I present results of recent work in the field of quantum optics and relate this work to discussions about the theory of quantum mechanics and God's divine action in the world. Experiments involving atomic decay, relevant to event uncertainty in quantum mechanics, as well as experiments aimed at elucidating the so–called Schrödinger’s–cat paradox, help clarify apparent ambiguities or paradoxes that I believe are at the heart of renewed attempts to locate God within our constructed physical theories and tend to narrow (...) the gaps proposed as an opening for divine action. Some problems arise because of imprecise use of nonmathematical language to force quantum mechanics into an intuitive “classical” framework. (shrink)

Schrödinger's Cat & The Golden Bough addresses the relationship between science and mythology from the starting points of Frazer's The Golden Bough and Erwin Schrödinger's famous cat. From the Greek origins of modern scientific thought, Bancroft traces the intertwining and separation of mythology, magic, and science through the ages. Drawing on psychology, mythology, literature, and history of science, the author, a physicist who works with electromagnetic Field Theory, presents a fascinating and provocative cross-disciplinary study.

There is no paradox with Schrödinger’s cat in a realist interpretation. In particular, a closer look at the temporal aspect shows that the two macroscopic wave functions (alive and dead) of Schrödinger’s cat are not to be compared with two superposed parts of a microscopic quantum wave function.

The Schrodinger's Cat and Wigner's Friend thought experiments, which logically follow from the universality of quantum mechanics at all scales, have been repeatedly characterized as possible in principle, if perhaps difficult or impossible for all practical purposes. I show in this paper why these experiments, and interesting macroscopic superpositions in general, are actually impossible in principle. First, no macroscopic superposition can be created via the slow process of natural quantum packet dispersion because all macroscopic objects are inundated with decohering (...) interactions that constantly localize them. Second, the SC/WF thought experiments depend on von Neumann-style amplification to achieve quickly what quantum dispersion achieves slowly. Finally, I show why such amplification cannot produce a macroscopic quantum superposition of an object relative to an external observer, no matter how well isolated the object from the observer, because: the object and observer are already well correlated to each other; and reducing their correlations to allow the object to achieve a macroscopic superposition relative to the observer is equally impossible, in principle, as creating a macroscopic superposition via the process of natural quantum dispersion. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg were the originators of two approaches, known respectively as “wave mechanics” and “matrix mechanics”, to what is now called “quantum mechanics” or “quantum theory”. The two approaches appear to be extremely different, both in their technical forms, and in their philosophical underpinnings. Heisenberg arrived at his theory by effectively renouncing the idea of trying to represent a physical system, such as a hydrogen Bohr's atom model for example, as a structure in space—time, but instead, following (...) the lead of Einstein's 1905 theory of relativity, representing only empirically observable properties, such as the transition amplitudes between the stationary states of the atom. These amplitudes can be arranged in square arrays of numbers. In Heisenberg's scheme these arrays, and other like them, are combined according to certain rules that were later recognized by Max Born to be the rules of matrix multiplication. The whole scheme is abstract and mathematical, and avoids using any space—time picture of what is going on at the atomic level. Schrödinger, on the other hand, represented the electron in an atom by a cloudlike wave surrounding the nucleus. This is a space—time structure that, superficially at least, is more in line with the classical physical theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. -/- Niels Bohr invited Schrödinger to come to Copenhagen to present his ideas, and to discuss this subject with himself, Heisenberg, and others. Schrödinger arrived in Copenhagen on October 1st, 1926, and was immediately intensively engaged by Bohr and the others in a “debate” that lasted for days. Eventually, Schrödinger become ill, and was confined in Bohr's home to a bed, upon which Bohr sat, continuing the discussion. Schrödinger finally exclaimed “If all the quantum jumping is here to stay, then I am sorry that I ever became involved in quantum mechanics”. Bohr replied, “But we are glad that you did!”. (shrink)

Alexander Wendt’s Quantum Mind and Social Science reopens the question of the relevance of quantum mechanics to the social sciences. In response, I argue that due to “quantum decoherence,” the macroscopic world filters out quantum effects. Moreover, quantum decoherence makes it unlikely that the theory of quantum brains, on which Wendt relies, is true. Finally, while quantum decision theory is a potentially revolutionary field, it has not clearly accounted for alleged anomalies in classical understandings of decision making. However, the logic (...) of quantum decoherence can motivate a new approach to the structure-agent problem. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 40-42.

