European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 4, Page 937-947, December 2021.

It is reported that in reply to John Wisdom’s request in 1944 to provide a dictionary entry describing his philosophy, Wittgenstein wrote only one sentence: “He has concerned himself principally with questions about the foundations of mathematics”. However, an understanding of his philosophy of mathematics has long been a desideratum. This was the case, in particular, for the period stretching from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the so-called transitional phase. Marion’s book represents a giant leap forward in this direction. In the (...) preface, Marion provides a diagnosis for why it has taken such a long time to obtain an accurate picture of Wittgenstein’s ideas in the foundations of mathematics. When the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics came out in 1956 the reception by specialists, such as Kreisel, was negative. This led many Wittgenstein scholars to set aside the issues in the foundations of mathematics and go on with the business of the day, focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and psychology. However, these early negative appraisals were severely limited by two facts. First of all, the nature of the Remarks was a hindrance to an understanding of what Wittgenstein was up to. The book was edited by Wittgenstein’s literary executors by collating together passages from several manuscripts dating from 1937 to 1944, cutting, however, many passages in between remarks. Second, many of the original manuscripts and typescripts of the transitional phase were not available and thus it was virtually impossible to obtain a balanced picture of Wittgenstein’s development. Finally, a stark contraposition between the early and late Wittgenstein did not encourage people to work seriously on the development of Wittgenstein’s position from the Tractatus through the transitional period to the later writings. (shrink)

Forms of contemporary life attest to the dissolution of the concept of the ‘people’ and the renewed importance of the idea of the ‘multitude’. Though they took center stage in the seventeenth century debate that spawned much of our ethico-political lexicon, these two notions are polar opposites. The ‘people’ is by its very nature centripetal. Converging towards a general will, it acts as an interface between citizens and the State. The ‘multitude’ is plural. Fleeing all political unity, it shuns negotiations (...) with the sovereign and refuses to delegate its rights to that power; it is a recalcitrant and disobedient entity with a taste for certain forms of non-representative democracy. For example, Hobbes claims that citizens in rebellion against the State represent “the multitude against the people.” But while Hobbes spotted the greatest hindrance to the workings of the State within this multitude, Spinoza found in it the roots of liberty. The political existence of ‘multiples’ as such has been stricken from the horizon of modernity: not only by Absolute State theorists, but also by Rousseau, the liberal tradition, and the socialist movement itself. (shrink)

I temi della fede e della religione, e del loro conflitto con la cultura laica, sono da qualche tempo al centro di un interesse mediatico crescente, alimentato anche dalle polemiche politiche suscitate dal moltiplicarsi degli interventi e delle "scomuniche" del papa e della Conferenza Episcopale Italiana contro la modernità. Mancava fin qui, tuttavia, un testo di discussione, da punti di vista diversi e reciprocamente problematici, sulle ragioni dell'ateismo e della fede. Un confronto tra gli esponenti di tre posizioni ideologiche molto (...) lontane tra loro, accomunate però dal rifiuto di ogni appartenenza accademica: il cristianesimo nietzschiano del "pensiero debole" di Gianni Vattimo, la saggezza atea di una tradizione antica rilanciata da Michel Onfray e l'empirismo naturalistico-esistenziale della "filosofia del finito" di Paolo Flores d'Arcais. In questo insolito dialogo a tre voci emergono tutti gli interrogativi essenziali legati al problema, a partire da quello più generale: quali devono essere i rapporti tra filosofia e ateismo? L'"ipotesi Dio" deve ormai essere considerata superflua anche dalla riflessione filosofica, visto che le scienze ne fanno metodologicamente a meno? Quali sono le conseguenze etiche e politiche dell'essere atei o, all'opposto, credenti? (shrink)

"The fact is, man is an etymologizing animal."Etymologizing—the practice of connecting one word with one or more other similar-sounding words that are believed to elucidate its meaning1—is a complex and putatively universal phenomenon.2 Thus, to take two representative examples far apart in time and space, etymologizing practices figure prominently in some episodes of the Hebrew Bible,3 but also provide some modern influential thinkers with an important mode of argument.4 Perhaps etymologizing is so pervasive because it offers a pliable and powerful (...) tool for addressing a key question, namely, why is something called what it is?While this question has universal appeal, only a few cultures seem to have addressed it... (shrink)

