This essay critiques the ontology and epistemology of African philosophy, with particular attention to Odera Oruka’s sage philosophy project, one of the most influential schools of thought in African philosophy. Oruka posits an absolutist ontology that holds to a conception of epistemology as presuppositionless and transcendental. Against this, I argue for a critical contextual epistemology that proffers a view of epistemology as embodied, linguistically performed, social, ideological, rhetorical, and contextual. I argue, ultimately, that (...) a critical contextual epistemology is not only useful for charting new directions in African philosophy but also may illuminate productive intersections between African philosophy and Western philosophy. (shrink)

One of the most debated issues in African philosophy concerns the question of ethnophilosophy. While most Particularists equate it to African philosophy, the Universalists reject it as philosophy let alone being African philosophy. The rationale behind the second position is that ethnophilosophy is said to be descriptive and lacks argumentation, criticality, rigor and systematicity, which are the hallmarks of philosophy. What these two views revolve around is the question of the place of (...) ethnophilosophy in African philosophy. Here, I focus on two scholars who have sought to address this question. The first is Ada Agada, who opines that ethnophilosophy plays a foundational role to African philosophy. The other is Aribiah Attoe, who sees this view as a myth that must be done away with. In this paper, I show two things: first, I show that these two conflicting views arose due to both scholars’ failure to clarify their ideas of what makes a philosophy African. Second, I converse with Attoe on his critique of the foundational role of ethnophilosophy as a myth. Here, I contend that Attoe’s view is a misreading of Agada’s views and that Attoe’s position that critical rigor instead of ethnophilosophy should be the foundation of African philosophy is unfounded. My argument is that criticality is just one among other tools of philosophy; and a tool of philosophy cannot be its foundation. Keywords: Agada, African Philosophy, Attoe, criticality, ethnophilosophy, Ezin’ulo Ontology. (shrink)

Despite the fact that management programmes provided by African universities are based on Western ontology, there exists a philosophy of management that is uniquely African. It is necessary to discover, understand and nurture this philosophy in order to explain why African managers behave in the ways they do. The African philosophy of management is premised on African traditional cultures, which have a strong influence on the organisational culture of African organisations. (...) For example, despite many Africans undertaking university degrees based on Western ontology at home and overseas, they inadvertently revert to African management philosophy in their (African) organisations. Consequently, the African philosophy of management significantly affects how African managers manage African organisations. The location of the author’s research for this paper is the neighbouring East African nations of Kenya and Tanzania. Although the limitation of the research to these two countries means that the research findings cannot be generalised to other African economies, it may nevertheless point to possible patterns of African management philosophy to be found in other economies of sub-Saharan Africa. Arguably, African management philosophy plays a key role at different levels in African organisations, with both positive and negative consequences. This paper explores such a role and its consequences. It also examines its implications for socio-economic development and social advancement for African peoples. It is widely accepted, for example, that African institutions and organisations are very corrupt. Africans do not have a monopoly on corruption, but a question of interest for this paper is whether the African philosophy of management contributes to corruption in the two countries on which this paper focuses, and what inferences may be drawn for other economies in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper includes both conceptual and field research in its exploration of the African philosophy of management. It is premised on the view that, while the Western world may not recognise or even think about an African philosophy of management, such a philosophy does exist. The effective management of African private and public organisations is not possible, if the African philosophy of management is not understood and accommodated in the management of African organisations. An understanding is critical for socio-economic development and social advancement, especially for Africans in Kenya and Tanzania, and also for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. (shrink)

In this study, I explore the challenges that ideological hegemonies of personhood imbibed by nurses and other healthcare workers could pose for the nursing profession, particularly in terms of inhibiting the acknowledgment of difference. Dominant or hegemonic conceptions of personhood in particular spaces often consist of self‐contained ideas and essentialist ontologies and normativity of what it means to be a person, lack of which results in the denial of personhood and the othering as non‐person or sub‐person. The other as the (...) residue of such self‐contained notions of personhood is most often denied the quality of care that the one who fits within such conceptions enjoy. For nurses and other healthcare workers to overcome such exclusionary tendencies in healthcare, they must overcome hegemonies and ideological dominance and be more open to alternative viewpoints and theories of personhood. I develop these lines of thought by focusing on the rich ideological traditions of Continental and African philosophies showing how exclusion takes place within these traditions based on conceptions of personhood and how such exclusion on the basis of difference impacts negatively on healthcare. I conclude by highlighting the need to go beyond hegemonic philosophies of personhood by decolonizing and demasculinizing healthcare, thereby allowing difference to flourish in an ecology of medical knowledge. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, the discipline of nursing has been influenced extensively by both Western and Eastern/Asian philosophies. What remains unknown or, perhaps, poorly articulated is the potential influence of African philosophy on the onto‐epistemology of nursing. As a starting point, this article sought to examine the core claims of African philosophy and how they may offer new meanings to the metaparadigm domains of interest in the discipline of nursing. At the core of African philosophy is the (...) notion of personhood (which is distinguished from what it means to be a human being), community, solidarity, and relationality. A major claim of African philosophy is the notion that ‘a person is a person through persons’ which may mean that nursing will be relevant from the African philosophical perspective if it is able to attain this. Health and illness from the African philosophical perspective are defined relationally which shifts attention from the biomedical framework to holism and relational care. The sick ‘person’ is also distinguished from the sick ‘human being’ which has the potential of leading to exclusion from the African philosophical viewpoint. Put together, the African philosophical stance potentially extends the meaning of the metaparadigm domains of interest to the discipline of nursing which warrants further exploration. (shrink)

A review of [Existence and Consolation: Reinventing Ontology, Gnosis and Values in African Philosophy]. Author: Ada Agada Editor: Jonathan O. Chimakonam Publisher: Paragon House and 3rd Logic Option Number of Pages: 368 Reviewer: Joseph N. AGBO Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki.

