Hugely controversial on publication, this is an insightful and characteristically entertaining survey of animal behaviour and the evolution of aggression throughout the animal world.

"Dialogisches Handeln" ist eine Sammlung von philosophischen BeitrAgen zum dialogischen Konstruktivismus im Sinne von Kuno Lorenz, der Philosophie als eine Kommunikation mit Selbstreflexion versteht. Dabei umfaAt der Dialog in diesem Buch verschiedene Disziplinen der Philosophie - von der Anthropologie A1/4ber die Grundlagen von Logik und Sprachphilosophie bis hin zur Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie. Die Reflexion auf die kommunikativen Grundlagen wissenschaftlichen Austauschs schlieAt dabei Denkperspektiven verschiedener Wissenschaften - von der Psychologie bis zu Physik und Chemie - ebenso ein wie die philosophischen (...) Disziplinen. (shrink)

Hendrik Lorenz presents a comprehensive study of Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of non-rational desire. They see this as something that humans share with animals, and which aims primarily at the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. Lorenz explores the cognitive resources that both philosophers make available for the explanation of such desires, and what they take rationality to add to the motivational structure of human beings. In doing so, he finds conceptions of the mind that are coherent and (...) deeply integrated with both philosophers' views about such topics as the relation between body and soul, or the nature of the virtues. (shrink)

According to terror management theory, humans rely on meaningful and permanence-promising cultural worldviews, like religion, to manage mortality concerns. Prior research indicates that, compared to religious individuals, atheists experience lower levels of meaning in life following reminders of death. The present study investigated whether reminders of death would change atheists’ meaning in life after exposure to normative support for atheism. Atheists were either reminded of death or a control topic and exposed to information portraying atheism as either common or rare, (...) and then asked to rate their perceived meaning in life. Results showed that reminders of death reduced meaning in life among atheists who were told that atheism is common. Results were consistent with the view that atheism reflects the rejection of religious faith rather than a meaningful secular terror managing worldview. Discussion considers implications for maintaining healthy existential wellbeing, identifies limitations, and highlights future research directions. (shrink)

In the context of network-ecological thought, information ethics is perhaps best understood as a transversal reflexive practice, aimed at identifying the stakes attending the creation, consumption, and disposal of infor-mation technologies. To situate itself as well as potential interlocutors, such a thought requires correspondingly complex cartographies, a multidimensional mapping of practices and presuppositions, of individual, collective, institutional actors as well as the conditions of possibility of their mutual engagement. Such cartographies do not assume the existence of the „local“ or the (...) „global“ as a given. Instead, they attend to the way human and non-human actors and the discursive and material practices they are involved in contribute to construction and reconstruction of geocultural formations. Reapproached from within such a „network-ecological“ horizon, information ethics becomes geophilosophy, generating new modalities of intervention in the conflictual dynamics associated with the social-economic life of waste. (shrink)

The vision of an internet of things, increasingly considered in the context of the “internet of everything”, calls for an ethics of technology driven less by the philosophical search for the essence of technology than by a transversal curiosity regarding processes of constitution. If growing interest in enhanced and expanded media literacy approaches facilitates ethical reflection, the scope of such reflection is related to the extent of our attention to and awareness of the immanence of our agency, our capacity for (...) relation in machinic assemblages that structure and sustain our communicative existences far beyond the sphere of signification. While the positions from which such reflection occurs are necessarily multiple, we can still respond to the distribution of agency with an aggregation of responsibility and the creation of a commons with greater attention to the vastness of the spatial and temporal scales of our situation. The idea of depletion design is both a concrete set of design strategies and an attempt to establish an experimental institutional object to facilitate and frame such ethico-aesthetic practice, an architecture for commoning that situates and affirms our ethical agency under the conditions of mediation. (shrink)

Various authors have argued that in the future not only will it be technically feasible for human minds to be transferred to other substrates, but this will become, for most humans, the preferred option over the current biological limitations. It has even been claimed that such a scenario is inevitable in order to solve the challenging, but imperative, multi-agent value alignment problem. In all these considerations, it has been overlooked that, in order to create a suitable environment for a particular (...) mind – for example, a personal universe in a computational substrate – numerous other potentially sentient beings will have to be created. These range from non-player characters to subroutines. This article analyzes the additional suffering and mind crimes that these scenarios might entail. We offer a partial solution to reduce the suffering by imposing on the transferred mind the perception of indicators to measure potential suffering in non-player characters. This approach can be seen as implementing literal empathy through enhanced cognition. (shrink)

"Presents, and in part develops, a systematic philosophy as the universal science, or the theorization of the unrestricted universe of discourse, explicitly including being as such and as a whole. Argues that complete exploration of the theoretical domain requires such a science"--Provided by publisher.

