Plantinga develops an ambitious theistic religious epistemology on which theists can have non-inferential knowledge of God. Central to his epistemology is the idea that human beings have a “sensus divinitatis” that produces such knowledge. Recently, several authors have urged an appropriation of the sensus divinitatis that is more friendly to internalist views, such as Phenomenal Conservativism. I argue that this appropriation is too timid and tepid in a variety of ways. It applies only to a small fraction of theistic beliefs; (...) it fails to play the theological role Plantinga intended the sensus divinitatis to play; it fails to imply that most theistic beliefs, most of the time, are justified; when combined with a standard form of Evidentialism, it actually implies that most theistic beliefs are, if justified, inferentially justified; and it is consistent with substantive criticisms of theistic belief originating in work from the Cognitive Science of Religion. (shrink)

Intellectual servility is a vice opposing proper pride about one's intellectual achievements. Intellectual timidity is also a vice; it is manifested in a lack of proper concern for others’ esteem. This paper offers an account of the nature of these vices and details some of the epistemic harms that flow from them. I argue that servility, which is often the result of suffering humiliation, is a form of damaged self-esteem. It is underpinned by attitudes serving social-adjustive functions and causes (...) ingratiating behaviors. Timidity, which is habituated through self-silencing, is underpinned by negative attitudes toward the intellectual worth of the self, which serve a defensive function. Like servility, timidity is an obstacle to the acquisition and transmission of knowledge and especially knowledge about oneself. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism by arguing that the inference principle it relies upon is not well motivated. The sorts of non-question-begging instances that might be offered in support of it fall short.

The Report of the Ad Hoc Adivisory Group on the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees has resulted in a strange mixture of the timid, the revolutionary, and the bizarre.The Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees is a curious document.1 The remit of the review was focused on the workings and effectiveness of NHS research ethics committees and the multicentre committees ). The Group was primarily set up in response to a (...) series of complaints from medical researchers about the new research governance regime in the UK as a result of the Clinical Trials Directive2 and the Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees.3 The opportunity was also taken to consider the role of research ethics committees in a wider context, and take account of recent developments in relation to the ethics review of social care research,4 student projects,5 as well as recent legislation such as the Human Tissue Act,6 and the Mental Capacity Act.7 However, the resulting report is a strange mixture of the timid, the revolutionary, and the bizarre.A good example of the report’s timidity is its reluctance to propose fundamental change to the process of review or seriously limit the type of research that requires REC review. To its credit AHAG does suggest that some research ‘especially surveys and many studies on NHS staff, could normally be conducted safely without a requirement for REC review’ .1 This is, of course, to be welcomed. However, the report ultimately seems dismissive of the general complaint from researchers that the current process is inappropriately uniform. For example, in section 3.2, it is argued that the ‘common perception that the NHS REC system is dominated …. (shrink)

Studies have supported the effectiveness of the From Timid to a Tiger and Supportive Parenting for Anxious Childhood Emotions program in reducing childhood anxiety. This study is the first to compare the effectiveness of the two programs in the treatment of childhood anxiety disorder and reducing family accommodations levels. Parents of children aged 6 to 9 were randomly allocated to either FTTT or SPACE groups, and each attended ten online sessions following the manuals of the interventions. Throughout the study, 9 (...) participants dropped out, resulting in a total of 49 participants, and we performed statistical analyses based on data from these 49 participants. The assessment took place pre- and post-treatment and at a ten-week follow-up on parent-rated child anxiety and family accommodation measures. Analyses of variance and gain scores were conducted to examine the data. The results indicated that both treatments approaches produced significant reductions in outcome measures, and the post-treatment gains of both treatments were maintained at a ten-week follow-up, though when considering the mean differences and effect sizes across the assessment scores and between groups, overall, the FTTT was significantly more effective in reducing child anxiety scores and family accommodation levels. Our results demonstrated that FTTT significantly outperformed the SPACE program in reducing childhood anxiety problems and family accommodation levels. (shrink)

Baars affirms Crick and Koch's position that the timidity most cognitive scientists show in the face of consciousness is ridiculous. Unfortunately, all three succumb to a variation on the timidity they deprecate. Furthermore, Baars' own method, ``contrastic analysis,'' is at odds with the computational conception of mind that dominates contemporary cognitive science.

We begin by showing that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. _Reckless_ theories recommend giving up a sure thing, no matter how good, for an arbitrarily tiny chance of enormous gain; _timid_ theories permit passing up an arbitrarily large potential gain to prevent a tiny increase in risk; _non-transitive_ theories deny the principle that, if A is better than B and B is better than C, then A must be better than (...) C. Having set up this trilemma, we study its horns. Non-transitivity has been much discussed; we focus on drawing out the costs and benefits of recklessness and timidity when it comes to axiology, decision theory, and normative uncertainty. (shrink)

The Mismeasure of the Self is dedicated to vices that blight many lives. They are the vices of superiority, characteristic of those who feel entitled, superior and who have an inflated opinion of themselves, and those of inferiority, typical of those who are riddled with self-doubt and feel inferior. Arrogance, narcissism, haughtiness, and vanity are among the first group. Self-abasement, fatalism, servility, and timidity exemplify the second. This book shows these traits to be to vices of self-evaluation and describes (...) their pervasive harmful effects in some detail. Even though the influence of these traits extends to any aspect of life, the focus of this book is their damaging impact on the life of the intellect. Tanesini develops and defends a view of these vices that puts vicious motivations at their core. The analyses developed in this work build on empirical research in attitude psychology and on philosophical theories in virtue ethics and epistemology. The book concludes with a positive proposal for weakening vice and promoting virtue. (shrink)

…vel quod res omnes timide gelideque ministrat, dilator, † spe longus, iners avidusque futuri, diffcilis, querulus… I agree with Brink, and other editors referred to by him ad loe, that spe longus in Horace's description of the typical old man's character cannot be made to give sense. For earlier attempts at emendation, see Brink's note . Most of those who have tried to emend the passage concentrate on longus, and are reluctant to relinquish spe: this is largely due to the (...) parallel with Aristotle's account of the character of old men in Rhetoric 2. 13. 1389b 13ff., in which they are said to be, among other things it seems to me that this parallel should not be pressed too far. There is much in Aristotle that is not in Horace, and nothing to suggest close and detailed dependence. The parallel can only be relevant if spe longus can be turned into a reasonable Latin equivalent for Otherwise there is no good reason to suppose that spe is any less likely to be corrupt than longus. (shrink)

