Considering that Husserl identifies passivity as the general principle of genetic dynamics and as given prior to any intentional activity, the original condition of possibility of such passivity must be clarified. Phenomenological analysis can successfully attest the presence of a drive-habituality operating prior to the level of the I, an instinct-character, thus, that raises the question about life as auto-affective capability. In the framework of a universal monadology the latter’s teleological orientation must be questioned in order to avoid that both (...) the limes constituted by the unconscious as well as affective being remain indeterminate and anonymous, which would not do justice to the transcendental rootedness of drive and instinct through the form of ipseity. (shrink)

A phenomenological reading of Pierre Maine de Brian offers a valuable understanding of one's own body in relation to the ego's apperceptive effort. As an organic mass, the body follows the double movement of this effort, manifested by an inner and an outer resistance. This movement allows the „constitution” of the world as correlative to the deployment of a force, identified with the apperception of the ego itself. This practical radicalization of the cogito can be viewed as the first outstanding (...) achievement of phenomenology itself, even prior to its historical foundation by Husserl. (shrink)

Ricoeur developed a very elaborated philosophy of religion. At the same time, he always moved along interdisciplinary borders of philosophy, theology, exegesis, historical and language sciences. His religious concerns are in this sense related to pre-philosophical experiences that within certain fields lend themselves to hermeneutical articulation. His analysis of the Scriptures in terms of narrativity deals with biblical texts. However, he doesn’t speak as a theologian,but as a philosopher, since the question of a philosophical and theological hermeneutics is from his (...) own point of view closely related to the fundamentaltension between autonomy and heteronomy. This paper regards his work as a new form of French philosophy of religion, and as a result of this includes a criticalconsideration of the pre-textual sphere understood as an absolute “priority”. This absolute “priority” should be presupposed by any hermeneutics of the written revelation, even when it is not able to provide a final response to its radical-phenomenological implications. (shrink)

The repetition of life is being examined on the basis of Henry’s analysis of life as a performance beyond habitualization as sedimentation in Husserl’s approach, as well as a difference in immanent conceptualization on the premise of the coveting organless body according to Deleuze. In contrast to this “nomadic thinking,” which always remains non-subjective, the emphasis in the original reciprocity of life and body is put on the basic transcendentality of the effective repetition of life in the bodily memorial of (...) the radical phenomenological habitualization. (shrink)

Ever since antiquity, philosophy has continuously striven to grasp the phenomenon of humor and laughter, while, in modern times, Bergson certainly holds a special place,\ with his interpretation of laughter, and particularly “humor”, as a form of social sanction. However, such an analysis neglects the fact that the ability to laugh is actually grounded in a primordial sphere of life-affection as such, so that, starting from here, we could understand laughter, in connection with the radical-phenomenological essence of life itself, as (...) being essentially joy. (shrink)

R. Kühn rappelle dans cette étude quelques principes sur les prérequis phénoménologiques de l’analyse spécifique du Prologue de Jean, lu au prisme d’une méditation attentive de Maître Eckhart. Il est évident que M. Henry se situe parmi les grands interprètes de ce texte qui influença les plus hautes spéculations en philosophie de la religion. Dans l’étude de cette profonde affinité entre M. Henry et l’Évangile de Jean, R. Kühn met en évidence l’analyse phénoménologique de la liaison entre l’homme et Dieu, (...) pensée dans le cadre d’une éthique et d’une théorie de la vérité affective. Si M. Henry peut ainsi préciser le geste de l’épochè de toute généalogie mondaine, en posant le premier Fils de Dieu au « commencement », et ceci en un rapport d’irréversibilité, il apparaît qu’il pense ainsi davantage la rupture du geste transcendantal que sa différence ou sa distance, puisque la naissance et la vie sont en deçà du monde et dans « l’intériorité de l’expérience transcendantale ». (shrink)

The recent interpretation of Michel Henry’s thought as a ‘phenomenological vitalism’ raises fundamental questions regarding the reception of his phenomenology. The issue raised, however, is not primarily about radical phenomenology being inspired (or not) by more or less vitalistic philosophies like those of Maine de Biran, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and even Freud, rather it concerns the ‘how’ of purely immanent appearing in affect and force understood as immediate corporeality. Does the latter, being original affectivity, require temporality in order to free the (...) affect from its passivity (Passibilit%t) and, thus, in order to enable action? This, however, would lead to an impossible intentional gap or difference within the original phenomenality of life itself. As an alternative, flesh can be seen as a potentiality, inwhich the concrete transcendental possibility and the phenomenological power of appearing as ‘I can’ are already united prior to any formal exercise of freedom. Such inquiry into the reception of the phenomenology of life provides at the same time a framework for the contemporary phenomenological debate. (shrink)