To the question,“what is sports”, or what is a good sports activity or event, I am sure Plato would know what to say, using references to his philosophical division of man into three parts, namely: the appetite soul; the emotional soul and the reasonable soul. Plato would have said that sports comes from the human person and being, and so, for any particular sports to be accorded the accolade of goodness it must have the correspondence of the three constituent parts (...) of man’s true nature. The concept of the soul in Plato is what exploring just as that of Professor Maduabuchi Dukor’s expositions concerning the African philosophical concepts of soul, mind, spirit and body as they affect philosophy of sports and the discipline of physical education. The article will therefore analyze the link between Plato concept of the good sports, Professor Dukor’s ontological ideas about the African core values as they affect the balance, harmony and health both the mind and body of the human being. The central point here is the analytical framework of enquiry which Plato sustained in his Dialogues when he queries people:“what is this?”. By this he wants people to appreciate the fact that when they are in search of truth, they usually have the impression that they have all when, actually, they have only half-baked understanding of issues. It is important therefore to understand the issues involved in the disciplines of physical education, philosophy of sports, ethics and the ontological frame of African philosophy as profiled under Professor Dukor theistic humanism of African philosophy. Centrally, the dialectical link between Plato and Dukor will expose the ethical dimension to sports development since every thing is not wining and money or drugs should not be the ultimate motivation for sports and physical exercises. The exercise of sports should lead to the dual development and balance of both mind and body; the highest being the competition of the soul with itself and not with others in which laurels, gold or money is won or lost. The man who wins is the one, like in the communal spirit of the African ontology, who has conquered over his selfishness and sacrifices for the good of the community. (shrink)

A review of [Existence and Consolation: Reinventing Ontology, Gnosis and Values in African Philosophy]. Author: Ada Agada Editor: Jonathan O. Chimakonam Publisher: Paragon House and 3rd Logic Option Number of Pages: 368 Reviewer: Joseph N. AGBO Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki.

An original and constructive African though system with universal reach. Existence and consolation transcends the ethno-philosophies the dominated in the post-colonial period. While the African experience might lead one to say human life is pointless, the author argues that meaning comes in the form of consolation and is rooted in mood.

The Hatata Inquiries are two extraordinary texts of African philosophy composed in Ethiopia in the 1600s. Written in the ancient African language of Geʿez (Classical Ethiopic), these explorations of meaning and reason are deeply considered works of rhetoric. They advocate for women's rights and rail against slavery. They offer ontological proofs for God and question biblical commands while delighting in the language of Psalms. They advise on right living. They put reason above belief, desire above asceticism, love (...) above sectarianism, and the natural world above the human. They explore the nature of being as well as the nature of knowledge, the human, ethics, and the human relation with the divine. They are remarkable examples of something many assume doesn't exist: early written African thought. This accessible English translation of the Hatata Inquiries, along with extensive footnotes documenting the cultural and historical context and the work's many textual allusions, enables all to read it and scholars to teach with it. The Hatata Inquiries are essential to understanding the global history of philosophy, being among the early works of rational philosophy. The book includes a translation by Ralph Lee with Mehari Worku and Wendy Laura Belcher of the Hatata Zara Yaqob and the Hatata Walda Heywat. The appendices by Jeremy R. Brown provide information on the scribal interventions in and the differences between the manuscripts of the two Hatatas. The book also includes a map, chronology, summary of the translation principles, and a discussion of the authorship debate about the Hatata Inquiries. (shrink)

What makes for good societies and good lives in a global world? In this landmark work of political and ethical philosophy, Omedi Ochieng offers a radical reassessment of a millennia-old question. He does so by offering a stringent critique of both North Atlantic and African philosophical traditions, which he argues unfold visions of the good life that are characterized by idealism, moralism, and parochialism. But rather than simply opposing these flawed visions of the good life with his own (...) set of alternative prescriptions, Ochieng argues that it is critically important to step back and understand the stakes of the question. Those stakes, he suggests, are to be found only through a social ontology – a comprehensive and in-depth account of the political, economic, and cultural structures that mark the boundaries and limits of life in the twenty-first century. It is only in light of this social ontology that Ochieng then proffers an alternative normative account of the good society and the good life – which he spells out as emergent from ecological embeddedness; social entanglement; embodied encounter; and aesthetic engenderment. At once sweeping and rigorous, incisive and subtle, original and revisionary, this book does more than just appeal to intellectuals and scholars across the humanities and social sciences – rather, it opens up the academic disciplines to a whole new landscape of exploration into the biggest and most pressing questions animating the human experience. (shrink)

An inquiry into the ontology of critical gender consciousness in Africa Philosophy is long overdue. Hitherto discourses on gender problems lost focus because of the tendency to leave out the gaps in culture created by colonial experience, modernity’s assaults and unAfricaness in ontology and essence. It is argued here that the fulcrum for a legitimate feminist doctrine is Theistic Humanism, the philosophy of African philosophy that exposes the epistemological and metaphysical basis of the rightful (...) and ethical place of women in the society. (shrink)

There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy (...) of Mind, care must, ab initio, be taken to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of considering phenomenal characters or properties of mental states to be part of the fabric of the world. (shrink)

