On 12 June 2000, the tenth anniversary of Boris Yeltsin's election as head of the reconstituted Russian state, 180 people who had formed an ‘initiative group for a pan-Russian referendum’ launched a campaign to collect the two million signatures required by Russian law to organize a popular initiative referendum which included these three questions:-Are you opposed to the importing of radioactive material from other states to be stored, buried or reprocessed on Russian territory?-Are you in favour of the existence of (...) a federal environmental protection agency which would be independent of those bodies concerned with exploiting and managing natural resources?-Are you in favour of the existence of a legally independent state service for forests in Russia? (shrink)

kn. 1. Sushchnostnoe vosprii︠a︡tie slova.

Purpose of this article is to tell foreign readers about novels made in Russian intellectual property law in 2014. As is known modern Russian revolution in the field of intellectual property legislation occurred January 1, 2008 when Russian intellectual property legislation was codified, included in the text of part fourth of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. Part fourth of the Russian CC entered into force on January 1, 2008. At the same day seven sectoral intellectual property laws (...) were repealed. Second Revolution in this field took place during 2014: Federal law №35-FZ, 2014, substantially amending the Fourth part on the CC, entered into force on October the 1st of 2014. Scientific aim: The essence and evaluation of these amendments is the subject matter of this paper. Methods: The research is based on the analysis of the new amendments and articles added to the part fourth of the CC. Findings: Codification of the sectoral legislation en bloc in CC is a unique phenomenon. The author believes that such a construction of intellectual property law was made correctly and at the proper time. Factually the Federal Law №35-FZ is the eleventh law amending the text of the part fourth of the CC. But all previous amendments were small and not substantial. As far as amendments introduced by the law №35-FZ are concerned, they are numerous and very, very substantial. Before entering into force of the law №35-FZ, the Part fourth of the CC contained 328 articles. The law 35-FZ amends 169 articles of it and adds seven new articles. I am convinced that the law is a rather big step towards building a modern system of intellectual property legislation in Russia. Conclusions: More than 150 amendments were introduced by the law №35-FZ. Author estimates about 80% of them as positive and about 20% as negative and erroneous. These amendments do not contradict the international intellectual property agreements signed by the Russian Federation. Generally their purpose is to enhance and clarify the Russian intellectual property legislation and to narrow the gap between Russian and European intellectual property laws. The author of this article deals with intellectual property laws more than 50 years on. This paper is a short English version of various articles on this topic published in Russian, in journals: «The business and the law» and «The patents and licenses». (shrink)

The article defines the nature of the Russian war against Ukraine in the context of social and state transformations of the 20th — 21st centuries. It is emphasized that this is a war of different worlds, mentalities, worldviews, ways of life, values, etc., which has been going on for many centuries in various forms (direct and mediated, open and veiled, hot and cold). The role of the religious-legal factor in the Russian war against Ukraine at various stages of Ukrainian state (...) formation (periods of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Soviet, modern) is revealed. It is emphasized that it was during the time of the Ukrainian People’s Republic that the legal basis for the organization of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, confessional differentiation and the establishment of freedom of conscience and interconfessional tolerance in Ukrainian society was created. Emphasized attention is paid to the fact that in the Soviet period, the Russian war against Ukraine continued in a new, veiled, hidden, invisible (at first glance) form with the active use of the religious factor. The results of this period have been determined, namely: rampant militant/ scientific atheism, radical extermination, Russification of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, etc. Special attention is paid to the Soviet secular/political religion (Marxism-Leninism) as a key basis for the implementation of an aggressive policy regarding the historical memory and cultural identity of the Ukrainian people and a manipulative tool for the destruction of Ukrainian history, culture, worldview, nation, state and law in the information, hybrid, total, full-scale and other Russia’s wars against Ukraine. The article substantiates that improved legislation with an effective legal mechanism for its implementation, a strong civil society with developed institutions, including the institution of religion (church), adequate guarantees of religious rights and freedoms are important factors in ensuring state, national, religious security and victory of Ukraine (at the current stage) in the war waged against it by the Russian Federation. (shrink)

This paper considers the views of Alexander Dugin, a leading proponent of Eurasianism in contemporary Russia. The point of his teaching is the preservation of the traditional social/cultural make-up of each civilization. He also believes that the Russian Slavs together with the minorities of the Russian Federation constitute a quasi-unity of Eurasian civilization. He emphasizes that globalism, led by the USA, is a mortal threat to the cultural identity of Russia/Eurasia and all other civilizations. For (...) this reason the USA and Russia are locked in mortal conflict with one other. At the outset of his intellectual career, in post-Soviet Russia, Dugin believed that Putin would follow the Eurasian road. It would be wrong to see Dugin as an intellectual guru at the head of the post-Soviet elite. Still, his views are important, for they indicate the kinds of ideas that circulate in the minds of the Russian elite. (shrink)

