This corpus-based study focuses on the revival of the geopolitical struggle in Africa between the U.S. and Russia (Stronski, 2019; Cohen, 2020). I investigate a corpus of speeches given by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken during their respective visits to Africa in July and August 2022. On the one hand, I examine to what extent the two antagonists combine figurative language with various discursive and psycho-cognitive strategies in order to sustain (...) and convey their ideological standpoint and their geopolitical agenda in Africa. On the other hand, I analyze how they select and construe some particular lexical units and structures, literally or figuratively, for the sake of foregrounding or backgrounding events, participants, and the relationships between them. Finally, based on a sample of reactions to the narratives, section (2.5) deals with their socio-cognitive perceptions by the African leaders and people. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to outline the geopolitical concepts of Aleksandr Dugin, the guru of Russian Eurasian geopolitics as a total ideology. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a rapid renaissance of geopolitics in Russia, which was an ideological attempt to rationalise the role and place of the post-Soviet Russian state in the post-Cold War international system. The dynamic development of geopolitics in Russia was also a way for the Russians to (...) overcome the post-imperial trauma and the post-Soviet identity crisis. Geopolitics was to define the global aspirations and goals of the Russian Federation, being the quintessence of postmodern Russian messianism and setting a new historical mission for this state. One of several geopolitical trends in Russia was neo-Eurasianism, whose main ideologist was Aleksandr Dugin. The Russian geopolitician has proceeded to formulate a total ideology based on geopolitics for Russia, which is to constitute an intellectually and conceptually attractive synthesis of all the universalist ideologies practised in this country throughout history. Dugin tries to integrate geopolitics with the metaphysics and philosophy of being, transforming it into a kind of ideocratic sacrum and ideological signpost for the contemporary Russian state. (shrink)

Investigating maternity tourism to the United States from Russia through the lens of technological mediation, this study foregrounds the geopolitical patterns of human reproduction that shape, and are shaped by, individual choices of maternal healthcare in a neoliberal healthcare market. Following the history of a highly popular Russian-language forum, I demonstrate how this online community gets imbricated into communicative biocapitalism – a neoliberal logic that commodifies the voice of an online user, turning networked publics into markets for medical services. (...) Adding to the literature on data colonialism, I explore a case in which data-driven algorithms effectively alter geographical distribution of reproductive bodies, outsourcing the production of new generations of neoliberal subjects through regimes of technological mediation. (shrink)

Modern Ukrainian society is stratified not only economically, socially, professionally, informally, territorially, politically, historically, but ideologically and experiencedly. Is there something that unites Ukraine today? E. This - the present as a set of cultural and civilization factors and reality as a set of fateful events. The number and intensity of the fateful events for Ukraine in the last 3 years - from November 22, 2013, that is, the first protest against the non-signing of the association with the EU - (...) is abundant. It is not time to sum up, there is a permanent crisis, there is a war, we have a lot of losses, but we have already made our choice. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2017 Heft: 215 Seiten: 235-253.

The defeat of russia on the battlefield must be accompanied by the delegitimization of the “russian world”, that is, the loss of attractiveness for the russians themselves of the concept of the supremacy of everything Russian over everything non-russian. Cultivating russia’s greatness as a key task of “russian world” is one of the main reasons for the current Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, but also for Russia’s aggressive foreign policy in the world in general. The (...) purpose of this article is to clarify the main features of the delegitimization of the “russian world” in the regime of social education. To do this, the definition of “russian world” as a special symbolic system, which the modern russian political regime is trying to adjust from the standpoint of aggressive russian geopolitical subjectivity, has been previously clarified. This leads to the performative selfdenial of the “russian world”, which can be traced at the level of the accumulation of symbolic capital, the establishment of political elites (the authorities and the opposition), as well as at the level of the development of civil society. Social learning involves the search at the level of civil society for new forms of communicative self-organization at various levels of collective formation. A way out for such performative self-denial is possible only through the ways of social learning, the search for a change in one’s own identity, and not through attempts at autistic self-affirmation characteristic of the modern russian political regime, as well as the destruction of all political and cultural alternatives to the stateapproved canon. Social education is a way of soft and non-violent delegitimization of the “russian world”, in contrast to rebellion and revolutions, which in russia traditionally only lead to the emergence of even more brutal forms of state dictatorship. The monologic nature of the russian political space provokes the reation of new forms of social consensus outside the russian political system – in the sphere of culture, counterculture, and subcultures. (shrink)

This reflection examines the context of philosophical-ethical research and its preceding and continuing particular geopolitical framework in the central zone of Central Europe in the case of the national and state revival of the Czech nation. It focuses on the work and endeavour of František Palacký and its interpretive development by Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, which resulted in the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic. In this context, it finally outlines the significance of the dramatic Central European affairs since the turn of (...) 1989 to the Russian war on Ukraine. (shrink)

The article deals with the role of Russian culture in the period of the RF war against Ukraine. The history is considered as the basic structure that shapes the discursive foundation of identity. Historical narratives as well as the cultural background of imperial identity and risks of the full scale representation of Russian culture in the Ukrainian social consciousness are analyzed. The two tendencies are also comprehended — junk science foundation of geopolitical projects and devalu- ation of the (...) historically formed senses. So the communicative action is penetrated by the strategic action bazed on the false reality fundament, this significant element of the war of the world. The vivid example of junk science is the neoeurasian ideology, that defines the strategy of Kremlin informational attack on the Ukrainian identity. Standoff between the identities takes place in the course of the imperial mobilization project development. The symbiosis of governmental authorities and artists plays the key role in its realization. The author outlines the main features of the strategic effect of penetration into the core of communicative process and the false reality building. Also the author develops the thought that the heartbreaking and impetuous change of con- tradictory narratives are the one of the fundamental resources of information war. In particular it deals with the great Russian Simulacrum as the vivid example of the instrumental reason that is in the base of the information war against Ukraine. It is also defined the historical origin of the simulacra as the instrument of the Russian special services and the role of their partners — the iconic figures of the Russian literature — in the projects of the public opinion manipulation. (shrink)

