The standard view on discourse pronoun resolution is that determining the antecedents of discourse pronouns is typically a function of extralinguistic reasoning. In contrast, Stojnić (2021) argues that pronoun resolution is a function of linguistic facts. In this article we offer what we take to be a friendly amendment to the technical aspects of Stojnić’s proposal. Our point of departure will be with our idea that prominence is not determined by the position of the candidate antecedent within a stack, but (...) rather by its position within standard syntactic tree structures, extended to include discourse-level trees. Our proposal leans on the notion of p-scope, a proof-theoretic accessibility relation among tree nodes which we develop in Ludlow and Živanović (2022), and the notion of closeness built on standard accounts of syntactic locality. The key idea is that a pronoun’s antecedent resolves to its closest p-scoper; specifically, p-scope determines the potential antecedents, and the closeness relation orders these by prominence. Coherence relations, which we provisionally represent as syntactic heads, can be then seen as affecting accessibility and prominence indirectly, in virtue of their position in traditional LF tree structures. (shrink)

In this paper I critically examine the implications of the uncodifiability thesis for principlism as a pluralistic and non-absolute generalist ethical theory. In this regard, I begin with a brief overview of W.D. Ross’s ethical theory and his focus on general but defeasible prima facie principles before turning to 2) the revival of principlism in contemporary bioethics through the influential work of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress; 3) the widespread adoption of specification as a response to the indeterminacy of abstract (...) general principles and the limitations of balancing and deductive approaches; 4) the challenges raised to fully specified principlism by the uncodifiability thesis and 5) finally offer a defense of the uncodifiability thesis against various critiques that have been raised. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The question of the “common” has earned prominence in capitalism’s current stage, marked by the regression of the welfare state, privatization of services essential to life, and aggravation of income concentration and social inequalities around the world, in tandem with the exponential increase in the production of goods and wealth. We will address the question of the “common” based on two current views on the subject, those of the pairs Negri/Hardt and Dardot/Laval, particularly regarding the latter pair’s critique of (...) the former. But we will open the discussion with Robert Zemeckis’ film “Cast Away”, starred by Tom Hanks, with which we will introduce the material and immaterial dimensions of the “common”. We will highlight, about the film, the importance of others in our lives and the question of otherness, which we will discuss through the thoughts of Winnicott and Merleau-Ponty. Finally, we try to unite the two perspectives developed in the article, i.e., that of our relationships with others and that of the “common”. (shrink)

In a series of papers in the early 1970s and in his important book _Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life_ (1975), Baruch Brody offered what remains to this day one of the most philosophically rigorous contributions to the debate concerning the morality of abortion and the ethics of homicide more generally. In this paper I would like to critically examine Brody’s argument that abortion is sometimes justifiable in some cases even when (1) one cannot claim self-defense, or (2) diminished (...) responsibility, and (3) the abortion is a ‘killing’ rather than a ‘not saving.’ This justification, I argue, is limited to certain cases in which the life of the mother is at stake. The cautious principle which he finally formulates merits serious attention and consideration. While I find a great deal of value in Brody’s discussion, I will argue that there are several difficulties with the principle of justifiable homicide he constructs. Accordingly, I will further amend and supplement his final version by offering my own alternative principle. (shrink)

Volume 25, Issue 3, March 2025, Page 93-95.

My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) (...) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die. (shrink)

This book explores the idea that all of logic can be reduced to two very simple rules that are sensitive to logical polarity. The authors show that this idea has profound consequences for our understanding of the nature of human inferential capacities, and for some of the key issues in contemporary linguistics.

