La pragmática trascendental del lenguaje de Karl-Otto Apel ha sido principalmente una reconstrucción (y fundamentación) de los presupuestos irrebasables del discurso argumentativo. Ella no se ha extendido sobre las acciones en principio no discursivas de los hombres. En el presente trabajo se expone cómo debería entenderse a este tipo de acciones en el marco de dicha pragmática. Así, se presentan aquí las implicancias que tiene para la constitución y explicación de las acciones el ser comprendidas bajo un aspecto central de (...) la pragmática de Apel como es la crítica trascendental del sentido. Con este objetivo, se desarrollan (I) las características generales y esquemáticas que presenta el lenguaje en su rol de “dador” de sentido en la obra de Apel. Luego (II), el artículo se extiende sobre este rol aplicado ahora a las acciones en general de los individuos. Finalmente, y mediante una reflexión sobre la validez implicada en toda articulación lingüística (III), se extraen algunas conclusiones sobre cómo debería entenderse a las acciones en el marco de la pragmática trascendental del lenguaje (IV). Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental pragmatics of language has been mainly a reconstruction (and justification) of the inevitable assumptions of argumentative discourse. This pragmatic has said barely anything about non argumentative action of men. This paper shows what implies for the constitution and explanation of non-argumentative actions of men to be understood under a central aspect of that pragmatic as the transcendental critic of sense (Sinn). To this end, it develops (I) the general and schematic characteristics that language presents in its role of meaning “giver” in the work of Apel. Then (II), the article spreads over this role now applied to the actions of individuals in general. Finally, through a reflection on the validity involved in all linguistic articulation (III), draws some conclusions about how the actions should be understood within the framework of transcendental pragmatics of language (IV). (shrink)

Resumen: En este artículo se aborda el argumento elaborado por Ludwig Wittgenstein en las Philosophische Untersuchungen acerca de la imposibilidad de un lenguaje privado. El objetivo de dicho abordaje reside en la presentación de una serie de argumentos, reconstruidos a partir de la pragmática trascendental del lenguaje, que demuestran también de una manera acabada la imposibilidad de concebir un lenguaje semejante. La importancia de los razonamientos de la pragmática trascendental consiste en que explicitan una forma de tener en cuenta el (...) propio proceso argumentativo que está ausente en los planteos de Wittgenstein. Así, luego de presentar la importancia y las particularidades del argumento de Wittgenstein se desarrolla la interpretación que es posible esgrimir desde la pragmática, así como una distinción que debe establecerse cuando se abordan cuestiones referidas al lenguaje. Por último se extraen algunas conclusiones.: This article addresses the argument developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophische Untersuchungen about the impossibility of a private language. The objective of this approach is to present a series of arguments, reconstructed from the point of view of transcendental pragmatics of language, which also demonstrate in a finished way the impossibility of such a language. The importance of the transcendental pragmatics reasonings is that they explicitly state a way of considering the very process of argumentation that is absent in Wittgenstein’s statements. After presenting the importance and particularities of Wittgenstein’s argument, the interpretation that can be employed from pragmatics is developed, as well as a distinction that must be made when dealing with issues related to language. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. (shrink)

Many believe that a citizen who engages in civil disobedience is not exempt from the sanctions that apply to standard law-breaking conduct. Since he is responsible for a deliberate breach of the law, he is also liable to punishment. Focusing on a conception of responsibility as answerability, I argue that a civil disobedient is responsible (i.e. answerable) to his fellows for the charges of wrongdoing, yet he is not liable to punishment merely for breaching the law. To support this claim, (...) I defend an account of political obligation framed in terms of respect for (rather than mere obedience to) the law, and argue that the mere illegality of civil disobedience does not suffice to establish wrongdoing. I then discuss and reject three objections to my argument. (shrink)