This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation ; it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice and that a concern for one's own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one's community, can be epistemically virtuous ; it explains two vices regarding these concerns (...) for one's own intellectual reputation and desire for esteem: intellectual vanity and intellectual timidity ; finally, it offers an account of some of the epistemic harms caused by these vices. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion in (...) the arrogant themselves. (shrink)

Machine learning algorithms bring out an under-appreciated puzzle of discrimination, namely figuring out when a decision made on the basis of a factor correlated with race is a decision made on the basis of race. I argue that prevailing approaches, which are based on identifying and then distinguishing among causal effects of race, in their metaphysical timidity, fail to get off the ground. I suggest, instead, that adopting a constructivist theory of race answers this puzzle in a principled manner. (...) On what I call a “thick constructivist” account of race, to be raced is to be socially positioned in the way indicated by a certain set of statistical regularities on the basis of particular phenotypical traits. A thick constructivist sees that acting on the basis of correlations that constitute race qua social position just is acting on the basis of race, because races just are social positions that subject their member individuals to a particular matrix of social relations that define the raced position. This conclusion has considerable ramifications for our understanding of discrimination, algorithms and beyond. (shrink)

During the late Soviet era, science fiction was one of the first zones of its ideological cosmos, registering the exhaustion of the communist utopia precisely within the literary genre aimed at its representation. In this article I consider the history of the “editing to death” of the Strugatsky brothers’ short novel Roadside Picnic as a representative case of the anti-utopian “uneasiness in civilization” of late actually existing socialism. Simultaneously with the censorship taming of the uneasiness, the Strugatsky’s science fiction dystopia (...) underwent a radical interpretation in Andrei Tarkovsky’s film adaptation Stalker as a Hegelian “good music with text”. In comparison to the censored edition, which is barely a timid emendation, ultimately yearning modestly for a good life during the most consumeristic and moderately repressive years of Soviet power, Tarkovsky’s aesthetically singular re-reading is truly a “Zone” of editing to death. (shrink)

In the edited book “Bourdieu and Chinese Education”, a group of scholars in China, Australia, Canada, and the USA engage in a dialogue with Bourdieu and raise persistent questions not only about issues of equity, competition, and change in Chinese education, but also about the value, venture, and violence in using established Western intellectual frameworks for analysing Chinese education. In response to these questions, this special issue analyses and discusses Chinese rural education, teacher education, language education, health and physical education, (...) and transnational education; and proposes a series of new conceptualisations, for example, regression- and network-based field analysis, Bourdieu-Chinese philosophy encounter, field of mediation, localised pedagogical capital, and new Chinese habituses (e.g., contemptuous habitus, diasporic cosmopolitan habitus, habitus (re)structuring). Such collective effort responds to the strident, and sometimes misleading, castigation of Bourdieu for determinism; and also disputes the non-reflexive, celebratory tone that consecrates the French sociologist and his canonical theorem, and hence reproduces the symbolic violence in the doxic academia. In this vein, the special issue is respectful for, but not restricted to, Bourdieu’s sociology, showing no timidity in questioning and contesting the framework of the famed thinker when research problems and findings demand so. (shrink)

A daring marriage of philosophical theory and practical politics, this collection is the first of Gianni Vattimo's many books to combine his intellectual pursuits with his public and political life. Vattimo is a paradoxical figure, at once a believing Christian and a vociferous critic of the Catholic Church, an outspoken liberal but not a former communist, and a recognized authority on Nietzsche and Heidegger as well as a prominent public intellectual and member of the European parliament. Building on his unique (...) position as a philosopher and politician, Vattimo takes on some of the most pressing questions of our time: Is it still possible, long after Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God, to talk of moral imperatives, individual rights, or political freedom? Are these values still relevant in today's world? Tackling these crucial issues, Gianni Vattimo argues that nihilism is not the absence of meaning but a recognition of a plurality of meanings; it is not the end of civilization but the beginning of new social paradigms. Commonly associated with the pessimistic belief that all of existence is meaningless, nihilism, as a philosophical principle, is far less sensational--it is the ethical doctrine that there are no moral absolutes or infallible natural laws, that "truth" is inescapably subjective. Because the conditions for equality and liberty are not "naturally" given, society must actively create these ideals or it will inevitably fall prey to irrationality, prejudice, and oppression. Vattimo contends that the infighting, timidity, and confusion that have overtaken contemporary liberal thought and politics are the products a prolonged and indulgent mourning over the loss of the transcendental father figure--any institution or power structure that defines truth, knowledge, and reality. Until humanity overcomes its need for external authority--whether it be organized religion, the nation-state, or free-market capitalism--emancipation will remain unattainable. Collecting fourteen of Vattimo's most influential essays on ethics, politics, and law, _Nihilism and Emancipation_ is a provocative reevaluation of meaning, values, and the idea of freedom in Western culture. (shrink)

La philosophie de Schelling pénètre en France, assez timidement, par le canal des penseurs spiritualistes (Cousin, Ravaisson), mais aussi par le biais d’érudits (Matter, Willm…). Sa philosophie romantique et son volontarisme métaphysique entrent en résonance avec des préoccupations d’époque ; son néo-christianisme semble pouvoir remplir l’espace laissé vacant par le retrait des croyances religieuses. La situation s’inverse avec le « retour à Kant » et le triomphe du rationalisme républicain. La philosophie de l’identité est alors interprétée comme un monisme qu’il (...) faut tenir à distance. Cette désaffection explique la rareté des traductions. On trouvera à la fin de l’article l’inventaire des textes (de Schelling et sur Schelling) publiés en français avant 1900. (shrink)

The author debates with the concept of the Soviet ideological turn as a simple means of pre-war mobilization. The paper argues that in the 1930’s the Bolsheviks refused to «national nihilism» and mouved to the national Great Russian position. First – within the «Soviet patriotism», then – according to the Russian historical grand-narrative. This transition was caused by the need to involve in the process of modernization as wide population as possible, especially those who were not too inspired heroism «new (...) era». The choice of historical figures and events of the past was dictated by the need to strengthen one-man rule of Stalin. Historians and artists, formed in the 1930's, took the leading role in science and in the creative unions in 1960-70's, which allowed the Soviet establishment to prevent the radical rejection of Stalin's legacy, to curtail the timid attempts to rethink the historical grand-narrative and to form among the so-called "Russian party". (shrink)