The paper examines the structure and dynamics of the political imaginary of the two countries of post-Soviet Central Asia - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As the authors show, Russia has a special place in this structure. For a long time, many ordinary citizens of these states did not perceive Russia as a foreign state on an equal footing with others. This perception was due to a number of factors, the most important of which was Soviet institutional and psychological inertia. (...) At the institutional level, Soviet inertia was expressed primarily in the transparency of the borders between Russia and the Central Asian countries. On a psychological level, it manifested itself in nostalgia for the Soviet past. It was the overlapping of soviet nostalgia with the understanding of the importance of migration to Russia for the material well-being of households that gave rise to a high level of loyalty to Moscow. Recently, however, the Russian Federation has started to gradually become a foreign state among others in the eyes of ordinary residents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the minds of people, Russia still has a specific status, but this specificity is increasingly seen in a global context; in this context, other actors along with Moscow matter (Beijing and Washington, as well as Istanbul and Tehran). The process of turning Russia into an ordinary “abroad” was going on before, but it accelerated sharply after February 24, 2022. The authors identify signs of distancing from Russia both at the level of the ruling elites and at the level of civil society. Among these signs are, in particular, the desire of governments to demonstrate a multi-vector foreign policy, a change in the public rhetoric of top officials, as well as manifestations of anti-Russian sentiment in the public sphere of Kyrgyzstan. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is to analyze various approaches to the processes of formation of the Russian civilizational identity in the context of modern Russian nation-building and modernization of education. The article substantiates the relevance of the growing civilizational paradigm of Russian education in accordance with the value orientations of the updated Constitution of the Russian Federation, the foundation of which is the course of positioning Russia as one of the civilizational poles of multipolar world development. An (...) important condition for the construction of the Russian civilizational identity is the dissemination of ideas about Russia as a state-civilization in the socio-pedagogical space. As a result of the analysis, the authors come to the conclusion that the modern model of national and civilizational identity should be built as a multi-level education, in which the Russian civilizational identity is complemented by the image of Russia as a Eurasian civilization. It is this image that can act as a certain supra-civilizational level, acceptable in other civilizational formations, which logically fits into the modern geopolitical vector of Russia, aimed at the formation of socio-economic, political and military institutions in the Eurasian space. (shrink)

The article discusses the legal and regulatory aspects of enlightenment activities within the context of the socio-cultural objectives of contemporary Russian educational policy. The author examines social and education-policy factors that underscore the need for extensive enlightenment efforts in the country. One of these factors is the increasing pragmatization of attitudes towards knowledge, leading to a decline in the cultural literacy of the population. Among the manifestations of this issue is the undervaluation of the importance of fostering a well-rounded cultural (...) identity, giving precedence to a “competency-based approach.” Educational standards are geared towards skill and ability development while minimizing the significance of general education subjects. The author also highlights the challenges associated with the growing impact of information technology on the intellectual development of society. These factors necessitate the development of federal legislation to support enlightenment in Russia. However, the existing legal and regulatory framework for enlightenment activities contradicts the values of Russian society and the traditions of domestic enlightenment, effectively turning government bureaucrats into the primary enlighteners. The author analyzes specific legislative clauses that establish cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, which essentially make free enlightenment impossible. Government agencies are burdened with overwhelming responsibilities to monitor enlightenment activities. The dangers of involving citizens in oversight of enlightenment efforts are emphasized, as this poses risks of reviving a culture of denunciation. Enlightenment in Russia requires state support, not artificial constraints. The author substantiates the thesis that enlightenment activities should focus on personal development, not merely on training specific competencies. (shrink)

Realities of the formed information society made actual for inclusive education a problem of formation of professionals of the new directions capable to apply information technologies to improvement of interaction between participants of process of distance learning. Until recent time the institute of distance learning had no analogs in our educational system. It has to become one of the most important elements of the organization of remote education. Inclusive education becomes the new strategic direction of modern education in Russia, (...) its program of development to 2020 is designated by the Federal law ‘About the education in the Russian Federation‘ which has come into force on September 1, 2013. Ideas of inclusive training were born from a pressing need of society to help children to be integrated with features of development into society. Without it a creation of a new civilized society, the education system that meets the requirements of the humanistic principles is not possible. In this connection, creation of a substantial and technological basis of the organization of inclusive education of children in the mode of distance learning is an extremely important for today social, moral and pedagogical problem. In its center are the development of the subject, granting equal opportunities to each pupil to build the individual educational trajectory, culturological cultivation of the person capable to take an independent position in relation to external conditions. Distance learning serves as strong and active technology of socialization of such children. However, in the theory and a technique of training, the problem of distance learning of children with disabilities is insufficiently solved that is caused by unavailability of most of teachers to apply these technologies. There is a contradiction between objective practical need of distance learning for children with disabilities and insufficient readiness of a theoretical and technological basis. This is a main problem discussed in the study. In theoretical plan, it is a problem of development of the practical-focused theoretical and technological basis of distance learning of children with disabilities. On the practical level, it is a problem of formation of the subject information and education environment, designing of the contents, definition of methods, pedagogical technologies, the conditions of formation promoting achievement of the planned educational results and development of cognitive independent activity without prejudice to health of children on the basis of the accounting of their individual abilities. Technological effectiveness of the purposes is provided with prediction of educational results, their expression through requirements to actions of pupils. Recent time, children only start studying and mastering remote technologies therefore, first of all, they have to seize rational ways of educational activity and learn to work with information, i.e. priority value has to be allocated for formation of informative and logical and informative and information universal educational actions. (shrink)

