Dias de Nietzsche em Turim de Bressane / Dias / Miguel Angel de Barrenechea -- A atopia potente de Antonio das Mortes: pensamento original e perspectiva histórica / Rodrigo Guéron -- Dioniso é Brasileiro? / Selda Engelman -- Theatrum Mundi: Filosofia e canção / Olgária Chaim Matos -- Uma filosofia do amor em Cartola / Rosa Dias -- Música e diferença: uma crítica à escuta "desinteressada" do cotidiano / Samuel Araújo -- As estruturas dualísticas dos cantos ritualísticos dos Índios (...) Karajá: um reflexão sob a ótica filosófica de fundamentação nietzchiana / Suely Brígido -- Choque de intensidade na ética / Luiz B.L. Orlandi -- Por um filosofia artístico-rizomática da leitura / Daniel Lins -- Nietzsche, a negatividade e a antropofagia: do Cordeiro e da Ave da Rapina ao Jabuti / Maria Cristina Franco Ferraz -- Entre o teatro e a loucura: uma experiência de "esquizocenia" / Peter Pál Pelbart --. (shrink)

Progressive supranuclear palsy is a movement disorder with prominent tau neuropathology. Brain diseases with abnormal tau deposits are called tauopathies, the most common of which is Alzheimer's disease. Environmental causes of tauopathies include repetitive head trauma associated with some sports. To identify common genetic variation contributing to risk for tauopathies, we carried out a genome-wide association study of 1,114 individuals with PSP and 3,247 controls followed by a second stage in which we genotyped 1,051 cases and 3,560 controls for the (...) stage 1 SNPs that yielded P ≤ 10-3. We found significant previously unidentified signals associated with PSP risk at STX6, EIF2AK3 and MOBP. We confirmed two independent variants in MAPT affecting risk for PSP, one of which influences MAPT brain expression. The genes implicated encode proteins for vesicle-membrane fusion at the Golgi-endosomal interface, for the endoplasmic reticulum unfolded protein response and for a myelin structural component. © 2011 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The main goal of the text is to emphasize Nietzsche’s friendship with Peter Gast, as well as to present Gast’s dedication to Nietzsche, in terms of music, writing and the philosopher’s books.

Cet article, version abrégée de l’introduction au nouveau volume des œuvres complètes de Rosa Luxemburg en langue anglaise (regroupant ses écrits sur la révolution des années 1906 à 1909), traite de la manière dont son concept de démocratie socialiste s’applique à deux problèmes liés : 1) le rôle des organisations révolutionnaires dans la formation d’une conscience de classe ; et 2) la forme exacte de la transition au socialisme dans des pays où la classe ouvrière ne constitue qu’une minorité (...) de la population. En étudiant une partie de ses écrits en polonais, qui n’ont été traduits que récemment, nous montrons que Luxemburg a apporté une contribution intéressante et singulière aux débats sur la transition au socialisme, contribution que les précédents commentateurs ont eu tendance à ignorer. (shrink)

En el presente escrito examinamos brevemente con intenciones comparativas la historiología y algunos de sus fundamentos en Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben y Peter Sloterdijk; posteriormente analizamos de manera somera la posición política que del mismo modo subyace dichas concepciones de la historia; por último construimos de manera esquemática y general una historiografía a partir de la obra temprana de Sigmund Freud, con base en la experiencia que sus casos revelaban para producir nuevas concepciones de algunos elementos importantes para la (...) conformación de una historiologia y que, como veremos, produce una peculiar e inédita concepción de la historia, a pesar de que, de inicio, no era tal la intención de la producción teórica del psicoanálisis primitivo. (shrink)

Independientemente de qué considere cada persona como saludable, lo más seguro es que cualquiera de nosotros quiera vivir una vida sin molestias ni dolores. De alguna manera todos queremos bienestar. Pues bien, el libro _Holistic Healing _editado por Peter A. Dunn nos presenta diferentes teorías, prácticas y el cambio social que estas traen consigo. Para algunos sectores y personas del ámbito de la salud, el término “holístico” puede causar desconfianza, recelo o simplemente indiferencia, ya que el término “holístico” ha (...) sido usado para referirse a prácticas de sanación que no hacen parte de la biomedicina o de la llamada medicina occidental. Lo interesante de este libro es que los autores de cada capítulo evidencian de distintas maneras que una aproximación más completa al ser humano permite abordar la salud desde una perspectiva que va más allá de curar las enfermedades físicas. Como veremos a continuación, una mirada holística considera las dimensión física, psicológica, emocional y espiritual del ser humano, cómo interactúan entre ellas y cómo se ven influenciadas por la realidad social, económica y ambiental. (shrink)

Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by Ren Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

The standard view of Cartesian sensations is that they present themselves as purely qualitative features of experience. Accordingly, Descartes view would be that in perceiving the color red, for example, we are merely experiencing the subjective feel of redness rather than seeming to perceive a property of bodies. In this paper, I establish that the argument and textual evidence offered in support of SV fail to prove that Descartes held this view. Indeed, I will argue that there are textual and (...) theoretical reasons for believing that Descartes held the negation of SV. Qualia aren't Descartes legacy. (shrink)

Raffaella De Rosa discusses the theory of sensory perception, especially color perception, offered by René Descartes. She offers a detailed overview of the recent literature on the topic and provides a new reading of Descartes' theory; she also raises questions of great interest in the contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

Descartes seems to hold two inconsistent accounts of the ontological status of mathematical essences. Meditation Five apparently develops a platonist view about such essences, while the Principles seems to advocate some form of “conceptualism”. We argue that Descartes was neither a platonist nor a conceptualist. Crucial to our interpretation is Descartes’ dispositional nativism. We contend that his doctrine of innate ideas allows him to endorse a hybrid view which avoids the drawbacks of Gassendi’s conceptualism without facing the difficulties of platonism. (...) We call this hybrid view “quasi-platonism.” Our interpretation explains Descartes’ account of the nature of mathematical essences, dissolves the tension between the two texts, and highlights the benefits of Descartes’ view. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor has argued that Classical Empiricists are as committed to the innateness of ideas as Classical Rationalists. His argument, however, is proven inconclusive by an ambiguity surrounding “innate ideas”.Textual evidence for this ambiguity is provided and the “Dispositional Nativism” that, prima facie, makes Empiricist and Rationalist views similar dissolves into two distinct views about the nature of both the mind’s and the environment’s contribution in the process of concept acquisition.Once the Empiricist’s Dispositional Nativism is not conflated with the Rationalist’s, (...) it becomes evident that the Empiricist can accept the premises of Fodor’s argument without accepting his conclusion and, hence, remain unmoved in her conviction that no ideas are innate. (shrink)

Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on (...) sensory representation. (shrink)

This chapter clarifies the different varieties of dispositional nativism (DN) that John Locke addresses. In the light of this clarification, the chapter then identifies the basic structure of Locke's arguments and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. It points out that Locke's polemic fails to undermine nativism. The chapter analyzes Locke's reasoning for dismissing nativism in its cognitive form. It explains Locke's arguments against the postulation of innate ideas. The chapter examines three problems with Locke's argumentative strategy. In light of the (...) three problems, the chapter concludes that Locke's attack on non‐cognitive dispositional nativism (NCDN) fails because it either establishes that nativism and empiricism are indistinguishable but it has the undesired effect of collapsing empiricism into nativism; it fails to establish that empiricism and nativism are indistiguishable and, hence, Locke's polemical strategy is undermined. Consequently, Locke's arguments neither undermine nativism nor shift the burden of proof on the nativists’ shoulders. (shrink)

Book Information What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered. What's Within. Nativism Reconsidered F. Cowie New York/Oxford Oxford University Press 1999 xvii + 334 Hardback US$35.00 By F. Cowie. Oxford University Press. New York/Oxford. Pp. xvii + 334. Hardback:US$35.00.

Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological (...) account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is claimed to have. (shrink)

The old and recent debates on Cartesian essences have focused on the question of whether Descartes is a Platonist or a conceptualist about essences. I argue that this is a false dichotomy. An adequate account of Cartesian essences must accommodate and reconcile two central doctrines and texts in Descartes' philosophy. I will argue that recent conceptualist and Platonist interpretations neither accommodate these doctrines nor reconcile these texts. Such failures are not accidental since Descartes' doctrines of divine creation and simplicity render (...) it impossible for Descartes to be either a conceptualist or a Platonist. Failure to notice this fact explains why there has been no progress on this exegetical issue. (shrink)

The paper proposes a reflection on mathematical beauty, considering the possibility of aesthetic qualities for formal language. Through a concise overview of the way this question is understood by some famous scientists and mathematicians, we turn our attention to Gian-Carlo Rota’s theoretical proposal: his reflections as a mathematician and philosopher offer a perspective, of phenomenological matrix, fruitful for looking at the question. Rota’s contribution allows us to focus on the role of competence, acquired through effort, sedimentation and habit of repetition, (...) in cultivating the potential to recognise the aesthetic quality of formal language. Finally, we draw on some contributions from Gestalt theory, closely connected to twentieth-century phenomenology for chronological and conceptual reasons, applying the idea of gestalt wholeness to the mathematical product and proposing some reflections that may help to clarify some of the dynamics underlying the attribution of qualities of beauty to formulas or the detection of its lack. (shrink)