This paper explores how Indic and Indic-derived linguistic analyses of the Buddha’s epithet _bhagavat_ influenced the epithet’s interpretations and translations in the Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions. The paper consists of three parts. The first part examines and classifies the evidence into four types of analyses that ultimately reflect analytical models afforded by the Indic linguistic disciplines of grammar (_vyākaraṇa_) and etymology (_nirvacana_). The second part explores how these linguistic analyses coordinate with pronouncements emphasizing the epithet’s extraordinary status as (...) opposed to ordinary language terms. The third part examines how these analyses fostered the adoption of certain translations strategies in China and Tibet, focusing on the second of the ‘Five Guidelines for Non-Translating’ (_wǔzhǒng bùfān_ 五種不翻) attributed to Xuanzang (600/602–664) and on pertinent statements recorded in the early-ninth-century Tibetan _Sgra sbyor bam po gñis pa_/_Madhyavyutpatti_. Using _bhagavat_ as an example, this paper aims to demonstrate the important yet little-studied role that Indic and Indic-derived linguistic analyses had in South Asian Buddhism as well as in the Indianized Buddhist cultures of China and Tibet. (shrink)

This essay explores selected examples of puns and etymologizing in the Pali canon. It argues that they do not solely serve a satirical intent, but are sophisticated rhetorical devices, skilfully employed by the Buddha to induce a reflective awareness in the listeners and persuade them into accepting his view. Their rhetorical function and efficacy is investigated, while foregrounding a new interpretation of the Aggaññasutta.

The concept of« multitude » opposes for a long time to that of the « people ». The people is a homogeneous unity, whereas the multitude is a network of peculiarities. The individuals who compose the multitude are not nevertheless atoms of one given but the result of a process of individuation. Of what consists this individuation which produces the individual from universal conditions ? One can tempt an answer by using Gilbert Simondon’s reflections and Russian psychologist L. Vygotskij. With (...) the aid of these authors one will end maybe in a more relevant comprehension of the Marxian concept of« social individual ». (shrink)

Nous faisons usage de machines, de chaussures, de cartes, en vue de notre vie, de sa conservation et de son développement. Mais c’est la vie elle-même qui est avant tout « usable », et pour laquelle machines, chaussures, cartes sont utilisées. L’ usage de soi, de son existence, est le présupposé et la poutre maîtresse de tous les autres usages. Or l’usage de soi se fonde sur le détachement de soi. Est utilisée une existence à laquelle on ne peut pas (...) toujours s’identifier, qui ne se possède pas entièrement et qui, sans être vraiment étrangère, n’est pas non plus complètement familière. Autrement dit, l’usage de la vie concerne l’espèce qui, en plus de vivre, doit rendre sa vie possible. Le jeu de scène théâtral récapitule et amplifie les procédés par lesquels l’être humain se sert de son existence. L’activité de l’acteur est un modèle incomparable de l’usage de la vie et du souci de soi. Pour reconstituer avec précision les « technologies du soi », il convient de regarder de près les écrits de Stanislavski, Mejerchol’d, Brecht et Grotowski. (shrink)

This paper aims to recover the ideas about semantics that are contained in Yāska’s _Nirukta_ (c. 6–3 century BCE), the seminal work of the Indian tradition of _nirvacana_ or etymology. It argues that, within the framework of his etymological project, Yāska developed consistent and sophisticated ideas relating to semantics—what I call his theory of meaning. It shows that this theory assumes the form of explicit and implicit reflections pertaining to the relation between three categories: denoting names (_nāman_/_nāmadheya_), denoted objects (_sattva_/_artha_), (...) and name-giving action expressed by verbal roots (_ākhyāta_). A typology of Yāska’s etymologies for what they reveal about semantics will be proposed and investigated. In doing so, attention will be paid to how Yāska’s ideas resemble and anticipate ideas concerning the difference between polysemy and homonymity, metaphoric transfer, and synecdoche. It is hoped that attending to Yāska’s thus-far largely overlooked ideas will help us better appreciate the _Nirukta_’s role in the history of early Indian engagements with semantics. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s view of suicide is a topic which in the last years has been the focus of works such as Julian Young’s and Paul S. Loeb’s. Within this context, this paper seeks to add new elements to the discussion. To this purpose, Nietzsche’s attitude to suicide will be explored from two different points of view. The first part of the paper focuses on the distinction between voluntary (free) and involuntary (natural) death. Nietzsche’s appraisal of both will be scrutinized. In particular, (...) through the comparison with the Classical and, especially, Stoic philosophy and through the critique of the religious (particularly Christian) conception of death, it will be shown, among other things, that Nietzsche defends the rationality of suicide, presents a view of voluntary death as emptied of morality and fights against the Christian denaturalization of suicide. In the second part of the paper, suicide will be considered from a philosophical-existentialist viewpoint, that is, as a possible consequence of the meaninglessness of human existence. The problem is to judge whether life is or is not worth living in a world devoid of meaning and purpose. Nietzsche’s attitude to suicide will be analyzed in a chronological way (early, middle and late Nietzsche). Special attention will be given to the role played by art. The relevant conclusion is that, although in different ways, Nietzsche gives an affirmative answer to the question whether life is worth living in a world devoid of meaning and purpose. (shrink)