Identity, is the distinguishing characteristic of a person or being. African identity is “being-with” as opposed to the Western individualism, communalism as oppose to collectivism. African “self” is rooted in the family-hood. The West battered African World view and cultural heritage, with the racialism, slave trade, colonization and other Western ideologies. They considered Africans inferiors and influenced most Africans to see themselves as such. Thus Africans are backward and without integral development and independence, although it was quite (...) certain that pre-colonial Africa was not static or dead. However, the essence of philosophy is to inquire critically into the marvels and problematic that confronts one in his world in view of producing systematic explanation and sustained response to them. Therefore, Contemporary African Philosophy focuses on these marvels and problematic confronting the Africa World. The essence of philosophical paradigm of African identity and development is to reason out the way people think with the aim of rediscovering and situating them on the right track, which is, being original and authentic with the view of arriving at a desired goal. It is also for emancipating Africa from bartered African image and European conditioning, slavery and neo-colonization. African ontology is anthropocentric; any serious minded development paradigm must take manmmaduasits point of departure and the point of arrival. It must be peoples’ oriented, relevant to the peoples’ needs and aspirations. (shrink)

The Hatata Inquiries are two extraordinary texts of African philosophy composed in Ethiopia in the 1600s. Written in the ancient African language of Geʿez (Classical Ethiopic), these explorations of meaning and reason are deeply considered works of rhetoric. They advocate for women’s rights and rail against slavery. They offer ontological proofs for God and question biblical commands while delighting in the language of Psalms. They advise on right living. They put reason above belief, desire above asceticism, love (...) above sectarianism, and the natural world above the human. They explore the nature of being as well as the nature of knowledge, the human, ethics, and the human relation with the divine. They are remarkable examples of something many assume doesn’t exist: early written African thought. This accessible English translation of the Hatata Inquiries, along with extensive footnotes documenting the cultural and historical context and the work’s many textual allusions, enables all to read it and scholars to teach with it. The Hatata Inquiries are essential to understanding the global history of philosophy, being among the early works of rational philosophy. The book includes a translation by Ralph Lee with Mehari Worku and Wendy Laura Belcher of the Hatata Zara Yaqob and the Hatata Walda Heywat. The appendices by Jeremy R. Brown provide information on the scribal interventions in and the differences between the manuscripts of the two Hatatas. The book also includes a map, chronology, summary of the translation principles, and a discussion of the authorship debate about the Hatata Inquiries. (shrink)

This work is of the view that the question of being is not only a problem in Western philosophy but also in African philosophy. It, therefore, posits that being is that which is and has both abstract and concrete aspect. The work arrives at this conclusion by critically analyzing and evaluating the views of some key African philosophers with respect to being. With this, it discovers that the way that these African philosophers have postulated the (...) idea of being is in the same manner like their Western philosophers whom they tried to criticize. This work tries to synthesize the notions of beings of these African philosophers in order to reach at a better understanding of being. This notion of being leans heavily on Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology which does not bifurcate or polarize being, but harmonizes entities or realities that seem to be contrary or opposing in being. (shrink)

This paper examines two claims about the ontology of globalisation. First, it interrogates the claim that the contemporary phenomenon of globalisation is underpinned by the theoretical construct of economic and information-epistemic determinism, which has been developmentally significant in the North. The paper contends that this claim is likely to propagate some values that ought not to undergird the end-state vision of the prospective global village if the PGV is to be essentially conjunctive rather than essentially disjunctive. Second, the paper (...) contends that if a cohesive and egalitarian PGV is truly the end-point of the philosophy of globalisation, then the African socio-cultural values of a relational understanding of the self and universal brotherhood ought to be globally recognised and emphasised by the North as fundamental to the realisation of the vision of the PGV. The paper seeks to illustrate that if properly applied to the globalising process, these cultural values are ontologically conjunctive in the sense that they have the potential to promote the building of a cohesive and egalitarian global village, since they tend to encourage acceptance and co-operation among the different peoples of the world. Keywords Africa, culture, determinism, globalisation, philosophy. (shrink)

The need for a logic that is inspired by an African background ontology and worldview, and yet universalizable gave impetus to the emergence of the book Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philo...

Groundwork for the intellectual life: ontology, imagination, and praxis -- Radical knowledge: toward a critical contextual ontology of intellectual practice -- Embodied knowledge: intellectual practices as ways of life -- Radical world-building: notes toward a critical contextual aesthetic -- Geographies of the imagination: figurations of the aesthetic at the intersection of African and global arts -- Theses on the intellectual imagination.

That African philosophy began with frustration and not with wonder as it is in Western tradition is a radical statement with far-reaching implications. Implications that are, as challenging as they are intellectually refreshing thus reinvigorating interest in the African discourse. As the discipline of African philosophy vitiated in the post debate disillusionment met with a new generation critical fire; methodic, technical and theoretic demands and issues unresolved in the old order surface. Old questions re-emerge with (...) new and daunting toga while new questions present fresh challenges for thought. With a carefully selected pool of emerging, original, African thinkers, the editor brought a creatively fascinating illumination upon the African episteme to herald the new era of African thought. The essays in this collection remark a sort of radical break from a long standing convention that requires serious critical reconstruction. Presenting a paradigm of creative individual philosophizing, the history, dating, criteria, logic and periodization imbroglio in African philosophy were resolved to give shape and direction to a hitherto formless discipline. Fundamental questions in ontology, epistemology, ethics and political thought gave birth to stunning metanarratives to inaugurate the conversational orientation in African philosophy. It provides a systematization that has been missing for almost a century and upon it defines an intellectually exciting future for the discipline. Whoever that wants to do African philosophy and understand it and make input must read this corpus. Carefully articulated and written, the essays in this collection constitute dependable research resources for students and researchers in all areas of African philosophy and studies. (shrink)