The studies in this book set out to examine the labile resonances of phenomenology and art in Michel Henry, by examining the different figures of movement given to the concept of the aesthetic by the philosopher. They are preceded by one of Michel Henry’s own texts. Les études qui composent ce livre proposent d’interroger les résonances labiles de la phénoménologie et de l’art chez Michel Henry, en examinant les différentes figures du déplacement imprimé par le philosophe au concept d’esthétique. Le (...) tout est précédé d’un texte de Michel Henry. (shrink)

La Philosophie de la religion demande une délimitation par rapport à des philosophies religieuses et la science religieuse. L'étude de quelques auteurs représentatifs montre ensuite une certaine convergence théorique autour du problème de la « contingence » dont la « maîtrise » socio-pratique implique aujourd'hui souvent tout le sens du « réel ». La tâche critique d'une philosophie de la religion consiste alors à plaider pour une ouverture des valeurs humaines vers l'« inconditionnel », et cela dans l'intérêt même d'une (...) « libertégénérosité » à sauvegarder. The Philosophy of religion requires demarcation comparatively to any religious philosophical thought and the science of religion. The study of several representative scholars points out that the problem of « contingency » is able at present to permit some conformity concerning theoretical positions. Frequently, the social and material « control » of this contingency of our world of life is forming the exhaustive sense of that what means « Reality » Therefore, it is a critical necessity of the philosophy of religion to demonstrate that human values are including orientation to an « inconditional ». (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 21 Heft: 1 Seiten: 257-274.

Maine de Biran (1766-1824) has rarely been thought of as a forerunner of phenomenology in German speaking countries, although mere self-apperception, which follows the primacy of practical transcendentality, surfaces in his analysis. Examining the differential lecture of the sense of touch, as well as the ‚Metaphysics of the Hand‘ by J. Derrida, the author questions his monistic premises to perceive the immediacy of any initial endeavour as a motion, which originates in the possibility of life itself. This result in combination (...) with the sensitivity of the skin leads to a radical phenomenological description of immanent self-manifestation in the flesh, bodily subjectivity and the visibility of flesh as body. (shrink)

The paper attempts to propound a new understanding of the experience of the world and others on the basis of a radical phenomenology of the body, as it is revealed in the originary impressibility as affect and desire. This impressibility shapes every relation to beings and others due to the unity of an originary life that founds individuation before any temporal difference, having ethical consequences for a plural communality, which can no longer be characterized by means of mere abstract processes (...) of objectivation. (shrink)

Transference, as well as counter-transference are both central to the praxis of psychoanalytical therapy. They emerge from the encounter with the patient who is caught in libidinal conflicts (Freud) and in the imaginary chain of signifiers (Lacan). Affective effects stemming from transference must, therefore, be taken into account in order to clarify their unconscious connection to the symbolic as well as to the real. Phenomenologically speaking, this corresponds to an original dimension of being-affected, a dimension prior to any sort of (...) interpretation. It aims at liberating desire (désir) by making jouissance possible as an act that does not lead to a hypostasis of the law (Phallus). (shrink)

In Lacan’s perspective, the cogito is unable to account for the separation between desire and language for the individual. The fundamental difference pertaining to the signifier makes it impossible for the enunciation to ever coincide with what is enunciated. Therefore no final knowledge of self, being and reality is possible within the framework of the imaginary-symbolic life-world. This analysis, which is decisive for the therapeutic process, is then confronted with a radical-phenomenological critique that questions Lacan’s presuppositions about alterity from the (...) perspective of a primal and transcendental life, a confrontation that ought to bear fruit for the dialog between psychoanalysis and phenomenology. (shrink)

