Radical phenomenology is nonintentional phenomenology, and it opposes what Michel Henry has designated since The Essence of Manifestation "onto-phenomenological monism,"1 according to which appearing is always ecstatic, that is, transcendent. Contrary to monism, radical phenomenology maintains a dualism of appearing: underlying the intentionally given, life reveals itself in pure immanence. Nonetheless, this living self-affection can never appear to intentionality, although the second is grounded in the first: they are two modes of appearing that are essentially (...) different. While the very essence of appearing or manifestation lies in immanent self-affection, intentional appearing is derived from and second to .. (shrink)

A brief and selective conceptual glance at the history of sociological foundation shows that a certain assumption about the `ultimate referentiality' of society has been at the heart of sociology. The late modern responses to, and reactions against, foundationalism in various schools in the human and social sciences provide a springboard for a new beginning in sociological inquiry. Drawing on radical phenomenology and postmetaphysical hermeneutical philosophy, this article summons attention to the concept of ultimate referentiality as the point (...) of moorage that supposedly secures our theoretical postulates in a presumed locus in the `real' — namely, `society'. Given our late modern crisis of metaphysical claims about ultimate foundations, the article makes an invitation to an interpretative sociological renewal with an acute sensitivity toward praxis. The article provisionally makes a number of suggestions with respect to the modes of sociological practice that would render the discipline attuned to our age. (shrink)

Quelle est la signification du « corps anonyme » ou, plus simplement, de l’anonymat dans l’usage qu’en fait Merleau-Ponty? Peut-elle offrir des ressources pour une critique féministe radicale et une politique émancipatrice? Certaines philosophes féministes en ont traité comme un idéal universel abstrait du corps qui est à la fois exempt de toute particularité et qui présume tacitement que le corps blanc masculin servirait de norme et aurait une puissance normative. D’autres ont voulu montrer que l’anonymat éclaire les manières dont (...) la domination et la normativité sont intrinsèques à la constitution corporelle. Je soutiens que le « corps anonyme » peut être lu d’une manière productive pour la compréhension des manières dont le corps vécu est fondamentalement constitué par des relations concrètes de pouvoir. Plus particulièrement, je reprends deux lectures de l’anonymat, l’une comme temporalité vécue – un passé sédimenté – et l’autre comme intériorité corporelle. Prises ensemble, ces lectures montrent que l’anonymat soutient le champ intersubjectif, qui joue un rôle clé dans la description de la constitution corporelle de Merleau-Ponty. Je reprends ensuite cette description pour lire la théorie du schéma corporel de Frantz Fanon et les histoires autobiographiques de l’écrivaine et activiste yankton Zitkála-Šá, le tout afin de montrer que le déni de l’anonymat, qui dérange le champ intersubjectif, a pour résultat une violence et des maux considérables. Le tout servira à montrer que la description du corps anonyme par Merleau-Ponty fournit d’importantes ressources pour une politique émancipatrice et une critique philosophique radicale. (shrink)

In this critical notice I review the main ideas presented in Peyman Vahabzadeh's thought-provoking investigation into the genesis of new social movements, Articulated Experiences: Towards a Radical Phenomenology of Contemporary Social Movements. I examine two central features of Vahabzadeh's work: (i) its notion of ?ultimate referentiality;? and (ii) the centrality of the role accorded to language in Vahabzadeh's overall theory. I argue that in his stipulation that language is the most fundamental mediating factor in articulation and acts of (...) identification, Vahabzadeh implicitly characterizes language as precisely the sort of privileged essential universality that his theory seeks to avoid. The repercussions of this criticism are not only relevant to the thesis of Articulated Experiences, they are also relevant to the thesis Vahabzadeh defends in his contribution to the present volume. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper examines two fundamental claims by Michel Henry on his philosophy’s relationship with classical phenomenology (Husserl and Heidegger) and Christianity. It shows in what way Henry’s phenomenology is the radicalization and absolutization of classical phenomenology: pure phenomenological truth is the identification of appearing and what appears rather than the separation of the two. According to Henry, his notions of life and truth is fully in accordance with Christianity’s Revelation of God. In the last part, the (...) paper challenges Henry’s claim that his phenomenology is a Christian philosophy from a Kierkegaardian point of view and argues that Henry’s phenomenology is, as a matter of fact, a philosophy without Christ. Contrary to a popular viewpoint that Michel Henry is a Christian thinker of our age, I would argue that Henry’s concept of God and Christ is essentially a scholarly philosophical invention. If Henry’s philosophy is an absolute and ultimate form of phenomenology, then it is reasonable to draw a conclusion that Christ as the Truth of Christianity is outside the boundary of phenomenology. (shrink)