The academic community in the West tends to be suspicious of Russian philosophy, often relegating it to another category, such as “ideology” or “social thought.” But what is philosophy? There is no simple universal definition, and many thinkers consider it impossible to formulate one. The most credible attempt is nominalistic: philosophy is the practice in which Plato and Aristotle were involved. As Alfred North Whitehead wrote, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of (...) a series of footnotes to Plato.”If so, then Russian thought needs to be understood as an important part of the Western philosophical heritage, given that it offers perhaps the most elaborate set of footnotes to Plato's most mature and comprehensive dialogues: the Republic and the Laws. The status of ideas in Russian philosophy mirrors Plato's vision of them as ontological and political entities, “laws,” or ideal principles—as distinct from mere epistemic units or tools of cognition. The Platonic tendency to integrate and implement religious, philosophical, and political teachings culminated in twentieth-century Russia. In the Soviet state, perhaps more than anywhere else in history, philosophy became a supreme legal and political institution, acquiring the power of a suprapersonal, universal reason. Hence thought itself, in the moment of its triumph, became a prisoner in the social structures that Soviet ideocracy erected on a philosophical foundation. In discussing Russian philosophy, we inevitably consider the practical application of Platonic conceptions by the Soviet ideocracy to a state in which philosophy was called upon to rule.According to Sergei Averintsev, the emphasis on Platonism in the Russian intellectual tradition is nothing to be proud of; it should rather be lamented and repented. Despite the obvious Platonic preferences of Russian thinkers (from Ivan Kireyevsky to Aleksei Losev), Averintsev asks whether even now we might be able to reorient the tradition toward Aristotle instead—toward a more secular, tolerant, and analytic philosophy of human nature. “If Plato is the first utopian,” Averintsev writes, “Aristotle is the first thinker to look the spirit of utopia right in the eye and overcome it.... Aristotle's technique of thought is more neutral toward religion than is Plato's ecstasy.” Characteristically, the name index to the Palgrave Handbook of Russian Thought contains almost twice as many mentions of Plato as of Aristotle.Each national tradition has its own “strange attractor,” as they say now in complexity theory. English empiricism, French rationalism, German Idealism, American pragmatism... However stereotypical these generalizations are, they help to clarify the nations’ distinctive contributions to philosophy. Where does Russia stand in this row? I think that Caryl Emerson is correct to pinpoint, among the most distinctive features of the Russian intellectual tradition, the striving for “wholeness” (tselostnost’). Many Russian thinkers seem to evade definitive and particular “isms,” preferring to find ways of complementing (and thus diluting) those that are on offer. Faced with the claims for rationalism, for example, the Russian response tends to be that true rationality is or should be coupled with fullness of feeling. The characteristic Russian “ism” is at best “holism,” at worst “totalitarianism,” and is usually directed against Western thought. Kireyevsky declares: There [in the West] is a bifurcation [razdvoenie] of the spirit, a bifurcation of thoughts, a bifurcation of the sciences, a bifurcation of the state, a bifurcation of estates, a bifurcation of society, a bifurcation of family rights and duties, a bifurcation of morality and the heart.... In Russia, on the contrary, there is a predominant tendency toward the wholeness of the inner and the outer, of public and moral being.Vladimir Solovyov held that the goal of all knowledge was to comprehend “total unity” and to overcome all kinds of unilateralism, which he referred to as “abstract elements” (otvlechennye nachala). These one-sided elements included Realism, rationalism, empiricism, and positivism, all of which had been advanced by Western philosophical movements.Reading the Handbook, I was struck by how steadily, from one thinker to another, the concept of “unity” is reiterated in various synonyms and contexts: “all-unity,” “wholeness,” “totality,” “integrity,” “edinstvo,” “tsel'nost,’” “tselostnost,” “sobornost,” and so forth. Russian thinkers endeavor not to create something original and special but to unify everything that has already been done and known. Consider opponents, like the Slavophiles and Westernizers; take Petr Chaadaev and Vissarion Belinsky, Kireyevsky and Alexander Herzen, Dostoevsky and Solovyov—all are united by this “super-idea,” proclaiming its embodiment to be the all-embracing vocation of the Russian people. At the same time, they sharply reject all “private principles” and “trashy certainty” (Belinsky's driannaia opredelennost’)—anything that restricts and divides individuals or nations. All these forms of privacy and particularity must be overcome on the way to a universal whole that is even greater in scale than Western Catholicism. According to this logic of totality, we would be better off left with nothing than to be content with the particular and the limited. The first original Russian thinker, Chaadaev (1794–1856), makes the salto mortale of declaring Russia a country that has given nothing to the world, then proclaiming that Russia's destiny is to rise above the rest of the world and resolve all its contradictions. From nothing to everything: such are the philosophical foundations for the totalitarian aspiration of Russian thought, which eventually expressed itself in the revolutionary movements and communist experiments of the twentieth century.As is well known, Russian literature is considered in the West a far more powerful and original expression of philosophical ideas than Russian philosophy as such. Characteristically, then, almost half of the Handbook, its entire second part, is devoted to the dialogue of Russian philosophy with literature and art. As M. N. Forster remarks in the Handbook's concluding essay: “It is natural to wonder why this striking asymmetry between relatively modest achievements in pure philosophy and spectacularly high achievements in literature came about.” To the literary focus of Russian philosophy, we can add a political focus. At least a third of part one of the Handbook is devoted to Russian political and revolutionary philosophy, to Lenin and other Marxists, to Ivan Ilyin, and so on. In this context, both literature and politics assumed philosophical dimensions, often overshadowing philosophy itself.Bertrand Russell lamented that the system of philosophical categories in the West featured mostly nouns (being, consciousness, idea, matter, substance, and so forth), omitting adjectives, verbs, prefixes, and other parts of speech. This criticism should be applied to the category philosophy itself. Why the noun philosophy rather than the adjective philosophical, which can be applied to many areas of activity and creativity, including literature and politics?In Russian intellectual history, the philosophical, rather than philosophy, is the predominant category. The state, ideology, economics, politics and geopolitics, literature, art, warfare, space exploration—all these spheres in Russia and the USSR have been and remain abundantly philosophical, subordinated to certain philosophical tasks, though philosophy as such has never been as developed and sophisticated as in the West. As a discipline, Western philosophy “outsourced” itself to Russian disciples, leaving it to Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, Lenin and Trotsky, to test in literary and political practices a host of Western philosophical ideas, from those of Plato, Rousseau, and Hegel to those of Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche.Likewise, the verb to philosophize is used in ways unusual and awkward in the West. “It is characteristic of the Russian people to philosophize [filosofstvovat'],” as Nikolai Berdyaev observed: “An illiterate Russian peasant likes to pose questions of a philosophical nature—about the meaning of life, about God, about eternal life, about evil and untruth, about how to realize the Kingdom of God.” The philosophical and philosophizing, as attributes and actions of the state and society, overpowered philosophy as a noun—as an academic discipline, if you will. Russian philosophy has had a very modest impact on the West, but the impact of the philosophical has been immense. Nineteenth-century Russian literature influenced Western culture with its philosophical interrogations and existential dilemmas, just as, in the twentieth century, the USSR influenced the West with the philosophical ideas (Marxism, materialism, dialectics, collectivism, socialism, communism) that determined Soviet ideology, politics, and economics.In the USSR of the 1920 and 1930s, for instance, philosophy as an independent academic subject was in a subdued position, as a servant of party ideology. But, meanwhile, the sphere of the philosophical spread to such distant domains as theater (Stanislavsky), physiology (Pavlov), and agriculture (Michurin), with all such activities glorified and sponsored by the state as “philosophically correct”—as faithful to “materialism” and “Realism.” Paradoxically, in the quintessentially philosophical state that was the USSR, the state of philosophy, with the repression of all independent thought and thinkers, was miserable. The fateful and often disastrous originality of Russian philosophy consisted precisely in its dissemination to other areas, in an act of kenosis or self-transcendence that can be viewed both as an aggressive philosophical appropriation of politics, economics, ideology, and literature—and as philosophy's sacrificial devotion to the world beyond its professional boundaries.So there are three features that make Russian thought relevant and dangerous: its Platonic utopian aspiration; its spirit of totality; and its tendency to transcend the boundaries of academic philosophy and to philosophize society, politics, and life in general. Russian philosophy has not been as good at explaining the world as at changing it, sometimes ethically and poetically, sometimes violently and aggressively. Teachers and students of Russian culture should be deeply motivated to draw more attention to the philosophical in Russia and to raise its status in the Western academy. In my view, we would do better service to Russian philosophy if we are frank enough to qualify it as dangerous, sometimes very toxic and addictive, fraught with totalistic tendencies. This philosophy is the voice of the “underground,” both in the Dostoevskian and Leninist senses.At the same time, however, the antidotes concocted in the Russian metaphysical laboratory are of enormous value: the Russian versions of personalism, existentialism, secular and religious liberalism, neorationalism, culturology, conceptualism, and postmodernism. These movements, which counteract totalization, need to be studied precisely because they were cooked up and tested under the same extreme conditions in which the most dangerous intellectual poisons have been produced. (shrink)