More than any other philosopher, Duns Scotus and Simondon both gave extensive consideration to the relation between what is primarily common and what is primarily singular. Pointing to certain resonances between their ideas can help us to develop a theoretical model to decipher the mode of being of the contemporary multitude. This article deals with: 1. The critique that Duns Scotus and Simondon address to everyone who believes that the matter form pair can account for the process of individuation; 2. (...) The gap separating the notion of the « universal » from that of the « common », and therefore, the need to precisely define the ontological and logical status of the « common » without any surreptitious use of categories linked to the « universal 1); 3. The paradoxical relation involving both addition and subtraction - between the individuated individual and « common nature »; and 4. The question of angels , a source of enduring fame in school textbooks for Duns Scotus, re-examined here in the light of Simondon ’s concepts of « transindividuality » and of « collective individuation ». (shrink)

La grammaire de la multitude en définit les traits saillants : le premier est la fin de la séparation du public et du privé. En découle un nouveau rapport entre l’individuel et le collectif : on ne converge pas dans l’Un, on agit différemment à partir d’un fond commun. La multitude est ambivalente, servile et révoltée à la fois. Elle aime avoir peur, mais en étant à l’abri, elle demande de la sécurité. Elle est animée par le sentiment de ne (...) pas se sentir chez soi, et adopte par rapport à cela des stratégies différentes, voire opposées. Les « lieux communs » caractérisent ses discours qui prennent des formes très générales. Ce recours aux « lieux communs » vient directement du sentiment de ne pas se sentir chez soi, et de devoir penser de quelle manière on y est. Mais l’aspect public de l’intellect éprouvé en commun, loin de laisser libre, crée une dépendance personnelle par rapport à des hiérarchies diverses. Chacun se comporte en public en virtuose, en artiste interprète, dans la coopération productive en quoi consiste tout travail contemporain. (shrink)

Angelaki, Volume 16, Issue 3, Page 63-76, September 2011.

Etymologies are often encountered in Vedic prose, in Brāhmaṇas and early Upaniṣads. Though they have received a fair amount of scholarly attention, Vedic etymologies still present a challenge to interpreters. To respond to it, I critically review previous interpretations, and focus on three case studies, Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 1.1.2, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.3, and Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.8. In my interpretation, I emphasize the need for a contextual reading, foreground Vedic etymologies’ complexity and sophistication, and call attention to the variety of purposes they (...) serve to achieve as well as to Vedic etymologists’ agency. Supplementing conventional interpretations concentrating mostly on their religious-magical aspects, I describe Vedic etymologies as discursive devices used by Vedic authors to further their thoughts and agendas. (shrink)

Recorded in Nirukta 1.15–16, the controversy between Kautsa and Yāska on whether the Vedic mantras are meaningful or not represents a turning point in the traditional interpretation of the Veda. While references to this controversy are often found in literature, a systematic discussion of the whole episode has not to our knowledge been undertaken. This paper offers a detailed analysis of this controversy. We first review previous scholarship and elucidate the structure and rationale of the controversy. Then, we provide an (...) annotated translation in which we propose new solutions to several philological and interpretive issues. (shrink)

Verbal forms of upa √ās are one of the characteristic features of Upaniṣadic diction. While several studies have investigated their semantics, very little attention has been given to their syntax. A quick comparison of different translations shows that there is no agreement among Upaniṣadic interpreters regarding the syntax of upa √ās. By considering all its occurrences in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads, this paper offers the first systematic study of its syntax. It is hoped that the analytic model proposed here (...) will allow us to better parse, understand, and translate the relevant Upaniṣadic passages. The paper comprises two parts: Part I presents the results of my analysis succinctly; Part II offers a detailed analysis. Two appendixes follow: Appendix 1 examines the formula ‘ya eta- evaṃ vidvān upa √ās’; Appendix 2 represents all the occurrences of upa √ās in a table. (shrink)

In Virgil, as in modern narrative, the act of saying is barely mentioned or left out altogether. At times the transition from indirect to direct speech comes abruptly, without warning . On the other hand, the stress falls on the speaker's position within the general narrative. We are thus drawn away from the actuality of speech to a broader frame of reference. The characters seem to be more concerned with the distant implications of the action than with the present moment. (...) Their motivations and fortunes cover the years. They merge, therefore, into legend, history, romance; and the words they speak illustrate their extending roles. (shrink)

On the background of Nespolo’s cinema there are on the one hand the new rules and the new structures assigned by art to itself during the Twentieth Century. On the other hand the “logic of dada”, based on the immediacy of the creation through a gesture of everyday objects presentation. Therefore, by exploring the experimental use of camera and of its technical possibilities, what Nespolo does is avant-gardist cinema in two senses: as an elaboration of visual image that represents surrealistic (...) and improbable worlds; as a way to establish linguistic connections with cultural development of society, as shown by his film about Italian artists of Arte Povera. (shrink)