In 'How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.

We propose a technical reformulation of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, which is based on the postulate that the final state of a measurement is classical; this accords with experimental practice as well as with Bohr’s views. Unlike the usual formulation (in which the post-measurement state is a unit vector in Hilbert space), our version actually opens the possibility of admitting a purely technical solution within the confines of conventional quantum theory (as opposed to solutions that either modify this (...) theory, or introduce unusual and controversial interpretative rules and/or ontologies). To that effect, we recall a remarkable phenomenon in the theory of Schrödinger operators (discovered in 1981 by Jona-Lasinio, Martinelli, and Scoppola), according to which the ground state of a symmetric double-well Hamiltonian (which is paradigmatically of Schrödinger’s Cat type) becomes exponentially sensitive to tiny perturbations of the potential as ħ→0. We show that this instability emerges also from the textbook wkb approximation, extend it to time-dependent perturbations, and study the dynamical transition from the ground state of the double well to the perturbed ground state (in which the cat is typically either dead or alive, depending on the details of the perturbation). Numerical simulations show that adiabatically arising perturbations may (quite literally) cause the collapse of the wave-function in the classical limit. Thus, at least in the context of a simple mathematical model, we combine the technical and conceptual virtues of decoherence (which fails to solve the measurement problem but launches the key idea that perturbations may come from the environment) with those of dynamical collapse models à la grw (which do solve the measurement problem but are ad hoc), without sharing their drawbacks: single measurement outcomes are obtained (instead of merely diagonal reduced density matrices), and no modification of quantum mechanics is needed. (shrink)

We propose a technical reformulation of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, which is based on the postulate that the final state of a measurement is classical; this accords with experimental practice as well as with Bohr’s views. Unlike the usual formulation (in which the post-measurement state is a unit vector in Hilbert space), our version actually opens the possibility of admitting a purely technical solution within the confines of conventional quantum theory (as opposed to solutions that either modify this (...) theory, or introduce unusual and controversial interpretative rules and/or ontologies).To that effect, we recall a remarkable phenomenon in the theory of Schrödinger operators (discovered in 1981 by Jona-Lasinio, Martinelli, and Scoppola), according to which the ground state of a symmetric double-well Hamiltonian (which is paradigmatically of Schrödinger’s Cat type) becomes exponentially sensitive to tiny perturbations of the potential as ħ→0. We show that this instability emerges also from the textbook wkb approximation, extend it to time-dependent perturbations, and study the dynamical transition from the ground state of the double well to the perturbed ground state (in which the cat is typically either dead or alive, depending on the details of the perturbation).Numerical simulations show that adiabatically arising perturbations may (quite literally) cause the collapse of the wave-function in the classical limit. Thus, at least in the context of a simple mathematical model, we combine the technical and conceptual virtues of decoherence (which fails to solve the measurement problem but launches the key idea that perturbations may come from the environment) with those of dynamical collapse models à la grw (which do solve the measurement problem but are ad hoc), without sharing their drawbacks: single measurement outcomes are obtained (instead of merely diagonal reduced density matrices), and no modification of quantum mechanics is needed. (shrink)

Using formal techniques, Schrodinger's 1935 cat argument is reproduced. Assumptions of the argument are made explicit as axioms and rules of inference; from these a contradiction is derived. The formal statement is then used to elucidate several crucial distinctions, to reject several commonly proposed resolutions, and to sketch an Einsteinian perspective for the argument.

El presente trabajo examina la naturaleza de la realidad en el marco de la física moderna, incluyendo laposibilidad de la libertad. Adicionalmente, propone una reforma a la metafísica del realismo. Para el realismo,el mundo es como es, independiente de la mente. Sin embargo, la relatividad general supone que la velocidadde los objetos y el orden temporal de los eventos dependen del marco de referencia que se adopte. Qué marco de referencia se adopta responde a intereses humanos, pero sigue habiendo hechos (...) físicos independientes delmarco de referencia: la velocidad de la luz, la distancia espaciotemporal, la equivalencia entre energía y materia,entre otros. Por otro lado, la “interpretación de Copenhague” estima que los estados cuánticos están en una superposición que solo se concreta en el momento de observación: el “gato de Schrödinger” está vivo y muerto, hasta que lo observamos. Sin embargo, se analizan posibilidades realistas menos inverosímiles. La física moderna, determinista o indeterminista, también amenaza la posibilidad de que tengamos libertad. Se analiza y desarrollala compatibilidad de la libertad como autogobierno con la física moderna. A pesar de que aspectos centrales dela metafísica realista se conservan, se concluye con una concepción filosófica-científica del universo que integrea los seres mentales dentro del mismo, lo cual supone una reforma a la metafísica del realismo científico estándar. (shrink)

