Explores Russell's activities as a polemicist, agitator, educator, and popularizer and discusses the evolution of his moral philosophy and its application, including his final battle against American intervention in Vietnam.

This paper reinterprets doxastic sentimentalism and neutral monism, as these doctrines appear in Bertrand Russell’s “On Propositions” (1919) and The Analysis of Mind (1921). It argues that Russell’s theory of belief, in this particular period, posited at least seven distinct types of feeling, but only one type of entity. The paper’s principal thesis is that Russell treated believing as feelings, but it also draws the conclusions that monism and sentimentalism are logically independent of one another, and that (...) sentimentalism and (at least one type of) behaviorism are inconsistent, qua theories of belief. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell always claimed that he took part in politics not as a philosopher, but as an outraged citizen and a suffering member of the human race. This essay takes Russell at his own word and explores his untheoretical radicalism. The essay thus treats him as a latter-day Thomas Paine and engages with his views on power, property, and warfare. The implausibility of Russell's reliance on moral outrage as the fuel for radical politics is examined in a (...) short coda on the contrast between Russell and Dewey as representatives of individualist and communitarian radicalism. (shrink)

In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers that they discuss or examine. The papers that they are especially concerned with are: “The Material World and Natural Religion in Hume’s Treatise” (Ryan) [Essay 3], “Hume’s Skepticism and the Problem of Atheism” (Fosl) [Essay 12], and “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism (Gautier) [Essay 16].

Individuals who demonstrate organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) contribute to their organization’s ability to create wealth, but they also owe their organizations a complex set of ethical duties. Although, the academic literature has begun to address the ethical duties owed by organizational leaders to organizational citizens, very little has been written about the duties owed by those who practice OCB to their organizations. In this article, we identify an array of ethical duties owed by those who engage in extra-role behavior and (...) describe those duties in context with personality theory. We suggest that employees who understand the complex nature of OCB and the associated duties they owe to others are more likely to reach their potential and make greater contributions within their organizations. (shrink)

Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy is a collection of essays that are all concerned with major figures and topics in the early modern philosophy. Most of the essays are concerned, more specifically, with the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). The sixteen essays included in this collection are divided into five parts. These parts are arranged under the headings of: (1) Metaphysics and Epistemology; (2) Free Will and Moral Luck; (3) Ethics, Virtue and Optimism; (4) Skepticism, Religion and Atheism; and (...) (5) Irreligion and the Unity of Hume’s Thought. A particularly important theme running through many of these essays is the subject of Hume’s irreligious aims and intentions. The fifth and final part of the collection is devoted to an articulation and defence of this specific understanding of Hume’s philosophical thought. (shrink)

Ramsey defined truth in the following way: x is true if and only if ∃p(x = [p] & p). This definition is ill-formed in standard first-order logic, so it is normally interpreted using substitutional or some kind of higher-order quantifier. I argue that these quantifiers fail to provide an adequate reading of the definition, but that, given certain adjustments, standard objectual quantification does provide an adequate reading.

Introduction 1 Part 1: Conceptual and Practical 19 1. Liberalism 21 2. Freedom 45 3. Culture and Anxiety 63 4. The Liberal Community 91 5. Liberal Imperialism 107 6. State and Private, Red and White 123 7. The Right to Kill in Cold Blood: Does the Death Penalty Violate Human Rights? 139 Part 2: Liberty and Security 157 8. Hobbes’s Political Philosophy 159 9. Hobbes and Individualism 186 10. Hobbes, Toleration, and the Inner Life 204 11. The Nature of Human (...) Nature in Hobbes and Rousseau 220 12. Locke on Freedom: Some Second Thoughts 233 Part 3: Liberty and Progress, Mill to Popper 255 13. Mill’s Essay On Liberty 257 14. Sense and Sensibility in Mill’s Political Thought 279 15. Mill in a Liberal Landscape 292 16. Utilitarianism and Bureaucracy: The Views of J. S. Mill 326 17. Mill and Rousseau: Utility and Rights 346 18. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Liberty: Some Unanswered Questions in Mill’s Politics 364 19. Bertrand Russell’s Politics: 1688 or 1968? 381 20. Isaiah Berlin: Political Theory and Liberal Culture 395 21. Popper and Liberalism 413 Part 4: Liberalism in America 427 22. Alexis de Tocqueville 429 23. Staunchly Modern, Nonbourgeois Liberalism 456 24. Pragmatism, Social Identity, Patriotism, and Self-Criticism 473 25. Deweyan Pragmatism and American Education 489 26. John Rawls 505 Part 5: Work, Ownership, Freedom, and Self-Realization 521 27. Locke and the Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie 523 28. Hegel on Work, Ownership, and Citizenship 538 29. Utility and Ownership 556 30. Maximizing, Moralizing, and Dramatizing 573 31. The Romantic Theory of Ownership 586 32. Justice, Exploitation, and the End of Morality 600 33. Liberty and Socialism 617 Notes 631. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill is—surprisingly—a difficult writer. He writes clearly, non-technically, and in a very plain prose which Bertrand Russell once described as a model for philosophers. It is never hard to see what the general drift of the argument is, and never hard to see which side he is on. He is, none the less, a difficult writer because his clarity hides complicated arguments and assumptions which often take a good deal of unpicking. And when we have done that (...) unpicking, the task of analysing the merits and deficiencies of the arguments is still only half completed. This is true of all his work and particularly true of Liberty. It is an essay whose clarity and energy have made it the most popular of all Mill's work. Yet it conceals philosophical, sociological and historical assumptions of a very debatable kind. In his introduction, Mill saysthe object of this essay is to defend one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion (Liberty, 68). (shrink)