The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin’s (b. 1962) challenge to the Western liberal order. Even though Dugin’s project is in many ways a theoretical epitome of Russia’s contemporary attempt to profile itself as a regional great power with a political and cultural identity distinct from the liberal West, Dugin can also be read in a wider context as one of the currently most prominent representatives of the culturally and intellectually oriented international New Right. The chapter introduces Dugin’s (...) role on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent “fourth political theory” as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to liberalism as well as the two other main twentieth-century ideologies, communism and fascism. Dugin’s fourth ideology, essentially meant as an alternative to a unipolar post–Cold War global hegemony of victorious liberalism, draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt’s pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin’s eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism. (shrink)

Ukrainian lands in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have been in proximity of great geopolitical changes several times. During that time the Ukrainian nation – due to various factors – encountered a number of “windows of opportunity” for achieving the realization of dreams about independence and national sovereignty. The author identified in the period considered four “general moments,” of which two have been completed successfully. The first of these occurred in 1990–1991, when for the first time in modern history, Ukrainians (...) managed to achieve a lasting and relatively stable independence. The second of the “moments” – still unresolved – are events that began in the late autumn of 2013. The process, called “Revolution of Dignity”, represents a new quality in the history of the Ukrainian nation, therefore, that the Ukrainians have to defend the status quo but not to seek to achieve an independent being. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the ability of Ukrainians to achieve and maintain independence is largely a function of the relative power of the Russian state as measured with respect to the shape and quality of international relations. (shrink)

The relocation of two Metropolitan Metropolitan Kirill II and Maxim to the North, to Vladimir above Klyazma, put the Galicia-Volyn state and the Ukrainian Church in a difficult position. While Kiev remained the actual Metropolitan Chair, the latter could stay in the northern Russian cities for a long time, without causing much anxiety or dissatisfaction in the South. However, with the relocation of Metropolitan Maxim to permanent residence in the capital of the North-Russian Grand Duke, the rulers of (...) the southwestern region of Russia realized that in this way they were losing significant spiritual and political power, which henceforth gave the North the advantage of the All-Russian genius. (shrink)

Two philosophers and prominent public figures explore the spiritual and cultural framework within which Russia's crisis and prospects for social renewal must be understood. Their discussion ranges over several main areas of concern in Russia today: the nature of the person and her capacities as social actor, the forms of sociality Russia has known as seen against the background of Orthodoxy and Communism, and Russia's tragedy during the seventy-five years of Communism. A third path is envisaged for Russian renewal (...) based on geopolitical, cultural, and spiritual constants in the history of the nation. (shrink)

Social researchers have extensively addressed the immigration of one million Russian speakers to Israel/palestine over the past twenty-five years. However, the immigrants’ incorporation into the Israeli occupation regime and the ongoing colonisation of Palestine have rarely been questioned as such. In the interviews informing this article, Russian-speaking immigrant women living in Arab-Palestinian communities discuss their complex relations with Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli and Russian-Israeli communities. Sharing a background with Russian-speaking Jewish Israelis on the one hand, and marital kinship (...) ties to Palestinians on the other, these women encounter multiple boundaries of territory and identity in their everyday lives. Drawing on feminist border thinking, I explore these encounters as a navigation through geopolitical and epistemic borderlands in a dense colonial reality. I am particularly interested in the potential of such an exploration to question essentialism and destabilise binary ethno-national categories of identity, such as Arab/jew and Israeli/palestinian, that dominate not only hegemonic but also emancipatory discourses. These binary divisions are not a straightforward outcome of political regimes but rather the result of ongoing border-making processes, which are vulnerable to disorder and disruption. This perspective aims to enrich understandings of the roles that gendered ethno-national identities play in sustaining the colonial relations of power in Israel/palestine. (shrink)

This article seeks to historicize both the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the debate on realism occasioned by Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Using the research of Gerard Toal on Russia’s construction of its security interests in the post-Soviet spaces that include Ukraine, the article argues that neorealist geopolitical explanations fail to do justice to the roles of contingency and culture in setting Russia’s so-called ‘red lines.’ It also identifies an agency problem in realism: realists (...) not only fail to do justice to the agency of small states like Ukraine in this conflict but elide the moral and practical agency of decisionmakers like Russian President Vladmir Putin. The article also suggests that the current realism debate is the tip of an iceberg: realism has long had a problem specifying the relation of its theory to its practice. The article concludes by discussing the long shadow of 19th century imperial history over contemporary discussions of spheres of influence and great power status. (shrink)