This paper studies John Buridan's octagons of opposition for the de re modal propositions and the propositions of unusual construction. Both Buridan himself and the secondary literature have emphasized the strong similarities between these two octagons (as well as a third one, for propositions with oblique terms). In this paper, I argue that the interconnection between both octagons is more subtle than has previously been thought: if we move beyond the Aristotelian relations, and also take Boolean considerations into account, then (...) the strong analogy between Buridan's octagons starts to break down. These differences in Boolean structure can already be discerned within the octagons themselves; on a more abstract level, they lead to these two octagons having different degrees of Boolean complexity (i.e. Boolean closures of different sizes). These results are obtained by means of bitstring analysis, which is one of the key tools from contemporary logical geometry. Finally, I argue that this historical investigation is directly relevant for the theoretical framework of logical geometry, and discuss how it helps us to address certain open questions in this framework. (shrink)

This paper studies the Lockean thesis from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic. The Lockean thesis states that belief can be defined as ‘sufficiently high degree of belief’. Its main problem is that it gives rise to a notion of belief which is not closed under conjunction. This problem is typical for classical epistemic logic: it is single-agent and static. I argue that from the perspective of contemporary epistemic logic, the Lockean thesis fares much better. I briefly mention that it (...) can successfully be extended from single-agent to multi-agent settings. More importantly, I show that accepting the Lockean thesis (and a more sophisticated version for conditional beliefs) leads to a significant and unexpected unification in the dynamic behavior of (conditional) belief and high (conditional) probability with respect to public announcements. This constitutes a methodological argument in favor of the Lockean thesis. Furthermore, if one accepts Baltag’s Erlangen program for epistemology, this technical observation has even stronger philosophical implications: because belief and high probability display the same dynamic behavior, it is plausible that they are indeed one and the same epistemic notion. (shrink)

For a set M, let \\) denote the set of all finite sequences which can be formed with elements of M, and let \ denote the set of all 2-element subsets of M. Furthermore, for a set A, let Open image in new window denote the cardinality of A. It will be shown that the following statement is consistent with Zermelo–Fraenkel Set Theory \: There exists a set M such that Open image in new window and no function Open image (...) in new window is finite-to-one. (shrink)

Aristotle takes practical wisdom and arts or crafts to be forms of knowledge which, we argue, can usefully be thought of as ‘empiricist’. This empiricism has two key features: knowledge does not rest on grasping unobservable natures or essences; and knowledge does not rest on grasping logical relations that hold among propositions. Instead, knowledge rests on observation, memory, experience and everyday uses of reason. While Aristotle’s conception of theoretical knowledge does require grasping unobservable essences and logical relations that hold among (...) suitable propositions, his conception of practical and productive knowledge avoids such requirements and is consistent with empiricism. (shrink)

Duality in Logic and Language [draft--do not cite this article] Duality phenomena occur in nearly all mathematically formalized disciplines, such as algebra, geometry, logic and natural language semantics. However, many of these disciplines use the term ‘duality’ in vastly different senses, and while some of these senses are intimately connected to each other, others seem to be entirely … Continue reading Duality in Logic and Language →.

Although universities have undergone changes since the dawn of their existence, the speed of change started to accelerate remarkably in the 1960s. Spectacular growth in the number of students and faculty was immediately followed by administrative reforms aimed at managing this growth and managing the demands of students for democratic reform and societal relevance. Since the 1980s, however, an entirely different wind has been blowing along the academic corridors. The fiscal crisis of the welfare states and the neoliberal course of (...) the Reagan and Thatcher governments made the battle against budget deficits and against government spending into a political priority. Education, together with social security and health care, were targeted directly. As the eighties went on, the neoliberal agenda became more radical—smaller state and bigger market—attacking the public sector itself through efforts to systematically reduce public expenditure by privatizing public services and introducing market incentives. At the same time the societal relevance of the universities demanded by critical students was turned on its head to become economic relevance to business and industry in the knowledge society. (shrink)