In a world that peers over the brink of disaster more often than not it is difficult to find specific assignments for the scholarly community. One speaks of peace and brotherhood only to realize that for many the only real hope of making a contribution may seem to be in a field of scientific specialization seemingly irrelevant to social causes and problems. Yet the history of man since the beginnings of science in the days of the Greeks does not support (...) this gloomy thesis. Time and again we have seen science precipitate social trends or changes in the humanistic beliefs that have a significant effect on the scientific community. Not infrequently the theoretical scientist, triggered by society's changing goals and understandings, finds ultimate satisfaction in the work of his colleagues in engineering and the other applied fields. Thus the major debate in mid-nineteenth century in which the evidence of natural history and geology at variance with the Biblical feats provided not only courage to a timid Darwin but the kind of audience that was needed to fit his theories into the broad public dialogue on these topics. The impact of "Darwinism" was felt far beyond the scientific community. It affected social thought, upset religious certainties and greatly affected the teaching of science. (shrink)

In his introduction Professor Edwards remarks that he does not believe that the work will be condemned "as either dull or timid", whatever else may be said about it. And, in the main, he is right in this belief. It is hardly feasible of course to maintain a uniform policy of scintillating provocativeness when one is summarizing the ideas of some rather obscure thinkers or dealing with some highly technical matter. But on controversial issues articles are often lively and make (...) no pretense of Olympian detachment. Some articles, even though useful, may be a bit flat. But the work as a whole certainly does not give this impression. (shrink)

Chile and Colombia have undergone very different postconflict processes. Whereas in Chile there was an elite-based negotiated transition from a state terror regime, Colombia presents a gradual exit from an armed conflict involving multiple actors and taking place in one of Latin America’s most stable democracies. A strong common feature nevertheless exists in these two countries: important social movements—notably, student, afro-descendant, Indigenous, and peasant movements—that put forward memory, but which reach beyond the circle of direct victims. These “memory from below” (...) movements in both countries cannot be understood from their institutional contexts, since these are so different: while Chile’s democratic governments strengthened the amnesty law and led only to timid commemorative initiatives twenty years after the end of the dictatorship, Colombia adopted numerous laws that allowed an institutional presence of memory—notably, through the creation of the National Center for Historic Memory—while the armed conflict was still fully fledged. From a comparative politics perspective, these institutional differences lead one to investigate other causes for the presence of “memory from below” movements in both countries: interviews of participants show that these movements stem from a common understanding of the political role of memory, as well as from a common social imaginary of “shared suffering” that seeks to uncover state violence and that understands past human rights violations as being part of a historic continuum of structural and colonial violence aimed at criminalizing and crushing social movements in democracy. (shrink)

Integrationism advocates a radical epistemological reform in semiological theory. It is a relatively recent perspective, developed by Oxford Professor Roy Harris (1931–2015); yet integrationism’s main principles are best seen as the outcome of different timid trends in the history of theories of language. The epistemological exigencies that this perspective puts on theorists has often provoked reproaches that this perspective was too negative, nihilistic, destructive, a form of scepticism. This article takes this criticism at its word and outlines a comparison between (...) the main form of scepticism known in Greek Antiquity, Pyrrhonism, and integrationism. A historical outline of the development of both movements is drawn, for context. Then particular issues serve as comparison points between both: the definition of doctrinal cohesion; the relation of each intellectual movement to ‘science’; the use of particular forms of arguments or ‘modes’; and some specific aspects of language-use that Pyrrhonism has addressed. (shrink)

Could Soviet federalism provide a pattern for a European Union? The similarity between the national diversity of the Soviet Union and that of Europe could lead us to think so.A careful examination of Soviet federalism reveals certain particularities which could be adapted to a federal Europe, but the most powerful element of centralisation and unity in the USSR is the Communist Party, besidesa tough political police and a common language - Russian - another cement of the Union.Bearing in mind the (...) present institutions of the European Community, it is difficult to imagine an evolution towards such a federal state.Nevertheless, if some principles were applied, such as the safeguard of the common interest as well as that of the member-states, it may be hoped to go further than a timid confederation.In such a prospect, some institutions of the Soviet Union could be taken as examples and an institutionalisation of the present «summit» conferences could be imagined to act as a European collective head of state, in the same way as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.Furthermore, Europe would need a common language and this should be a neutral one, so as to achieve among member-nations strict equality, for this is an element of success as are two other basicprinciples of federalism : autonomy and participation. Since the Communist Party just would not fit within a free and democratic Europe, it is in the above principles that the Community should seek the ferments of itsunion. (shrink)

There is a plethora of occasions where we feel the intuitive urge to say that the fact that one is a participant in some sort of conventional or institutional practice is a reason to abide by its rules because that is just what it is to be a practice participant. This form of prescription-cum-justification argument is a fusion of an appeal to ordinary practical reasons (the prescriptive part) and an appeal to what is known as a constitutive explanation (the justificatory (...) part) of such reasons. The latter explanation is constitutive in the sense that the reason-for complement, namely, the activity of abiding by the rules of is a partial description of what it is to be a practice participant. The author of this essay argues that the use of constitutive arguments for explaining the normativity of conventional requirements is one step ahead of what needs to be accounted for in the first place which is the following: is the normative force of practice-based requirements a matter of practical reasons? The essay’s timid proposal will be to consider the possibility that the normativity of social practices is more akin to the normativity of formal rationality than to the normativity of practical reasons. (shrink)