The Schrödinger’s cat paradox has troubled physicists for many years and many ways to solve it has been provided so far. In this paper I will try to provide a different method of solving the Paradox with the help of logical machine and it will look like a hybrid of Wigner’s no-go theorem and the machine of Gödel in his Incompleteness Theorems. And due to the machine the paradox will not require any human intervention to measure the state of the (...) cat, whether it is alive or dead, while the measurement will be made by humans with regard to the statement given out by the machine. (shrink)

By way of an example, Lewis imagines your being invited to join Schrödinger’s cat in its box for an hour. This box will either fill up with deadly poison fumes or not, depending on whether or not some radioactive atom decays, the probability of decay within an hour being 50%. The invitation is accompanied with some further incentive to comply (Lewis sets it up so there is a significant chance of some pretty bad but not life-threatening punishment if you don’t (...) get in the box). Lewis argues that the many minds theory implies that you should get in the box with the cat, despite this making it 50% likely you will die. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to review and clarify the quantum “measurement problem.” The latter originates in the ambivalent nature of the “observer”: Although the observer is not described by the Schrödinger equation, it should nevertheless be possible to “quantize” him and include him in the wave function if quantum theory is universally valid. The problem is to prove that no contradiction may arise in these two conflicting descriptions. The proof invokes the notion of irreversibility. The validity of the (...) latter is questionable, because the standard rationale for classical irreversibility, namely mixing and coarse graining, does not apply to quantum theory. There is no chaos in a closed, finite quantum system. However, when a system is large enough, it cannot be perfectly isolated from its “environment,” namely from external (or even internal) degrees of freedom which are not fully accounted for in the Hamiltonian of that system. As a consequence, the long-range evolution of such a quantum system is essentially unpredictable. It follows that the notion of irreversibility is a valid one in quantum theory and the “measurement problem” can be brought to a satisfactory solution. (shrink)

In collapse theories of quantum mechanics such as the GRW theory, the measurement result is represented by the post-measurement state which is still a superposition of different result branches, although the modulus squared of the amplitude of one result branch is close to one. This leads to the tails problem. In this paper, I present a new analysis of the tails problem of collapse theories, and suggest a more complete solution to the problem. First, I argue that the tails problem (...) exists not only in collapse theories, but also in Everett's theory and even in Bohm's theory. Moreover, I point out that the tails problem has two levels: the physical and mental levels, which may be called the objective and subjective tails problems, respectively. One needs to analyze not only the connection between high modulus-squared values and macro-existence, but also the connection between these values and our experience of macro-existence. Second, I briefly review the existing solutions to the objective and subjective tails problems. I argue that although the objective tails problem may be solved more directly, one needs to further investigate the psychophysical connection in order to solve the subjective tails problem. Third, I analyze how the mental state of an observer is determined by her wave function in collapse theories. It is argued that the mental content of an observer is related to the amplitude of each result branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it may be composed of all possible results. Moreover, it is conjectured that the modulus squared of the amplitude of each result branch may determine the vividness of the part of the mental content containing the result. Finally, I argue that this vividness conjecture may help solve the subjective tails problem of collapse theories. (shrink)

Recently, several philosophers and physicists have increasingly noticed the hegemony of unitarity in the black hole information loss discourse and are challenging its legitimacy in the face of the measurement problem. They proclaim that embracing non-unitarity solves two paradoxes for the price of one. Though I share their distaste over the philosophical bias, I disagree with their strategy of still privileging certain interpretations of quantum theory. I argue that information-restoring solutions can be interpretation-neutral because the manifestation of non-unitarity in Hawking's (...) original derivation is unrelated to what's found in collapse theories or generalized stochastic approaches, thereby decoupling the two puzzles. (shrink)