For \(n\in \omega \), the weak choice principle \(\textrm{RC}_n\) is defined as follows: _For every infinite set_ _X_ _there is an infinite subset_ \(Y\subseteq X\) _with a choice function on_ \([Y]^n:=\{z\subseteq Y:|z|=n\}\). The choice principle \(\textrm{C}_n^-\) states the following: _For every infinite family of_ _n_-_element sets, there is an infinite subfamily_ \({\mathcal {G}}\subseteq {\mathcal {F}}\) _with a choice function._ The choice principles \(\textrm{LOC}_n^-\) and \(\textrm{WOC}_n^-\) are the same as \(\textrm{C}_n^-\), but we assume that the family \({\mathcal {F}}\) is linearly orderable (...) (for \(\textrm{LOC}_n^-\) ) or well-orderable (for \(\textrm{WOC}_n^-\) ). In the first part of this paper, for \(m,n\in \omega \) we will give a full characterization of when the implication \(\textrm{RC}_m\Rightarrow \textrm{WOC}_n^-\) holds in \({\textsf {ZF}}\). We will prove the independence results by using suitable Fraenkel-Mostowski permutation models. In the second part, we will show some generalizations. In particular, we will show that \(\textrm{RC}_5\Rightarrow \textrm{LOC}_5^-\) and that \(\textrm{RC}_6\Rightarrow \textrm{C}_3^-\), answering two open questions from Halbeisen and Tachtsis (Arch Math Logik 59(5):583–606, 2020). Furthermore, we will show that \(\textrm{RC}_6\Rightarrow \textrm{C}_9^-\) and that \(\textrm{RC}_7\Rightarrow \textrm{LOC}_7^-\). (shrink)

Several authors have recently studied Aristotelian diagrams for various metatheoretical notions from logic, such as tautology, satisfiability, and the Aristotelian relations themselves. However, all these metalogical Aristotelian diagrams focus on the semantic (model-theoretical) perspective on logical consequence, thus ignoring the complementary, and equally important, syntactic (proof-theoretical) perspective. In this paper, I propose an explanation for this discrepancy, by arguing that the metalogical square of opposition for semantic consequence exhibits a natural analogy to the well-known square of opposition for the categorical (...) statements from syllogistics, but that this analogy breaks down once we move from semantic to syntactic consequence. I then show that despite this difficulty, one can indeed construct metalogical Aristotelian diagrams from a syntactic perspective, which have their own, equally elegant characterization in terms of the categorical statements. Finally, I construct several metalogical Aristotelian diagrams that incorporate both semantic and syntactic consequence (and their interaction), and study how they are influenced by the underlying logical system’s soundness and/or completeness. All of this provides further support for the methodological/heuristic perspective on Aristotelian diagrams, which holds that the main use of these diagrams lies in facilitating analogies and comparisons between prima facie unrelated domains of investigation. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of authors have started studying Aristotelian diagrams containing metalogical notions, such as tautology, contradiction, satisfiability, contingency, strong and weak interpretations of contrariety, etc. The present paper is a contribution to this line of research, and its main aims are both to extend and to deepen our understanding of metalogical diagrams. As for extensions, we not only study several metalogical decorations of larger and less widely known Aristotelian diagrams, but also consider metalogical decorations of another type (...) of logical diagrams, viz. duality diagrams. At a more fundamental level, we present a unifying perspective which sheds new light on the connections between new and existing metalogical diagrams, as well as between object- and metalogical diagrams. Overall, the paper studies two types of logical diagrams and four kinds of metalogical decorations. (shrink)

The extensive research in logic conducted by using concepts and methods of game theory as documented in this collection of papers, allows to see dialogue logic in a number of new perspectives. This situation may gain further clarity by looking back to the inception of dialogue logic in the late fifties and early sixties.

Three parts of philosophical papers concerned with works, matters and traditions, respectively, present ways of dealing methodically with problems that arise while having and articulating experience. The contents range from philosophy in Antiquity as well as Buddhist to existentialism and analytic philosophy, from relating science and art to the antagonism between freedom and justice. By reflecting on the particular steps of argument the papers become samples of dialogical philosophy with respect both to subject matter and means of procedure.

