Simmias' famous epiphenomenalist analogy of the soul-body relation to the harmony and strings of a lyre leads to Socrates' initial refutation and subsequent prolonged defense of soul's immortality in the Phaedo. It also yields in late antiquity significant treatments of the harmony relation by Plotinus and Porphyry that present a larger context for viewing the nature of harmony in the soul and the psycho-somatic compound. But perhaps the most detailed treatment of the musical analogy, and certainly the most radical, (...) is to be found in Gregory of Nyssa's De Hominis Opificio. Gregory's remarkable development of the musical instrument analogy provides a multi-layered analysis of interrelated causality on the mechanistic, physiological, psycho-somatic and intellectual/spiritual planes. Gregory not only sees mind/soul and body as radically equal and yet multilayered in their mutual development; he also refuses to restrict mind to the brain alone, for all physiological systems, in his view, are holistically and individually expressive of mind's activity. Gregory's theory is more innovative than Augustine's view of the mind/soul-body relation and, in my view, the most important account between Plotinus and Aquinas. (shrink)

There is growing recognition in Phaedo scholarship of a parallel between the deuteros plous passage and the introduction to Simmias' speech: both speak of attempting to discover or to learn the truth about things, and then, if that proves impossible, to resort to divine or human logoi, the former being the "safer" of the two. It is contended that that model governs Socrates reply to Cebes: he first tried to discover the truth about causes by himself; then he tried (...) to learn it from Anaxagoras; and then, having failed in both endeavors, he resorted to logoi, both "divine" in the hypothesis of the forms and "human" in the hypothesis of intermediates, the former being the "safest" recourse. Finally, a defense is provided for the thesis that in calling the deuteros plous "deuteros," Socrates is being ironical. (shrink)

La objeción que Simmias formula en el Fedón (85e-86d) responde al tercer argumento presentado por Sócrates acerca de la inmortalidad del alma, a saber, el argumento de la afinidad (78b-84b). Allí Simmias sugiere que el alma es una especie de armonía. Como la armonía desaparece tras la destrucción de la lira, entonces hay que afirmar que el alma desaparece tras la destrucción del cuerpo. O bien, habría que afirmar que la armonía sobrevive a la destrucción de la lira, (...) lo cual es absurdo. Ante la objeción, Sócrates formula tres refutaciones que se dirigen específicamente contra la tesis del alma como armonía. Proponemos que ἁρμονία debe entenderse como afinación para comprender el sentido de la objeción de Simmias y de las refutaciones de Sócrates. Esta tesis del alma como ἁρμονία fue atribuida mayormente al pitagorismo, especialmente a Filolao. No obstante, si se entiende el término ἁρμονία como afinación, se presentan problemas teóricos para aceptar la atribución. (shrink)

At Phaedo 86b7–c2 Simmias puts forward the theory that the soul is the attunement of bodily elements. Many scholars have claimed that this theory originates in the Pythagoreans, especially Philolaus. The claim is largely based on their reading of the Phaedo, since we have scarce doxographical evidence. In this paper I show that the dialogue in question does not constitute any evidence for the Pythagorean origin of Simmias’ attunement theory, and that it rather represents the theory as stemming (...) from a materialistic world view that had become widespread among people at that time. I also pursue the question how and why, then, the attunement theory was able to attract many people, by examining its relation to Socrates’ affinity argument. (shrink)

In thePhaedo, Socrates warns his listeners, discouraged by the objections of Simmias and Cebes, against becoming haters oflogoi. I argue that the ‘misologists’ are presented as a type of proto-skeptic and that Socrates in fact shows covert sympathy for their position. The difference between them is revealed by the pragmatic argument for trust in the immortality of the soul that Socrates offers near the end of the passage: the misologists reject such therapeutic uses oflogos. I conclude by assessing the (...) relationship of the positions of Socrates and the misologists in thePhaedoto those of later ancient skeptics. (shrink)

Interpretations of recollection in the "Phaedo" are divided between ordinary interpretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible (...) particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the "Phaedo", recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum. (shrink)

This chapter examines Plato's recurrent response to the “Growing Argument” in the dialogue that exhibits Plato's most extensive evaluation of the concept of “number,” Phaedo. There, Plato illustrates mathematical Pythagorean argumentative techniques in the figures of Socrates's interlocutors Simmias and Cebes, and critiques them according to whether or not they exhibit a proper methodological rigor. The proposition of Forms and teleological causation generates new ways of thinking about number. When Socrates finally develops the most complete analysis of number that (...) can be found in Plato's oeuvre, in the final argument, he does so chiefly in order to lay the groundwork for a proof of the soul's immortality. The Phaedo thus illustrates Plato's most circumspect appropriation of mathematical Pythagorean concepts. (shrink)

Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul DAVID APOLLONI VROM Phaedo 78b to 8od, Socrates attempts to answer Simmias' fear that, even if the soul has existed eternally before birth, it might be dispersed and this would be the end of its existence . His answer is an argument which attempts to show that the soul is incomposite because it is similar to the Forms and dissimilar to physical objects. To date, this argument -- the so-called Aftin- (...) ity Argument -- has not received much sympathy from Plato's commentators, who universally consider it the weakest of Plato's arguments for the immortal- ity of the soul? The lack of sympathy and enthusiasm for this argument is not difficult to understand. Just consider the following outline of the argument. The soul is invisible, therefore the soul is more similar to the Invisible, i.e., the Forms, which are always the same, than are bodies, which are visible and which are constantly changing, and which are more similar to the Visible than is the soul . Further, the soul is more like the Always the Same in that when it uses the body to see or hear or perceive, it is "dragged" by the body into the Never the Same, and the soul "wanders and is confused and whirls as if intoxicated" insofar as the soul has come in contact with such things . Whereas when the soul considers by itself, it goes to the realm of the Forms, and ceases its wandering. Therefore the soul is more like the Always.. (shrink)

Plato's central contribution to psychology is his theory of the tripartite soul. This is at once a theory about the nature of the embodied human soul and a theory of human motivation. This article emphasizes on the importance and immortality of the soul. Plato does say that perceptible particulars derive their names from the forms they partake of their souls. One of his arguments against the harmonia theory of the soul, put forward by Simmias, relies on the occurrence of (...) conflicts between desires and also of conflicts between how one decides to act and how anger or fear incline one to act. Among other things, he points out that people who are thirsty may nonetheless be averse to drinking. (shrink)

According to Platonism, "Socrates is wise" expresses the exemplification by Socrates of the property of being wise; while "Simmias is taller than Socrates" expresses the exemplification by <Simmias, Socrates> of the relation of being taller than. What about "Socrates is as tall as Socrates"? Is this property or relation exemplification? I show there is an answer that solves Russell's Paradox, Plato's "Third Man" argument, and the Greeling-Nelson paradox of non-self-applying terms.

In this paper I argue for a reading of the Phaedo which takes into account the different levels of understanding and the different intentions of the partners to the dialectical discussions. Taking as an instantiation the argument about recollection, I show that the steps leading to the conclusion of the soul’s prenatal knowledge are steps to which Socrates’ interlocutor Simmias is committed; Socrates the questioner, however, does not commit himself to the concessions elicited from his partner.

Phaedo. As I recall. when these points had been granted him, and it was agreed that each of the forms was something, and that the other things, partaking in them. took the name of the forms themselves, he next asked: ‘If you say that that is so, then whenever you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, you mean the, don't you, that both things are in Simmias, tallness and shortness?’.

In the course of a series of arguments to refute Simmias' hypothesis that soul is an attunement Socrates asks the question , which may be literally translated ‘Is it not natural for each attunement to be an attunement according as it has been attuned?’ This question Simmias admits he does not understand, and Socrates responds with another question in which he suggests that if it is more attuned and to a greater extent, supposing that it is possible for (...) this to happen, it would be more of an attunement and a greater attunement, if less attuned and to a smaller extent, less of an attunement and a smaller attunement .if less attuned and to a smaller extent, less of an attunement and a smaller attunement . Neither the meaning of these questions nor their place in the argument is at all obvious, and none of the solutions offered by the English commentators seems to be without difficulty. (shrink)

