It is proved in this paper that the positive abstraction scheme is consistent with extensionality only if one drops equality out of the language. The theory obtained is then compared with GPK, a wellknown set theory based on an extended positive comprehension scheme.

'In this book, Alan Roland has presented the challenge of Asian cultures to psychoanalytic theory and practice more forcefully than ever before. The book is full of new ideas and fascinating anecdotes and case material from Roland's clinical work and that of others. His proposals to revise psychoanalysis for the treatment of Indian and Japanese patients should initiate a debate of fundamental significance.' - Robert A. LeVine, Harvard University.

Glenn Pearce, labels the identification of the firing of one's pain centres in the brain with feeling pain ‘a naive view,’ the refutation of which cannot much threaten any serious version of materialism. But in fact at least a dozen proponents of contemporary materialism have already hypothesized the identification of feeling pain with activation of a specific neural mechanism, although they picked the wrong mechanism, namely C-fibres. Just to take a recent example, James Cornman and Keith Lehrer, trying to get (...) around the objection to the identity theory that the language of neural processes and the language of feeling pains belong to different linguistic categories, suggest that the materialist could devise a new term to refer to the same entity across categories: ‘fibain.’They write,He would then claim that there are fibains, that is, entities with those properties usually associated with pains, and also with the properties usually associated with firing C-fibers. He can, then, avoid category mistakes by saying that what are thought to be pains and what are thought to be firing C-fibers are really fibains. (shrink)

The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung. It aims at demonstrating that among other insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective, to state that (...) Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies. (shrink)

Cet article prend pour point de départ les généalogies de l’enfance de Michel Foucault disséminées dans son œuvre et complexifiées par les études foucaldiennes contemporaines, en particulier les recherches féministes de Silvia Federici (et ses généalogies des femmes) et les études postcoloniales d’Ann Laura Stoler (et ses généalogies des colonisés). Foucault passant sous silences l’histoire des femmes et des colonies, ce détour par des généalogies féministes et postcoloniales nous permettra de nous inscrire dans les débats sur l’intersectionnalité. En effet, depuis (...) les années 1990, cette perspective méthodologique a été pensée de multiples manières (comme articulation, matrice, assemblage etc.), il s’agira donc de voir comment penser l’intersectionnalité en référence aux cadres d’analyse foucaldiens et à leurs critiques. Plus précisément, en réunissant ces auteurs et leurs généalogies, cet article tentera de se situer dans les débats contemporains sur l’intersection du Childism et du mouvement décolonial. Alors que certains auteurs considèrent que la production de l’enfance/de l’âge précède la production de la colonialité/de la race, d’autres voient le contraire. Pour entrer dans ces débats, nous reprendrons à Bacchetta (2015) l’idée de co-formations et de co-productions des rapports coloniaux et âgistes dans l’histoire longue des métropoles et des colonies. Ce faisant, nous tenterons de décrire et d’analyser les relations d’assujettissement (de genre, de classe, de race ou d’âge) d’une part, comme un effet de multiplicité selon des conjonctures spécifiques, et d’autre part, comme la cristallisation de relations de pouvoir qui s’étendent sur de larges espace-temps. (shrink)