Recently, Frauchiger and Renner proposed a Gedankenexperiment, which was claimed to be able to prove that quantum theory cannot consistently describe the use of itself. Here we show that the conclusions of Frauchiger and Renner actually came from their incorrect description of some quantum states. With the correct description there will be no inconsistent results, no matter which quantum interpretation theory is used. Especially, the Copenhagen interpretation can satisfy all the three assumptions,, and of Frauchiger and Renner simultaneously, thus it (...) has no problem consistently describing the use of itself. (shrink)

We discuss two recent attempts two solve Schrodinger's cat paradox. One is the modal interpretation developed by Kochen, Healey, Dieks, and van Fraassen. It allows for an observable which pertains to a system to possess a value even when the system is not in an eigenstate of that observable. The other is a recent theory of the collapse of the wave function due to Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber. It posits a dynamics which has the effect of collapsing the state (...) of macroscopic systems. We argue that the modal interpretation cannot account for non-accurate measurements and that both accounts have the consequence that in ordinary measurement situations the observables that ends up well defined are not quite the ones that we want to be well defined. (shrink)

When the fuzzy indeterminacy of quantum mechanics overthrew the orderly world of Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein and Erwin Schrödinger were at the forefront of the revolution. Neither man was ever satisfied with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, and both rebelled against what they considered the most preposterous aspect of quantum mechanics: its randomness. Einstein famously quipped that God does not play dice with the universe, and Schrödinger constructed his famous fable of a cat that was neither alive nor (...) dead not to explain quantum mechanics but to highlight the apparent absurdity of a theory gone wrong. But these two giants did more than just criticize: they fought back, seeking a Theory of Everything that would make the universe seem sensible again. In Einstein’s Dice and Schrödinger’s Cat, physicist Paul Halpern tells the little-known story of how Einstein and Schrödinger searched, first as collaborators and then as competitors, for a theory that transcended quantum weirdness. This story of their quest—which ultimately failed—provides readers with new insights into the history of physics and the lives and work of two scientists whose obsessions drove its progress. Today, much of modern physics remains focused on the search for a Theory of Everything. As Halpern explains, the recent discovery of the Higgs Boson makes the Standard Model—the closest thing we have to a unified theory— nearly complete. And while Einstein and Schrödinger failed in their attempt to explain everything in the cosmos through pure geometry, the development of string theory has, in its own quantum way, brought this idea back into vogue. As in so many things, even when they were wrong, Einstein and Schrödinger couldn’t help but get a great deal right. (shrink)

Complementarity tells us we cannot know precisely the values of all the properties of a quantum object at the same time: the precise determination of one property implies that the value of some other (complementary) property is undefined. E.g. the precise knowledge of the position of a particle implies that its momentum is undefined. Here we show that a Schrödinger cat has a well defined value of a property that is complementary to its “being dead or alive” property. Then, thanks (...) to complementarity, it has an undefined value of the property “being dead or alive”. In other words, the cat paradox is explained through quantum complementarity: of its many complementary properties, any quantum system, such as a cat, can have a well defined value only of one at a time. Schrödinger’s cat has a definite value of a property which is complementary to “being dead or alive”, so it is neither dead nor alive. Figuratively one can say it is both dead and alive. While this interpretation only uses textbook concepts (the Copenhagen interpretation), apparently it has never explicitly appeared in the literature. We detail how to build an Arduino based simulation of Schrödinger’s experiment based on these concepts for science outreach events. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Zukowski and Markiewicz showed that Wigner’s Friend (and, by extension, Schrodinger’s Cat) can be eliminated as physical possibilities on purely logical grounds. I validate this result and demonstrate the source of the contradiction in a simple experiment in which a scientist S attempts to measure the position of object |O⟩ = |A⟩S +|B⟩S by using measuring device M chosen so that |A⟩M ≈ |A⟩S and |B⟩M ≈ |B⟩S. I assume that the measurement occurs by quantum amplification (...) without collapse, in which M can entangle with O in a way that remains reversible by S for some nonzero time period. This assumption implies that during this “reversible” time period, |A⟩M ̸= |A⟩S and |B⟩M ̸= |B⟩S – i.e., the macroscopic pointer state to which M evolves is uncorrelated to the position of O relative to S. When the scientist finally observes the measuring device, its macroscopic pointer state is uncorrelated to the object in position |A⟩S or |B⟩S, rendering the notion of “reversible measurement” a logical contradiction. (shrink)