For an integer \, Ramsey Choice\ is the weak choice principle “every infinite setxhas an infinite subset y such that\ has a choice function”, and \ is the weak choice principle “every infinite family of n-element sets has an infinite subfamily with a choice function”. In 1995, Montenegro showed that for \, \. However, the question of whether or not \ for \ is still open. In general, for distinct \, not even the status of “\” or “\” is known. (...) In this paper, we provide partial answers to the above open problems and among other results, we establish the following:1.For every integer \, if \ is true for all integers i with \, then \ is true for all integers i with \.2.If \ are any integers such that for some prime p we have \ and \, then in \: \ and \.3.For \, \\\ implies \, and \ implies neither \ nor \ in \.4.For every integer \, \ implies “every infinite linearly orderable family of k-element sets has a partial Kinna–Wagner selection function” and the latter implication is not reversible in \ ). In particular, \ strictly implies “every infinite linearly orderable family of 3-element sets has a partial choice function”.5.The Chain-AntiChain Principle implies neither \ nor \ in \, for every integer \. (shrink)

The chapter describes the sharing economy in Germany as a heterogeneous dynamic, combining local trends and histories with economic forms drawing on experiences mainly from across Europe and North America. Increasingly taken into account by policymakers in the regulation of markets and the redesign of innovation governance frameworks, “sharing” as a complex nexus linking the exercise of citizenship to sustainable consumption and informational self-determination in digital societies will continue to drive and frame the creation of value chains. Of particular interest (...) are linkages between sharing economies and the traditions of cooperativism, currently experiencing a renaissance. The latter is key because it shapes the context in which sharing economy initiatives exist and expand—an opening of definitions and narrative of innovation, of value, and of collaborative agency and cooperative management. (shrink)

In logic, Aristotelian diagrams are almost always assumed to be closed under negation, and are thus highly symmetric in nature. In linguistics, by contrast, these diagrams are used to study lexicalization, which is notoriously not closed under negation, thus yielding more asymmetric diagrams. This paper studies the interplay between logical symmetry and linguistic asymmetry in Aristotelian diagrams. I discuss two major symmetric Aristotelian diagrams, viz. the square and the hexagon of opposition, and show how linguistic considerations yield various asymmetric versions (...) of these diagrams. I then discuss a pentagon of opposition, which occupies an uneasy position between the square and the hexagon. Although this pentagon belongs neither to the symmetric realm of logic nor to the asymmetric realm of linguistics, it occurs several times in the literature. The oldest known occurrence can be found in the cosmological work of the 14th-century author Nicole Oresme. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 122-123 [Access article in PDF] Andreas Kamp. Philosophiehistorie als Rezeptionsgeschichte. Die Reaktion auf Aristoteles' De Anima-Noetik. Der frühe Hellenismus. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 2001. Pp. viii + 315. Cloth, $82.00. This book is the first installment of an extraordinarily ambitious project. The plan is to investigate the reception of Aristotle's conception of the intellect, set out in De Anima 3.4-5, in (...) the subsequent history of philosophy, from Theophrastus to the present.The current volume deals with the natural starting-point for this project, philosophy in the early Hellenistic period, centering on Theophrastus and his tenure as head of the Peripatos, the school that Aristotle founded.Kamp begins with an engaging, somewhat lengthy introduction, which remains curiously remote from what one might expect it to concentrate on, namely Aristotle's conception of the intellect. Apart from presenting an outline of the reception of Aristotle's philosophical work in general from Theophrastus to Sigmund Freud, the introduction includes only one short paragraph specifically on the topic of the intellect (12). This paragraph, which comes closest to revealing Kamp's reason for focusing, of all things, on Aristotle's discussion of the intellect in De Anima3.4-5, simply makes two unsubstantiated claims. First, Kamp claims that the conception of the intellect, as presented in those chapters, is at the center of the Aristotelian system; and secondly, that this is, of all Aristotelian and perhaps all philosophical theories, the one that received the highest level of attention in the subsequent history of philosophy. The reader might be content to wait and let the second claim be borne out, in the present volume and beyond; but the first claim—concerning the centrality of the intellect, and of De Anima3.4-5, to Aristotle's thought—should at least have received some specification and illustration.The central part of the book, and philosophically by far the most interesting, concerns Theophrastus. Kamp begins with an extensive discussion of the political, social, and economic circumstances of Theophrastus's biography and of the history of the Peripatos. He then offers a reconstruction of Theophrastus's remarks on the nature of the intellect in the fifth book of his Physics. This reconstructive effort is based on a number of fragments [End Page 122] preserved in Themistius's De Anima paraphrase (written at about 350ad) and in Priscianus Lydus's Metaphrasis in Theophrastum (about 530ad). Kamp's discussion of these fragments is well informed, judicious, and illuminating throughout.It may be in order, though, to indicate one misgiving. One of the problems that Theophrastus addresses is that it might appear as if thinking were a matter of the intellect being changed by intelligibles, much as perceiving is, or may appear to be, a matter of sense being changed by sensibles. (If so, the question arises as to what the principle of thought is, the intellect itself or the intelligibles.) Kamp reconstructs the train of thought as follows (124-5).(1) The intellect stands to intelligibles the way sense stands to sensibles (intellect-sense analogy).(2) Sense is changed by sensibles.Therefore, the intellect is changed by intelligibles.Kamp proceeds to suggest (126) that Theophrastus attempted to avoid the conclusion by denying the first premise. According to Kamp, Theophrastus rejected the intellect-sense analogy by drawing attention to significant differences between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception, one of these being that the intellect (in thinking) is changed only in a special sense, namely inasmuch as it undergoes a transition to activity, energeia. Kamp is right that the notion of a special kind of change that consists in a transition to activity is Aristotelian; it is presented in considerable detail in De Anima2.5 (417b2-16). But it would surely be puzzling if Theophrastus thought that one significant difference between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception was that the intellect (in thinking) was changed in a special sense (whereas sense perception, to complete the... (shrink)