That the Eudemian Ethics is a genuine work of Aristotle, belonging to a middle stage in his development, is now widely accepted on the various grounds advanced by Jaeger and others from 1909 onwards. I want to show that, quite apart from those considerations, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of E.E. on the ground of peculiarities in its vocabulary, as these can be explained in various ways. A presentation of the evidence as regards special vocabulary may in (...) any case be of interest, and may throw some light eventually on its position among Aristotle's writings, if it belongs among them; and for this reason I add a further section on words in E.E. uncommon in Aristotle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology”Roland Littlewood (bio)Keywordsreligion, innovation, psychosis, culture, diagnosisThis is an ambiguous though clinically valuable paper. Jackson and Fulford suggest that the distinction between their two categories, spiritual experience and mental illness, is conventional, yet their emphasis on issues of correct practice from the medical perspective threatens to return both into distinct ontological categories, albeit with a shared phenomenology. I do not understand why any (...) single instance must either be pathological or spiritual, except through clinical and clerical demands for clarity and order.Mental illness and spirituality are not two distinct natural phenomena “out there,” existing independently of human volition. They are both social—cultural if one prefers—ascriptions. Neither has some substantive core whose elucidation through psychophysiological, phenomenological or ultrahuman procedures could enable us to define its essence and thus differentiate it from the other. Neither experience is a self-evident datum. Both are easily susceptible to critiques, either that they do not exist as natural categories, or else that they should more properly be described as something else—as the workings out of social exclusion in the case of mental illness, as cosmological understanding or mass hysteria in the case of spirituality. Neither, I would suggest, can be specified by physiology or ultrahuman interventions respectively, but rather through shared cultural meanings which in turn are experientially validated by the biosocial phenomena themselves. It is not that we need to exclude the possibility of concurrences in brain states, but rather that these cannot specify the meaning and experience of the phenomena.Note that I emphasize “experienced through cultural meanings,” not “influenced by” culture: I do not accept that psychophysiology can have any existence independent of the social world through which it occurs. The psychiatrists’ form/content distinction, an optimistic proxy for nature/culture (Birnbaum 1923; Schneider 1928) may remain a convenient heuristic device, but it has a curious, perhaps doubtful, intellectual history (see the Endnote following).Cross-cultural comparisons argue that local idioms which we might approximate to current Western notions of mental illness and religion are quite varied. And the validity of particular instances of both “spiritual experience” and “psychopathology” may be contested in any society. While the social consequences of a pattern may determine the approbation accorded to a pattern such that patterns recalling chronic schizophrenia [End Page 67] are regarded as a deficit (and here I agree with James [1902] and the two authors), they are not necessarily aligned to categories of physical illness, but may be seen as a spiritual failure or obstruction. Unsuccessful or inappropriate shamanic practice among Amerindian and circumpolar societies is the classic instance (Eliade 1964). Within Western societies, demonic possession may be read by doctors as mental illness. (It is just as much a “spiritual experience”: why introduce the religionist’s distinctions between different types of ultrahuman agency? Compare Maslow on “peak” experiences. The terms “spiritual” and “religious world view” are naturalized idioms of late Christianity rather than cross-culturally valid terms [Tambiah 1990].) But also the converse (Koch 1972). And this depends on our professional interests. Clearly, psychiatrists prefer to perceive the world in a psychopathological idiom, while religious enthusiasts and clergy may favor divine intercession or demonic possession; and a Christian psychiatry not surprisingly may claim to act as arbiter (Sims 1991). Any specific instance may be perceived differently by individuals in accordance with their interests and affiliations.The paper’s terminology—“spiritual psychotic experience,” “genuine spiritual experience”—is confusing in that it does imply realist, not conventional claims (cf. Endnote 1, Jackson and Fulford). It is not necessary. A less laden idiom—such as “statistically or normatively unusual brain states and their experiential correlates” (Littlewood 1993, 257)—may be just too unwieldy for repetition, but I would propose that at this level of detail we need rather four categories depending or not on concordance with (i) something close to psychiatry’s recognition of a major mental illness, and (ii) something like an anthropological notion of religious or spiritual experience (cf. Littlewood 1991):[Table 1]PsychosisReligious ExperiencePresentAbsentPresentABAbsentCDSo Jackson and Fulford’s three cases fall into group “A” if the PSE was scored... (shrink)

"Erst in diesem Jahr gestartet, ist bereits abzusehen, dass die Reihe der Sozialgeographischen Bibliothek im Franz Steiner Verlag fur die deutschsprachige Geographie Massstabe setzen wird [a] Lippuner, der mithin eine der besten ...

Much evidence cited by Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) in support of their notation-specific representation hypothesis is based on tasks requiring automatic number processing. Several of these findings can be alternatively explained by differential expertise in mapping numerical symbols onto semantic magnitude representations. The importance of considering symbol-referent mapping expertise in theories on numerical representations is highlighted.

ArgumentThis article discusses a number of heterogeneous Yiddish monographs on Einstein's theory of relativity. It presents background information on Einstein's relationship with the Yiddish language, with the cultural movement, Yiddishism, and with its leading institution, YIVO. Although Einstein avoided taking sides in the conflict between Yiddishism and its rival Zionism, his Zionist friends were successful in establishing at least a “primacy of palestinocentric Zionism” in his thinking. Of special interest are two books by philosophic writers and one by an author (...) trained in mathematics and physics, Tuvia Schalit, an acquaintance of Einstein's assistant Jacob Grommer. This article describes the underlying motivations and the philosophical horizon of these authors, in particular with respect to their view on the relationship between Kantianism and the theory of relativity. In contrast to many German academic philosophers, the Yiddish authors thought it possible to reconcile Kantianism with the new physics. (shrink)