Animals populate our artistic and philosophical discourses in critical ways. From Jacques Derrida's or Karen Barad's cat, to Donna Haraway's dog, to the fish in Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Véréna Paravel's Leviathan, these animals feature heavily in discussions regarding limits – the limits of the human and thus its relation with non-humans, but also the limits of knowledge itself. Cute or dangerous, real or fantasised, dead or alive: in this article, I juxtapose the various ways that such animals confront us with (...) what Jacques Derrida describes as “the point of view of the absolute other”. Similarly, recent texts stage encounters with animals – thus distributing agency towards a larger variety of beings, carving out space for a previously excluded non-human other. Yet these encounters are mediated in profoundly different ways. In researching how encounters with the animal are differentially inflected and “defracted” respective to the medium in which they are staged, this article invokes questions of form and style within the critical dialogue that attempts to centre non-human animals. Highlighting how formal decisions are not accidental, but rather integral, to the praxis of the philosophy of animality, this article aims to draw attention to how specific forms and styles allow for a moment of contact with a non-human other. To this end, this article examines three oft-cited encounters: Derrida's encounter with his cat, an intense stare with a fish in Leviathan, and Barad's inflection of Schrödinger's cat. This juxtaposition gives insight into the limits of certain styles of producing thought and critically reflects on these works in their discussion of non-human life and agency. (shrink)

I show in this paper why the universality of quantum mechanics at all scales, which implies the possibility of Schrodinger's Cat and Wigner's Friend thought experiments, cannot be experimentally confirmed, and why macroscopic superpositions in general cannot be observed or measured, even in principle. Through the relativity of quantum superposition and the transitivity of correlation, it is shown that from the perspective of an object that is in quantum superposition relative to a macroscopic measuring device and observer, the observer (...) is already sufficiently well correlated to the measuring device that once the object correlates to the measuring device, there is no time period in which the observer can perform an appropriate interference experiment to show that the measuring device is in a superposition. (shrink)

Parmenides’ Poem on Nature contains a proof that the world could not have come into being in time, because no explanation could be given for why it would do so at a given time. This same proof reappears in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, where it is directed against Newtonian absolute time. Newtonians, Leibniz explains, believe that time is homogeneous and absolute, but this makes it inexplicable how God could have chosen to create the world on a given day. Similarly, in his (...) correspondence with Schrödinger in the 1930s, Einstein suggests that certain quantum mechanical occurrences, such as the spontaneous decay of a radioactive atom, are absurd, because they cannot be assigned a definite location in time. In Schrödinger’s version of Einstein’s argument, we must say that the cat dies twice: first, inside the box; yet, second, when we open the box. But both accounts cannot be true. Since each of the authors discussed was aware of the approach of his predecessors, they share a structure. In this article, I develop a unified account of all three. (shrink)

This essay equates Penrose's (1989) Emperor with the scientist engaging in mental (Schrödinger's cat) or real experiments.The simultaneous presence of apparently contradictory phase-spatial symmetry conditions on the various hierarchical levels of biological systems are seen as the result of genetic and neurophysiological information that interferes with the physico-chemical vectors between the structural components of the system, the experimenter being an integral part of this informational causality. Equations pertaining to the lowest structural levels of matter, therefore, may not be extendable over (...) higher levels of biological organization, including human science and technology, which are seen as part and parcel of biology. This situation calls for a formal theoretical biophysics which concentrates on macroscopic processes where life and, above all,Homo sapiens, is involved. (shrink)

Von Neumann's theory of measurement in quantum mechanics is reinterpreted so that the experimental arrangement specifies the location of the “cut” by calling for the separate observation of the object and the measuring apparatus after the initial measurement interaction. The measurement ascertains which element of the mixture describing the final state of the apparatus is actually present. The relevance and feasibility of observing the final coherent state of the object plus apparatus is criticized and the paradoxes of “Schrödinger's cat” and (...) “Wigner's friend” are discussed. (shrink)