In her important and well-known discussion “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Mary Anne Warren regrets that “it is not possible to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman’s right to obtain an abortion without showing that the fetus is not a human being, in the morally relevant sense.” Unlike some more cautious philosophers, Warren thinks that we can definitively demonstrate that the fetus is not a person. In this paper, Warren’s argument is critically examined with a focus (...) especially on the question of the foundation and the boundaries of the moral community. The fundamental thesis of the paper is that Warren’s approach is flawed for at least four reasons: (1) that being a person is not as obviously central to having full moral rights as Warren assumes, (2) that her exclusivism regarding moral status has dubious moral consequences independent of the abortion issue, (3) that it is not clear that a fetus is not a person, even on Warren’s own criteria, and (4) her criteria for personhood are themselves suspect. (shrink)

RESUMO Nossa intenção é apresentar a filosofia da vida de Renaud Barbaras, reunida em Le désir et le monde, e o lugar que ela nos parece ocupar na fenomenologia. Barbaras divide sua filosofia da vida em três níveis: fenomenológico, cosmológico e metafísico. Sem deixar de contemplar seu projeto total, nosso enfoque será mais fenomenológico, destacando, e discutindo, suas noções de desejo, sentimento e relação com o outro. ABSTRACT Our intent is to present Renaud Barbaras' philosophy of life, assembled in his (...) book 'Le désir et le monde', as well as the place it seems to us it occupies in phenomenology. Barbaras divides his philosophy of life in three levels: the phenomenological, the cosmologic and the metaphysic levels. Though not foregoing his overall project, our focus will be rather a phenomenological one, highlighting and discussing his notions of desire, feeling and relationship with the other. (shrink)

Na filosofia de Aristóteles, o sentimento de amizade apresenta uma ambivalência com as emoções de rivalidade (philotimia) como a cólera (orgê) e a emulação (zêlos). Neste sentido, este artigo tem como objetivo principal refletir sobre os aspectos emocionais que envolvem a noção de amizade, visando aprofundar a relação entre as emoções de rivalidade e as categorias do desejo em Aristóteles. A produtividade dessas reflexões, aponta que o modo como as diversas relações sociais e a construção do conhecimento desenvolvido, também são (...) emocionais, fato que expõem como condição necessária para o desenvolvimento de aspectos vinculados a formação humana. (shrink)

Solon's extraordinary claim, that we should call "no one happy who is still living", presents a fascinating and distinctive argument about happiness and the length of a human life. The issues Solon raises are important, and even if we think his pessimistic conclusion is an exaggeration we can still appreciate his central concern how conceptions of happiness and the length of a human life are connected. The purpose of this paper is to explore a few of these problems, in particular (...) the reason why Aristotle's reply to Solon in the Nicomachean Ethics is somewhat ambiguous. We find Aristotle addressing Solon's claim at the outset of Eth. Nic. A 10, troubled in one sense by its conclusion, yet struck by its partial truth. On the one hand, he thinks that requires a "complete life" or at the very least, a sufficient and "complete span of time", both of which are compatible with Solon's advice that we should postpone calling someone happy until a later point in life. But on the other hand Aristotle defines in such a way that raises the question whether he needs to accept Solon's claim in any form. In particular, if happiness is defined in terms of excellent activity as Aristotle repeatedly claims, why should we wait until a person dies to call him or her happy? Why shouldn't excellent actions, at the very time they are performed, count someone as happy? The puzzle, in short, is the fact that Aristotle defines happiness in terms of activities that are complete without developing over time, and yet also claims that happiness requires a "complete lifetime". (shrink)

Alan Donagan, in The Theory of Morality, famously claims that the principles of “common morality” (i.e., the morality of the Judeo-Christian tradition) form a consistent system that can be derived from a single fundamental principle: It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature. In particular, I want to show that the prohibition contained in the fundamental principle is interpreted by appeal to prior convictions about particular sorts of cases, whether they involve (...) the violation of “respect” or not, and that this has unfavorable consequences for Donagan’s claim that the principles of common morality form a truly deductive system of morality. (shrink)