The notion of belongingness in African philosophy has its most profound expression in Pantaleon Iroegbu’s uwa ontology, which stipulates that being is that which exists in the community, or, as he puts it, “To be is to belong.” The main contention of this article is that Jonathan O. Chimakonam’s ezumezu logic is fully equipped to explain this ontology of belongingness. This is due to the trivalent and dynamic nature of this African culture–inspired logic, which adequately (...) captures the African conception of reality. According to this conception, individual entities continue to coexist or to belong in the community without losing their respective identities. (shrink)

Zhongdaology is the core of Chinese traditional Confucian philosophy. The zhongdaological way of thinking represents the Chinese philosophical thinking mode, with Confucianism as the main body, and has deeply influenced many aspects of Chinese culture. It is different from the traditional ontological thinking in the West. However, for a long time, due to the influence of the dominant position of Western ontological thinking in the field of philosophical research, the characteristics of zhongdaological thinking have not been fully elaborated and (...) promoted. This essay briefly exposes the historical origin of the doctrine of zhongdaology and its significance in Confucianism. Like the situation of traditional Chinese philosophy, African philosophy also has long been overshadowed and ignored by western philosophy to some extent. To this end, it can be safely stated that the dominance of western tradition is why the interaction between Chinese philosophy and African philosophy and otherunderrepresented philosophical traditions in the south have not taken firm roots. This essay makes some preliminary comparisons betweenChinese Confucian zhongdaology with some African philosophical ideas such as Ezumezu and Ubuntu, to show, first, the significance of broader dialogue and exchange among different philosophical traditions in the south, second how zhongdaology itself could serve as a veritable framework for doing philosophy across borders. (shrink)

African Philosophy and St Thomas Aquinas have both been taught in African universities, but the engagement between the continent’s indigenous philosophical tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition’s preeminent strand, has not been thorough. Presupposing that plural philosophical traditions contribute to the search to better understand, this research embarks upon a comparative analysis of the perspectives of the African ubuntu philosophy and Thomist philosophical conceptualisations of human becoming and being. Through analysis of dimensions of both traditions, (...) it is contended that human fulness arises through relationality. It is argued that in centring on the interpersonal encounter and the consequent recognition of another’s being through mutual engagement, these philosophical traditions open to each other. Further, both traditions contribute toward the ontology of personhood in ubuntu and the good of mutual indwelling, respectively. (shrink)

Cinema is neither neutral nor a universal medium. Particularly in African contexts, cinema contributes to European exceptionalism, imposes European values as the norm, and acts as an instrument of cultural and psychological control. It seems that African cinema is ontologically, politically, and aesthetically Eurocentric. By introducing an intercultural philosophical approach to the realm of cinema, we aim to move away from Eurocentrism in African cinema towards a more intercultural and dialogical orientation as an input for the liberation (...) of humanity. Based on findings from a dramaturgical analysis of five films, we argue that African cinema shows a deficiency in communicating liberation and it often fails to portray African people’s values, will, and interests as it has been alienated from its nature and purpose. Overall, African cinema seems to be either in a state of assimilation or confusion. By exploring aesthetics of liberation in African cinema and art (as described in African and intercultural philosophy,) we search for alternative film aesthetics and a mode of filmmaking that seeks to liberate the image and the minds of the filmmakers and spectators of African cinema. Inspired by Kimmerle’s aesthetic-ethic alternative ‘Living (with) art’, we propose an alternative for critical filmmaking based on aesthetics of liberation with an intercultural orientation: Living cinema. Living cinema is a dialogical and liberational cinema with aesthetics of liberation at its core. Based on aesthetic-ethic principles of African philosophy and interculturality, the liberating function of living cinema can be found in reconnecting the aesthetics and filmmaking with African values. Simultaneously, it might be contributing to the liberation of world cinema as it has an impact on both the hegemonic and the suppressed cinema. (shrink)

Existentially, Igbo-African metaphysics swivels around ethics, morality, justice, and medicine. This state of being is evident in their credo on the ontology of the deities, which they see as a strategic variable in their hierarchy of beings and a critical agent in their quest for sane, responsible, peaceful existence and co- existence. Based on these premises, this paper interrogated these variables to establish the symmetry between them. In doing this, this research employed the critical analytic cum existential model (...) in its analysis. After which, it became palpable that the existence and ontology of the deities accentuates the mode of operation of the Igbo-African and from that position; it was blatant that the communal life of the Igbo-African makes African metaphysics a lived-metaphysics or what I have called anthropologised-metaphysics. (shrink)

This book calls for the institution of an African feminist philosophy of language, challenging existing debates and encouraging a move away from the Western gaze. The book begins with an analysis of the philosophical context of African feminism, and a call for the decolonization of epistemological discourse. Oyeleye then goes on to consider how indigenous patriarchies play out in the cultural reality of the Yoruba in particular, ontologically unpacking the nature of woman as expressed in language, especially (...) in myths and proverbs. Challenging the derogatory language found in proverbs which entrench patriarchal oppression, the book advocates for postproverbials: new proverbs which draw on old traditions but reconstruct the space of woman in a new, egalitarian rhetorical tradition. The book concludes by outlining the conditions necessary for African feminist philosophers to consider language as a decolonizing space which can help to push through the agenda of social change. This book will be an important resource for researchers from across the fields of gender and women studies, feminist philosophy, philosophy of language, cultural studies, and African studies. (shrink)