With the digitalization of the economy and society, varieties of "platform capitalism" appeared in the world. The article presents the first attempt at a critical understanding of the "gig economy" model that is taking shape in contemporary Russia. By problematizing the narratives that dominate foreign studies of platform employment, the author shows the embeddedness of platformization in the current economic system. Unlike countries with a developed market economy, labor platforms in Russia are part of giant platform ecosystems controlled by oligarchic (...) businesses and the state, which, in the course of "creeping nationalization", increases its influence through ownership and management structures. In key sectors of platform employment, quasi-monopolies are formed with the dominance of one company. In the context of geopolitical tensions, the process of "sovereignization" and the closure of the platform economy is being completed. Having successfully platformized informal labor markets in some sectors, platforms are becoming a tool for the legalization of employment in the hands of the state, driven primarily by fiscal interests. In Russia, a neoliberal model of regulation of the gig economy is being formed based on the legal introduction of the category of 'self-employed' in the absence of due attention to labor rights and the social protection of workers. With the strengthening of the authoritarian nature of the state, the possibilities of self-organization and collective defense of the interests of platform workers are blocked. The author concludes that in the Russian model of "platform capitalism", the state enters an alliance with big capital and consumers against labor: the state strengthens control over the economy and tax revenues, large platform companies use labor at lower costs, and consumers receive cheap services through convenient digital services. The author calls for an integration of the issues of platform capitalism into broader discussions about the Russian model of socio-economic development. (shrink)

The essay proceeds from the assumptions that for a economic/political integration group to succeed, first, its participants’ motives should ideally be as alike as possible and not oppose one another and, second, their expectations from integration should correspond to the organisation’s capabilities. In light of these assumptions, the study endeavours to assess the Eurasian Economic Union’s (EAEU) potential for stability and development. First, the author analyses the key motives that were driving its member states’ decisions to enter the organisation, compares (...) them with one another and discusses how the countries’ motives influence their conduct in the union. Second, the author confronts those motives against the EAEU’s activities and the general logic of interstate politics on the post-Soviet space to reckon up whether the bloc’s capabilities fit with the expectations of its member countries. Finally, based on that discussion, the author speculates on how the divergence/convergence of EAEU member states’ goals, as well as the (in-)feasibility of their expectations, affect the organisation’s development. (shrink)

The heritage of civilizations in geopolitics is progressively used to consolidate the vision of a multipolar world and, thereby, to establish its important place in the arena of international affairs. Civilizational heritage and civilizational imagination become increasingly important geopolitical factors which begin to shape the relations between China, Russia, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. In global politics during the last decades, in one way or another, Samuel Huntington’s ideas of the interactions between civilizations and their development (...) externalised with the stress on the increase of civilizational conflicts. These ideas made great impact on political elites of main world powers. The author of this article—drawing attention to the importance of cultural and especially religious factors for civilizational processes and the interactions between civilizations, which were also raised by Huntington—examines the peculiarities of the Russian and Turkish civilizational and geopolitical discourses, and connects to those discourses the current geopolitics pursued by the political elites of these countries. The promotion of the current role of the civilization and its geopolitical legacy highlights the uniqueness of civilizations and creates an effort to strengthen the civilizational imagination and to use the civilizational imperial experience and its cultural heritage in current political events. The Russian discourse is characterised by the historical anti-Western and anti-European attitude of Eurasian Messianic civilizational distinctiveness, while the Turkish rhetoric is characterised by the elevation of the imperial Ottoman Islamic cultural and political heritage. Both the discourses are linked by an imperial mentality, orientation towards a multi-civilizational and multi-polar world as well as the demand to create a new world order in line with such an emerging worldview. The article also discusses some of the ideas prevailing in the European Union that underpin the policy of creating a post-national European cosmopolitan community. However, such discourse lacks a cultural, civilizational as well as religious heritage, which brings people together and can form a long-lasting sense of civilizational community. (shrink)

He work of the Russian nationwide conference ‘National identity through language and literature. Characteristics of conceptoshere of national culture‘ is analyzed in the article. Previous theoretical sources on the issue in question are summarized. The matters represented in the considered scientific forum are generalized. Diachronic analysis of national cultural consciousness as well as complex cognitive-based approach are used to investigate the issue. Special attention is paid to the study of linguistic world-image as exemplified in fiction, folklore, religious texts, business (...) papers, scholarly works and media texts, as well as to the research of intercultural communication in the era of multiculturalism and globalization. As long as terms ‘cultural code‘, ‘national code‘, and ‘fictional code‘ are not precisely defined, the problem of terminological field was noted, as well as the issue of linguo-cognitive interpretation of methods for representing country image in linguistic consciousness. The attention was paid to Russian as a foreign language, to perception and transforming of European cultural codes by American and western European writers in synchronous and diachronic ways. Geopolitical factor of North and South that matters both in global and local context was noted, particularly the issue of German distinction of the modern European mindset was reviewed. Lots of speaker papers mirrored interdisciplinary links that is of importance for contemporary scholarship in the context of globalization and multicultural society. Up-to-date schools of thought in the field of linguistics, literary studies and journalism were represented. (shrink)

The proceeding of the Round Table on "Reason vs Post-Truth: Ontology, Axiology, Geopolitics".

The paper deals withy the analysis and highlighting the concepts of First and third Rome under the context of the «Russian world» ideology and modern Vatican verification. The imperian segment of First and third Rome, interconnection between the ideologeme «Moscow – the Third Rome» and geopolitical in the essence concept of Kyryll patriarch. The process of historial fails of «Moscow the Third Rome» created for all the Christian world. It has been pinted out that the «Russian world» abd (...) the ROC were designated only for Eastern Slavonic countries of Europe. (shrink)

The proceedings of the Round Table on "Reason vs Post-Truth: Ontology, Axiology, Geopolitics".Authors of the proceedings:V.V. Mironov K.K. Momdzhyan A.V. Belokobylskyi A.P. Kozyrev O.A. Efremov M.V. Bratersky A.V. Pilko V.S. Levytskyy.

The purpose of the study is to analyze various approaches to the processes of formation of the Russian civilizational identity in the context of modern Russian nation-building and modernization of education. The article substantiates the relevance of the growing civilizational paradigm of Russian education in accordance with the value orientations of the updated Constitution of the Russian Federation, the foundation of which is the course of positioning Russia as one of the civilizational poles of multipolar world (...) development. An important condition for the construction of the Russian civilizational identity is the dissemination of ideas about Russia as a state-civilization in the socio-pedagogical space. As a result of the analysis, the authors come to the conclusion that the modern model of national and civilizational identity should be built as a multi-level education, in which the Russian civilizational identity is complemented by the image of Russia as a Eurasian civilization. It is this image that can act as a certain supra-civilizational level, acceptable in other civilizational formations, which logically fits into the modern geopolitical vector of Russia, aimed at the formation of socio-economic, political and military institutions in the Eurasian space. (shrink)

The paper deals withy the analysis and highlighting the concepts of First and third Rome under the context of the «Russian world» ideology and modern Vatican verification. The imperian segment of First and third Rome, interconnection between the ideologeme «Moscow – the Third Rome» and geopolitical in the essence concept of Kyryll patriarch. The process of historial fails of «Moscow the Third Rome» created for all the Christian world. It has been pinted out that the «Russian world» abd (...) the ROC were designated only for Eastern Slavonic countries of Europe. (shrink)