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. Rus (Kyiv`s (...) Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2402\INDEXISS.242 : 2005-05-19 13:34
ibliographies, rchival nventories, ndexes INDEX TO RUSSELL’S THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY R H Summerfields, The Glade Escrick, York  , .. @.. he edition of the richly allusioned The Impact of Science on Society Tindexed here is that of George Allen and Unwin, published in London in . The pagination of Simon and Schuster’s edition (New York, ) is (...) different and spans pages – instead of the first British edition’s –. The very first edition of the book (New York: Columbia U. P., ) contained two paragraphs comparing Catholicism and Communism that were overlooked for the British and all subsequent editions. Russell regarded them as important, and Sir Stanley Unwin wrote him that they would be incorporated in the next printing. The next printing was not until , and the paragraphs were again overlooked. They belong just before the paragraph on page  beginning “Every fanatical creed” in Chapter , “Science and Values”. These paragraphs are not indexed.—Ed. I meet many people who think that the evils of Communism can be combated by Catholicism. This seems to me a dangerous error. What are the evils of Communism as it has developed? First, adherence to a rigid and static system of doctrine, of which part is doubtful and part demonstrably false. Second, persecution as a means of enforcing orthodoxy. Third, a belief that salvation is only to be found within the Church and that the True Faith must be spread throughout the world, by force if necessary. (These are the beliefs of Communists.) Fourth, that the priesthood, which alone has the right to interpret the Scriptures, has enormous power, physical east of the Iron Curtain and spiritual over the faithful in partibus. Fifth, that this power is used to secure an undue share of wealth for the priesthood at the expense of the rest of the population. Sixth, that bigotry, and the hostility that it engenders, is a potent source of war. Every one of these evils was exhibited by the Catholic Church when it had power and would probably be exhibited again if it recovered the position it had in the Middle Ages. It is therefore irrational to suppose that much would be gained if, in the defeat of Communism, Catholicism were enthroned in its place. (Pp. –) russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s.  (winter –): – The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U.  - _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2402\INDEXISS.242 : 2005-05-19 13:34    Abraham  absolute monarchy  Adler, Alfred  adventure, impulse to ,  vs. rashness  aeroplanes  Africa cotton market  North, and Romans  age, average, in West – agriculture effects of  in history of man  integration into larger economy – wasteful of natural resources – see also soil conservation air power and governments  Alexander the Great and superstition  ambassadors, independence of  America see United States anaesthetics  anarchy  Anaxagoras ,  animals, and man  anthropology  apathy  Arab-Israeli conflict – Arabian Nights slaves of lamp in  Arabs and scientific technique  Archimedes , ,  Argentina agriculture  Arians  Aristotle  and causation – movement of heavenly bodies  armed forces and civil authorities  international, as concentration of power ,  perceptions of own/other nations’  in Russia –,  artillery  arts: authors and artists independence of –, –,  ascetic mentality  Asia: population and prosperity  astrology – astronomers Greek  prospects for life on earth  astronomical events indicating disaster  Atlantic Pact  atom bomb , , ,  atomic energy –, ,  Attica, history  Attlee, Clement  Augustine, Saint scientific argument against astrology – Auschwitz  Australia aborigines ,  agriculture  federal government  Austria: war with Prussia  Authority and the Individual (BR)  authority vs. observation –,  autonomy of physical world , – Aztecs and cannibalism  and infanticide  Babylonians and eclipses  Bacon, Francis and witchcraft  bacteriological war  Baltic–White Sea canal  barbarians, and late Roman Empire ,  Barbarossa (Frederick I)  , independence of  Bede, the Venerable on comets  belief(s) on basis of authority, as unscientific – science as determinant  in superstition  uncivilized peoples  benefits of scientific technique – _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2402\INDEXISS.242 : 2005-05-19 13:34 Index to Impact of Science on Society  Bentham , ,  Bergson, Henri  Bible, false statements in  see also individual books of biological conditions of stability (of society) –, – biology technique(s) from – birth control and population , , – birth rate, low ,  Black Death , – Blimps, Col., Romans as  breeding, scientific – Bright, John  Britain, happiness in  British Empire... 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