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither “deflationary” nor “substantive”.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In (...) particular, it is shown that generally an “objectual” ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting “objects” (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of “primary states of affairs”. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible. (shrink)

This article describes a specific pedagogical context for an advanced logic course and presents a strategy that might facilitate students’ transition from the object-theoretical to the metatheoretical perspective on logic. The pedagogical context consists of philosophy students who in general have had little training in logic, except for a thorough introduction to syllogistics. The teaching strategy tries to exploit this knowledge of syllogistics, by emphasizing the analogies between ideas from metalogic and ideas from syllogistics, such as existential import, the distinction (...) between contradictories and contraries, and the square of opposition. This strategy helps to improve students’ understanding of metalogic, because it allows the students to integrate these new ideas with their previously acquired knowledge of syllogistics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:I argue that there are, according to Aristotle, two importantly different kinds of goals or ends in the domain of human agency and that one of these two kinds has been frequently, though not universally, overlooked. Apart from psychological goals, goals that agents adopt as their purposes, there are also, I submit, goals that actions have by being the kinds of actions they are and, in some cases, by occurring in the circumstances in which they do. These latter goals belong (...) to suitable actions whether or not agents adopt them as purposes and whether or not agents are aware of them. There is evidence both in Aristotle's ethical writings and in his discussion of chance and luck in Physics II.4–6 that he recognizes goals of this latter kind. (shrink)

What are the relationships between philosophy and the history of philosophy, the history of science and the philosophy of science? This selection of essays by Lorenz Krüger (1932-1994) presents exemplary studies on the philosophy of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, on the history of physics and on the scope and limitations of scientific explanation, and a realistic understanding of science and truth. In his treatment of leading currents in 20th century philosophy, Krüger presents new and original arguments for a (...) deeper understanding of the continuity and dynamics of the development of scientific theory. These result in significant consequences for the claim of the sciences that they understand reality in a rational manner. The case studies are complemented by fundamental thoughts on the relationship between philosophy, science, and their common history. (shrink)

For a ⊆ b ⊆ ω with b\ a infinite, the set D = {x ∈ [ω]ω : a ⊆ x ⊆ b} is called a doughnut. A set S ⊆ [ω]ω has the doughnut property [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D] if it contains or is disjoint from a doughnut. It is known that not every set S ⊆ [ω]ω has the doughnut property, but S has the doughnut property if it has the Baire property ℬ or the Ramsey property ℛ. (...) In this paper it is shown that a finite support iteration of length ω1 of Cohen forcing, starting from L, yields a model for CH + equation image + equation image + equation image. (shrink)