This article describes present day reaction of Ukrainian Baptist community on the current geopolitical situation in Ukraine and its reflection in first modern independent theological steps of named Late Protestant denomination. It is stressed, that complete process of theology creation is a maker of healthy and protected, factually free religious life in certain boundaries of country or land. Also it’s shown that in Ukrainian case for present day’s start of the modern Baptist theology discourse the trigger factor was Revolution of (...) dignity 2013-2014 and de-facto Russian-Ukrainian ongoing war. Ideas and practices raising up in their environment mark how all this impacts the whole Ukrainians and members of Ukrainian Baptist Churches, do they feel themselves as responsible citizens of their country, would they react or not on realities of their country life or not, and do they think about question of their identity. This entire things signal about deeper processes of final institutionalization of named denomination, its entry into democratic era together with state. (shrink)

This paper considers the views of Alexander Dugin, a leading proponent of Eurasianism in contemporary Russia. The point of his teaching is the preservation of the traditional social/cultural make-up of each civilization. He also believes that the Russian Slavs together with the minorities of the Russian Federation constitute a quasi-unity of Eurasian civilization. He emphasizes that globalism, led by the USA, is a mortal threat to the cultural identity of Russia/Eurasia and all other civilizations. For this reason the (...) USA and Russia are locked in mortal conflict with one other. At the outset of his intellectual career, in post-Soviet Russia, Dugin believed that Putin would follow the Eurasian road. It would be wrong to see Dugin as an intellectual guru at the head of the post-Soviet elite. Still, his views are important, for they indicate the kinds of ideas that circulate in the minds of the Russian elite. (shrink)

The article offers to look at modern political processes through the prism of the participation of the religious factor in them. Considering the current Russian-Ukrainian war as a kind of trigger that launched global changes in the system of international relations, burying its previous bipolar model, the authors analyze the changes that have taken place in Ukraine, in its religious segment. Ukraine is turning from a little-known part of the world religious space into an active reformer of this space. (...) At a certain moment, it becomes the center of a global confrontation between three main religious points - Constantinople, Rome and Moscow, reformatting the usual Christian landscape of the world. The given quantitative and qualitative indicators of the presence of Ukraine as a religious entity in the European and world space demonstrate both its enrichment and problematic conflict. The war revealed latent inter-denominational confrontations in Ukraine and in the world. Such a powerful tool of ideological influence as religion/church is used by conflicting parties to justify and sanctify aggression and protect against it. The authors focus their attention on Ukrainian Orthodoxy, on its role in reformatting the religious space. Ukrainians put an end to the unlimited dominance of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ecumenical Orthodoxy, which affected other Christian communities. The absence of Ukraine in the geopolitical space, which lasted due to historical circumstances, has been overcome. Now it is subjectively present in the worldwide religious community and is there as an independent spiritual and organizational force that will only increase its potential. The former world security system has collapsed, and the old levers of restraining the aggressive and dangerous intentions of individual countries do not work. So, it is suggested to think about new forms of geopolitical coexistence. In the constructive solution of controversial issues, the human community must accumulate the efforts of all possible participators of the democratic alliance, including such a powerful religion, which over the millennia of its spiritual and practical activity has developed its own specific methods of peacemaking. (shrink)

While Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The question of Russia's desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the type of liberalism embedded in that order. Despite some calls from within for it to create a new, post-liberal order premised on conservative nationalism and geopolitics, Russia is unlikely to fare well in such a world.

The conditions for development of a regional system of national security in Central Asia in the post-Soviet period are reviewed in a new geopolitical context. The emergence in the region of new political actors of the first echelon - the USA, the European Union and the People's Republic of China as well as the second echelon - Turkey, the Islamic republic of Iran, India and Pakistan is emphasized. The role of the above countries in ensuring political and economic security is (...) traced. The regional integration situation is analyzed. Available regional threats, some of them of global nature, are looked into, their characteristic features described for each New Independent State. Interstate conflicts and their resolution potentiality in the current situation are investigated. The unity of the region in combatting international terrorism and extremism is pointed out. Regional threats which endanger the West are identified. Special attention is given to politicization of Islam, radical fundamentalism and their belligerent manifestations which took place in Central Asia. The membership of Central Asian countries in such security-focused interstate organizations as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as relations with the UN and the NATO are laid stress on. A great military and technical dependence of the armed forces of Central Asian countries on the Russian factor is pointed out. Some facts of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia, the EU, the USA and China are referred to. Conclusions are drawn as to incapability of countries of the Central Asian region to stand up to current geopolitical challenges on their own and the lack of a regional security system. The necessity of multi-vector foreign policy as a form of guarantee against external aggression is brought into focus. (shrink)

The article discusses the civilizational approach, which was formed in the 20thcentury and has become one of the main research approaches both in Russia and in the Western countries. The author presents a brief overview of the main milestones in the development of civilizational theory and its main representatives in Russia and the West. It is shown that in Russia, the importance of the civilizational approach is caused by the “change of epochs” that occurred after the 1990s and demanded to (...) consider the civilization principles in the social sciences and in the socio-political structure of the country. A brief description of the civilizational theory in the West, which has its own characteristics, not only demonstrates the universality of this scientific method but also reveals both its positive and negative aspects that were identified by the researchers. Although the Russian and Western scholars focus on the specifics of their own situations, they agree that in order to overcome the limitations of the civilizational approach, it is necessary to supplement it with other methods of scientific analysis. Since this article deals with the problems faced by Russia, the author presents the arguments of the Russian researchers, who suggest supplementing the civilizational analysis with the logic of sense, formations, geopolitical, ideological and worldview research approaches. It should be noted that the logic of sense approach is the latest achievement of the philosophical thought and a kind of scientific discovery (authored by A.V. Smirnov). It is concluded that all the supplementing methods find their meaning and place in relation to each other only within the framework of a holistic interdisciplinary approach, which provides a theoretical understanding of a larger set of problems that the country is facing today. (shrink)

In the article the attitude of the social and political elite to the existence of independent Ukraine. For this purpose analyzed the major geopolitical concepts and legal documents on foreign policy that defined the Russian policy on post-Soviet states during the 1990s. Common to all these works have analyzed the declaration of the Russian Federation Centre the former Soviet Union and former Soviet territory republics - the Russian zone of vital interests. Also, attention is focused on the (...) plans of the Russian social and political elite to restore the former USSR new association with the dominant role of Russia in it. The emphasis is on the negative perception of independence of Ukraine in the Russian social and political thought. Also accented Russian politicians to substantiate the need to restore political unity of the Slavic peoples, to return the "natural" geopolitical status of Russia, provide a geopolitical control over the territories that were part of the USSR. Political, economic, military and informational relationship between Ukraine and Russia in terms of Russian politicians, the long-term national interests of Russia. On the contrary same integration of Ukraine to other international entities threat to the Russian Federation and the plan of building a "Great Russia". The influence of these concepts on the formation of foreign policy strategy, particularly in the current policy of Russia towards Ukraine. It is assumed that it is the political rhetoric of the Russian national patriots and left gave impetus to the efforts of great practical implementation of their geopolitical goals, including through the brutal interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine. (shrink)