Reiner Schürmann, known for his readings of Heidegger and Eckhart, was also known for his philosophy of ontological anarché. The transition from metaphysical theory to post-metaphysical practice, for him, meant the transition from theoria, which looks at phenomena monomorphically in accordance with principles (archai), to a praxis that is an-archic and thinks in recognition of polymorphic singularities. Here, I seek to clarify Schürmann’s notion of ontological anarchy and the praxis following it. I inquire into its political implications and relation to (...) political anarchism. What is the connection between his “radical phenomenology” of ontological anarché and what he called anarchic praxis? (shrink)

ABSTRACT Both Fichte's 1804 Wissenschaftslehre and Henry's radical phenomenology conceive of the absolute as life. At the same time, both have to deal with a contradiction that seems to follow inevitably from the limitations they impose on thought and intentionality: Since the latter are intrinsically incapable of apprehending life as absolute and immanent, how is radical phenomenology, and how is the Wissenschaftslehre, even possible? The article takes this difficulty as the start to a possible comparison between (...) Fichte and Henry. But, as will be seen, Henry's claim about the existence of a nonintentional mode of appearing is not shared by Fichte. (shrink)

This paper explores a view of experience as a strife between earth and world. The concept of strife, borrowed from the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, is elaborated as a new starting point for an empirical psychology.

Radical and autopoietic enactivists disagree concerning how to understand the concept of sense-making in enactivist discourse and the extent of its distribution within the organic domain. I situate this debate within a broader conflict of commitments to naturalism on the part of radical enactivists, and to phenomenology on the part of autopoietic enactivists. I argue that autopoietic enactivists are in part responsible for the obscurity of the notion of sense-making by attributing it univocally to sentient and non-sentient (...) beings and following Hans Jonas in maintaining a phenomenological dimension to life-mind continuity among all living beings, sentient or non-sentient. I propose following Merleau-Ponty instead, who offers a properly phenomenological notion of sense-making for which sentience is a necessary condition. Against radicalist efforts to replace sense-making with a deflationary, naturalist conception of intentionality, I discuss the role of the phenomenological notion of sense-making for understanding animal behavior and experience. (shrink)

What does it mean to adopt a phenomenological approach when doing philosophy of perception? And what form should such an approach take? I address these questions by first distinguishing three different ways of drawing philosophical conclusions based on phenomenological reflection: 'Humean' phenomenology, which attempts to discern the structure of perceptual experience via reflection on its surface properties; 'Kantian' phenomenology, which aims to provide a priori arguments about the structure perceptual experience must have if it is to possess universally (...) agreed upon manifest properties; and 'Husserlian' phenomenology, which aims to achieve an intuitive grasp of the essential properties of perceptual experience via attempted imaginative variation of its aspects and properties. Drawing on arguments from Merleau-Ponty, I then argue that the shortcomings of each of these approaches motivate a 'Merleau-Pontian' conception of phenomenology as 'radical reflection' - a mode of reflection on perceptual experience that simultaneously attempts to understand the origins and authority of reflection itself. The methodology for philosophy of perception that results is a thoroughly interdisciplinary one, aiming to reconcile philosophical conclusions about the necessary structures of perceptual experience with our best empirical knowledge of the bodily, psychological, cultural and historical contingencies that shape both our experiences and our reflective capacities. (shrink)