O objetivo deste ensaio é apresentar uma análise sucinta dos reflexos dos argumentos de Durkheim sobre educação no corpo da Lei de Diretrizes e Bases daEducação Nacional nº 9394/96. Arquiteto de um paradigma clássicopara a sociologia, que se irradia alimentando outros paradigmas de teóricos degrande envergadura, que o sucederam, Émile Durkheim conferiu àSociologia uma base empírica, com métodos próprios de investigação, demonstrando que os fatos sociais – seu objeto de estudo – teriam características próprias, que os distinguiriam dos estudados pelas (...) demais ciências. Considero que fiz uma aproximação tímida, a partir de leituras preliminares, que revelaram um universo teórico complexo, com uma vasta gama de conceitos enredados, e além disso um fascínio que torna difícil interromper as leituras. O texto reflete leituras das obras Educação e Sociologia e Divisão do Trabalho Social, bem como de comentadores, como Quintaneiro e Aron .The purpose of this essay is to present a brief analysis of the reflections ofDurkheim's arguments about education in the Law of Directives and Basis ofNational Education nº 9394/96. It was with Emile Durkheim , the architect of a classic paradigm for sociology, that radiates to otherparadigms of major theorists, who succeeded him, that sociology came to be considered a science, with an empirical basis and its own methods of research; he showed that its object of study, social facts, would have characteristics that distinguish it from those studied by other sciences. I believe that I done a timid approach, from first readings, that revealed a complex theoretical universe, with awide range of concepts, and a fascination that makes it difficult to stop the readings. The referential reflects the readings of Education and Sociology and The Division of Labour in Society and commentators, as Quintaneiro and Aron. (shrink)

That Ibn Sīnā’s “Canon of medicine” figures among the major classics of the history of medicine is doubted by no serious historian of medicine, eastern or western, Islamic or non-Islamic alike. It is therefore all the more surprising that so far no serious critical edition of this text was available. Certainly, a first, very timid step toward a really critical edition was made at the Institute of the History of Medicine and Medical Research, under the direction of Hakeem Abdul Hameed. (...) It compared the four existing editions: Rome 1593; Būlāq 1877; Tehran 1878; and Lucknow 1905. In addition it used an ancient manuscript of Aya Sophia, dated 618, i. e. MS Aya Sophia 3686. With this new edition a further important step toward a full critical edition is made. Even if it is obvious that it does not yet present a “critical edition” in the full sense of the word, it has important merits. (shrink)

The article explores the considerations of Nietzsche on the Renaissance painter Raphael Sanzio, who are rare in the set of the work of the philosopher, however permeates all the phases of his intellectual development process. The approach, more often than is positive, with remnants of censorship with respect to the artist’s timidity in promoting a transvaluation of Christianity, which sounds as a certain ambiguity. The most fruitful moment of the approach occurs in the intermediate period, in which Nietzsche values (...) the Renaissance humanism and the works of Rafael illustrate the characteristics of the Renaissance he values. (shrink)

In the late 1990s, Alice Sebold is writing what will become her phenomenally successful novel The Lovely Bones (2002), but she finds herself having to abandon it in order to write her critically acclaimed rape memoir Lucky (1999). She did not want, she says years later, Susie Salmon (the novel’s dead narrator) doing “work for her”, but wanted Susie free “to tell her own story”. Lucky would be the “real deal” about rape, while The Lovely Bones would be a fantasy. (...) And yet, the memoir and novel are similar in many respects; and nearly identical to begin with. The Lovely Bones opens with the rape, murder and mutilation of a young girl – Susie – while Lucky opens with reference to the girl who was raped, murdered and mutilated in the tunnel Sebold was also raped in. This girl, Sebold maintains, always haunts her. Thus, I will argue, it is not possible to read her novel, which some critics have dismissed as “timid and sentimental”, without reading her gritty autobiography; and vice versa it is not possible to read Sebold’s rape memoir without reading her novel, which in a complex way bears witness to that unnamed girl, if not for all dead, unnamed girls. The question is, then, how does the intertextuality of Sebold’s novel and memoir, and, more broadly, the interrelationship of truth and fantasy, impact on our reading of Sebold’s work, especially her memoir? Keywords Rape, fact, fiction, truth, lie, reading, writing, creative witnessing, wishful thinking, utopia. (shrink)

Rosa Luxemburg était économiste de formation. Sa plus grande ambition était d’être à la pointe de la recherche en économie politique marxiste. Dans cet article, nous montrons comment Rosa Luxemburg a lu le chef d’œuvre de Marx, Le Capital inachevé, comment elle a critiqué Marx et comment elle a essayé de mettre à jour sa théorie afin de mieux comprendre les changements récents dans l’économie mondiale capitaliste. Pour elle, les marxistes contemporains étaient beaucoup trop timides, hésitant à critiquer et dépasser (...) Marx – comme elle essayait de le faire dans son livre sur l’accumulation du capital. Sa façon d’aborder la question de l’accumulation du capital a ouvert de nouvelles perspectives. Elle n’a pas réussi à présenter une explication consistante de l’économie capitaliste à l’âge de l’impérialisme, mais elle a clairement perçu les difficultés inhérentes de tous les projets coloniaux et impérialistes des grandes puissances de son temps. Car pour coloniser des pays et peuples non-capitalistes, et pour les rendre exploitables pour le capital, il leur fallait d’abord transformer ces économies et sociétés non-capitalistes. (shrink)

C’est avant tout comme théologien que Paul est lu par les Pères grecs. La réception des épîtres dans les premiers siècles montre comment les premiers lecteurs de Paul hiérarchisaient eux-mêmes les textes et leurs données, même s’il n’y a pas consensus, d’autant plus que les lectures d’une même épître peuvent diverger. Cependant l’émergence est encore timide au milieu du IIe siècle, ce qui ne peut que valoriser le « tournant irénéen », Irénée étant le premier à présenter une réception globale (...) du corpus paulinien. Puis s’impose Origène et d’abord avec son attention à l’ensemble de l’Ecriture, en raison aussi de ses commentaires des épîtres de Paul, en particulier de l’épître aux Romains. Avec lui, le corpus paulinien est, - et sera de plus en plus après lui -, la source par excellence de la dogmatique chrétienne. Reste la question de savoir si cette manière dogmatique de comprendre la pensée de Paul ne l’a pas déformée en même temps qu’elle la mettait au premier plan.The Greek Fathers read Paul above all as a theologian. The reception of the epistles in the first centuries shows how Paul’s first readers themselves graded the texts and their themes, even if there was not a consensus, given that the readers of the same epistle could differ. The emergence, nevertheless, was still timid in the middle of the second century, which could only valorize the “Irenaean bent,” since Irenaeus was the first to present a global reception of the Pauline corpus. Then Origin imposed himself, first by paying attention to the whole of Scripture, and also because of his commentaries on Paul’s epistles, in particular the epistle to the Romans. With him, the Pauline corpus is -- and will be more and more after him -- the source par excellence of Christian dogma. The question remains as to whether this dogmatic manner of understanding the thought of Paul did not deform it at the same time that it put it in the forefront. (shrink)