In a Realist ontology relations are subsisting or existing entities distinct from ordinary things. Idealists claim that the notion of relations is subject to a vicious infinite regress. Nominalists claim that relations are particularized instances. In an attempt to search for the roots of a Realist conception of relations and to meet these challenges I investigate Plato's conception of relations in the Phaedo. ;Against the current of a majority of Plato scholars, Castaneda finds evidence for a distinction between relations and (...) properties at Phaedo 102 b-d. I enter the debate on Castaneda's side and find support for his interpretation of the passage in the context of the dialogue as a whole. The relation--quality distinction resolves the paradox of Simmias being both taller than Socrates and shorter than Phaedo at the same time, since Plato possesses relational characteristics of tallness and shortness, which are not contraries unlike the the contrary properties of hot and cold which could not coexist in an individual. Gallop offers the alternative essence--accident distinction which also resolves the paradox since tallness and shortness as accidents may coexist. The latter distinction however Aristotelianizes Plato. I have shown how the essence--accident distinction is incompatible with Plato's theory of Forms, as it leads to such odd conclusions as the admittance of accidental Forms. ;Castaneda claims that Plato reduces relations to Form-chains in which individuals participate in pairs. I offer the alternative of Plato's positing of relational Forms as distinct from monadic Forms. I survey the corpus of Platonic dialogues in search of support for the distinction between relations and properties. I find that in the Statesman there is a distinction between two types of Forms which generates the distinction between monadic Forms and relational Forms. ;I conclude that there is ample evidence in Plato's dialogues and in Aristotle's assessment of Plato to ascribe this distinction to Plato. Plato's explanation of relations in terms of Forms, which have the highest grade of reality for him, sets up the basis for any Realist theory of relations--for reductionist theories reducing relations to relational properties or some other subsisting entities, as well as for the irreducible concept of relations as abstract subsisting entities. (shrink)

Ancient philosophy has been a source of inspiration for contemporary philosophy in recent decades. An outstanding example is the renaissance of hylomorphism in the field of philosophy of biology. For the philosophy of mind, hylomorphism has been little discussed so far. Therefore, ancient models in the philosophy of mind are still of interest. This article argues that Plato’s Phaedo can act as a source for contemporary debates. As a starting point, Simmias’s objections to the immortality of the soul are (...) analyzed. Plato does not simply reject these objections, but introduces conditions for a hylomorphistic understanding of the soul in Socrates’ reply. These conditions are the following: (A) the mind supervenes on the body; (B) this supervenience must allow the strong emergence of the mind; (C) the mind comprises causal powers; (D) teleological explanations are a necessary ingredient of a suitable model for the mind-body problem. With these conditions, Plato already introduces central components that are present in contemporary philosophical debates, but have not yet been unified into a hylomorphistic concept in the philosophy of mind. The present article proposes this unification. (shrink)

The author of this article maintains that there is a progression in plato's "phaedo" from argument and myth to action. In the dialogue, socrates is portrayed as a believer in immortality. How is that belief conveyed to skeptics like simmias? it is argued here that plato deliberately employs a variety of methods because men are not convinced by rational argument. Plato's depiction of socrates' own death is itself the final demonstration.

Previous chapter Pulse Rhythm as Part of a Mind-Body Identity Theory? – Galen Let us now turn towards the philosophical correlates of this change in the theory of rhythm. To get a clearer picture we need to come back first to the use of its musical counterpart—the concept of harmony—in philosophy. The comparison of the soul with musical harmony, which most probably originates in Heraclitus and Pythagoras, is exposed by Simmias - Médecine – Nouvel article.

Plato seeks to establish in _Phaedrus_ a close link between poetry and the eidetic sphere to which philosophical knowledge belongs, or which the philosopher accesses through a practiced synoptic-dialectic understanding. This type of philosophical poetry is perfectly illustrated in the Socratic palinode itself, which Socrates –and ultimately Plato – establishes as a paradigm of the poet philosopher, a palinode by necessity must be uttered “with certain poetic terms”. Working from that palinode as a model, Plato seeks to approach the subject (...) of _éros_ with philosophical discourses fed with poetical terms, that is, through an explicit blend of philosophical and poetic elements, the clearest example of which is the _Phaedrus_ as a whole, or, in more general terms, the Platonic dialogical genre in as much as this puts forward an interaction between the philosophical and poetic registers. Taking into account this relationship of compatibility that Plato establishes in _Phaedrus _between the poetic-philosophical paradigm and the traditional paradigm – which in books I, III and X of the _Republic_ clearly appeared in tension–in this paper I’m interested in supporting such a relationship in the dream anecdote as told by Socrates at the start of the _Phaedo_. In this anecdote, the philosopher confesses to Simmias and Cebes that since his time in prison, although he had never done such a thing before before, he has been composing poems based on the versification and musicalization of Aesop’s fables and a hymn to Apollo. (shrink)

Socrates' last words are a microcosm of the riddle his character poses to the philosophical reader. Are they sincere or ironic? Do they represent an afterthought prompted by a belated sense of familial responsibility or a death–bed epiphany? Are we to determine their reference in relation to the surface logic of the Phaedo or take them as the sign of a concealed discursive depth? In what follows, I will argue that the answer to these questions depends upon acknowledgement and clarification (...) of the pedagogical challenge Socrates faces in conversation with Simmias and Cebes. What I have to say is prompted, in large measure, by Glenn Mosts recent article which both undertakes substantial analysis of the riddles treatment by the tradition and develops a plausible solution. I do not accept this solution. But the struggle to articulate my misgivings about his argument was indispensible to the development of my own. In view of this, it seems prudent to begin with a brief summary of the position he takes. (shrink)