Starting with the acknowledgment of the necessity of radical imagination for social change, and with the threat that neoliberal capitalism poses to radical imagination, our hope is that this themed issue offers the time and space to cultivate radical imagination as it takes up questions of racial justice. Moreover, our intent is to solicit critical phenomenology toward robust investigations of radical imagination, what it makes possible, and the ways in which current social, economic, and political (...) arrangements sustain or foreclose the space and time for its cultivation. What the past few years have made clear is that individuals and institutions continue to be complicit in the perpetuation of structural inequality and racial violence in our society. For us, the editors of Puncta, acknowledging this complicity means at a minimum to use our platform to amplify the voices of scholars of color and establish a forum devoted to critical conversations about racial justice. In sum, we hope we can create a space-time for the cultivation of radical imagination. This themed issue strives to be such a venue; the ten articles featured in this issue explore the intersections of race/racialization with methodological concerns within the field of critical phenomenology, theoretical understandings of the notion of race itself, and demands for racial justice on scholarly, activist, and imaginary grounds. (shrink)

This paper does two things. Firstly, it clarifies the way that phenomenological data is meant to constrain cognitive science according to enactivist thinkers. Secondly, it points to inconsistencies in the ‘Radical Enactivist’ handling of this issue, so as to explicate the commitments that enactivists need to make in order to tackle the explanatory gap. I begin by sketching the basic features of enactivism in sections 1–2, focusing upon enactive accounts of perception. I suggest that enactivist ideas here rely heavily (...) upon the endorsement of a particular explanatory constraint that I call the structural resemblance constraint, according to which the structure of our phenomenology ought to be mirrored in our cognitive science. Sections 3–5 delineate the nature of, and commitment to, SRC amongst enactivists, showing SRC’s warrant and implications. The paper then turns to Hutto and Myin’s handling of SRC in sections 6–7, highlighting irregularities within their programme for Radical Enactivism on this issue. Despite seeming to favour SRC, I argue that Radical Enactivism’s purported compatibility with the narrow supervenience of perceptual experience is in fact inconsistent with SRC, given Hutto and Myin’s phenomenological commitments. I argue that enactivists more broadly ought to resist such a concessionary position if they wish to tackle the explanatory gap, for it is primarily the abidance to SRC that ensures progress is made here. Section 8 then concludes the paper with a series of open questions to enactivists, inviting further justification of the manner in which they apply SRC. (shrink)

This paper suggests that one single thread characterizes the developments of French phenomenology that occurred after 1990 in the wake of Merleau-Ponty's and Levinas's major contributions. Janicaud in 1991 had already identified one global trend in French phenomenology and believed it was possible to unite the thoughts of Levinas, Henry, Marion and Chrétien under the common banner of “theological phenomenology.” However, his analysis seems to fail to account for deeper-seated affinities that exist between French phenomenologists such as (...) Marion, Lacoste, Chrétien, Richir, Depraz, Romano – and Benoist for part of his work. This is the reason why, although the present paper does agree with Janicaud's idea that the French authors who define themselves as phenomenologists share some common ground, it defines this common trend quite differently, i.e., as a form of epistemological realism that ultimately manifests itself as a radical empiricism. Consequently, the present study will state and defend three hypotheses: contemporary French phenomenology professes a form of realism of experience, which is the true rallying point of otherwise differing elaborations; this type of epistemological empiricism, by virtue of its radicality, implies a problem that threatens to drive phenomenology towards its own dissolution, because as it precipitates in fine the dilution of philosophical discourse into a multitude of other discourses; this variant of empiricism shows that, within its strictly defined viewpoint, there is scarcely any difference between French phenomenology and a certain part of French analytical philosophy. All three hypotheses lead to the same conclusion: the determination of the defining aspect of contemporary French phenomenology entails, beyond the apparent, misleading, and futile quarrel of paradigms, to bring to light a common space for contemporary French philosophy, which, from both perspectives, can be conveyed by the single term “to show.” It is, in fact, the elevation of “to show” to the detriment of “to demonstrate” that seems to ensnare thinkers within an impasse. (shrink)