It is a common view that Descartes' causal principle is to be understood in light of a similarity condition that accounts for how finite causes contribute to an explanation of their effects. This paper challenges this common view and offers a sui generis reading of Descartes' views on causation that has also the advantage of solving the two exegetical issues of whether Descartes thought of the body-to-mind relation in occasionalist or causal terms and of whether Descartes regarded sensory ideas innate (...) or caused by bodies. (shrink)

The Vlaams Blok has been among the more successful of Europe’s far-right parties. But there is still a good deal of statistical analysis which might be done to help identify the factors in their success.This study looks at the best available data from electoral returns in the nine districts of Antwerp, which has been the locus of the Vlaams Blok’s support.A statistical comparison is made between various social and economic factors, and the level of support for Vlaams Blok in an (...) attempt to identify significant correlations. (shrink)

Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate and caused in us by bodies. Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating two questions that need to be kept distinct while inquiring about the (...) origin of ideas: the psychological question of the mechanisms by which we acquire ideas and the metaphysical question of how the content of these ideas is determined. I conclude by proposing a new way of reconciling Descartes's Claims A and B in light of this distinction. On my account, Descartes's very views on innateness explain why bodily states must be causes of sensory ideas. (shrink)

The topic of this dissertation is a discussion of the seventeenth century debate between Descartes and Locke over innate ideas. I propose a novel approach to the study of this debate. I argue that their disagreement over innate ideas is directly related to their differing views of how the content of ideas is determined and of what counts as having an idea in the mind. Approaching the controversy between Descartes and Locke from this perspective has allowed me to conclude that (...) Descartes' nativist argument prevail over Locke's arguments to the contrary. ;I begin the discussion, in Chapter One, by examining the anti-nativist arguments offered by Locke in Book I of his Essay concerning Human Understanding and by clarifying the nature of Descartes' dispositional nativism. I conclude that since Locke's arguments rely on a principle whose denial is implied by Descartes' Dispositional Nativism, his arguments at best beg the question against Descartes. I suggest then that discussion of the controversy between Descartes and Locke should shift to the arguments they provide, respectively, for and against the awareness principle. ;In Chapter Two, I argue that Locke's argument for the awareness principle is to be found in the empiricism of Book II of his Essay and, hence, that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I are question-begging since they presuppose the very empiricism they aim to prove. ;In Chapters Three and Four, I argue that Descartes' argument for the denial of the awareness principle is to be found in his rationalist theory of idea-individuation according to which the content of ideas is determined by an intellectual and implicitly known presentation of the object. ;In the final chapter, I argue that Descartes' arguments for nativism are a version of what is known in the literature as "Poverty-of-the-Stimulus Arguments" and conclude that, interpreted this way, they have an edge over Locke's anti-nativist arguments. I contend that whereas Locke's argument for the awareness principle depend on an empiricist theory of idea individuation that assumes that principle, Descartes' argument for the denial of the awareness principle depends on a rationalist theory of idea individuation that argues for the denial of that principle. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments’ (...) dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke’s arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the Awareness Principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism. (shrink)

This book aims to overturn the common view of materially false ideas , which is that Descartes’s discussion in Meditation Three generates confusion about his views on truth and falsehood and is irrelevant to the rest of the argument in the Meditations.After introducing MFIs and then criticizing previous interpretations, Wee provides her own account in chapter three. Since a proper understanding of why MFIs fail in their representational function allows Wee to revisit their role in the Meditations, this chapter occupies (...) a central place in the book. She attributes to Descartes two theories of representation, the “Accurate Causal Account” and the “Alternative Account” . According to ACP, “an idea represents truly only if the idea comes from the cause from which it purports to come, and the idea accurately represents that cause” . According to AA, an idea is true “if it represents a thing with objective being ” .Since Descartes, in Meditation Three, is “unable to determine the causes of his . . . ‘adventitious’ ideas, far less to determine whether his ideas accurately represent their causes” , the claim that MFIs “represent no-things as things” is to be explained in light of AA as follows: “Under AA, all ideas purport to. (shrink)

Jesse Prinz has argued that a proxytype theory of concepts provides what he calls the 'intentionality' and 'cognitive content' desiderata better than any current competitor, and that the hybrid nature of proxytypes allows his theory to combine the informational component of informational atomism with the view that concepts are semantically structured entities. In response, I argue that the hybrid character of proxytypes, far from delivering the advantages Prinz claims, generates a threatening dilemma: either his theory is novel but fails to (...) deliver the intentionality and cognitive content desiderata, or it delivers these desiderata but is not novel. (shrink)