This paper raises a new interpretive puzzle concerning Socrates’ attitude towards truth in the Phaedo. At one point Socrates seems to advocate that he is justified in trying to convince himself that the soul is immortal and destined for a better place regardless of whether or not these claims are true, but that Cebes and Simmias should relentlessly pursue the truth about the very same matter. This raises the question: Why might Socrates believe that he will benefit from believing (...) things about death irrespective of the truth, but that Cebes and Simmias will not? Why should they continue pursuing the truth? This paper argues that the relevant difference between Socrates and his friends is that Socrates is a fully accomplished philosopher, while his friends are not. This, I argue, makes Socrates an epistemic authority, and it is in virtue of being an epistemic authority that he is justified in not pursuing the truth about death. The upshot of this paper is that sometimes the demands of living well require that we abandon the pursuit of truth and knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:From Death to Life: Key Themes in Plato’s Phaedo by Franco TRABATTONIAthanasia A. GiasoumiTRABATTONI, Franco. From Death to Life: Key Themes in Plato’s Phaedo. Boston: Brill, 2023. 190 pp. Cloth, $143.00In his comprehensive study of the Phaedo, Franco Trabattoni challenges the conventional interpretation of Plato’s thought by denying that Plato was ever a dogmatist or a skeptic. The opening chapter proposes that Plato employs a “third way” standing (...) on the Parmenidean distinction between dôxa (belief) and epistēme (knowledge). According to Trabattoni, the Phaedo (together with all other dialogues dealing with the distinction between sensible and intelligible reality) implies that knowledge of the forms can be obtained only after the separation of body and soul and only without the assistance of intermediaries. He contends that humans have no better instrument than lôgos to discover the intelligible realities (forms) that philosophy seeks. However, because lôgos serves as an intermediary, he believes that the mediation of lôgos introduces an unavoidable fault into the cognitive process, which is directly linked to the concept of dôxa. He maintains that this hypothesis is essential for the arguments presented in the Phaedo’s first part to make sense.Trabattoni delves into the Phaedo not just philosophically but also linguistically, particularly in passage 60c, where Cebes brings up the question of suicide. Notably, in chapter 2, Trabattoni provides a new translation of this passage that contrasts with the readings supplied by Dorter, Gallop, and Boter. Trabattoni claims that Plato responds to the problem of suicide by adhering to the eudaemonistic stance that no obligation that goes against the happiness of the individual subject to it is of any value.Chapter 3 features a counterargument to the predominant viewpoint positing an inconsistency between the Phaedo and the Republic. Trabattoni asserts that these dialogues agree in maintaining that true virtue can be ascribed only to those who believe in metaphysical realities and possess an exclusive desire to acquire knowledge of them. He posits that the disparities between the two dialogues can be attributed primarily to differing perspectives rather than a significant theoretical divide.In my opinion, chapter 4 is the book’s most interesting and original portion. Here, Trabattoni argues that Plato’s contrast in the Phaedo between genuine and false philosophers is directed at Antisthenes, specifically, that Plato opposes his Socratism to Antisthenes’ by depicting the Platonic Socrates as a genuine philosopher (philōsophos) in contrast to Antisthenes’ Socrates, who is portrayed as a false one (philōdoxos). According to Trabattoni, Plato endeavors to provide what Antisthenes’ portrayal of Socrates does not, namely, a metaphysical perspective that differentiates between opinion and truth. Though novel and charming, Trabattoni’s interpretation is not supported by the text since the Phaedo makes no direct allusion to Antisthenes’ Socrates, mentioning Antisthenes only at the beginning (58b) as someone present at Socrates’ last moments. Thus, the book’s strongest section could also be considered its weakest.Chapter 5 argues that the recollection theory is not intended to establish the possibility of a complete retrieval of the knowledge of the forms. [End Page 163] Trabattoni disagrees with Scott’s and others’ assertion that recollection is a method of inquiry on the grounds that Socrates never explains how the alleged “method” of recollection should be applied. Rather, Trabattoni contends, the function of recollection is to explain why human intellective knowledge cannot exceed the boundary of dôxa. Trabattoni argues further that the recollection theory indicates that only when the soul is separated from the body, that is, when a person dies, is it possible to gain knowledge of the forms.Chapters 6 and 7 examine in depth the philosophical, methodological, and linguistic aspects of the objections raised by Cebes and Simmias as well as Socrates’ ensuing arguments regarding the immortality of the soul. Additionally, Trabattoni explores the historical background of Plato’s Phaedo and the impact on it of Pythagoreanism, Orphism, and Eleatic philosophy.Chapter 8 is another particularly captivating section. It offers a fresh perspective on the concept of the “second voyage” (deũteros ploũs), challenging the prevailing interpretation, on which the second voyage signifies the triumph of the... (shrink)