“ is collection is a much-needed remedy to the confusion about which varieties of enactivism are robust yet viable rejections of traditional representationalism approaches to cognitivism – and which are not. Hutto’s paper is the pivot around which the expert commentators, enactivists and non-enactivists alike, sketch out the implications of enactivism for a wide variety of issues: perception, emotion, the theory of content, cognition, development, social interaction, and more. e inclusion of thoughtful replies from Hutto gives the volume a further (...) degree of depth and integration o en lacking in collections of essays. Anyone interested in assessing the current cutting-edge developments in the. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James’s radical empiricism against Max Scheler’s non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds’s arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in (...) outlining four propositions characteristic of Scheler’s positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology. (shrink)

In his late works Husserl interprets the crisis of European sciences as the loss of their meaning for life. The diagnosis seems to suggest therapeutic strategy: to overcome the crisis, phenomenology must return to the evidences of the life-world. The article argues that the husserlian strategy of overcoming the crisis consists not in the elimination of the break with the prescientific evidences of the natural attitude, but, on the contrary, in the radicalization of the breach. Thus, I want to (...) show that Husserl seeks to overcome the crisis of sciences by means of more radical crisis of phenomenology. In Husserl’s view, phenomenology must become the only science, which does not presuppose the life-world, since it problematizes it. I am going to argue also, that the counterintuitive strategy is not just of the historico-philosophical interest, but is meaningful for the actual philosophical understanding of the life-world. To justify those claims, I will proceed in three stages. In the first section of the article, I analyze the difference between the objective world and the life-world, which is the point of departure of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of sciences in Crisis. Bringing into correlation the difference between the objective world and the life-world in Crisis with the distinction of the ideal world and the real one in Ideas I, I disclose the ambiguity of husserlian interpretation of the crisis of European sciences. According to Husserl, the crisis arises, when science transcends the life-world through the idealizations, and, at the same time, presupposes the immediate prescientific evidences as something that is taken for granted. In the second section, I argue that the strategy of overcoming the crisis in Crisis is based on the phenomenological epoche, which allows for the porblematization of the life-world without presupposing it, Within this context I demonstrate the motivational unity of two reductions, performed by Husserl in Crisis—the reduction to the life-world, stripping the reality of the garb of ideas mistakingly taken to be the reality itself, and the reduction of the life-world, turning it into horizon and depriving phenomenologist of a right of relying on the life-worldly evidences, which is taken for granted in the natural science and renders it possible. The unity of the reductions indicates that phenomenological descent back down to the life-world is treated by Husserl as the radical break with the evidences of the natural life. The third section discusses the question, whether the problematical character of the life-world can be revealed only from the point of view of disinterested spectator, or it can be discovered, in a way, from within, in pretheoretical experience, which capacitates the life to problematizing itself and motivates phenomenological epoche. I argue that, although the question is not answered in a suitable way within husserlian analyses of the motivation for the epoche, the key to the solution of the problem is provided by the genetic phenomenology, since it thematizes the historicity of the life-world. I interpret the historicity as the ambivalent pretheoretical experience, constituting both the self-evidence and the problematical character of the life-world. (shrink)

An easily recognizable feature of Sartre’s phenomenological existentialism is his conception of freedom. According to a popular interpretation, we are absolutely free, not only from factual constraints, but also free to create and pursue our own values. In this respect, Sartre appears to continue in a radical direction the Kantian project of making room for freedom in a world colonized by scientific determinism and dogmatic moralism. This chapter challenges the popular reading. It argues that Sartre extends the implications of (...) Kant’s conception of freedom, especially concerning the constraining character of imperatives and principles; yet he acknowledges the need for some limitation on a legitimate account of freedom. This limitation is given by the higher-order values expressed by our free actions. (shrink)