As it happened, I became acquainted with E.V. Il'enkov quite late, in the mid- or even the late 1960s. It was only a bit more than ten years before his death that I began to feel at home in his house, was able to visit without calling ahead, and was able to call him by his first name and the familiar "you"—that is, like many, many of not only his true friends but also like-minded thinkers, who became his close acquaintances, (...) most of whom justly considered themselves his pupils … The door would open wide, and Olia, Professor K.I. Salimova, Eval'd's wife and most devoted friend, not at all surprised by the unexpected guest and seemingly even quite happy at his arrival , would try first to draw him into the kitchen and feed him … which she more often than not succeeded in doing. I am not talking about myself: there were always many guests, and this is precisely how they arrived at the Il'enkovs' apartment. Recently, a critic in Literaturnaia gazeta recalled those whom he met in Eval'd's apartment in the 1960s: "This was a tight circle of like-minded thinkers," wrote the critic. "But some of them are no longer with us, while most are far away, beyond our borders." Obviously, he had not been in the house often or had forgotten things over the distance of years. There was no "circle," nor could there have been one—not with this host, not with his lifestyle and way of relating to people. I met a good hundred fine and various people in Eval'd's home: I.N. Korzhavin, V. Davydov, A. Meshcheriakov, S. Vinogradova, N. Dubinin, V. Zinchenko, A. Zinov'ev, Iu. Kamiakin, and … indeed, five pages would not be enough to list the quite famous and the not-quite-so-famous, simply ordinary people with no claim to fame. Nazym Khikmet, A.N. Leont'ev, and B.M. Kedrov were friends of the house … Ever new faces, figures, and words come to mind. I cannot forgive myself: once Eval'd Vasil'evich wanted to take me along to Iurii Liubimov's to read his play Neither God nor Tsar nor Hero … [Ni bog, ni tsar' i ni geroi], but I had some other business, something so important that I do not even remember now what it was, and it is probably not worth remembering. But most likely I was too timid to appear uninvited at the house of a person burning with creativity. The same thing happened with Galich … Eval'd liked especially his song about Zoshchenko. He did not sing it; he narrated it, but in such a way that tears always came to one's eyes. (shrink)

There were two ways for the solicitor general of the United States to litigate the constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 brought by twenty‐six states and the National Federation of Independent Business. One path, which the solicitor general pursued, was to cautiously navigate judicial precedents, claim the barest increment of new congressional authority, and give the Supreme Court as many hooks as possible on which to hang a favorable decision.The road not traveled was to (...) offer a full‐throated defense of federal authority to comprehensively regulate the U.S. health care system, a multitrillion dollar commercial and social enterprise that represents the largest component of federal expenditure after national defense. The ACA has three cornerstones. First, make health insurance coverage as widespread as possible. Second, improve the quality and efficiency of health care delivery. Third, make individuals and communities healthier. The second and third pillars are sometimes overlooked because so much attention is paid to expanding coverage, but the hallmark of the ACA is that it combines major changes to health insurance, health care delivery, and health in a single piece of federal legislation.The Obama administration's timidity echoes what is strikingly absent from the new law. Although the ACA represents the successful culmination of a decades‐long struggle to universalize coverage, its structure and text never convey the intent that all Americans have a common stake in the health care system. This lack of shared national identity is the missing fourth pillar of the ACA. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present a systematic literature review of empirical studies into online platforms for political participation. The objective was to diagnose the relationship between different types of digital participatory platforms, the real possibilities of participation generated by those initiatives and the impact of such participation on the decision-making process of governmental representatives. Design/methodology/approach A systematic literature review was conducted using pre-defined terms, expressions and criteria. A total of 434 articles from 1995 to 2015 were (...) gathered from the Web of Science database. And, 32 studies were selected from those articles for meta-synthesis, and the cases investigated were evaluated according to the e-participation ladder model. Findings The results indicated that online political participation worldwide remains timid both in quantity and quality. We have witnessed the growth of a kind of “rhetorical participation” promoted by policy-makers and the rise of a “participatory despotism”, in which only the privileged partake, while the majority remains silent. Practical implications The solutions found to promote increased participation and ensure its effectiveness ranged from shaping the platform design in accordance with citizens’ capacities and interests to a need for profound political–administrative change, which includes the world’s public agencies adopting a more transparent, inclusive and collaborative approach to decision-making. Originality/value This paper proposes a systematic review, mapping the studies on online platforms for political participation, analysing the questions, methods and conclusions found by the authors and evaluating each case study with a participation ladder. (shrink)

Although modern texts of Propertius have generally inclined to conservatism, there remains a number of cases where editors have chosen, in Housman's phrase, timidly to alter what they might without rashness have defended; or where the arguments so far advanced in favour of the best attested reading leave room for supplement.Thus:I. 6. 25 f. me sine, quem semper uoluit fortuna iacere,hanc animam extremae reddere nequitiae.extrema … nequitia Fonteine.