Metz holds that we can use African communal ethics to constitute global economic practices such as appropriation, production, distribution and consumption in such a way that promotes harmonious relations. In this article, I will show that Metz’s reformist approach to constituting the global economic practices is problematic as it fails to deal with the fundamental problem that pertains to a racialised world order that is structurally configured by coloniality of being. I will show that reformist approaches such as Metz’s (...) use of African communal ethics to constitute global economic practices in a way that promotes harmonious relations are undesirable attempts that are opposed and curtailed by a structural racialised logic/ontology of the world that governs and supervises the evolution of the world economic structures and practices in a way which undermines harmonious relations and in a way which causes economic marginalisation and impoverishment of historically disadvantaged indigenous Africans. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guest Editor's Introduction:The Time of Africana PhilosophyOmedi OchiengAfricana philosophy is in the main a philosophy of the present. Many will demur and with good reason. In the first place, in worrying about the definition and animating energies of Africana philosophers, Africana philosophers have looked to the past to furnish answers to the former, and to the future to motivate its orientation to the latter. For Lucius Outlaw, (...) for example, writing in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Africana philosophy is a third-order, metaphilosophical, umbrella-concept used to bring organizing oversight to various efforts of philosophizing—that is, activities of reflective, critical thinking and articulation and aesthetic expression—engaged in by persons and peoples African and of African descent who were and are indigenous residents of continental Africa and residents of the many African Diasporas worldwide" (2017, first paragraph).If, then, on the one hand, Outlaw's definition points to the past to make intelligible the contours of Africana philosophy—"persons and peoples... of African descent"—it is to the end of mobilizing toward the future. "In all cases," he argues, "the point of much of [Africana] philosophizings has been to confer meaningful orderings on individual and shared living and on natural and social worlds while resolving recurrent, emergent, and radically disruptive challenges to existence so as to survive, endure, and flourish across successive generations." It is striking, for all that, though, that he makes sure to insist on Africana philosophizing, the verb, rather than philosophy, the noun. For Outlaw, "the name [Africana philosophy] does not refer to a particular philosophy, philosophical system, method, or tradition" (2017). Rather, it is primarily a philosophizing, a doing. Where, then, the past and the future are invoked to give Africana philosophy its shape and contours, the doing of Africana philosophy—practices of the moment, of the present—are revealed to be its constitutive marrow.In the history of Africana philosophy few encounters clarify its present stakes as much as the bitter debate that erupted in post-independence African philosophy over whether there could be said to be an African philosophy. For the protagonists and other commentators, those debates seemed overwhelmingly to be fights about the past—specifically, over the [End Page 1] existence of African philosophy in the precolonial past. Those who came to be identified as ethnophilosophers held that worldviews of precolonial African societies constituted coherent systems of thought worthy of the name "philosophy." They were vehemently opposed by those who insisted on a universalist standpoint, led by the redoubtable Beninois Paulin Hountondji. These philosophers argued that those bent on the task of recuperating traditional worldviews were doing anthropology, not philosophy.At first glance, then, it would seem that these debates have little to tell us about the present of African philosophy. Indeed, there is overwhelming weariness among African philosophers regarding the pitched and factionalized disputations that tore through the discipline in the immediate post-independence era. And yet the view that these debates are now passé, relics and distractions from an immature era of a fledgling discipline, cannot account for their stakes; why precisely they were so rancorous, and why, even today, they occasion simmering tensions and embittered eruptions among African philosophers. Ethnophilosophers, after all, were not intent on recuperating the epistemes of traditional African societies out of sheer curiosity. Rather, they were intervening in deeply contested sociopolitical cleavages of their time.Alexis Kagame, for example, is renowned within the field of African philosophy as one of the most prominent ethnophilosophers to have emerged in the mid-twentieth century. His explication of the ontology of the Bantu, as revealed in Bantu languages, ought to be seen as all of a piece with his position as the central court historian and political theorist of the Kingdom of Rwanda. As historian Claudine Vidal (1991) established, Kagame's influential scholarship had as one of its primary goals the justification of a constitutional monarchy. Indeed, half a century after his writings, Rwandese leaders who came to power in the wake of the 1990s genocide would seize on his portrayal of precolonial Rwanda as a pastoral social formation and his testimony to the existence of a Greater Rwanda in justifying their political and... (shrink)

This book critically explores indigenous sub-Saharan African agrarian thought. Indigenous African agrarian philosophy is an uncharted and largely overlooked area of study in the burgeoning fields of African philosophy and philosophy of nature. The book shows that wherever human beings have lived, they have been preoccupied with exploring ways to ensure the sustainable management of limited resources at their disposal, to attain to their basic needs: food, shelter, and security. The book also shows that (...) agriculture and the way people relate with nature are an essential, but generally neglected, determinant of the emergence and orientation of all philosophical traditions. In traditional, pre-colonial African culture, it was difficult to separate agriculture from African relational ontology. Agriculture and the use of natural resources were at the centre of community life and influenced the social, political, economic, and spiritual worldviews of the people. In their contact with nature through agriculture, different beliefs, knowledge systems, norms, moral outlooks, cultural practices and institutions emerged and have been valorized to guide societies on how to sustainably manage the environment. As a way of life, then, agriculture was deeply connected with indigenous beliefs, values, and practices which transcended a wide range of issues related to ecological ethics, food ethics, religion, traditional medicine, political economy, social organisation, biological reproduction and species survival, indigenous knowledge, and property rights. This book will thus be a valuable resource for policy makers and researchers in diverse fields such as philosophy, geography, sociology, anthropology, and development studies. (shrink)

