Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.

The concept of observability of entities in physical science is typically analysed in terms of the nature and significance of a dichotomy between observables and unobservables. In the present work, however, this categorization is resisted and observability is analysed in a descriptive way in terms of the information which one can receive through interaction with objects in the world. The account of interaction and the transfer of information is done using applicable scientific theories. In this way, the question (...) of observability of scientific entities is put to science itself. The result is a demonstration that observability has many dimensions, some more epistemically significant than others. (shrink)

In the spirit of B. C. van Fraassen's view of science called Constructive Empiricism, we propose a scientific criterion to decide whether a concrete object is observable, as well as a coextensive scientific-philosophical definition of observability, and we sketch a rigorous account of modal language occurring in science. We claim that our account of observability solves three problems to which current accounts of observability, notably van Fraassen's own accounts, give rise. We further claim that our account of (...) modal propositions (subjunctive conditionals included), which proceeds wholly within the framework of the semantic view on scientific theories, grounds his claim that such an account is possible without relying on ‘inflationary metaphysics’, notably without postulating an infinitude of different universes besides the universe we inhabit. We thus claim to solve a fourth problem: how to give a precise nominalist account of modal language in science tailor-made for Constructive Empiricism. Introduction: Rough Guides The semantic view and the wave theory of light A scientific guide and a scientific criterion A New Rough Guide and a definition The Context Problem and Psillos' Problem Musgrave's Problem Modality without inflationary metaphysics Exitum. (shrink)

I provide a fairly systematic analysis of when quantities that are variant under a dynamical symmetry transformation should be regarded as unobservable, or redundant, or unreal; of when models related by a dynamical symmetry transformation represent the same state of affairs; and of when mathematical structure that is variant under a dynamical symmetry transformation should be regarded as surplus. In most of these cases the answer is `it depends': depends, that is, on the details of the symmetry in question. A (...) central feature of the analysis is that in order to draw any of these conclusions for a dynamical symmetry it needs to be understood in terms of its possible extensions to other physical systems, in particular to measurement devices. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, contrary to the constructive empiricist’s position, observability is not an adequate criterion as a guide to ontological commitment in science. My argument has two parts. First, I argue that the constructive empiricist’s choice of observability as a criterion for ontological commitment is based on the assumption that belief in the existence of unobservable entities is unreasonable because belief in the existence of an entity can only be vindicated by its observation. Second, I (...) argue that the kind of ontological commitment that is under consideration when accepting a scientific theory is commitment to what I call theoretical kinds and that observation can vindicate commitment to kinds only in exceptional cases. (shrink)

The atomistic paradigm of high energy physics cannot anymore be dismissed because the proposed elementary particles are too many or because it is not possible to observe quarks in an isolated manner. The developments in particle physics have brought about radical changes to our notions of simplicity and observability, and in this paper we elaborate on these changes. It is as a result of these changes that the present situation in elementary particle physics justifies our claim that we have (...) indeed reached a level of explanation where the constituent particles used for the explanation of the various phenomena considered to be delineating a particular level in the descriptive framework of the physical phenomena and a specific stratum in the organization of nature, can be regarded as elementary. (shrink)

,d simple example is used to analyze the issue ofimperfcsct obseruabilitt of commitmerit and to highlight the follotving phenor»enon: u'hen a player h«s tlie option of taking — at a cost — a (potentiality' deterring action, she is less lil.ely to do so cigainst an opponent rgho is aware of' tlie aoailabilitt' of tliis opticrn thaii against an opponent it her is not..

Some epistemological and methodological problems associated with the principle of observability are discussed, especially in relation to this principle's heuristic role and its objective basis and in relation to the philosophical doctrine of Mach.

Fundamental experiments on the dual nature of atomic entities (photons, electrons, neutrons, etc.) can be interpreted in terms of “empty” waves not carrying energy and momentum. Similar points of view were advanced in famous papers by Einstein, de Broglie, Bohr, and Born. Recent proposals could lead to experimental tests of this idea, using low intensity photon beams, thanks to modern experimental apparatuses.

A macroscopic experiment capable of detecting a signature of spinorial sign changes is discussed. If realized, it would determine whether Bell inequalities are satisfied for a manifestly local, classical system. By providing an explicitly local-realistic derivation of the EPR-Bohm type spin correlations, it is demonstrated why Bell inequalities must be violated even in such a manifestly local, macroscopic domain, just as strongly as they are in the microscopic domain. The proposed experiment has the potential to transform our understanding of the (...) relationship between classical and quantum physics. (shrink)

The paper introduces a new model of telepresence. First, it criticises the standard model of presence as epistemic failure, showing it to be inadequate. It then replaces it with a new model of presence as successful observability. It further provides reasons to distinguish between two types of presence, backward and forward. The new model is then tested against two ethical issues whose nature has been modified by the development of digital information and communication technologies, namely pornography and privacy, and (...) shown to be effective. (shrink)

I develop a concept of observability that pertains to qualities rather than objects: a quality is observable if it can be registered by human sensation (possibly with the aid of instruments) without involving optional interpretations. This concept supports a better description of observations in science and everyday life than the object-based observability concepts presupposing causal information-transfer from the object to the observer. It also allows a rehabilitation of the traditional empiricist distinction between observations and their interpretations, but without (...) a presumption that observations are infallible. Using this concept of observability, I also propose a re-formulation of constructive empiricism that is easier to defend against realist attacks, while open to reasonable realist intuitions. (shrink)