The paper examines a concept of the Balto-Black Sea Union, which ideas were translated into reality during the Kievan Rus and Grand Duchy of Lithuania period. In the 10th-11th centuries the road from the North to the South, from the East-country to the Black Sea ran through the territory of Ukraine. The way 'from the Varangians to the Greeks' integrated two regions, the Baltic and the Black Sea, and was to the advantage of all those involved. This conceptual idea was (...) again looked into by Ukrainian politicians and researchers in the early 20th century, it was explored and proposed by Mykhailo Grushevskyi, Yuriy Lypa and Stepan Rudnytskyi. The idea of the 'inter-sea area' became a subject for active discussion in Polish, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian political quarters in the late 1980s. This plot deserves attention of contemporary Ukrainian politicians in the current dynamic geopolitical context as an efficient and timely anti-Russian international project which will underpin the security of Ukraine. This idea was partially implemented in the form of the GUAM, the Black Sea Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Community of Democratic Choice. The natural vector 'North - South' of communicative and transit transport flows is not used in full measure by Ukraine. The Balto-Black Sea Union offers a significant security component which is of interest to the USA and the European Union. The emergence of such new world economic centers as the USA, the EU and China imparts a new focus to foreign policy priorities of Ukraine. (shrink)

The article explores the nature, purpose and means of influencing the public consciousness of the "Russian world" phenomenon. The origins of the project, the course of its implementation in the intellectual and power circles of Russian society are shown. It is proved that as an instrument of global competition, the "Russian world" project is an alternative to the Western project of cultural development and can be quite effective. The author concludes that under any development of events the (...) perspective of thinking that opens within the paradigm of the "Russian world", taking into account its relevance in modern Russia, consolidating the potential and influence on the perception and interpretation of contemporary and historical events, will remain a weighty factor in shaping Russia's policy in the coming years. (shrink)

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine constitutes a poignant reminder of the enduring relevance and potential devastation associated with nuclear weapons. For decades, the possibility of such catastrophic conflict has not seemed so imminent as in the current world affairs. -/- This contribution presents a comprehensive analysis of nuclear strategy for the 21st century. By examining the evolving geostrategic landscape the talk illuminates key concepts such as nuclear posture, credible deterrence, first & second strike capabilities, flexible response, EMP , variable yield, (...) counterforce & countervalue, limited war and escalation dominance, thereby providing a nuanced understanding of the delicate balance of power in the nuclear arena in modern conflicts. Furthermore, it concentrates on the era that started with the war in Ukraine, offering insights into how recent geopolitical developments influence nuclear doctrines. -/- Through conceivable real-world scenarios, we gain perspective on the multifaceted challenges posed by newer technologies and potential escalation dynamics involving global nuclear actors. -/- Such scenarios include: -/- 1. A non-weaponised or sub-critical test within Russia to intimidate opponents into understanding Russia’s resolve and capabilities. Prior norms have restricted testing since 2000, apart from North Korea. In case of a full surface test, Russia could detonate in uninhabited areas within its own vast territory with minimal fallout. While clarifying military strength, demonstrations risk hardening resistance without incentivising surrender. -/- 2. Coercive atomic threat to compel Ukraine or its supporters to make concessions. By leveraging the spectre of nuclear warfare, Russia could expect to achieve its objectives through intimidation and fear. However, the effectiveness of such a strategy is questionable, as it may provoke a strong international response and further galvanise support for Ukraine. -/- 3. Demonstration detonation over/under the Black Sea to signal resolve without targeting Ukraine itself; possibly amidst negotiations to gain diplomatic leverage, whilst limiting human casualties to zero or causing a mild, non-destructive tsunami. -/- 4. Ukraine could decide to launch a pre-emptive strike on Russian nuclear facilities or weapons, fearing an imminent attack. Such an action would have a high risk of failure and might even provoke a nuclear retaliation from Russia. It could also lead to a broader conflict, as neighbouring countries might feel compelled to intervene. -/- 5. Limited tactical strike against Ukrainian military or infrastructure to weaken capacity and morale. Russia’s 2000+ non-strategic arsenal could target positions using short-range missiles with 0.3 – 5 kiloton yields. Objectives like crippling Kharkiv defences might create no-go zones hindering advances. However, Ukraine might maintain drone and cyber offensive capabilities regardless. -/- 6. Electromagnetic Pulse attack designed to disable critical infrastructure in Ukraine and NATO countries without radioactive fallout. This aims to hinder the war effort and economy without provoking the same conventional military response as a blast. However, an EMP attack affecting NATO shall still be considered an act of war warranting retaliation. -/- 7. A weapon could be deployed accidentally or without proper authorisation. This could occur due to a technical malfunction, miscommunication, human error, or the actions of rogue elements. The consequences of such an event could be catastrophic, leading to a rapid escalation of the conflict and potentially triggering a global crisis. -/- 8. Sub-strategic offensive targeting NATO in the European theatre, so as to fracture allied resolve, against arms routes in Poland, Baltic stockpiles, British naval bases, American troop concentrations in Germany etc. Putin may perceive defeat or deposition as an existential threat, viewing such an option as self-preservation despite adverse consequences. -/- . (shrink)

For most readers, myself included, the views and opinions on the Russian attack and consequent war in Ukraine are dependent on the main media houses, who present the situation in a certain language. In this article, Badiou’s understanding of democratic materialism (languages and bodies) will be explored within the context of the war, and how language is used to order bodies into categories of good and evil. In democratic materialism, there are only bodies and languages, but no truth. The (...) question that will be explored in these few pages is, is there a way beyond democratic materialism via truth towards a materialist dialectic? Contribution: The paper contributes to the current discussion on the war in Ukraine and tries to make sense of the geopolitical context of the war. It then seeks to engage with these discourses from a theological perspective. (shrink)

This article explores the networking activities of Count Nikolai Rumiantsev and Adam von Krusenstern, his close collaborator. The visionary Russian statesman and the celebrated navigator were deeply involved in northern exploration. They funded and organized a circumnavigating voyage by the brigRurikin 1815–18, with the explicit goals of searching for a northern passage between Eurasia and North America and conducting a series of scientific investigations in the Bering Strait region. This private exploratory enterprise profoundly influenced the exchange of information and (...) reconfigured both local and global networks of knowledge. Based on an analysis of private correspondence, printed accounts and journal articles related to theRurik's expedition, this study sheds light on how this transnational network of actors emerged and functioned, and how it promoted a lively circulation of information about exploration in the Bering Strait region in the 1810s–1820s. I argue that a complex interplay of geopolitical and intellectual competition, with exchanges, collaborations and coordination among various actors (e.g. patrons, navigators, scholars, entrepreneurs and publishers), stimulated further research on the global ocean's northern spaces and laid the foundations of marine science. (shrink)