Thaddeus Metz, in his book “A Relational Moral Theory” compares the relational African view to Western theories of right action with a focus on Kant (respective contemporary Kantianism) and Utilitarianism. In focussing on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view, Metz questions the interpretation of basic normative assumptions that are guiding central Western moral and political institutions. He particularly focusses on Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to which he ascribes substantive moral assumptions in terms of utility respective autonomy. (...) In this paper, we reconstruct Metz’s position on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view on ethics. We then investigate whether his relational conceptualisation is a convincing reconstruction of African views and question his take on Western positions, focussing in particular on views around individual rights and communality as presented in the Kantian tradition. We highlight the value of ubuntu in intercultural discourse to foster ethical and moral reasoning in a holistic way and conclude that any reflection on ethics necessarily involves an understanding of our common human nature, which is at the core of philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

How can African philosophy of education contribute to contemporary debates in the context of complexities, dilemmas and uncertainties in African higher education? The capacity for self-reflection, self-evaluation and self-criticism enables African philosophy of higher education to examine and re-examine itself in the context of current issues in African higher education. The reflective capacity is in line with the Socratic dictum 'know thy self.' African Higher Education in the 21st Century: Epistemological, Ontological and Ethical (...) Perspectives responds to the demands for reflection and self-knowledge by drawing from ontology, epistemology and ethics in an attempt to address issues that affect African higher education as they connect with the past, present and future. (shrink)

Questions on understanding the connections between human beings and the natural environment have generally been addressed extensively. However, more effort still needs to be made to augment such research by considering how to further understand human-environment connections from ethical perspectives. In this work, I consider how the human-environment relationship might be approached differently by appealing to some underexplored relational values of existence that are salient in the African philosophy of _unhu/ubuntu_. I argue why these values of _unhu/ubuntu_ ought (...) to be relevant to environmental challenges currently facing the world. After considering some of the implications of the current environmental crisis for the environment and human beings, I will explore what environmental ethical intuitions might be drawn from the African relational ethical view based on _unhu/ubuntu_. In the end, I argue that an appeal to African ethics of _unhu/ubuntu_ ought to be taken seriously in terms of its implications for the ontological connectedness, communality, relationality, harmonious and intergenerational co-existence between different beings. Ultimately, I show how ubuntu can function as the basis for an environmental philosophy for Africa and elsewhere as I consider some of the environmental challenges facing the world. (shrink)

Philosophy premises itself on the ideals of openness and continuous self-renewal. And yet, the story of philosophy has been an endless struggle against the violence of systematic exclusion and erasure. This article deploys the principle of openness as an analytic category to reflect on the broader question of epistemic decolonisation and the imperative this imposes on the practice of philosophy. There are important ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions to the principle of openness with a bearing on the (...) enterprise and how to conceptualise its future. Whether at the global level or within a specific individual tradition, the principle of openness is about the reconfiguration of philosophy itself and restoring its richness and diversity. For the African philosopher, this entails assuming responsibility for the ongoing task of articulating ‘what philosophy is and what it can be’ within the context of Africa’s own history, its problematics, and priority questions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethnophilosophy, Comparative Philosophy, Pragmatism:Toward a Philosophy of EthnoscapesThorsten Botz-Bornstein, Associate ResearcherIn this essay I would like to reflect on the place of philosophy within a "globalized" world and reconsider its status as a phenomenon that is potentially linked to a "local" culture. Whenever we question the authority of "general" truths and we look for ways of integrating "local discourses" into the overall construction called "global (...) class='Hi'>philosophy," we come across the old idea of "ethnophilosophy." Far from suggesting ethnophilosophy as a model for the philosophy of the future, I intend to rethink certain themes of ethnophilosophy and contrast them with disciplines such as "comparative philosophy" and pragmatism. I will sketch an approach that I believe to be appropriate for the development of philosophy in times of globalization.One of the negative undertones of the term "globalization" is that it is seen as a uniformizing and flattening power that eliminates existing cultural differences. On the other hand, there is an important side effect of globalization represented by those movements acting against it, stressing the importance of "localization" or "regionalization." Ethnophilosophy, in spite of its outdated origin and its potential dangers, remains interesting as an intellectual model as long as it is not formulated in a radical fashion. When it is formulated in a radical fashion it has to face the reproach of relativism and of enclosing itself in a cultural sphere that it declares to be inaccessible to others.Ethnophilosophy: A Renaissance?Ethnophilosophy was developed in Africa in the 1960s, although its origin can be traced back to a book on Bantu philosophy by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels. In this book, published in 1946, Tempels tried to conclude with the view that primitive peoples have neither ontology nor logic and are unable to recognize the nature of being or even of reality as such. Tempels was looking for an ontology colored by "local" cultural components but also by language,1 and he made a serious attempt to build a philosophical system based on Bantu thought.What followed were endless controversies about the nature of African philosophy that made of "ethnophilosophy" a stream of thought much richer than its name might allow one to suppose. A part of its stimulating power can perhaps be traced to the ambiguity of Tempels' approach: on the one hand it could easily be dismissed as paternalism or the attempt to force African philosophy into the straightjacket of European concepts, while on the other hand the expressed desire to give "ethnic" [End Page 153] philosophy a new role within the international hierarchy of the philosophies was immensely attractive. Be that as it may, Tempels' book became the real manifest of "ethnophilosophy."Another point at issue that spurned internal ethnophilosophical discussions was the question whether African philosophy is advanced by an entire people (that is, by a collective) or by individual philosophers. This question (which does not arise in Tempels' book) was first taken up by the Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji,2 who claimed that ethnophilosophy is no philosophy at all because it remains indifferent toward individually critical, that is, typically philosophical, approaches. Related debates touch upon fundamental questions concerning the meaning of "collective thinking" or the nature of philosophy as such.3However subtle the points may be that emerge from these discussions, for the outside observer ethnophilosophy appears to be a kind of anthropology (whose premises it continues to share) with an incorporated interest in metaphysical questions. Its opposite is "conventional" Western philosophy, which persistently explores truth with the help of a single, individual mind, aiming at the crystallization of a truth relevant for everybody. What matters for ethnophilosophy is the truth brought forward by a certain way of life of a group of people that can be found on the "inside" of a culture and that can exist independently of any considerations of those things that exist on the outside. Ethnophilosophy is radical in the sense that it not only aims to reestablish, through its opposition to the all-intruding "international" philosophy, its own philosophy within the borders of a certain nation; going much further than many of today's opponents of globalization would dare to go, ethnophilosophy thinks of philosophy... (shrink)