The amplitude and the diversity of Ricoeur’s philosophical production is astonishing. Three factors shed light upon this fact. First, his philosophical career covers seventy years wherein he witnessed the rise and the decline of tlve philosophical -isms. Further, he is a typical dialogical thinker: in conversation with the great classical and modern philosophers, and eager to listen to the methods and results of human an linguistics sciences. A third reason, particularly of differentiation, stems from his double conviction and commitment. On (...) the one hand, he wants to be a rigorous philosopher, even keeping on a methodic agnosticism. On the other hand, however, he is a convinced Christian, and so he also likes to think critically – a rigorous philosophizing here is inappropriate – on religion, belief, and biblical language and topics. Nevertheless, it is only since 2000 that he is getting fully aware of the disintegrated impression many readers have from his publications. In his opinion, this impression is perfectly understandable: a reading public and myself are on completely different wavelengths. From reading my books people spontaneously nurture their own expectation with regard to coming publications, whereas my concern always was: am I answering your questions? So, in four recent articles Ricoeur speaks of his technical philosophy composed of eleven books: from The voluntary and the Involontary to the Course of Recognition . He argues that the continuity of his basic philosophical writings is, each time, determined by a residue, a question the preceding publication left open. But, where to situate then his twenty-two other books into a global and consistent picture? All these other works are explorations of specific philosophical issues, and reflections and topics as prophecy, tragedy and religion bordering philosophy. For this matter, a fully rigorous philosophical discourse is not always possible. These writings, however, find their setting around the hard core of his philosophy. Ricoeur himself only mentions two genres: volumes of articles for a larger audience as History and Truth and university lectures as Lectures on Ideology and Utopia . But other headings need to be added to umbrella other publications: historical and autobiographic writings, collection of articles on political topics, on the sacred and biblical language, on philosophy of law, and on medical ethical issues. On a more remote distance from the heart of his philosophy are located hundred of articles and interviews on philosophical topics, reflections on actual themes, an even some homilies. To amazement of many, two eminent Ricoeur commentators recently characterized his philosophy as “An Ontology of Life”. This is not as strange as it looks! Already in The voluntary and the Involontary. Ricoeur offers a phenomenology of “life, to be in life and birth”. To him, life also is a lived and hard-won value. In fact, belief in life is related to his main category of “originative affirmation” and of “hope”. Hope, however, is never a knowledge but only the regulative idea of my metaphysical thinking, and it remains inextricably bound up with the anguish for a senseless totality. “Nothing is closer to the anguish of nonsense than timid hope.”. (shrink)

In the preface to the Yale edition of Samuel Johnson’s poems, the editors remark that “for a modern reader who can recreate the situation in which [“London”] was written, it may still be exciting enough. But to one with less imaginative capacity or historical knowledge, its appeal lies in Johnson’s skillful handling of the couplet.”2 To assist us in re-creating the milieu of 1738, the editors supply the usual notes identifying various historical personages and events which are no longer in (...) the domain of common knowledge. In this respect they follow Johnson’s lead. “London” is manifestly an occasional poem; and its occasion—in part, Walpole’s timidity abroad and corruption at home—like all occasions, passed.3 Indeed it passed so quickly that Johnson himself felt called upon in the fifth edition to annotate, for instance, his mention of “the Gazetteer”: “the paper which at that time contained apologies for the Court.” By 1750 Walpole was long out of court, the Gazetteer extinct, and “London” as outdated as yesterday’s newspaper.For poems like “London” whose contents are neither au courant nor immortal but rather historical or simply dead, the Yale editors suggest two avenues of resuscitation: the reader may either restore the background by means of historical imagination or, failing that, admire Johnson’s couplet art, which perhaps has a better chance at perennial appeal. Either content or form, either history or art—both options require a sacrifice on our part, and that sacrifice is our occasion, our need. Even assuming that the poem’s context could be exhumed and that we could participate once again in all the rage of the “patriot” opposition to Walpole, Why would we want to? The problem is that not only “London” but the Walpole regime itself is now defunct. Yet the same question must be asked of the poem’s art, even and especially if it is eternal. Why are we interested in the aesthetic knowledge of couplets that have been drained of all substance? Is understanding “London” in either case an end in itself? The pure content of the poem is too concrete, its pure form too abstract, to answer our occasions. Thus to understand the poem as either history or art demands a leisure that has no exigencies and is therefore free for the bygone and ethereal.42. E.L. McAdam, Jr. and George Milne, eds., Poems, vol. 6, The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson , p. xvii.3. For a detailed exposition of the social and political background of “London,” see Donald Greene, The Politics of Samuel Johnson , pp. 88-92, and James Clifford, “London,” Young Sam Johnson , pp. 175-94.4. John Locke explains the infinite leisure we can take in understanding the obscurities of ancient authors in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser, 2 vols. , 2:110:There being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of, but those that contain either truths we are required to believe, or laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of other authors; who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions: and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with a due clearness and perspicuity, we may lay them aside. (shrink)

Après avoir erré quelques années, étudiant férocement studieux mais aussi très anarchiste, après avoir déambulé le long des docks du port de Glasgow, alors du dernier stade de la révolution industrielle, entouré d'une drôle de musique où les accents de Rimbaud («Je me crois en enfer») et de Hölderlin («Ce que tu veux, c'est un monde») se mêlaient aux phrasés grinçants de L'Opéra de quat'sous de Bertolt Brecht, je me posais la question : que faire? Que faire de fondamental? D'abord (...) pour donner un fondement et un mouvement à une existence individuelle, mais aussi pour tenter de changer le cours des choses, sur les plans culturel, civilisationnel et sociopolitique. Pendant le XIXe et le XXe siècle on a cru, malgré tout, que l'Histoire était synonyme de Progrès. Qu'elle menait quelque part : à un grand Etat, au communisme universel, à un Supermarché du bonheur. Personne n'a plus confiance dans l'Histoire. D'où un grand vide existentiel et culturel. Sans utopisme, sans réenchantement facile, Kenneth White entreprend une navigation hauturière dans un espace de vie et de pensée, qui a toujours existé au large de l'Histoire. Les escales de ce voyage sont au nombre de cinq : une analyse socio-politique de la fin de la modernité ; une investigation qui remonte aux origines de la culture ; l'examen de diverses tentatives de refondation sociale à travers le monde ; la question, posée encore trop timidement par l'écologie, de l'habitation de la Terre ; et enfin, une critique de la situation contemporaine de l'art. (shrink)

In this comment on John Yolton's Is There a History of Philosophy? (Yolton, 1985) I review his account of the development during the 17th to 19th centuries of a common sense of the range of philosophical problems and of the canon of philosophical works. I suggest that his account may be read in light of Rorty's four genres of historiography (Rorty, 1984). I criticize his view of the place of the history of philosophy in philosophy as too timid, though correct (...) as far as it goes. I then suggest, but do not attempt to establish, a bolder thesis. Finally, I raise some doubts about the adequacy of Yolton's reading of Descartes and Berkeley set out in two of his Puzzlements. The Puzzlements themselves are supposed to illustrate typical misreading of major figures in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Atheists and agnostics have a vexed relationship. Atheists often regard agnostics as timid, or perhaps as disguised apologists. Agnostics often regard atheists as dogmatic hypocrites: they proclaim something on insufficient evidence, while accusing theists of this. This dynamic is familiar from the academic and popular literature. Here, I consider a more radical conflict between the two, based on Kripkean semantics for empty terms applied to atheism. Sorensen : 373–388) christened the Kripke-inspired formulation of atheism ‘Unicorn Atheism’ and argued from (...) there to the incoherence of agnosticism. But, I argue, the objection fails and instead presents an opportunity to reformulate agnosticism. By appreciating the relevance of Kripkean semantics to the issue, a better understanding of the two positions, and their conflict, emerges. (shrink)