Modern Ukraine is a post-colonial, post-totalitarian state in which decolonization, decommunization, and de-Russification have not yet been fully implemented. This article sets itself the goal of reviewing the agenda of the processes of civilizational transit of Ukraine and developing theoretically grounded vectors of the said process. The important fact that the current stage of development of the “worldview gravity” of Ukrainian society is characterized by an eclectic system of stereotypes is also of significant importance: here coexist both old stereotypes of (...) consciousness and behavior, which have largely ceased to fulfill their functions, and new ones that are unstable and ambiguous. The series of ideas regarding the Ukrainian civilizational choice was already discovered in a monograph, “Civilizational crossroads of modern society,” and presented for Ukrainian readers a few years ago. The current article offers a revision of the previously presented ideas for the international audience of the journal readers, taking into account the current Ukrainian sociocultural situation, at the center of which are the challenges produced by the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The policy of new realism can become an effective tool for social modernization. The given word combination is not accidental: the realism of this type of politics insists on the need for the adequate perception of reality in all its essential aspects, and the novelty emphasizes the need to operate not with the laws and features of the socio-political status quo “in general,” but taking into account the latest dynamics, trends, threats, and problematic challenges. The people and the country need not only (and sometimes not so much) a thorough understanding of their cultural-civilizational, geopolitical, and economic-economic prospects but an indomitable character that guarantees the realization of their potential in spite of anything and against anything. On the difficult path of establishing a civilizational choice, Ukrainians will need not only the awareness of the incomplete state of political modernization, the limited, post-totalitarian (post-colonial, etc.) status, but also to work at the individual level to accelerate evolutionary processes. These processes can catalyze political decisions, not at the declarative level but at the practical level, to fill the steps for the approval of the civilizational choice with content. Step-by-step changes in favor of a new worldview horizon will require significant changes at the personal level through the rejection of destructive post-colonial (post-totalitarian, etc.) narratives in social practice in favor of the development of Ukrainian national identity, which will be preceded by the rational assimilation of the perspectives of civilizational choice, which is a fruitful combination of the European civilizational project and heritage of Ukrainian culture. (shrink)

The author reviews some archival documents and materials of Pavlo P. Skoropadskyi, Hetman of the Ukrainian state, his personal memoirs and executive decisions on foreign policy issues over a period of April-December 1918. Pavlo Skoropadskyi's stand as to building the state and his commitment to the pro-Russian vector are demonstrated. Some examples of practical steps taken by Pavlo Skoropadskyi's government to gain understanding with the Entente countries after Germany and Austria-Hungary lost the war are given. Based on its organizational (...) structure, the type of the Hetman state is defined. An example of rapport with new temporary state formations on the Don and Kuban Rivers is given. The paper describes radical and prompt actions of the Hetman government, taken to draw the Crimea under the dominion of Ukraine. The fallacy of the pro-Russian line of policy of Hetman P. Skoropadskyi in the context of the German and Austro-Hungarian occupation is pointed out. The ambiguous course of Ukraine is exemplified by the formation of its Armed Forces, Cabinet of Ministers and delaying in the implementation of the agrarian reform. The attitude of Pavlo Skoropadskyi to the Ukrainians and the Galicians is demonstrated through specific references to his statements. The paper shows some practical steps in opening embassy missions and consular agencies in European countries, which point to the efforts of the Cabinet of Ministers to win international recognition and authority for the Ukrainian state. A situational geopolitical change of the diplomatic relations is demonstrated by the example of Romania. The main causes of the anti-Hetman uprising are defined as the lack of a negotiation process with representatives of socialist and democratic forces of Ukraine, incapability to enlist the support of rural masses and inferior moods in respect of Russia. (shrink)

Crucial components of strategic communication include the audience, which plays a decisive role in how any conflict plays out. Strategic narratives are seen as means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors. The article analyzes the news discourse of the Russian media sources RT, Pervyj Kanal, and NTV on Russia’s coronavirus aid to Italy in spring 2020. In the context of media coverage, some methodological (...) questions arise: How should the intentional structuring of narratives, targeting of audiences, and the manipulative intentions of the strategic actor be studied? For this purpose, the article combines strategic narrative theory with Umberto Eco’s concepts of the Model Reader and the Model Author. Analysing the aims and intentionality of the strategic narratives, we postulate the Model Reader as an analytical category that organizes the study of the audience’s interpretation process. The function of the Model Reader is to actualize the codes and intertextual references that the author has strategically planned in the news message, in order to achieve the geopolitical aims of the strategic narratives in question. The analysis of constructing the Model Reader and the Model Author of strategic narratives is complemented by Greimas’ semiotic theory of the narrative and the composition principles of Lotman’s discrete/non-discrete texts. (shrink)

Cross-disciplinary studies carried out lately by Russian scholars discovered a causal relationship between the three variables: technological potential, cultural regulation quality, and social sustainability. The patterns called techno-humanitarian balance law, states that the higher production and war technologies' power, the more refined the behaviorregulation means that are required for self-preservation of the society. The article shows that the law has controlled social selection for all of human history and prehistory, discarding unbalanced social organisms, as far as they could not (...) cope with ecological and geopolitical crises, which had been caused by their own activities. It also shows how successive growth of instrumental opportunities in long-term retrospection has dramatically led to the consecutive perfection of cultural and psychological regulation mechanisms. Relevant calculations, comparative-anthropological evidence, and historical illustrations are provided. Regularities in mental processes are described that precede and accompany crisis-causing behavior, to certain extent regardless of population's historical and cultural peculiarities. (shrink)

Scholars from different disciplines are seeking to construct the new field of post-communism, which has been created by the implosion of the communist regime. They explore the most important dimensions of the differences between various types of space and geographical territories: the spaces of identity and the social, political and geopolitical spaces in certain countries of Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia) and the Russian world and its Eurasian borders (...) (Russia, Mongolia, Buriatia, Kazakhstan, Moldavia and the Baltic states) not to mention the borders of the Middle or Far Eastern communist world (descriptions of China and the Middle East). (shrink)

