In the last two centuries, our world would have been a safer place if philosophers such as Rousseau, Marx, and Nietzsche had not given intellectual encouragement to the radical ideologies of Jacobins, Stalinists, and fascists. Maybe the world would have been better off, from the standpoint of sound practice, if philosophers had engaged in only modest, decent theory, as did John Stuart Mill. Yet, as Ronald Beiner contends, the point of theory is not to think safe thoughts; the point is (...) to open intellectual horizons. In Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, Beiner reflects on the dualism of theory and practice. The purpose of the theorist is not to offer sensible guidance on the conduct of social life but to test the boundaries of our vision of social order. Whereas the liberal citizen should embody the practical virtues of prudence and moderation, the theorist should be radical, probing, and immoderate. Looking back at the liberal-communitarian debate of the 1980s, Beiner recognizes that the antidote to our spiritless times lies neither in the embrace of community over individualism nor of individualism over community: both individual and community need to be submitted to radical questioning. It is by exposing ourselves to the challenge of fearless thinking encountered at the philosophical extremities that we are most likely to understand our own world at a deeper level. In this collection of essays and reviews, Ronald Beiner helps us to think critically about the thought-worlds of our foremost contemporary thinkers, including Hannah Arendt, Allan Bloom, Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg Gadamer, J¦rgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka, Christopher Lasch, Richard Rorty, Judith Shklar, Leo Strauss, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. (shrink)

Within the political lexicon of the European Middle Ages, tyranny (along with related terms such as tyrant and tyrannical) constituted one of its most ubiquitous and flexibly applied discursive fields. Moreover, once Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics began to circulate in the West after their translation into Latin in the mid-1200s, a closely related term for tyranny emerged: despotism. Yet when we turn to Marsiglio of Padua, the fourteenth-century political theorist who is often regarded to be the quintessential medieval exponent of (...) Aristotelian political ideas, we find remarkably few references to either tyranny or despotism. The present article examines how Marsiglio deploys the languages of tyranny and despotism in his major work, the Defensor pacis (completed in 1324). Three intertwined theses are proposed. First, the occasions on which Marsiglio invokes tyranny and despotism reveal a great deal about his intellectual connection to his supposed source, Aristotle. Second, unacknowledged dimensions of Marsiglio’s highly critical attitude toward the papacy, especially the doctrine of the papal plenitude of power (plenitudo potestatas), may be illuminated. Third, examination of the languages of tyranny and despotism reveals additional insights into Marsiglio’s signature theory of political consent espoused in the first discourse of the Defensor pacis. (shrink)