In the context of animal cognitive research, anthropomorphism is defined as the attribution of uniquely human mental characteristics to animals. Those who worry about anthropomorphism in research, however, are immediately confronted with the question of which properties are uniquely human. One might think that researchers must first hypothesize the existence of a feature in an animal before they can, with warrant, claim that the property is uniquely human. But all too often, this isn't the approach. Rather, there is an a (...) priori argument against attributing some properties to animals. Which features are thought to be uniquely human on a priori grounds? The class can be quite large, including psychological states such as beliefs and desires, personality traits such as confidence or timidity, emotions such as happiness or anger, social organizational properties such as culture or friendship, moral behavior such as punishment or rape. For convenience, I will refer to the members of the class as "psychological properties". One critic includes feeling, purpose, intentionality, consciousness, and even cognition in his list of psychological properties that are incorrectly attributed to animals (Kennedy 1992). Among the critics, there is quite a bit of disagreement about what counts as an anthropomorphic attribution, and this alone should raise questions about the charge. We can identify two different questions about the practice of attributing psychological properties to animals within a scientific context. First we can ask whether it is scientifically respectable to examine questions about the mental, psychological, cultural, etc. states of animals. Those who bemoan anthropomorphism think that we ought not even ask such questions. I will look at the worries about asking the question, and argue that there is no special problem with it. The second question arises with an affirmative answer to the first. Given that it is scientifically respectable to examine whether an animal has a psychological property, there must be some scientifically respectable method for doing the examination.. (shrink)

IT MIGHT WELL seem that any topic of lesser import than "Being" or "Reality" would be inappropriate to mark the Silver Jubilee of our Society. But even apart from my own timidity in the face of themes that strain our powers of abstraction to their very limits, I have another more specific reason to speak of science. For it is in regard to science, I think, that the most profound philosophical shift has occurred—in the English-speaking world, at least—in the (...) twenty-five years since the Metaphysical Society of America was founded. The change is one, moreover, that must have a particular significance for our Society. (shrink)

Xavier Landes | : In this article, consensus, defined as the consent of all citizens, is argued to be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Consensus would be the foundation of the liberal society that, when out of reach, needs to be approximated through, for instance, voting. I build on the timid attempts in political theory at using the theorem of the second best as a tool to settle difficult decision making in applied political (...) theory. More precisely, I defend the view that consensus would be the first best for part of the liberal tradition on political legitimacy. Furthermore, I illustrate how moral, factual, disagreements may create second-best problems, especially in terms of stability. Finally, I spell out some reasons why such problems directly affect a liberal order, on pragmatic grounds. The final purpose is to contribute to the literatures on legitimacy and on the application of the theorem of the second best outside economics. The key idea is to stress that much more work has to be done for “importing” the theorem of the second best into political theory. | : Dans cet article, le consensus, défini comme le consentement de tous les citoyens, est présenté comme remplissant la fonction d’optimum de premier rang [first best] pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique. Le consensus fonderait la société libérale qui, lorsque hors d’atteinte, nécessiterait d’être approximer au travers, par exemple, du vote. Je m’appuie sur les timides tentatives en théorie politique d’utiliser le théorème de l’optimum de second rang [second best] comme outil pour résoudre des prises de décision difficiles en théorie politique appliquée. Plus précisément, je défends l’idée que le consensus serait l’optimum de premier rang pour une partie de la tradition libérale quant à la légitimité politique. De plus, j’illustre comment les désaccords moraux, factuels peuvent créer des problèmes d’optimum de second rang, en particulier en termes de stabilité. Enfin, j’expose quelques raisons pour lesquelles de tels problèmes affectent directement un ordre libéral, d’un point de vue pragmatique. Le but final est de contribuer aux littératures sur la légitimité et sur l’application du théorème d’optimum de second rang à l’extérieur des sciences économiques. L’idée principale est de souligner qu’il reste beaucoup de travail afin d’« importer » le théorème d’optimum de second rang en théorie politique. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham, protesting against the cruelty of inflicting the death penalty on mothers who kill their newborn infants, described infanticide as the killing of a being ‘who has ceased to be, before knowing what existence is.’ He also pointed out that is an offence ‘of a nature not to give the slightest inquietude to the most timid imagination,’ for all those who come to learn of the offence are themselves too old to be threatened by it.1 These points still hold (...) true, and also apply to abortion. They do not, of course, enable one to conclude that there is nothing wrong with either abortion or infanticide, but they do suggest a plausible ground for thinking that these acts should not be thought of as morally equivalent to the murder of beings who are capable of ‘knowing what existence is’ and of learning that beings like them can be, and sometimes are, killed. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo tem por objetivo avaliar a presença da área Ensino de Filosofia nos cursos de licenciatura em Filosofia das universidades públicas federais. Para tanto, parte-se da seguinte indagação: A área Ensino de Filosofia existe nos cursos de licenciatura em Filosofia? A questão surge a partir de um problema detectado em outros estudos, a saber, o forte caráter bacharelesco existente nos cursos de licenciatura em Filosofia. Após consultar o Projeto Político-Pedagógico (PPP’s) destes cursos, constatou-se que, embora tímida, a (...) área Ensino de Filosofia é uma realidade em parte deles, enquanto em outros é quase inexistente. O diagnóstico e a reflexão realizados podem colaborar com a reformulação curricular ou o fortalecimento da formação inicial dos/as professores/as de Filosofia. Por ser um estudo que envolve elementos quantitativos e qualitativos, foram adotados procedimentos metodológicos apropriados para a realização da investigação, mesclando a análise de conteúdo com a tabulação de dados. Como fonte, além dos PPP’s e da legislação vigente, foram consultados referenciais teóricos que pudessem auxiliar na reflexão em torno do problema em questão. Palavras-chave: Ensino de Filosofia; licenciatura; universidade federal. The presence of Philosophy Teaching in Philosophy undergraduate courses in federal universities Abstract: This paper aims to evaluate the presence of Philosophy Teaching in Philosophy undergraduate courses of federal public universities. To this end, we start from the following question: Does Philosophy Teaching exist in the undergraduate courses in Philosophy? The question arises from a problem detected in other studies, such as the way the Philosophy undergraduate course focuses in reasearch aspects, rather than teaching methods. After consulting the Political-Pedagogical Project (PPPs) of these courses, it was found that, although timid, the Philosophy Teaching area is a reality in part of them, while in others it is almost non-existent. The diagnosis and reflection carried out can collaborate with the curricular reformulation or the strengthening of the initial training of Philosophy teachers. Because this is a study involving quantitative and qualitative elements, appropriate methodological procedures were adopted to carry out the investigation, combining content analysis with data tabulation. As sources, in addition to PPPs and current legislation, theoretical references were consulted that could assist in the reflection on the problem in question. Keywords: Philosophy Teaching; Bachelor's; Federal University. La presencia del área de Enseñanza de la Filosofía en los cursos de pedagogía en Filosofía de las universidades estatales Resumen: El presente artículo tiene por objetivo evaluar la presencia del área de Enseñanza de la Filosofía en los cursos de pedagogía en Filosofía de las universidades públicas estatales. Para eso, comenzamos con la siguiente indagación: ¿El área de Enseñanza de la Filosofía existe en los cursos de pedagogía en Filosofía? La cuestión surge a partir de un problema detectado en otros estudios, esto es, las marcadas características de una formación de licenciatura que presentan los cursos de pedagogía en Filosofía. Después de consultar el Proyecto Político-Pedagógico (PPP’s) de estos cursos, se confirmó que, aunque tímida, el área de Enseñanza de la Filosofía es una realidad en parte de ellos, mientras que en otros es casi inexistente. El diagnóstico y la reflexión realizados puedan colaborar con la reformulación curricular o el fortalecimiento de la formación inicial de los/las profesores/as de Filosofía. Por ser un estudio que contiene elementos cuantitativos y cualitativos, fueron adoptados procedimientos metodológicos apropiados para la realización de la investigación, uniendo el análisis de contenido con la tabulación de datos. Como fuente, además de los PPP’s y de la legislación vigente, fueron consultadas referencias teóricas que pudiesen contribuir en la reflexión en torno del problema en cuestión. Palabras clave: Enseñanza de la Filosofía; pedagogía; universidad estatal. Data de registro: 20/01/2023 Data de aceite: 24/01/2024. (shrink)