The paper discusses Husserl’s method of historical reflection, radical Besinnung, as defined and used in Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929). Whereas Formal and Transcendental Logic introduces and displays Husserl’s usage of Besinnung in the context of the exact sciences, the paper seeks to develop it as a more general critical method with which to approach any rational goal-directed activity. Husserl defines Besinnung as a method that enables understanding agents and their actions by explicating agents’ typically implicit goals. It leads (...) to the inclusion of historical-teleological activities as part of Husserl’s natural understanding of the world. The transcendental reflection radicalizes Besinnung by clarifying the kinds of evidence sought for in activities and then suggesting revisions to the concepts and principles used. The result is inner critique, which means that the activities are criticized against the norms that arise from reflection on these activities themselves, and not from a comparison with external standards or measures. (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to explore the contribution of the phenomenological reduction to a distinct form of empathy, which has been identified and called by Ratcliffe :473–495, 2012) radical empathy. This form of empathy brings to light the sense of reality experienced by the subject rather than a mere mental state. However, I shall consider whether and how the phenomenological reduction allows different interpretations of the same experience, thereby impacting on our understanding of another’s sense of reality. Far (...) from dismissing the role of the reduction, I propose a reconsideration of its relevance for radical empathy. In order to spell out my argument, I propose a case ex negativo that looks at Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s different analyses of the sense of reality experienced by obsessive patients. I argue that this interpretative difference ultimately depends on two opposite uses of the reduction itself, and that Merleau-Ponty’s account offers a promising perspective to reintegrate and contextualize the phenomenological reduction into radical empathy. (shrink)

Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the world's, are always both naive and at the same time dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself round me and begins to exist for me.

In this essay, Miriam argues for a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to the radical feminist theory of sex-right and compulsory heterosexuality. Against critics of radical feminism, she argues that when understood from a phenomenological’ hermeneutic perspective, such theory does not foreclose female sexual agency. On the contrary, men's right of sexual access to women and girls is part of our background understanding of heteronormativity, and thus integral to the lived experience of female sexual agency.

"Time and the Museum: Literature, Phenomenology, and the Production of Radical Temporality, is the first explicit in-depth study of the nature of museum temporality. It argues as its departure point that the way in which museums have hitherto been understood as temporal in the scholarship - as spaces of death, othering, memory and history - is too simplistic, and has resulted in museum temporality being reduced to a strange heterotopia (Foucault) - something peculiar, and thus black boxed. However, (...) to understand the ways in which museum temporalities and timescapes are produced, and the consequences that these have upon display and visitor response, is crucial, because time is itself a political entity, with ethical consequence. Time and the Museum highlights something we all experience in some way - time - as a key ethical and political feature of the museum space. Utilizing the fields of literature and phenomenology, the book examines how time is experienced and performed in the public areas of three museum spaces within Oxford - the Ashmolean, Pitt Rivers, and Oxford University Museum of Natural History. Using concepts such as shape, structure, form, presence, absence, authenticity and aura, the book argues for a reconsideration of museum time as something with radical potential and political weight. It will appeal to academics and post"--. (shrink)

The radical autonomy of innovation – regardless of who it depends on – must be pursued with no external pressure to make it more suitable for contemporary challenges. The challenge is to look at innovation as a production or vector of phenomena, and therefore no longer be interested in its consequences. Just as non‐standard philosophy can be considered as an invention in philosophy, phenomenology can be perceived as a recommencing of philosophy, a renewal, a rebirth. The authors propose (...) to focus on the method of phenomenology, its detailed constitution both in its theories and in its modalities of implementation, and to compare each aspect systematically, each step of this philosophy, to measure a possible contribution to (re)thinking innovation. Science, psychology and philosophy color Husserl's phenomenology. What will transpire from its introduction is the rigor that emerges, a rigor that translates into a method, tools, almost procedures, for this phenomenology to be established. (shrink)

Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects (...) of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought and cognition. Does cognition have its own phenomenal character? Can introspection tell us either way? If consciousness flows in an unbroken ‘stream’ as William James argued, how might a punctuated sequence of thoughts fit into it? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a clarification of the nature of the debate about cognitive phenomenology and the network of concepts and theses that are involved in it. He then examines the following topics: • Introspection and knowledge of our own thoughts • Phenomenal contrast arguments • The value of consciousness • The temporal structure of experience • The holistic character of experience and the interdependence of sensory and cognitive states • The relationship between phenomenal character and mental representation -/- Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between James’ early psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late development of James’ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of (...) the dual structure of intentionality. However, I argue that the later “genetic” development of phenomenology converges with some central aspects of James’ radical empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the subject-object duality and is at the base of the process of co-constitution of the subject and the object in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience as structured by formal conditions that depend on the concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Summary: What makes Hutto's account special is his commitment to the rejection of content, a point where he becomes a real radical. The book is not just another book about enactivism but it is an enactive book for everyone written by an enactivist.