The essence of deities has captured our imaginations for as long as we can remember. Does a God exist, or is the divine entity just a figment of our dreams, a projection? Is God what Aribiah Attoe calls a “regressively eternal and material entity” or what Gericke calls “a character of fiction with no counterpart outside the worlds of text and imagination”? This paper aims to wrestle with those questions from a theological perspective and to look at the ontological status (...) of Yahweh and how that worldview lends itself to African Traditional Religions in conversation with Attoe's method of inquiry from the perspective of African Metaphysics. This paper aims to be a part of the larger project undertaken by the author, showing that philosophy can and should be an auxiliary discipline in Old Testament Studies as it has been seen, both fields have ways of similar arguing and coming to the same conclusions. This paper is intended to be an interlocutory exercise or experiment and does not seek to validate any hypothesis about either view. (shrink)

According to the propositional view of belief, a belief situation involves a believer’s standing in the relation of belief to a proposition. It is argued that the propositional view has unacceptable implications concerning the identity conditions of belief situations involving beliefs with indexical contents, especially where such beliefs are held over a period of time during which background circumstances change. After a critical discussion of Perry’s alternative to the propositional view, a version of the adverbial theory of belief, which accounts (...) satisfactorily for the identity conditions of belief situations, is advanced. This theory, which avoids the standard objections to adverbialism, is defended against the charge that it cannot provide an account of the semantics of sentences attributing the same belief to two or more believers. In the course of this defense it is argued that the standard propositional account of such sentences is insensitive to everyday language. (shrink)

PurposeThis paper aims to demonstrate the relevance of worldviews of the global south to debates of artificial intelligence, enhancing the human rights debate on artificial intelligence (AI) and critically reviewing the paper of UNESCO Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) that preceded the drafting of the UNESCO guidelines on AI. Different value systems may lead to different choices in programming and application of AI. Programming languages may acerbate existing biases as a people’s worldview is captured in (...) its language. What are the implications for AI when seen from a collective ontology? Ubuntu (I am a person through other persons) starts from collective morals rather than individual ethics.Design/methodology/approachLiterature overview on the African philosophy of Ubuntu as applied to artificial intelligence. Application of it to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) debates on establishing guidelines to the ethics of artificial intelligence.FindingsMetaphysically, Ubuntu and its conception of social personhood (attained during one’s life) largely rejects transhumanism. When confronted with economic choices, Ubuntu favors sharing above competition and thus an anticapitalist logic of equitable distribution of AI benefits, humaneness and nonexploitation. When confronted with issues of privacy, Ubuntu emphasizes transparency to group members, rather than individual privacy, yet it calls for stronger (group privacy) protection. In democratic terms, it promotes consensus decision-making over representative democracy. Certain applications of AI may be more controversial in Africa than in other parts of the world, like care for the elderly, that deserve the utmost respect and attention, and which builds moral personhood. At the same time, AI may be helpful, as care from the home and community is encouraged from an Ubuntu perspective. The report on AI and ethics of the UNESCO World COMEST formulated principles as input, which are analyzed from the African ontological point of view. COMEST departs from “universal” concepts of individual human rights, sustainability and good governance which are not necessarily fully compatible with relatedness, including future and past generations. Next to rules based approaches, which may hamper diversity, bottom-up approaches are needed with intercultural deep learning algorithms.Research limitations/implicationsThere is very few existing literature on AI and Ubuntu. Therefore, this paper is of an explorative nature.Practical implicationsThe ethics of Ubuntu offers unique vantage points in looking at the organization of society and economics today, which are also relevant for development of AI, especially in its tenet of relatedness rather than individuality (and practical use of AI for individuals), taking responsibility for society as a whole (such as analyzing the benefit of AI for all strata of society), and embodying true inclusiveness. Whether looking at top-down guidelines for the development and implementation of AI or the bottom-up ethical learning process of AI (deep learning), ethics of the Global South can have an important role to play to combat global individualist tendencies and inequity, likely reinforced by AI. This warrants far more research.Social implicationsApplications of AI in Africa are not contextualized, do not address the most pressing needs of the African continent, lead to cybersecurity issues and also do not incorporate African ethics. UNESCO’s work in this regard is important but expert inputs are largely centered around Western “universal” principles and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and EU precedence. African ethics have, so far, a small role to play in global ethics and philosophy and therefore risk to be overlooked in the discussion on AI and ethics. This is why the consultation process of UNESCO on ethics of AI was of paramount importance. However, it does not automatically lead to consultation of African philosophers or sages, as many are educated in Western (ized) education systems. See further details under practical implications.Originality/valueThis is a new area of research in which little work has been done so far. This paper offers the opportunity to widen the debate on AI and ethics beyond the conventional discourse, involving multiple worldviews, of which Ubuntu is just one. (shrink)