Cultivating Virtue brings together philosophers, theologians, and psychologists to provide substantive formational insight and to chart the course for future investigation of character development. After a brief overview of the volume, I interact with a few of its central themes as represented in two essays: “Aristotle on Cultivating Virtue” by Daniel C. Russell, and “Cultivating Virtue: Two Problems for Virtue Ethics” by Christine Swanton.

Josef Pieper’s insight into Aquinas’s metaphysics, that “createdness determines entirely and all-pervasively the inner structure of the creature,” applies equally to philosopher William Desmond.1 For at the heart of Desmond’s metaphysical project lies a refusal to take creation for granted, a challenge to Bertrand Russell’s assertion that “the universe is just there, and that’s all.”2 Desmond work aims at “renewing metaphysical astonishment before the enigma of being that was, and is, and always will be too much for us, in (...) excess of our groping efforts.”3 This “enigma of being” arouses a sense of astonishment at creation’s givenness, “that it is,” and at creation’s contingency, for all that is “might not have been .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Russell's leviathan by Mark S. Lippincott 1. INTRODUCTION BERTRAND RUSSELL'S POLITICAL thought underwent several metamorphoses in his nearly seventy years of political activism and writing. Indeed, many commentators on Russell take this as the overarching attribute ofhis politics. Alan Ryan writes that "Russell's career defies summary analysis; his life was much too long and his activities too various. His philosophical allegiances were no more (...) stable than his emotional allegiances, and his political allegiances no more stable than either."1 Likewise, Benjamin Barber suggests that "Russell had to contend with staying alive; and by the time he was ninety, consistency must have seemed to him less like the hobgoblin of little minds than the hallmark Of a short life."2 Ryan, Barber and others come to different conclusions about Russell's engagements with pacifism, anarcho-syndicalism, socialism and liberalism, but their efforts, taken collectively, signal a growing appreciation for the fluidity of Russell's politics. This essay treats the diversity of Russell's "political allegiances" as a first step 1 Alan Ryan, Bertrand Russell: a Political Life (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1988), p. l. 2 Benjamin R. Barber, "Solipsistic Politics: Bertrand Russell and Empiricist Liberalism", in his The Conquest ofPolitics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1988), p. 25. Russell's leviathan 7 toward a new understanding of his political thought. Yet, unlike so much commentary on Russell, the search for the overarching concept or unifying theme is eschewed. The core premise of the argument is that to understand the political Russell, it is necessary to suspend the urge to unify. What is crucial is an openness to the extraordinary variety and range of his political interests and reflections. Once this step is taken, it becomes possible to uncover the degree to which Russell's eclectic activism is reflected in his approach to political theory. It becomes possible to see that his statements on a particular political issue are embedded with concepts selected from various sources within the western tradition ofpolitical discourse. In addition, this approach highlights the conceptual background of some of Russell's more contentious political statements which seem so characteristically out of character. The issue selected for this essay arises from one of the most controversial and least understood acts in Russell's life. It concerns his public statements following World War II that the United States might do well to use its monopoly of atomic bombs to force the Soviet Union into abandoning the development of its own atomic weapons. Past attempts to explain this episode range from cursory denials and dismissals of its importance, to assertions that it was the step-child of Russell's Russophobia.3 If one examines these state3 The argument for threatening the Soviet Union into renouncing nuclear weapons is advanced by Russell in several public statements: "The Bomb and Civilization", Forward, 29 Sept. 1945; "Humanity's Last Chance", Cavalcade, 20 Oct. 1945; speech in the House of Lords, Hansard,_'2,~Nov. 1945; "The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War", Polemic, July-Aug. 1946; speech in the House of Lords, Hansard, 30 April 1947; "Still Time for Good Sense", '47 Magazine ofthe Year, Nov. 1947; "International Government", The New Commonwealth, Jan. 1948. Ronald Clark provides an important guide to Russell's statements during this period in Vie Life of Bertrand Russell (London : CapelWeidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), but he does not examine the philosophical background. Alan Ryan comes closest to seeing Russell's theoretical link with Hobbes, but he leaves it as a passing remark about Russell's attitude towards world government during the First World War: "It is as if Russell had read Hobbes's Leviathan and been carried away by Hobbes's argument that the state of nature and the war of all against all was so dreadful that any rational man would fly to absolute monarchy for protection. Russell generalizes Hobbes's argument to the international sphere, but it fails to ask how men who get themselves into a 'war of all against all' can be expected to get themselves out again, and fails to show how they have done 8 Russell summer 1990 ments with an eye to Russell's... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSEL:rS ANTI-COMMUNIST RHETORIC BEFORE AND AFTER STALIN'S DEATH STEPHEN HAYHURST History / Copenhagen International School Copenhagen, Denmark 1100 A communist regimes collapse in Eastern Europe, and the rhetoric of the Cold War is at last abandoned, it seems an appropriate time to examine an aspect of Bertrand Russell's political life and thought which has not been as well documented as, for example, his activities in the First World (...) War or the 1960s. In the decade following the end of the Second World War Russell could, with some justification, be accused of contributing to Cold War mistrust, and even of playing the role of a "Cold War Warrior". Between 1945 and 1953 not only was Russell, as he himself later admitted, well entrenched as part of the "Establishment", but he was also actively involved in denouncing Communism, Stalin, the Soviet Union, and at times even the Russian people. Russell's Cold War invective intruded into his private letters, newspaper and magazine articles, public lectures and some of his books during this period. For example, What is Freedom? and What is Democracy?, whilst not the best remembered of Russell's books, are illustrative of his vehement hatred of Stalin's regime, and are of especial interest because they underwent small but significant revisions after Stalin's death. This brief survey of Russell's anti-Stalinism is, by necessity, highly selective, and has intentionally focussed on some of Russell's more extreme statements. A much more comprehensive study would be necessary to analyze the overall significance of Russell's anti-Stalinism. Russell's political thought in the years immediately after the end of the Second World War is dominated by what has been called his "preventative war phase". His proposal that the Soviet Union should be ru II: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McM rer University Libraty Press n.s. II (summer 1991): 67-81 ISSN 0031>-01631 68 STEPHEN HAYHURST pressured into signing the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear weapons, was made on at least twelve separate occasions between 1945 and 1949 and was, he later confessed, "the worst thing" he ever said.I This episode, characterized by controversy, proposals, denials and counter-denials, and reasonably well discussed by both critics and commentators, has direct relevance to Russell's anti-communist rhetoric.2 His prescient awareness of the staggering implications of nuclear weapons led him to demand, within two weeks of the destruction of Hiroshima, the urgent implementation of some procedure of international control.3 Since the First World War Russell had always maintained a vigorous belief in the long-term necessity of world government. Although this internationalism had been a central component of Russell's political thought, it had remained at least until 1945, at the level of a political ideal rather than a concrete proposal. In his more pessimistic moods, Russell had maintained that it would only arise through American hegemony, and at all times he had argued that a world government would only be effective if it possessed a monopoly ofweapons.4 Suddenly with the development of the atomic bomb, conditions had changed. Until 1949 the United States had a monopoly of this new monstrous weapon. Despite his very mixed views about both American political ideology and practice, Russell now clearly looked to the United States for international leadership. From the outset he accepted that international control of the bomb may not arise voluntarily. In October 1945 he wrote, "I think a world government supremely important, and I do not expect to see it established without I The twelve occasions are set out in I. F. Stone, "Bertrand Russell as a Moral Force in World Politics", Russell, n.s. I (1981): 7-25. Interview by Cedric Belfrage in the National Guardian, New York, 8, no. 35 (18 June 1956): 6. 2 Clark: D. P. Lackey, "Russell's Contribution to the Study of Nuclear Weapons Policy", Russell, n.s. 4 (1984): 243-52; Alan Ryan, Bertrand Russell, a Political Lift (London: Allen Lane the Penguin P., 1988): Stone, "Bertrand Russell as a Moral Force in World Politics~'. l "The Bomb and Civilization", Forward. Glasgow, 39, no. 33 (18 Aug. 1945): I, 3... (shrink)