The fair-play theory of punishment claims that the state is justified in imposing additional burdens on law-breakers, to remove the unfair advantage the latter have enjoyed by disobeying the law. From this perspective, punishment reestablishes a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among all citizens. In this paper, I object to this view by focusing on the case of civil disobedience. I argue that the mere illegality of this conduct is insufficient to establish the agent’s unfair advantage over his lawabiding (...) fellows, hence the imposition of additional burdens upon him through legal punishment. I articulate a broader account of citizens’ fair-play duties, able to capture disobedience as well as obedience to the law. While claiming that some law-breakers may not be treated as free-riders, I also gesture at the fact that some law-obeying citizens may not be ‘playing fair’: in some cases, a failure to engage in civil disobedience represents a failure to do one’s own part within the cooperative scheme of society. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article examines the Trinitarian anthropology inherent in the ‘charism of unity’ that characterizes the Focolare Movement stemming from the mystical experience of Chiara Lubich. After describing the theological cornerstones of this charism―namely the evangelical centrality of the commandment of reciprocal love, the circularity between theology and anthropology and Jesus Forsaken as the Christological key to understanding and achieving unity―the article studies its cultural implications as reflected in the philosophical and theological contribution of Klaus Hemmerle. In dialogue with modern thought, (...) Hemmerle in fact draws from and develops the anthropological meaning of the charism of unity as a feasible way to respond to the most acute challenges of today. (shrink)

El autor plantea que el Estado ha ingresado en una creciente crisis y la sospecha sobre su real “utilidad” para la sociedad, y vincula a este tema el surgimiento de la cuestión del espacio público. Sostiene que un cambio radical se produce a partir de la nueva percepción del territorio, cuando ya no parece posible que el Estado, y por lo tanto el espacio público, pueda ser pensado exclusivamente en términos nacionales. Discute luego la relación espacio público-vida privada, y los (...) nuevos modos de hacer política en este nuevo espacio público. Afirma finalmente que la construcción de un bien común puede ser pensado y diseñado colectivamente. (shrink)

Acts of civil disobedience, which imply the open violation of a legal directive, often result in the forceful imposition of a choice upon others (e.g. blockades). This is sometimes justifiable, within a democracy, in cases of ‘democratic deficit’, namely, when fundamental rights of an oppressed minority are at stake. In this article, I claim that the use of physical force, in a democracy, may also be justified by the rights of (at least some of) the very people upon whom force (...) is applied. Focusing on the nature of civil disobedience as a ‘form of address’, I argue: (1) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena does not entail infringing upon their status as autonomous agents; (2) using physical force to address others in the democratic arena may contribute to the fulfilment of a positive duty to promote the autonomy of (at least some of) those very people upon whom force is applied. This is not a defence of paternalism: I claim that using force against others, in the democratic arena, may be constitutive of a behaviour that treats others with the respect due to their status as autonomous agents. (shrink)

It is still an open question whether or not Civil Disobedience (CD) has to be completely nonviolent. According to Rawls, “any interference with the civil liberties of others tend to obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one's act”. From this Rawls concludes that by no means can CD pose a threath to other individuals' rights. In this paper I challenge Rawls' view, arguing that CD can comprise some degree of violence without losing its “civil” value. However, I specify that violence (...) must not be aimed at seriously injuring, or even killing, other individuals. This would contravene the communicative aspect of CD. The main claim is that what really is important is that the civil disobedients be willing to accept the punishment following their law-breaking behaviour. By doing so, they demonstrate the conscientiousness of their civilly disobedient action. This also shows that they are aiming for future cooperation with the State, and are expecting the State to be sensitive to their concern for the principles of justice. (shrink)

(2000). The Evolutionary challenge for the Enterprise. World Futures: Vol. 55, Challenges of Evolution at the Turn of the Millennium: Part III: The Chllenges of Globalization and Sustainability, pp. 159-171.

Protein aggregation has been studied for at least 3 decades, and many of the principles that regulate this event are relatively well understood. Here, however, we present a different perspective to explain why proteins aggregate: we argue that aggregation may occur as a side‐effect of the lack of one or more natural partners that, under physiologic conditions, would act as chaperones. This would explain why the same surfaces that have evolved for functional purposes are also those that favour aggregation. In (...) the course of reviewing this field, we substantiate our hypothesis with three paradigmatic examples that argue for the generality of our proposal. An obvious corollary of this hypothesis is, of course, that targeting the physiological partners of a protein could be the most direct and specific approach to designing anti‐aggregation molecules. Our analysis may thus inform a different strategy for combating diseases of protein aggregation and misfolding. (shrink)