Einstein Versus Bohr is unlike other books on science written by experts for non-experts, because it presents the history of science in terms of problems, conflicts, contradictions, and arguments. Science normally "keeps a tidy workshop." Professor Sachs breaks with convention by taking us into the theoretical workshop, giving us a problem-oriented account of modern physics, an account that concentrates on underlying concepts and debate. The book contains mathematical explanations, but it is so-designed that the whole argument can be followed with (...) the math omitted. Professor Sachs' story begins with classical and nineteenth century physics, describes the early discoveries in particle theory, and introduces the "old" quantum theory, which evolved into the quantum mechanics of the Copenhagen School. Such important ideas as the Einstein Photon Box experiment and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox, and Schrodinger's Cat Paradox are clearly expounded, followed by a completely fresh explanation of relativity in conceptual terms, showing how apparent paradoxes can be removed by Einstein's own interpretation, especially that of his later years. Professor Sachs gives a detailed comparison of the fundamentals of the quantum and relativity theories, suggesting how the contradictions might be resolved. In an epilogue, he makes suggestions, with reference to religious notions, Taoism, and Buber's theory of I-Thou, for generalizing Einstein's approach beyond physics. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the definition of quantum superpositions within orthodox Quantum Mechanics and their relation to physical reality. We will begin by discussing how the metaphysical presuppositions imposed by Bohr on the interpretation of QM have become not only interpretational dogmas which constrain the limits of the present Orthodox Line of Research, but also how these desiderata implicitly preclude the possibility of developing a physical representation of quantum superpositions. We will then continue analyzing how most interpretations of QM (...) argue against the existence of superpositions. Firstly, we will focus on those interpretations which attempt to recover a classical representation about ''what there is'', and secondly, we will concentrate on the arguments provided by Dieks and Griffiths who, staying close to the orthodox formalism, also attempt to ''get rid of the ghost of Schrodinger's cat''. Contrary to the OLR, we will argue -based on our definition of Meaningful Physical Statements - that from a representational realist perspective which stays close to the orthodox Hilbert space formalism, quantum superpositions are not only the key to the most important -present and future- technological and experimental developments in quantum information processing but also, they must be considered as the kernel of any interpretation of QM that attempts to provide a physical representation of reality. We will also argue that the price to pay for such representational realist development must be the abandonment of the idea that 'Actuality = Reality'. (shrink)

Newton's bucket, Einstein's elevator, Schrödinger's cat – these are some of the best-known examples of thought experiments in the natural sciences. But what function do these experiments perform? Are they really experiments at all? Can they help us gain a greater understanding of the natural world? How is it possible that we can learn new things just by thinking? In this revised and updated new edition of his classic text _The Laboratory of the Mind_, James Robert Brown continues to defend (...) apriorism in the physical world. This edition features two new chapters, one on “counter thought experiments” and another on the development of inertial motion. With plenty of illustrations and updated coverage of the debate between Platonic rationalism and classic empiricism, this is a lively and engaging contribution to the field of philosophy of science. (shrink)

Science has made a mighty advance since it originated in ancient Greece more than 2500 years ago. Yet we still live in Plato's cave today; we think everything around us moves continuously, but continuous motion is merely a shadow of real motion. This book will lead you to walk out the cave along a logical and comprehensible road. After passing Zeno's arrow, Newton's inertia, Einstein's light, and Schrodinger's cat, you will reach the real world, where every thing in the (...) universe, whether it is an atom or a ball or even a star, ceaselessly jumps in a random and discontinuous way. In a famous metaphor, God does play dice with the universe. Discovering motion is not continuous but discontinuous and random is like finding the Earth is not at rest but moving. The new discovery may finally solve Zeno's paradoxes and the quantum puzzle, and it will lead to a profound shift in our world view. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramer's transactional account, which is shown to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries such as Schrödinger's cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in assessing Cramer's theory was (...) that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected. (shrink)

Gödel appears to have believed strongly that the human mind cannot be explained in terms of any kind of computational physics, but he remained cautious in formulating this belief as a rigorous consequence of his incompleteness theorems. In this chapter, I discuss a modification of standard Gödel-type logical arguments, these appearing to strengthen Gödel’s conclusions, and attempt to provide a persuasive case in support of his standpoint that the actions of the mind must transcend computation. It appears that Gödel did (...) not consider the possibility that the laws of physics might themselves involve noncomputational procedures; accordingly, he found himself driven to the conclusion that mentality must lie beyond the actions of the physical brain. My own arguments, on the other hand, are from the scientific standpoint that the mind is a product of the brain’s physical activity. Accordingly, there must be something in the physical actions of the world that itself transcends computation. We do not appear to find such noncomputational action in the known laws of physics, however, so we must seek it in currently undiscovered laws going beyond presently accepted physical theory. I argue that the only plausibly relevant gap in current understanding lies in a fundamental incompleteness in quantum theory, which reveals itself only with significant mass displacements between quantum states (“Schrödinger’s cats”). I contend that the need for new physics enters when gravitational effects just begin to play a role. In a scheme developed jointly with Stuart Hameroff, this has direct relevance within neuronal microtubules, and I describe this (still speculative) scheme in the following. (shrink)

