to the topic of tolerance temper in the prophets’ calling to their people, through the calling of the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him peace, to his people. At the end of the research, it concluded with results, the most prominent of which were: that the Holy Qur’an is the constitution of morals and etiquettes, and it includes sublime etiquettes and refined morals, and that (...) the Prophet, may God bless him, was the most prominent worker of divine directives, especially with regard to tolerance temper with his people when calling them to Islam. The research also ended with a recommendation to conduct specialized studies on tolerance temper among the prophets in the rest of the Qur’anic surahs. (shrink)

This thesis analyzes from a philosophical perspective different models for nonmonotonic inference, belief revision and the handling of inconsistencies. ;The first chapter serves as an introduction to the subject, giving examples and analyzing the main concepts. As a result of these discussions, this thesis tries to: produce a refined map of the main notions related to this subject, maintain that there can be a fault tolerant logic that stands in support of fault tolerant reasoning, and defend the use of deductive (...) databases as models for changes of belief. ;The second chapter explores monotonic proposals to deal with uncertain reasoning. These include logics based on a classical notion of consequence, interpretations of defeasible reasoning as containing implicit premises, and systems in which temporal change is an integral part of the representation of states of affairs, via temporal indices or more elaborate devices. ;The third chapter explores quantitative approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning like dispositional logic, and theories of probabilistic reasoning including Bayesian, certainty factors, and Dempster-Shafer. ;The fourth chapter explores qualitative approaches. Here we mention conditional, default, and nonmonotonic logics, and the circumscription and autoepistemic formalisms. ;The fifth chapter studies different proposals to deal with contradictions. It starts with a review of the types of belief inconsistencies, and then it presents mechanisms to prevent, control or correct them. I explore paraconsistent logics, specially relevance logics, to "bracket" the area of conflict and allow inferences about non-related topics to continue unaffected. Then I examine different methods to get rid of the inconsistencies, including the use of dependency-directed backtracking and of relevance logic. ;Finally, I present my conclusions, and mention some of the open problems. (shrink)

In explaining the reasons for sustained existence of tolerance in Indian philosophical mind and continuation of tolerant practices in socio-political life, Amartya Sen argues that tolerance is inherently a social enterprise, which may appear as contingent, but for all intents and purposes is persistent. Basing his thesis that is opposed to Cartesian dualism, which makes a distinction between mind and body, Sen submits that Indian system of universalizing perception finds a subtle form of connection between mind and body. (...) He expands the ancient core worldview, Vasundhara kutumbakam as a secular tolerant civil code,1which makes a connection between the transcendental and the pragmatic planes of consciousness, and reconstructs a thesis about tolerance around human consciousness, which is collectivized and anchored in an acknowledged public space in society that is joined together psychologically as well as philosophically. Tolerance as consciousness can be regarded a necessary condition for playing the role of intentionality as stipulated by classical philosophy. Aware of this ancient wisdom that accepts relativism as an impasse over some evaluative matter, Sen avoids the pitfalls of cultural relativism in tolerance by offering an argument that is based on the metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta and other religious and secular literature, and epitomizes an internationalizing virtue in tolerant traditions. I would examine some interconnected issues, such as the ethical “perimeter” of Sen’s philosophical observation of totalized value system and Indian tolerant attitudes in real life, etc., raising the broader question about the location of cultural identity in relation to supranational state organization. My chief argument is that Sen has been able to observe a connection between the Advaita Vedantic moral philosophy that informs that viewed from the Brahmanic perspective of absolute knowledge in unity, the apparent subject of duality is not the ultimate subject. My conclusion is that valuing of tolerance, individual liberty as well as civil rights is a particular contribution of Western thinking and philosophy; the Western advocates of these rights often provide ammunition to the non-Western critics of tolerance and human rights. (shrink)

John Horton’s work has been particularly influential in debates on specific topics related to toleration, political obligation, modus vivendi and political realism. More recently, he has synthesised these views in the form of a distinctive position in political philosophy, a position that has the potential to question much of the received wisdom in the field. The papers of this special issue engage with some of the most fundamental issues of Horton’s account, more exactly, the related issues of toleration and modus (...) vivendi, Horton’s account of associative obligations, with a focus on the methodological assumptions which underpin his position more generally, and the metaphysical presuppositions of his account, in particular, the presupposition of contingency. I offer brief presentations of the papers in the special issue and of the ways they link with each other. In the discussion of the papers by Forst, Newey, Jones, Weale and Mendus, the emphasis will be on those arguments which question Horton’s position. Horton’s paper will then be presented with a focus on possible responses to these challenges. I will conclude with several remarks on an unexpected continuity between Horton’s realist view and a view realists usually criticise as idealising, namely, John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. (shrink)

In this research, I tried to collect and study Qur’anic verses related to the topic of tolerance temper in the prophets’ calling to their people, through the calling of the Prophet Ibrahim, may God bless him and grant him peace, to his people. At the end of the research, it concluded with results, the most prominent of which were: that the Holy Qur’an is the constitution of morals and etiquettes, and it includes sublime etiquettes and refined morals, and that (...) the Prophet Ibrahim, may God bless him, was the most prominent worker of divine directives, especially with regard to tolerance temper with his people when calling them to Islam. The research also ended with a recommendation to conduct specialized studies on tolerance temper among the prophets in the rest of the Qur’anic surahs. (shrink)