This book champions phenomenology’s place in networked learning theory, research, and practice. The book illuminates and showcases something of the powerful richness, depth, and novel insights offered by phenomenological perspectives on human experience to invoke a fundamental rethinking of experience in networked learning. It also signals the broader learning technology community to acknowledge and engage with these perspectives. -/- The editors and authors have collaborated to bring a renewed focus upon the human facet of networked learning. As our world (...) becomes more digitally enmeshed, infiltrated, and contested, the need to investigate and convey, at maximum fidelity, the lived experience of learners, teachers, and other stakeholders in education becomes paramount. Through phenomenological inquiry, we disclose the complex dance between the human and the technical, spotlighting how individuals engage, navigate, and find meaning within virtual yet embodied landscapes. This approach suitably honours the complexity, profundity, and ethicality of human existence in our evolving digital ecologies. -/- The first section, “Phenomenological Perspectives in Researching Networked Learning” lucidly explains phenomenology and some of its potential affordances. The second section, “Practising Phenomenological Research in Networked Learning”, explicates the tangible practice of phenomenological research into specific phenomena: chapters sample of a select range of studies that also indicate the kind of insights such research can bring to networked learning. The concluding section presents two chapters that denote novel and arresting, “Critical Phenomenological Perspectives on Networked Learning”. Together, these final chapters demonstrate the type of radical challenge that phenomenology can bring to the field, refreshing even networked learning’s most basic conceptions and practices. -/- With this book, we open a space for anyone who wishes to join us in the wonderful, inspiring, and challenging application of phenomenology within the field of networked learning. (shrink)

Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a ?phenomenological stance? enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to (...) contemplate the possibility of structurally different ways of ?finding oneself in the world?. Such a stance, I suggest, can be incorporated into an empathetic appreciation of others' experiences, amounting to what we might call ?radical empathy? (shrink)

Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...) article is to address both problems, by offering an understanding “from the inside”. Our phenomenological approach is a form of “radical empathy”, and crosses the Jaspersian limits of understanding. It compares delusional experiences with variations of reality experience in everyday life, and makes use of the structure of imagination. Six factors influencing the experience of reality are discussed and illustrated by clinical and non-clinical examples. These factors are: continuity, materiality and resistance, multiplicity of sensations and perceptions, intensity, the sense of authorship, and the complex role of intersubjectivity. I suggest that experiences of hypo- and hyperreality are not restricted to pathology, but have their place in everyday life as well. Delusional phenomena can be better understood by investigating the interplay of these six factors. With this framework, the two complex phenomena consequently prove to be better understandable to us. Our approach remains within the phenomenal experience and might thereby contribute to the validity of psychopathology. (shrink)

[From the publisher]Taking the term “phenomenologist” in a fairly broad sense, Early Phenomenology focuses on those early exponents of the intellectual discipline, such as Buber, Ortega and Scheler rather than those thinkers that would later eclipse them; indeed the volume precisely means to bring into question what it means to be a phenomenologist, a category that becomes increasingly more fluid the more we distance ourselves from the gravitational pull of philosophical giants Husserl and Heidegger. In focusing on early (...) class='Hi'>phenomenology this volume seeks to examine the movement before orthodoxies solidified. More than merely adding to the story of phenomenology by looking closer at thinkers without the same fame as Husserl or Heidegger and the representatives of their legacy, the essays relate to one of the earlier thinkers with figures that are either more contemporary or more widely read, or both. Beyond merely filling in the historical record and reviving names, the chapters of this book will also give contemporary readers reasons to take these figures seriously as phenomenologists, radically reordering of our understanding of the lineage of this major philosophical movement. (shrink)

A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual (...) quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism. (shrink)