"The picture of Hume clinging timidly to a raft of custom and artifice, because, poor skeptic, he has no alternative, is wrong," writes John Stewart. "Hume was confident that by experience and reflection philosophers can achieve true principles." In this revisionary work Stewart surveys all of David Hume's major writings to reveal him as a liberal moral and political philosopher. Against the background of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century history and thought, Hume emerges as a proponent not of conservatism but of reform. Stewart (...) first presents the dilemma over morals in the modern natural-law school, then examines the new approach to moral and political philosophy adopted by Hume's precursors Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler. Illuminating Hume's explanation of the standards and rules that should govern private and public life, the author challenges interpretations of Hume's philosophy as conservative by demonstrating that he did not dismiss reason as a key factor determining right and wrong in moral and political contexts. Stewart goes on to show that Hume viewed private property, the market, contracts, and the rule of law as essential to genuine civilized society, and explores Hume's criticism of contemporary British beliefs concerning government, religion, commerce, international relations, and social structure. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Bioethics as it stands today is a typically American product, but whether it can be spread across the globe as easily as Coca-Cola remains to be seen. Historically, we can observe that the internationalization of bioethics has taken place in a form of concentric waves beginning in the United States and encompassing increasingly new territories having older roots. Born in the 1960s, bioethics as the study of ethical issues in life sciences began to permeate the Anglo-Saxon world. Ten years later (...) it penetrated countries with developed liberal democratic traditions and remnants of the different Protestant attitudes to life where issues such as patients' rights, abortion, euthanasia, eugenics quickly started to appear frequently in newspapers, magazines, and on television. Then in the '80s the bioethics wave swept into the European community, and by the end of the '80s and early '90s bioethics advanced timidly into Eastern Europe. Because the difficult birth of bioethics in Eastern Europe is not widely known, the purpose here is to provide a perspective of that development, including its struggle with a totalitarian legacy, as well as to offer some comments as to how current cultural gaps between East and West, and especially between the Western and Orthodox worlds, might be bridged. (shrink)

The reappearance of the question of moral judgments by historians makes a reappraisal of the issues timely. Almost all that has been written on the subject addresses only the propriety of moral judgments in the written texts historians produce. However, historians have to make moral choices when selecting a subject upon which to write; and they make a tacit moral commitment to write and teach honestly. Historians usually dislike making explicit moral evaluations, and have little or no training in how (...) to do so. They can argue it’s not their job; they are only finders of fact. Historians holding a determinist view of actions do not think it appropriate to blame people for doing what they couldn’t help doing; for those believing there is an overall pattern to history, individual morality is beside the point. Finally, since earlier cultures had values different from ours, it seems unjust to hold them to contemporary standards. This essay modifies or rejects these arguments. Some historians have manifested ambivalence, acknowledging it is difficult or impossible to avoid making moral evaluations . Ordinary-language philosophers, noting that historiography has no specialized vocabulary, see it as saturated by the values inherent in everyday speech and thought. I argue that the historicist argument about the inevitably time-bound limitation of all values is exaggerated. Historians who believe in the religious grounding of values obviously disagree with it; but even on a secular level, morals are often confused with mores. If historians inevitably make moral evaluations, they should examine what philosophical ethicists—virtue ethicists, deontologists, and consequentialists—have said about how to make them; and even if they find no satisfactory grounding for their own moral attitudes, it is a brute fact that they have them. I end with an argument for “strong evaluations”—neither treating them as a troublesome residue in historiography nor, having despaired of finding a solid philosophical ground for moral evaluations, concluding that they are merely matters of taste. I believe historians should embrace the role of moral commentators, but that they should be aware that their evaluations are, like all historical judgments, subject to the criticisms of their colleagues and readers. Historians run little risk of being censorious and self-righteous; the far greater danger is acquiescing in or contributing to moral confusion and timidity. (shrink)