In this book two philosophers, Simmias and Cebes, who were friends and contemporaries of Plato’s continue their discussions of life and death and religion in this current year of crisis. Beginning in a railway station in Boston and continuing on through Providence and New Haven, they argue the eternal problems of what truth is and whether liberalism, with its concern for human reason, its tolerance of people who disagree with it, has much of a place in a world of (...) totalitarianism and war, of Freud with his irrational subconscious and the atomic bomb with its fury. In an amusing and searching scrutiny of the liberals and their opponents Mr. Bixler analyzes through his two heroes the principal modern philosophies that are grappling with the ills of the world, and he demonstrates a considerable area of agreement between their opposing views. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss two passages in Plato’s Phaedo : 91e–92e, i. e. the first argument Socrates uses against Simmias’ contention that the soul is a harmony ; 74e–75c, which is a part of the recollection argument. The aim in discussing these two passages is to show that Plato allows his characters, Socrates and Simmias, to pursue different strategies in the argument, based on different levels of understanding. I further argue that reading the passages mentioned as dialectical (...) games involving two personae shows that a certain doctrine attributed to Plato, i. e. the so-called theory of recollection, was not in fact part of Plato’s philosophical creed. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit erlautert und interpretiert Platons Dialog Phaidon. Vor dem Hintergrund der Ausfuhrungen zu Eidos, Psyche und Unsterblichkeit und deren Relationen zueinander stellt diese Untersuchung einen prazisen Kommentar dar, der eine synchrone Lekture des Phaidon stutzt. Die Interpretationen der Dialogaussagen zu den Eide, zur Seelenkonzeption und zur Unsterblichkeitslehre werden erganzt durch den Vergleich mit den grundlegenden philosophischen Todes- und Jenseitsauffassungen der Vorsokratik. Neben der eng am Text entwickelten Uberprufung aller Unsterblichkeitsbeweise, der Einwande des Simmias und des Kebes und der (...) Widerlegungen dieser Einwande durch Sokrates, beschaftigt sich diese Arbeit ferner mit einer detaillierten Explikation des Hypothesisverfahrens.". (shrink)

Socrates' account of recollection in the Phaedo has been the subject of much study, but little attention has been paid to the questions whether and how far his arguments address Simmias' claim that he needs to recollect and be reminded that learning is recollection . I shall argue that Socrates reminds Simmias by appealing to Simmias' experience of question-and-answer discussion in order to show him how in these discussions they are regaining forgotten knowledge, but have not yet (...) completed this process. (shrink)

This chapter discusses how all the Pythagorean theories of the soul known to us are different. Only Simmias and Echecrates, the pupils of Philolaus, held identical views. The similarity among some of these theories can sometimes be explained by direct influence, but most often by the fact that many Pythagoreans shared the interpretation of the soul as the source of motion, which was the most widespread view amongst the Presocratics. It is also shown that there is neither a clear (...) formulation of number doctrine, nor tangible examples of it, in ancient Pythagoreanism. It transpires that the theory which was taken to be the essence of Pythagorean philosophy, a theory backed by the authority of Aristotle as the source and as a historian of philosophy, is, like many other elements of the ancient tradition about the Pythagoreans, a retrospective projection. (shrink)

There is something undeniably puzzling, difficult, about relations. Socrates is a fine individual substance, and his paleness a fine accident; but what of his being taller than Simmias? If to our eyes Aristotle is working no harder in chapter seven of the Categories than in chapter eight, to medieval eyes things were messier there—or at any rate sufficiently unsettled to yield an extended and hotly disputed controversy than which only the question of universals is knottier. Leibniz evidently managed no (...) better than Aristotle, which scarcely counts against him: there were of course more medieval thinkers offering their glosses on Aristotle on relations than there are Leibniz scholars, but those of the latter who’ve thought they had something helpful to say about Leibniz on relations would agree that things are unsettled, and maybe even hotly disputed. Readers can gain some sense of this from Dennis Plaisted’s excellent but sadly under-reviewed contribution to the debate in Leibniz on Purely Extrinsic Denominations, which represents the most extended and detailed attack on broadly “reductionist” readings of Leibniz on relations to date. For reasons owing more to divine intervention than creaturely freedom, the present review is delinquent in a way that discussion of Plaisted’s work should not be. (shrink)