We raise two objections to Slote’s article. First, empathy cannot provide information about the world in the direct way Slote proposes. Emotional contagion might be able to do so, but this type of process is different from the empathic one. Second, even if we accept his view of empathy, his claim that we make moral judgments via empathizing with the ‘warmth’ or ‘coldness’ of the actor seems misguided because, we usually empathize with the patient, and we empathize with emotions, not (...) “temperatures”. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é trazer o debate de alguns autores sobre a crise atual da sociedade ocidental contemporânea, a partir de três questões que nos parecem discriminar parte considerável dos seus principais problemas: a autonomização da economia, a razão instrumental e a decadência cultural. Com a primeira e a segunda questão se acusam os riscos da separação da economia, da ciência e da técnica diante das necessidades da vida, e com a terceira se acusa nosso estado atual de impotência (...) para responder a tais desafios. O objetivo é fomentar a discussão crítica desses problemas, que nos parecem questões incontornáveis no presente de nossas vidas. (shrink)

Neste artigo buscamos investigar o papel da arte no pensamento e obra de Albert Camus. Para isso, avançamos em seus principais ensaios: O mito de Sísifo e O homem revoltado, na tentativa de sintetizar suas ideias acerca da criação absurda e da arte revoltada. Consideramos que a criação absurda, pensada n’O mito... sofrerá uma expansão explosiva no segundo ensaio do autor. Se, inicialmente, a arte para Camus devia expressar a fratura do homem e seu mundo, a consciência de nossa própria (...) absurdidade, a arte revoltada revela o movimento inicial de todas as subjetividades humanas: a estilização de um mundo sem sentido. Dessa forma, a criação artística deixa de ser unicamente uma escola de paciência, lucidez e multiplicação diante de uma experiência humana que carece de unidade e sentido, tornando-se a expressão mais proeminente dessa própria condição. O revoltado e o artista compartilham as mesmas exigências, éticas e estéticas, afinal, a própria revolta é, em parte, uma exigência estética. Desse modo, buscamos expor e elucidar os conceitos camusianos em torno da arte, absurda ou revoltada, e seus desdobramentos para uma ética estilizada. (shrink)

The paper examines the perception of nature and of the human-nature relationship which is deeply marked by the collective memory of human’s destroying domination over nature, especially in the Western world. In this segment the positive contribution of Christian theological eco-feminism is of utmost importance, as it discloses and breaks down the prejudice of the model of human’s superiority over nature by means of a critical historical overview of individual religious traditions. The centrepiece here is an analysis of the tensions (...) inherent in contemporary gender and nature religious policy and the implication of theological eco-feminist ethics of interdependence in everyday life and in understanding the identity of women and nature from this perspective. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objeto o direito de resistência na teoria política de Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes é conhecido por defender um modelo de poder e Estado absoluto ao mesmo tempo que inclui o direito de resistência como como um direito natural inalienável. Mas qual é o limite dessa ideia na teoria hobbesiana? Parece que há uma aparente armadilha em torno do direito de resistência colocada pelo próprio autor. Pretendo indicar pontos que mostrem como dissolver tal aparente armadilha do pensamento político (...) hobbesiano e, sobretudo, mostrar que Hobbes não estava fazendo um convite à resistência. (shrink)

Social health disparities are increasing in most countries around the world. During the past two decades, a large amount of evidence has emerged about the health consequences of social inequalities. Despite such evidence, the concept of medical fairness, as traditionally defined by the World Medical Association, has remained unchallenged and even reinforced by some scholars who emphasize that doctors should remain neutral to the socioeconomic status of their patients when providing clinical care. The inconsistency between public health and clinical care (...) perspectives raises tension between a narrow interpretation of the ethics of justice, which stresses the importance of equality and impartiality, and the ethics of care, which highlights the importance of particularity and individuality in clinical practice. This article analyzes the concept of medical fairness using the emerging evidence that demonstrates the impact of social health disparities on clinical care. It proposes a new approach of medical fairness based on equity rather than on equality and provides a consistent ethical framework based on Paul Ricoeur’s three levels of medical judgments. This integrative framework provides a better balance between public health and clinical care in medical practice. (shrink)