R. S. Peters on Education and Ethics reissues seven titles from Peters' life's work. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the books are concerned with the philosophy of education and ethics. Topics include moral education and learning, authority and responsibility, psychology and ethical development and ideas on motivation amongst others. The books discuss more traditional theories and philosophical thinkers as well as exploring later ideas in a way which makes the subjects they discuss still relevant today.

Polanyi’s philosophy of “man in thought,” by all appearances, chronologically and structurally, seems to be founded on his epistemology. Polanyi’s epistemology of tacit knowing as integration is teleological. By his “ontological equation,” he patterned comprehensive (and complex) entities as emergence on his epistemology. This forces him to make puzzling formulaic statements which land him in trouble with fellow scientists. The equation also lends itself to unwarranted problematic interpretations. The exploration leads me to suggest that Polanyi may be understood as a (...) “rational realist” who insisted on a tacit knowledge version of interactionist mode of mind-body relation. (shrink)

R. S. Bluck’s engaging volume provides an accessible introduction to the thought of Plato. In the first part of the book the author provides an account of the life of the philosopher, from Plato’s early years, through to the Academy, the first visit to Dionysius and the third visit to Syracuse, and finishing with an account of his final years. In the second part contains a discussion of the main purpose and points of interest of each of Plato’s works. There (...) is a chapter on Plato’s central doctrine, the Theory of Ideas, and a translation of Plato’s Seventh Letter , which not only provides valuable additional material for the study of Plato’s thought but also contains a vivid account of many incidents in Plato’s life. (shrink)

I am very pleased to see the response by J S Taylor to my critique of the “organs debate”. He makes some notable and important points, but also some errors to which attention should be drawn.Taylor erroneously attributes to me concern that the organ debate excessively focuses on saving the lives of a few people. My concern was about the narrow framework within which the debate is embedded and that it focuses on the lives of a few privileged people—those who (...) can pay—while largely neglecting the lives of those who cannot. The fact that some attention has been paid to such issues in some journals does not negate the importance of my claim. Moreover, it is not that the question of millions of premature deaths has …. (shrink)

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably reliable, elegantly readable (...) presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)

Contemporary ideas about caring in welfare states can wreak havoc if applied to one's own life. In this essay, a mother offers a personal commentary on the debate regarding diakonia and caring. She identifies three concepts, popular in contemporary caring discourse, that threaten her ability to genuinely and effectively care for those around her, particularly her family. The first problematic concept is that the state ought to provide care on our behalf. The second is that people have rights to claim, (...) but no one in particular bears the responsibility. The third is that the Church is responsive rather than normative in the social setting. (shrink)

In C.Q. N.S. vii , 164 ff. Professor Demos raises the question in what sense, if at all, the state which Plato describes in the Republic can be regarded as ideal, if the warrior-class and the masses are ‘deprived of reason’ and therefore imperfect. The ideal state, he thinks, appears at first sight to be composed of un-ideal individuals. But ‘the problem is resolved by separating the personal from the political-technical areas of control. In so far as they are citizens, (...) men in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the soul and one function.…. (shrink)

Shaḥrūr, Muḥammad; Islamic philosophy; Qurʼan; hermeneutics; criticism, interpretation, etc.

R. S. Downie; IX—Can there be a Private Morality?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 June 1968, Pages 167–186, https://doi.org/10.1.

R S Peters; Postscript 2, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 179–180, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1973.tb00480.x.

Chapters 12 and 13 of the De Interpretations present some puzzles, which it is my purpose to try to solve. The latest commentator, Professor Jaakke Hintikka, attempts in Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv, 5–22, to abolish the difficulties by taking certain verbs in an unusual way. He suggests that in these chapters, which is usually taken to denote logical consequence, sometimes expresses simply compatibility, sometimes equivalence, and that at 22a38ff., 22b3O, and 23a17, which again is usually taken to denote consequence, in (...) fact expresses compatibility. I propose to counter Hintikka's arguments and to maintain that both verbs express consequence; but as my main purpose is to give my own explanation of the general trend of Aristotle's remarks, I shall take the passages discussed by Hintikka in the order in which they occur in Aristotle's text. (shrink)

The author sets a goal to show the specificity of the formulation of universal prescriptive judgments about a virtuous act in the framework of Aristotelian ethical doctrine. To achieve this goal, Aristotle’s philosophy concept of practical wisdom is analyzed. It shows a necessity to distinguish the use of practical wisdom in a personal experience of the act and for forming the inter-subjective practical knowledge about making of a virtuous act. The specificity of ethics as practical knowledge and its difference from (...) individual moral experience are defined by means of the distinction of the use of practical wisdom. It also shows the limitations of practical syllogism as the main rational mechanism for the formation of inter-subjective practical knowledge. Additionally, the universal prescriptive judgments are divided into informative and functional: the former reveals the content of the action, the latter – its structure, that is, the former defines what a person must do, the latter defines what an action should be to comply with the right purpose, consequently, the right content. At the same time, the right content is recognized only in individual experience and can not be expressed universally, without losing its practical value. The author concludes that the formulation of informative universal prescriptive judgments is impossible within the framework of Aristotelian ethical doctrine. It is impeded by the unsolvable problem of the correlation between the general and the particular, the transition from descriptive judgments to prescriptive judgments. However, it is possible to formulate functional universal prescriptive judgments. They also constitute the methodological basis for criticism of the accepted in society moral norms, which are based on the past positive experience of actions. (shrink)

The first question here is the interpretation of line 638. Burges wrote: ‘Constructio sic solvenda est: M. Parmentier in the Budé edition translates, ‘On ne souffre pas quand on n'a nul sentiment de ses maux’, likewise assuming that is doing double work. For this he compares Andromache 706 f., Electra, 383, and Orestes 393. None of these passages is in fact an example of how a negative can negative simultaneously a finite verb and a participle. But in any case, what (...) is the subject of Burges supposed that a line was lost ; Parmentier does not explain his ‘On’. (shrink)