Jason Brennan has argued that democracy is intrinsically unjust, for it grants voting power to politically incompetent individuals, thus exposing people to an undue risk of harm. He claims democracy should be replaced by epistocracy, i.e., the rule of the knowers. In this paper, I show that his argument fails. First, Brennan mistakes voters’ competence for voters’ trustworthiness. Second, despite Brennan's claim to the contrary, an epistocracy may not reduce people’s exposure to an undue risk of harm. Third, Brennan overlooks (...) the fact that citizens are not equally affected by ‘bad voting.’ Fourth, far from being a defence of libertarian ideals, Brennan's argument supports paternalism. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been asserted or implied by Mach and more recent writers, the law of illumination and the study of photometry were not ignored in the years between Kepler's first enunciation of the former in 1609 and Bouguer's Essai on the latter in 1729. The law of illumination was in fact denied in 1613 by Aguilonius. It was probably rediscovered independently and certainly reformulated in more modern terms by Mersenne and Castelli in 1634, and by Boulliau in 1638. (...) It was again formulated and this time demonstrated empirically by Montanari no later than 1676, and possibly as early as 1634 by Castelli. Although neither the law nor photometry were major concerns before Bouguer, they were not completely neglected either. (shrink)

El trabajo se extiende en un breve examen del lugar asignado por algunos autores como Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel o Julio De Zan al discurso como instancia de legitimidad y crítica meta institucional de la sociedad. Haciendo un repaso de posiciones contrarias como las de Arnold Gehlen o Niklas Luhmann se procura establecer los alcances y los límites del espacio público –topos natural del discurso– como lugar paradigmático para interrelaciones sociales de fuerte contenido normativo orientadas hacia la validez de las (...) instituciones. Por último, se realizan una serie de precisiones que son necesarias para esa reivindicación del espacio público político. (shrink)

En el siguiente trabajo se examina la explicación de Raimo Tuomela acerca de la aparición de los hechos sociales básicos. En esa propuesta, los componentes elementales de una ontología social se deben a la “intencionalidad colectiva” compartida por diferentes actores. Si bien Tuomela hace alusión al lenguaje presente en algunas formas de intencionalidad, su reconstrucción está orientada a otras formas de generar hechos sociales que supuestamente no lo incluirían o serían más básicas que las generadas por esa praxis. En este (...) escrito se sostendrá, por el contrario, que no es posible eludir al lenguaje como principal mecanismo de generación de fenómenos elementales de la socialidad en ninguna instancia. Una vez que el lenguaje ocupa su lugar como principal instrumento de coordinación de la acción, creador de grupos sociales y desarrollo de una ontología social, muchas de las distinciones del programa intencionalista pierden relevancia desde un punto de vista ontológico. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordo una serie de teorías que han tenido a la performatividad y a la comunicación, más precisamente, como centro de indagación y como forma de explicar la constitución de las dimensiones fundamentales de la estructura social. En concreto, presentaré y discutiré aquí el llamado ‘constructivismo comunicativo’, representado por las teorías de H. Knoblauch y J. Reichertz. Luego de presentar su relevancia y algunas de sus características más destacadas (I), hago foco en el problema del alcance de (...) lo lingüístico en estas teorías (II), así como en el fundamento del lazo social tal como ellas lo entienden (III). Finalmente (IV), esquematizo cuáles deben ser las condiciones generale. (shrink)

My aim is to defend Winch's view that morality must be autonomous from religion. I defend him from Mounce's criticism, who claims that unless morality is supported by divine law, moral relativism cannot be avoided. Winch considers the Samaritan's behaviour and says (i) that the background of divine law is irrelevant to the parable; (ii) that we do not need divine law to understand the Samaritan's impossibility to ignore the victim; (iii) and that the absolute moral ought requires no external (...) support provided by religion. Winch adds that God cannot make any moral demand on humans, and thus He cannot reward them with salvation or punish them, without turning Himself into a means of moral corruption. All this spells the end of religion at least as far as the relation between God and man's moral and spiritual life is concerned; while relativism is shown to be morally corrupt and internally inconsistent. (shrink)

Central topics pertaining to the current debate in the philosophy of action concern the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning, and the nature of a conclusion in a process of reasoning. In this debate the reference to the Aristotelian reflection is recurrent. In four passages from his works, that is MA. 7, 701a7-b1, EN. H 5, 1147a24-31, EE. B 11, 1227b23-33 and EN. Г 5, 1112bl1-24, Aristotle explores some important aspects of practical reasoning making a parallel with the logical structures (...) of theoretical reasoning. In particular he finds specific analogies between practical and theoretical syllogism, practical and theoretical necessity, deliberation and analysis, action and demonstration. In spite of its specifications, the activity of reason shows its unity. Aristotle considers and deepens the constitutive ingredients of theoretical reasoning in the contest of practical philosophy. The comparison between practical and theoretical reasoning has consequently an expositive purpose, because it supports Aristotle's treatment of action theory. (shrink)