This essay works to bridge conversations in philosophy of education with decolonial theory. The author considers Margonis’ ( 1999 , 2011a , b ) use of Rousseau ( 1979 ) and Heidegger ( 1962 ) in developing an ontological attitude that counters social hierarchies and promotes anti-colonial relations. While affirming this effort, the essay outlines a coloniality of being at work in Rousseau and Heidegger through thier reliance on the colonial conceptualization of African Americans and Native Americans as (...) savage and primitive. The essay turns to decolonial theory and the work of Maldenado-Torres (Cult Stud 21(2–3):240–270, 2007 , 2009 ) to highlight how a decolonial attitude complicates, yet enriches Margonis’ philosophical framework. (shrink)

The paper examines the loss of African identity within the modern/ contemporary era. African identity has been a recurrent theme in all domains of African studies, serving as a major intellectual concern of many African scholars. Debates on the reality of African Philosophy are anchored on the questions surrounding African identity giving rise to thoughts and contents of that philosophy. Despite the volumes already generated on the theme, the controversial circumstances that engendered (...) the subject of African identity makes its intellectual concern sustainable and almost inexhaustible. The question of African identity is basically an ontological question of the reality of Africa cum the being of an African. The series of infiltration and appraisals of Africa by foreign elements tend to plunge the continent into crises of identity. In addition to the various approaches to the subject, the nature-culture perspective presents the argument that if culture is ideally the product of a people’s nature, African culture represents the objective manifestation of the Africanity of the continent and its organic/holistic content. Such frame of thought embellished with philosophic tools provides further locus for a more feasible and stable definition of African identity as the holistic nature and character of being African. (shrink)

Defining the features of ubuntu in the context of African philosophy, is basically about the quest for a definitive means of culturally expressing what seems primal, unique, useful, and common to the Africans in relation to the world. Put simply, the quest to clarify the key features of ubuntu is to some extent a search for the African self-concept or identity for effective global interconnectedness of the races. This is to be done in a way that defines (...) and sustains the ontology and essence of the Africans, as a people who know who or what they are, and what they are capable of contributing to the world. A search for the values of ubuntu is the pursuit of a new way of doing things: a quest for a new definition of social justice in which all people, particularly the Africans and their beliefs will be given due recognition and respect in the global order. Legitimizing of ubuntu is in a way the repudiation of the colonial history of the African continent; the aggressive and relentless pursuit of the decolonization of all African spaces-economic, cultural, political, moral, intellectual, and so on. So, in summary, ubuntu is framed philosophically as a platform for liberating the Africans from all manners of peonage, domination, oppression, and exploitation both from within or outside the continent and establishing a basis for interrelations with the world. (shrink)

In the Western theist tradition, the conception of a person tends to be understood as an intrinsic property. Hence, the classification of someone as a person does not depend on relational aspects of that person. From this, Western theists often understand that their conception of God as a person does not clash with the idea of immutability. In this article, I challenge the idea that being a person and being immutable are compatible properties by using Afro-communitarian philosophy and, more (...) specifically Afro-communitarian metaphysics of personhood. Afro-communitarian metaphysics is fundamentally relational, i.e. it understands that most properties of the world depend on the existence of other entities. More precisely, personhood is a property that depends on the existence of relatable beings. But if this is true, then it is not possible to hold that an entity that has the property of personhood also has the property of immutability. More specifically, an entity that is a person has to change due to the fact that personhood is a relational property. This is because it is a necessary condition for being a person that one relates to others, i.e. one only becomes a person when this relation occurs. Hence, the process of becoming a person requires a moment before the relation with another and one after; thereby, the feature of being a person requires the feature of change. With respect to the Christian conception of God, what this implies is that if theist philosophers wish to understand Him as a person, they have to also accept that God is not immutable. For if other beings besides Him are not eternal, then it is only possible that He can be a person when these other beings first started existing. This is the case because the kind of relationality needed to be a person is not simply to relate to something (like emptiness), but to do something that makes Him addressable (which requires that the thing He relates to has the capacity to address Him). This means there are two moments of existence where He has distinct properties and, therefore, is mutable. (shrink)

In this accessible book, Barry Hallen discusses the major ideas, figures, and schools of thought in African philosophy. While drawing out critical issues in the formation of African philosophy, Hallen focuses on the recent scholarship, current issues, and relevant debates that have made African philosophy an important key to understanding the rich and complex cultural heritage of Africa. Hallen builds upon Africa's connections with Western philosophical traditions and explores African contributions to cultural universalism, (...) cultural relativism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and Marxism. Hallen also examines African challenges to Western conceptions of philosophy by taking on questions such as whether philosophy can exist in cultures that are significantly based in oral traditions and what may or may not constitute philosophical texts. Among the figures whose work is discussed are Ptah-hotep, Zar'a Ya'aqob, Anton Wilhelm Amo, Paulin Hountondji, V. Y. Mudimbe, Oyeronke Oyewumi, Kwame Anthony Appiah, and Kwasi Wiredu. This clearly written, highly readable, and concise work will be essential for students and scholars of African philosophy as well as readers with a wide range of interests in African studies. (shrink)

Agada’s new book has arrived at a time when contemporary African philosophers are gradually engaging one another’s work and participating actively in system-building. It is based on this “new wave” in contemporary African philosophy scholarship that I provide some critical comments over Agada’s book emConsolationism and Comparative Philosophy: Beyond Universalism and Particularism./em Whereas the originality and depth of Agada is not in doubt regarding his idea of Mood, the ultimate category of his ontology, I level (...) four objections against the metaphysical system. These shortcomings, I argue, set limits on the ontological framework that can mediate thought, theory, and practice both in Africa and beyond./p. (shrink)