The article discusses the civilizational approach which was formed in the 20th century and has become one of the main research approaches both in Russia and in the Western countries. The author presents a brief overview of the main milestones in the development of civilizational theory and its main representatives in Russia and the West. It is shown that in Russia, the importance of the civilizational approach is caused by the “change of epochs” that occurred after the 1990s and demanded (...) to consider the civilization principles in the social sciences and in the socio-political structure of the country. A brief description of the civilizational theory in the West, which has its own characteristics, not only demonstrates the universality of this scientific method but also reveals both its positive and negative aspects that were identified by the researchers. Although the Russian and Western scholars focus on the specifics of their own situations, they agree that in order to overcome the limitations of the civilizational approach, it is necessary to supplement it with other methods of scientific analysis. Since this article deals with the problems faced by Russia, the author presents the arguments of the Russian researchers, who suggest supplementing the civilizational analysis with the logic of sense, formations, geopolitical, ideological and worldview research approaches. It should be noted that the logic of sense approach is the latest achievement of the philosophical thought and a kind of scientific discovery. It is concluded that all the supplementing methods find their meaning and place in relation to each other only within the framework of a holistic interdisciplinary approach, which provides a theoretical understanding of a larger set of problems that the country is facing today. (shrink)

An important moment in the recent history of the Eastern Orthodox Church was for sure the recognition granted to the Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople with the Tomos of autocephaly. Praised by some Orthodox churches and damned by other, it was preceded by some attempts of negotiation initiated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and by a few meetings between the representatives of the aforementioned institution, Russian Patriarchate and the Ukrainian local churches that was later recognised by Constantinople (...) and by a Schism between the Constantinople and Moscow. At the same time, it divided the local Orthodox churches between the ones who sustain one or the other side or prefer to remain in a neutral state and determined later meetings like the one from Amman in Jordan, between leaders and representatives of the Orthodox Church. Conscious of the relevance of the event and its potential consequences, we have tried here to see how it was reflected in the ecumenical space. Therefore, we have proceeded to the investigation of the journals from the ecumenical area that spoke about it, and we analysed the way how they saw it and emphasised the main elements that have raised their interest. Together with the ecclesiastical challenges, we found that they were also interested in this problem not only for its theological meaning but also because of its geopolitical relevance. The research, based on the literature investigated, therefore presents the Ukrainian problem and its image in the ecumenical space.Contribution: The research investigates how the image of the Eastern Orthodox Church changed in the ecumenical space after the foundation of the New Ukrainian Church and the debates that followed inside of the Orthodox space in this context. It is linked with the scope of the journal due to the fact that investigates a topic relevant for the ecumenical area and presents a topic that can contribute in the future to the change of the relationships with different churches with the Orthodox one. (shrink)

The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked affinities with the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period have in recent years been emphasized by an emerging radical-conservative “right-Heideggerian” orientation. I first discuss the later Heidegger's “being-historical” narrative of the culmination and end of the metaphysical foundations of Western modernity in the contemporary Nietzschean era of nihilism and (...) of an emerging postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, focused on historical and cultural relativism and particularism. In Heidegger's work of the 1930s and 1940s, we find attempts to apply this historical narrative to interpreting contemporary geopolitical and ideological phenomena in ways that connect Heidegger to certain central ideas and concerns of the conservative revolutionaries, especially Carl Schmitt's geopolitical particularism. De Benoist, the key name of the French Nouvelle Droite and a founding figure of contemporary Identitarianism, is particularly inspired by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the culmination of the “metaphysics of subjectivity” dominating Western modernity. For de Benoist, this modern metaphysics is the root of the “ideology of the Same” underlying the liberal universalism and individualism that he opposes in the name of a cultural ethnopluralism. De Benoist's Russian disciple Dugin bases the pluralistic geopolitics of his radical-conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the conservative revolution, the key intellectual model of which Dugin discovers in Heidegger's notion of the “other beginning”. (shrink)

Russland und das Russische werden für Nietzsche in den 188034 Jahren, besonders nach seiner "Entdecklung" Dostojewkijs, zu signifikanten Metaphern in sienen Überlegungen zur Zukunft Europas und der europäischen Kultur. In geopolitischer, geschichts- und moralphilosophischer Hinsicht bestimmte Nietzsche Russland als ein "Zwischenreich" zwischen Europa und Asien, das durch seinen Machtwillen in der Lage sein Könnte, das Überleben der europäischen Kultur in den von Nietzsche vorhergesehenen globalen Auseinandersetzungen des kommenden Jahrhunderts zu fördern. In psychologischer under metaphysischer under metaphysischer Hinsicht sah Nietzsche in (...) dem "beherzten Falalismus ohne Revolte" der Russen eine große Nähe zum amor fati und seiner eigenen Experimentalphilosophie.Russia and the Russian culture became significant metaphors in Nietzsche's reflections on the future of Europe and European culture in the 80s, especially after his "discovery" of Dostjevskij. On one hand, concerning geopolitics, history, and morality, Nietzsche identified Russie as an "empire-between" Europe and Asia that could guarantee the survival of European culture in the global contests of the coming century. On the other hand, concerning metaphysics and psychology, he connected the "fatalism without revolt" of the Russian people with the amor fati and his own experimental philosophy. (shrink)

Russia’s war against Ukraine has grave consequences in several political categories. These include: a reassessment of the school of ‘political realism’, one of whose proponents claims to have predicted the war. Was the West partly ‘responsible’ for the war? Second, to what extent does the war of aggression, as an undeniable violation of law, damage the status of international law and justice? Third, the war is embedded in political developments that stretch back a century. It is examined in its context (...) within American foreign policy since the Wilsonian peace programme, in relation to the dangerous reluctance of the EU to pursue a decisive geopolitical policy towards Russia, and interpreted in the light of Stalinist echoes within Russian politics. (shrink)

The article examines features of the post-Soviet period of social transformation and state building of Belarus in the context of the comparative analysis of the Soviet (communist) and Western (capitalist) development systems conducted by the famous Russian philosopher and sociologist Alexander Zinoviev. The author pays attention to the reasons of the collapse of the USSR, according to A.A. Zinoviev, as well as to the search by the post-Soviet countries, including the Republic of Belarus, for their own ways out of (...) the current crisis. The author states that the most important task of gaining state sovereignty is associated not only with social and economic processes but also with the field of national self-consciousness and the specifics of the formation of national and cultural identity. This cause is related, among other things, with the national philosophy as a stable basis of intellectual cultural creation, the evolutionary formation of worldview and cultural values of people. The author demonstrates a tolerant nature of this process in Belarus which made it possible to avoid acute social conflicts in the country and to avoid the opposition of the Belarusian model of development and culture to the traditions and achievements of neighboring countries and the world civilizational process as a whole. Also the author demonstrates contemporary achievements of the Republic of Belarus in the sphere of socio-economic and scientific-technological development as the basis for further modernization of the country in new geopolitical conditions. The conceptual views of A.A. Zinoviev are multifaceted, they have contributed and continue to play an important role in science, culture, social development, socio-political practice. Zinoviev’s works are very valuable since they are still actual and serve as a good theoretical, ideological, and methodological basis in assessing modernity, including understanding socio-political processes that have developed today in the post-Soviet space, around Russia and Belarus, in relations between the West and the East. (shrink)