A drastic resolution of the quantum paradoxes is proposed, combining (I) von Neumann's postulate that collapse of the state vector is due to the act of observation, and (II) my reinterpretation of von Neumann's quantal irreversibility as an equivalence between wave retardation and entropy increase, both being “factlike” rather than “lawlike” (Mehlberg). This entails a coupling of the two de jure symmetries between (I) retarded and (II) advanced waves, and between Aristotle's information as (I) learning and (II) willing awareness. Symmetric (...) acceptance of cognizance as a source of retarted waves, and of will as a sink of advanced waves, is submitted as a central “paradox” of the Copernican or Einsteinian sort, out of which new light is shed upon previously known paradoxes, such as the EPR paradox, Schrödinger's cat, and Wigner's friend. Parapsychology is thus found to creep into the picture. (shrink)

Prologue: Stormclouds : London, April 1900 -- Quantum of action: The most strenuous work of my life : Berlin, December 1900 ; Annus Mirabilis : Bern, March 1905 ; A little bit of reality : Manchester, April 1913 ; la Comédie Française : Paris, September 1923 ; A strangely beautiful interior : Helgoland, June 1925 ; The self-rotating electron : Leiden, November 1925 ; A late erotic outburst : Swiss Alps, Christmas 1925 -- Quantum interpretation: Ghost field : Oxford, August (...) 1926 ; All this damned quantum jumping : Copenhagen, October 1926 ; The uncertainty principle : Copenhagen, February 1927 ; The 'Kopenhagener geist' : Copenhagen, June 1927 ; There is no quantum world : Lake Como, September 1927 -- Quantum debate: The debate commences : Brussels, October 1927 ; An absolute wonder : Cambridge, Christmas 1927 ; The photon box : Brussels, October 1930 ; A bolt from the blue : Princeton, May 1935 ; The paradox of Schrödinger's cat : Oxford, August 1935 -- Interlude: The first war of physics : Christmas 1938-August 1945 -- Quantum fields: Shelter Island : Long Island, June 1947 ; Pictorial semi-vision thing : New York, January 1949 ; A beautiful idea : Princeton, February 1954 ; Some strangeness in the proportion : Rochester, August 1960 ; Three quarks for Muster Mark! : New York, March 1963 ; The 'God particle' : Cambridge, Massachusetts, Autumn 1967 -- Quantum particles: Deep inelastic scattering : Stanford, August 1968 ; Of charm and weak neutral currents : Harvard, February 1970 ; The magic of colour : Princeton/Harvard, April 1973 ; The November revolution : Long Island/Stanford, November 1974 ; Intermediate vector bosons : Geneva, January/June 1983 ; The standard model : Geneva, September 2003 -- Quantum reality: Hidden variable : Princeton, Spring 1951 ; Bertlmann's socks : Boston, September 1964 ; The Aspect experiments : Paris, September 1982 ; The quantum eraser : Baltimore, January 1999 ; Lab cats : Stony Brook/Delft, July 2000 ; The persistent illusion : Vienna, December 2006 -- Quantum cosmology: The wavefunction of the universe : Princeton, July 1966 ; Hawking radiation : Oxford, February 1974 ; The first superstring revolution : Aspen, August 1984 ; Quanta of space and time : Santa Barbara, February 1986 ; Crisis? What crisis? : Durham, Summer 1994 -- A quantum of solace? : Geneva, March 2010. (shrink)

We discuss the idea that superpositions in quantum mechanics may involve contradictions or contradictory properties. A state of superposition such as the one comprised in the famous Schrödinger’s cat, for instance, is sometimes said to attribute contradictory properties to the cat: being dead and alive at the same time. If that were the case, we would be facing a revolution in logic and science, since we would have one of our greatest scientific achievements showing that real contradictions exist.We analyze that (...) claim by employing the traditional square of opposition.We suggest that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of contradiction in the case of quantum superpositions. From a metaphysical point of view the suggestion also faces obstacles, and we present some of them. (shrink)