In this paper I intend to do two things. The first is to discuss a method of doing philosophy, the method of ‘ordinary language’ philosophy, as it is commonly and misleadingly called. (Its other common title: ‘Oxford Philosophy’ is even more misleading, since the roots of the method lie in Cambridge, and many of the most flourishing branches are in the United States rather than England.)If it needs a name, perhaps the best is—adapting Popper to our purpose—‘piecemeal philosophical engineering’. Such (...) a title would emphasise the attention to detail and the caution about conclusions that characterise the best of such work. The second aim of this paper is to apply the method thus discussed and defended to three questions connected with the concept of freedom. These problems arise out of three recent discussions of freedom—Thought and Action and Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom by Professor Hampshire, and Two Concepts of Liberty by Professor Berlin. (shrink)

Physicians vary in their moral judgments about health care costs. Social intuitionism posits that moral judgments arise from gut instincts, called “moral foundations.” The objective of this study was to determine if “harm” and “fairness” intuitions can explain physicians’ judgments about cost-containment in U.S. health care and using cost-effectiveness data in practice, as well as the relative importance of those intuitions compared to “purity”, “authority” and “ingroup” in cost-related judgments.

Stephen Jay Gould argued that replaying the ‘tape of life’ would result in radically different evolutionary outcomes. Recently, biologists and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the theoretical importance of convergent evolution—the independent origination of similar biological forms and functions—which many interpret as evidence against Gould’s thesis. In this paper, we examine the evidentiary relevance of convergent evolution for the radical contingency debate. We show that under the right conditions, episodes of convergent evolution can constitute valid natural experiments (...) that support inferences regarding the deep counterfactual stability of macroevolutionary outcomes. However, we argue that proponents of convergence have problematically lumped causally heterogeneous phenomena into a single evidentiary basket, in effect treating all convergent events as if they are of equivalent theoretical import. As a result, the ‘critique from convergent evolution’ fails to engage with key claims of the radical contingency thesis. To remedy this, we develop ways to break down the heterogeneous set of convergent events based on the nature of the generalizations they support. Adopting this more nuanced approach to convergent evolution allows us to differentiate iterated evolutionary outcomes that are probably common among alternative evolutionary histories and subject to law-like generalizations, from those that do little to undermine and may even support, the Gouldian view of life. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that bioethicists have a thus-far unfulfilled role to play in helping life scientists, including medical doctors and researchers, think about race. I begin with descriptions of how life scientists tend to think about race and descriptions of typical approaches to bioethics. I then describe three different approaches to race: biological race, race as social construction, and race as cultural driver of history. Taking into account the historical and contemporary interplay of these three approaches, I suggest (...) an alternative framework for thinking about race focused on how the idea of race functions socially. Finally, using assisted reproductive technologies as an example, I discuss how bioethicists and scientists might work together using this framework to improve not only their own but broader perspectives on race. (shrink)

Abstract:In this essay I examine restrictions on labor as takings of property: a liberty to work is property, and restrictions of that liberty are takings. I set property in one’s labor within a unified framework for all forms of property, understood as a social institution for balancing two freedoms: freedom to act even if it interferes with someone else, and freedom from interference. As such, property includes not only possession but also use and disposition. To restrict use or disposition is (...) to alter those freedoms, which is a taking of property, including property in one’s labor. I understand such takings to be justified insofar as they benefit the persons whose freedoms are altered, taking up the question of when restrictions on use and disposition of labor are to the benefit or the harm of excluded workers. Appreciating that labor is property, and that restrictions on labor are takings, reframes the justificatory burden that restrictions on labor must bear. And where that justification is lacking, this approach reframes the nature of the wrongs that unjustified restrictions perpetrate, especially against the most vulnerable workers. (shrink)