Ahrensdorf’s interpretation of the Phaedo leaves few stones unturned. While other scholars have pointed to the fallibility of Socrates’ “proofs” for the immortality of the soul, or have sought to distinguish the primary interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, or have examined this dialogue’s vindication of the philosophical life, Ahrensdorf manages to pull all these issues together in a coherent, holistic reading of the Phaedo. The dialogue, he argues, presents Socrates’ views that the individual soul is not immortal and that our (...) embodied human existence is the place where the philosophical life is lived out, not some transcendent reality in which perfect wisdom exists. “In the Phaedo, then, Socrates indicates, albeit quietly, that, in his view, the philosophical life is the best way of life, not because of the rewards the divine soul of the philosopher will enjoy in Hades, but rather because of the happiness the philosopher enjoys, as a human being, in this life”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 113 phers); nevertheless, I feel that the book would have been more effective pedagogically had they devoted more attention to them than they have. As a specific recommendation, I would suggest several short introductions at strategic places in the text devoted to a brief resum~ of the historical setting in which the philosophers to be discussed found themselves. Once again I should emphasize that, despite the criticisms (...) I have made, I think the book to be an excellent piece of work, which should prove quite successful as an undergraduate text in the history of philosophy. OLIVER JOHNSON University of California, Riverside Plato's Theory of Knowledge. By Norman Gulley. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.; New York: Barnes & Noble Inc. Pp. viii ~ 203.) Mr. Gulley gives an account of the development of Plato's theory of knowledge. The impetus to this development he finds in an inconsistency that underlies the attempt to combine an a priori method of analysis with a theory of knowledge based on the doctrines of recollection and the archetype-copy relation of Forms and sensibles. Only in the last chapter, "Mathematical Knowledge," does he suggest a theory of the relation of a priori to empirical knowledge which he thinks might have satisfied Plato. The major part of the work, the first three chapters, concerns the conflicts and readjustments occasioned by the underlying inconsistency. I shall discuss these chapters in terms of a few central points. In chapter I, GuUey attempts to get at the basis of the theoretical difficulties. He points out that Plato first considers philosophic method as independent of the theory of Forms and the theory of recollection (pp. 40 f). In the Meno it is a method of analysis, which is a forerunner of the Phaedo's method of hypothesis, of which the dialectical method is a further development. It is an a priori method. But the theories, which are first hypotheses examined by the method (Phaedo), become later "presuppositions for the effective practice of the method," as, for example, in the Republic. In "recollection" there is an intimate connection between Forms and sensiblcs, but in knowledge there is complete separation. This is what Gulley considers to be the source of the major difficulties. Since I do not find these difficulties, I shall concentrate on their exposition. Gulley notes in the Phaedo two meanings of "giving an account": (1) in terms of a method of propositional analysis; (2) in terms of participation of sensibles in Forms. His explanation of the first offers no difficulties, but of the second there are serious problems. His explication of the second is as follows: To "give an account" is "to explain one's possession of a Form by showing that it is necessarily implied by that judgment of the 'deficiency' of sensible characters which arises as soon as they are recognized" (p. 40). His argument for this interpretation is as follows: "... if to know a Form brings with it the ability 'to give an account', and if to know a Form is to be reminded of it by the sensibles which resemble it (74 b-c), the 'giving of an account' must be explicable within the conception of 'knowledge' implied in the use of the term in 74 b-c" (p. 46). He assumes that Plato is at least consistent. Now in 74 b-c Simmias agrees with Socrates that we have knowledge of equality "in and by itself" and that such things as equal logs and stones "lead us to conceive" of it. Only "recollection," not the preexistent knowledge of Forms is in question here. Since it is assumed that knowledge implies the ability to give an account of what is known, then this instance of knowledge, which occurs in conjunction with perception, implies a similar ability. But one cannot infer from this that the discussion of equality as Plato has discussed it, which is a discussion of it as an example of recollection, is the same thing as the giving an account of equality itself, much less that it is "the only type of account possible" within the theory of Forms. That it is the only possible type is in fact contradicted by the assumption of pre... (shrink)