Als Reaktion auf den Funktionalismus ergab sich in der postmodernen Architektur eine Doppelcodierung von Einfachheit und Komplexität sowie Tradition und Innovation. Damit konnte der Primat von Gebrauch und Nützlichkeit in der Städteplanung durchbrochen werden, aber die postmodernen Verwirklichungen blieben oft Einzelverwirklichungen, ohne das Erbe der alten ›europäischen Stadt‹ als Differenz und Einheit effektiv aufzugreifen. Teilweise wurden organische Verbindungen von Umgebung und Wohnnotwendigkeit berücksichtigt, und auch das Ornament gewann wieder als Zitat oder spielerische Ironie der Stile an Bedeutung. Bis heute scheint (...) jedoch eine radikal phänomenologische Berücksichtigung des Bezuges zwischen Leiblichkeit und Architektur zu fehlen. Denn der bebaute Wohnraum ist nicht nur der affektiv-leibliche Raum der Bedürfnisse und Imagination der Menschen, sondern schlechthin die Weise seiner Kosmoseinverwurzelung. Da die großen ›Metaerzählungen‹ nicht mehr als Sinngebung von Einheit seit der Postmoderne herangezogen werden können, bleibt nur die unmittelbar subjektive Leiblichkeit mit ihren Selbst- und Weltbezügen, um eine erneute sinnlich-ästhetische Einheit ohne ideologischen Allgemeinheitsanspruch stiften zu können. Diese ebenso individuell wie gesamtkulturell zentrale Frage zu unterstützen, dürfte die aktuelle Aufgabe der Baukunst sein. As a reaction against functionalism, postmodern architecture developed a twofold codification using both simplicity and complexity as well as tradition and innovation. Thus, the primacy of use and utility was effectively undermined in urban planning. However, postmodern achievements often remained isolated performances that failed to actively take over the heritage of the ›European city‹ as difference and unity. The organic unity of the environment with housing needs was partially taken into account, as was the ornament taken as a form of quotation or as playful irony referring to styles. A radical phenomenological account of corporeality (›Leiblichkeit‹) and architecture, however, is still lacking today. Housing space, indeed, is not only the affective-corporeal space pertaining to human needs and imagination, but also the way through which the human is rooted in the cosmos. Since the rise of post-modernity the great ›meta-narratives‹ have become unable to provide meaning to such unity. Therefore, the task of producing a new sensitive-aesthetic unity without recourse to the generalizations of ideology, can only be accomplished by referring to immediate subjective corporeality in its relation to self and world. To support this both individually and culturally relevant research could very well be the task of contemporary architecture. (shrink)

Until now, the research literature on Sartre has hardly taken into account the originary necessity of an affective self-consent in the act of transcendence of consciousness. For this purpose, Sartre’s basic axioms of freedom, situation, decision, and dialectical practice with others are successively analyzed in order to reveal the respective self-event as rooted in a pre-reflexive pre-givenness.

Ohne Zweifel ergänzte Fichte das Denken Kants hinsichtlich des pathologischen und rein praktischen Willens mit dessen äußeren und inneren Motiven bzw. Triebfedern, denn ein guter Wille wäre nicht nur ein praktischer Wille ohne sinnliches Begehren, sondern ein Tun, welches niemals irgendein Ertragen im Sinne von Passivität darstellt, weil Selbstsetzung und »aktive« Selbstbestimmung zusammenfallen. Gut wäre dann nur jene Faktizität, wo das wissend wollende Subjekt jeweils vollständig präsent ist, denn dadurch wäre sein Tun auch gleichzeitig wahr im Sinne der höchsten Vernunft (...) der Wissenschaftslehre. In dieser Hinsicht muß daher das Nichthandeln bei Fichte als das Böse selbst auftreten, was dann zur Frage des gemeinsamen Handelns im intersubjektiven Sinne sowie zum rechtlich staatlichen Handeln überleitet. Das Nichtich, da es kein getrennter Bereich des Ich ist, sondern eine primordiale Bedingung desselben darstellt, ist die Natur im Menschen, welche für Fichte mit dem vielfach Sinnlichen zusammenfällt und vom Ich dem Wissen und Wollen angeglichen werden muß. Denn sinnliche Vielfalt bedeutet nicht nur Objektsein auf der Naturebene, sondern aus der Sicht des Menschen auch Verweigerung und Übertretung, wobei die materielle Trägheit der Naturgegenstände bei Fichte zur ethischen Trägheit als Quelle aller Laster wird, wie er unter anderem in den »Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten« von 1794 ausführt. (shrink)