The study of Austrian and German modernist literature has a long and venerable history in this country. There have been no attempts yet, however, to reassess German and Austrian literary modernism in light of current discussion of modernity and postmodernity. Addressing a set of historical and theoretical questions central to current reevaluations of modernism, this volume presents American readers with a state-of-the-art account of German modernism studies in the eighties. Essays by Jochen Schulte-Sasse, Russell A. Berman, Peter Uwe Hohendahl, (...) Judith Ryan, Mark Anderson, Klaus R. Scherpe, Biddy Martin, Klaus L. Berghahn and Acbar Abbas, center around German and Austrian literary and philosophical prose of the early twentieth century. texts by well-known authors -Kafka, Rilke, Musil, Doblin, Benjamin, Benn, and Junger - and less well-known ones -Franz Jung, Carl Einstein, Ernst Bloch, Lou Andreas-Salome, are examined. Particular attention is paid to the processes and strategies by which certain experiences of "modern life" are translated into modern aesthetic forms. The unique contribution of this volume is that it combines theory with an attempt to reintroduce an historical and contextual dimension. The authors believe that their revisions of Ausrian and German modernism will themselves be informed by a new set of questions pertinent to the modernist debate. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉDes travaux récents par Joseph Raz, Niko Kolodny et Sergio Tenenbaum suggèrent qu'il n'existe aucune contrainte normative propre aux intentions. De telles contraintes seraient un mythe. Selon eux, il est possible d'articuler la rationalité des intentions sans postuler que l'intention est un état mental. Je soutiens que nous pouvons aussi comprendre la nature descriptive des intentions sans postuler que l'intention est un état mental. Tout comme l'idée selon laquelle il y aurait des contraintes normatives propres aux intentions, ce postulat est (...) aussi un mythe. L'intention est plutôt une action accompagnée de certaines sous-actions caractéristiques et jouant un rôle de coordination. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This wide-ranging conversation explores the potential of comedy to effect social change; the connections and disconnections between comedy and tragedy; the problem of laughter, humor, and ridicule; and the power of feminist humor.

Newspaper stories that rely on reconstruction of events from police reports, court records, and recollections of witnesses often sacrifice attribution for the sake of immediacy. Such stories make compelling reading, but they mislead readers by erasing the line between information obtained via observation and information obtained from human or documentary sources. This article argues that the lack of attribution is more distracting than it presence--because readers wonder how the reporters know what they know--and calls on reporters to make clear when (...) they have left the realm of observation and entered that of reconstruction. (shrink)

Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language presents the Tractatus as a work of mystic theology intended to direct the reader to a transcendental plane from which human existence can be viewed from the divine perspective. More than any other work on Wittgenstein, this study integrates text material with personal biographical information, especially information dealing with his spiritual and psychological states. The result is a fresh, coherent, and extremely illuminating picture of Wittgenstein, successfully avoiding the pitfalls of either psychological reductionism or (...) unfaithfulness to the text. It is bold without being reckless, passionately argued without being doctrinaire, and makes a very powerful and persuasive case for its main thesis. (shrink)

In this article, I examine A. John Simmons’s philosophical anarchism, and specifically, the problems that result from the combination of its three foundational principles: the strong correlativity of legitimacy rights and political obligations; the strict distinction between justified existence and legitimate authority; and the doctrine of personal consent, more precisely, its supporting assumptions about the natural freedom of individuals and the non-natural states into which individuals are born. As I argue, these assumptions, when combined with the strong correlativity and strict (...) distinction theses, undermine Simmons’s claim, which is central to his philosophical anarchism, that a state may be justified in enforcing the law, even if illegitimate or unjustified in existing. (shrink)

In his introduction to this symposium, “Religions and Cultures of East and West: Perspectives on Bioethics,” Dr. Robert Sade defined its purpose as follows: “The objective of [our] discussions…is to explore the limits of enhancement technologies in light of what makes us essentially human, in the view of world-wide cultures and religions.”These issues would seem to be at the cutting edge of any informed deliberation concerning the merits of “human enhancement” technologies. For instance, the issue of how “what makes us (...) essentially human” affects our reflection on issues of technological “life enhancement” is raised in a 2007 book by Harvard professor Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. (shrink)