Doubts have been expressed about the virtue of toleration, especially in view of what some have seen as its complicity with a morality of anything goes. More rigorous arguments have been provided by Peter Gardner and Harvey Siegel against the relativism evident in certain versions of multiculturalism and in the new religious studies. This article examines their arguments. While it recognises the cogency of these arguments, it suggests that their concentration on matters of belief and mistaken belief is apt to (...) divert attention from what is most important with regard to questions of toleration in these areas of experience. In order to illustrate this, remarks of Wittgenstein on religion and on understanding other cultures are considered. In contrast to the standard analysis of toleration, where toleration is seen as a response to an object that arouses disgust or disapproval, the value and the limitations of an easy-going tolerance are examined. This is related to bearing witness and knowledge-by-acquaintance. In the final section attention is turned to aspects of the curriculum that may have an unexpected relevance to toleration and the multicultural society. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes argued for absolute sovereignty, and claimed that in Christian countries the sovereign was fully empowered to govern the church as well as the state. There are grounds for seeing Hobbes as a staunch opponent of religious toleration, and a number of scholars support some variation of this position. This chapter examines the case for and against the idea of the tolerant Hobbes, beginning with his views on the clergy, and the historical context of those views, especially in the (...) debates on church–state relations that preoccupied his English contemporaries. Hobbes noted that clerics were commonly funded by tithes, which were a tenth of the incomes of the laity to whom they catered. Many English Protestant supporters of toleration drew the line at tolerating Roman Catholicism. Hobbes contended that “there is Publique, and Private Worship”. The precept that states should establish the uniform, public worship of God stemmed, in his opinion, from reason and nature. (shrink)

In this paper, we set out to show that the relationships between individuals, including the intersubjectivity inherent to the body politic, are also affective relationships, so as to reconstruct Spinoza’s minimalist theory of tolerance. According to Spinoza’s concept of affectivity and bodily life, affection refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body, while affect refers to the transition from one state to another, taking into account the correlative variation of affective bodies, (...) that is, the affect is always a passage or variation in the intensity of our power to exist and act — the increase or decrease, the favoring or the restraint of our power to exist and act. We argue that Spinoza’s geometry of affective relations decisively contributes to a political theory of democracy, insofar as it anticipates modern, liberal conceptions of tolerance. (shrink)

Cet article poursuit la réflexion de Dilhac (2014) touchant la relation entre politique et vérité. Au terme d’une analyse de la tolérance chez Mill et Popper, Dilhac conclut qu’une conception épistémique de la tolérance manque sa dimension politique, et qu’il est préférable d’opter pour le concept rawlsien de consensus raisonnable. Discutant ces résultats, le premier objectif est ici de montrer qu’une notion de « raisonnabilité » peut facilement trouver ses racines dans la neutralité scientifique wébérienne, et donc être porteuse (...) d’une dimension épistémique minimale. Le second objectif est de clarifier l’impact de cet argument particulier sur le débat général entourant la démocratie épistémique. Il sera défendu que l’opposition traditionnelle entre les conceptions épistémique et politique de la délibération est à trouver dans un certain perfectionnisme épistémique, mais qu’il existe au moins une conception minimale du potentiel épistémique tout à fait compatible avec les valeurs fondamentales du libéralisme, comme l’inclusion, l’égalité ou la diversité. En d’autres termes, les exigences épistémiques minimales de la neutralité scientifique peuvent être indépendantes du perfectionnisme épistémique. (shrink)

Our time is characterized by what seems like an unprecedented process of intense global homogenization. This reality provides the context for exploring the nature and value of toleration. Hence, this essay is meant primarily as a contribution to international ethics rather than political philosophy. It is argued that because of the non-eliminability of differences in the world we should not even hope that there can be only one global religion or ideology. Further exploration exposes conceptual affinity between the concepts of (...) intolerance, ideology, and doctrinal evil. The last concept is developed in contrast to pure evil and average evil, and under the assumption of the metaphysical necessity of free will. Doctrinal evil is found to represent the main source of intolerance as a result of a mechanism that tends to confuse doctrinal evil (or the competing conceptions of the good) with pure evil. This connection between doctrinal evil and pure evil provides ideologies with their forcefulness. Tolerance cannot be properly understood in terms of a simple opposition to intolerance, however. Tolerance emerges as a sort of vigilance, conscientiousness, and non-negligence based not on a supposedly correct interpretation of the good, but rather on the acceptance of the fallibility of any such attempted definition. Conversely, the principal evil in doctrinal evil is found in arrogance that accompanies the intolerance-inducing irresponsible thoughtlessness. With this conceptual topology in mind the paper also addresses questions regarding religious tolerance, the ideology of human rights and democracy, the right to self-defense, ways to face evil, the dialectics of using old names for novel evils, and related issues. (shrink)

In the first part of the essay, the author analyzes the difference and the relation between two different ideas of toleration, the passive and the active meaning. While the former is related to opportunistic and prudential purposes, the second is grounded in an ethical framework and presupposes the individual's freedom of conscience. This second meaning appears to be very important in a multicultural society: On its basis it is possible to develop toleration both as a plurality of contexts of (...) choice and as a priority rule between conscience and culture in Rawlsian terms. In the second part, starting from the case of O. Preminger Institut v. Austria, the author examines the relation between this idea of toleration and freedom of speech. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe essay considers the nature and extent of toleration extended by Roman authorities to the religious pluralism of the empire. Roman legal instruments and works of law and political theory identify religion not as a concern of individuals but communities, and above all of juridically-constituted communities. As a related matter, classical and Christian Latin employs the language of political belonging, most notably that of republican citizenship, as its dominant apparatus for discussing religious affiliation. These related conceptual apparatus placed considerable limits (...) on Romans’ ability to afford liberty in matters of religion to individuals. (shrink)