The subject of this study, the step forward—which the author felt to be ‘of evolutionary value’—was occasioned by a Delphi discussion. The debate was opened by Varga's (2003, 2006a) contrastive exposition of diagnoses of present history with respect to Hungary's accession to the European Union, offered by some leading Hungarian sociologists (Henrik Kreutz, Kálmán Kulcsár, Iván Szelényi, Iván Vitányi), in which he tried to place the views of these authors in a value sociological system by Charles Morris (1956, 1964) and (...) Geert Hofstede (1991). In Morris’ case, this involved recourse to his combination of two systems: one semiotic, the other axiological; in Hofstede's, to his system of ‘software of the mind’ embracing axiology and organizational psychology. This synthesis was opposed by Kreutz (2006a) who offered a new ordering principle which he advanced as truer to life. The present confrontation between the value sociological synthesis advanced by Kreutz, on the one hand, and the trends hallmarked by the names of Morris and Hofstede, on the other hand, provided the author with an opportunity to find a resolution of the tension between desired and desirable, for which he has gained some side light from Robert K. Merton's (1957) theory of the different degrees of insulation of role–activities from observability by members of the role–set (and which has derived further refinement from Jean–Paul Sartre's conception of ‘glance and shame’). (shrink)

There is a natural objection to the epistemic coherence of Bas van Fraassen’s use of a distinction between the observable and unobservable in his constructive empiricism, an objection that has been raised with particular clarity by Alan Musgrave. We outline Musgrave’s objection, and then consider how one might interpret and evaluate van Fraassen’s response. According to the constructive empiricist, observability for us is measured with respect to the epistemic limits of human beings qua measuring devices, limitations ‘which will be (...) described in detail in the final physics and biology’ (van Fraassen 1980: 17). In order for the constructive empiricist to determine what counts as observable, he will have to appeal to our best scientific theories of light, human physiology, and so forth. To put the same point in a slightly more abstract way, in order to draw a distinction between observable and unobservable entities, the constructive empiricist needs to use his best scientific theory of observability – call it T* – to tell him the identity of the observable entities. This raises an interesting difficulty. Constructive empiricism is the view that ‘science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate’ (van Fraassen 1980:12). When he accepts a theory, the constructive empiricist only believes the statements of his scientific theories that are about observable entities. Thus, in order to know which statements of a scientific theory to believe, the constructive empiricist needs to know which statements of that theory are about observable entities. In particular then, the constructive empiricist only believes the statements of his theory of observability T* that are about observable entities. Therefore, in order to know which statements of T* he can believe, the constructive empiricist needs to know which statements of T* are about observable entities. However, it is T* that tells the constructive empiricist what counts as an observable entity: the constructive empiricist therefore needs to use T* to tell him which statements of T* he can believe. The fact that the distinction drawn by T* must also apply to itself is not an immediate cause for alarm.. (shrink)

A central point of controversy in the time of the Copernican Revolution was the motion, or not, of the earth. We now take it for granted that Copernicus and Galileo were right; the earth really does move. But to what extent is this conclusion based on observation? This paper explores the meaning and observability of the rotation of the earth and shows that the phenomenon was not observable at the time of Galileo, and it is not observable now.

This note establishes a new identification result for additive random utility discrete choice models. A decision-maker associates a random utility Uj+mj\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$U_{j}+m_{j}$$\end{document} to each alternative in a finite set j∈1,…,J\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$j\in \left\{ 1,\ldots,J\right\}$$\end{document}, where U=U1,…,UJ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {U}=\left\{ U_{1},\ldots,U_{J}\right\}$$\end{document} is unobserved by the researcher and random with an unknown joint distribution, while the perturbation m=m1,…,mJ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} (...) \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {m}=\left $$\end{document} is observed. The decision-maker chooses the alternative that yields the maximum random utility, which leads to a choice probability system m→Pr1|m,…,PrJ|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf { m\rightarrow }\left,\ldots,\Pr \left \right) $$\end{document}. Previous research has shown that the choice probability system is identified from the observation of the relationship m→Pr1|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ \mathbf {m}\rightarrow \Pr \left $$\end{document}. We show that the complete choice probability system is identified from observation of a relationship m→∑j=1sPrj|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {m}\rightarrow \sum _{j=1}^{s}\Pr \left $$\end{document}, for any sshrink)

This study explores questions posed by students in response to live video broadcasts of dental treatments. The aim of the study is to show and discuss the reflexive relationship between the questions, what they were occasioned by and how they are responded to. Procedures and anatomical features, that for the seminar leader are unproblematically seen in endodontic terms, repeatedly present problems for the students. Visible but unrecognized shifts in the dentist’s work, for instance, provide occasions for questions of the form (...) ‘What is he doing now?’. In the midst of an ongoing procedure, questions tend to be formulated as noticings that elicit instruction either about some detail of the dentist’s actions or about what a generic ‘one should’ or ‘should not do’, what ‘frequently’ happens and so on. It is shown, however, that the movement between specific here-and-now features on the one hand and more general issues on the other characterizes the entire scope of the relevant material, particularly because the seminar leaders’ answers tend to place even minute details within more general endodontic considerations. (shrink)

Alan Musgrave, Michael Friedman, Jeffrey Foss, and Richard Creath raised different objections against the Distinction between observables and unobservables when drawn within the confines of Bas C. van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism, to the effect that the Distinction cannot be drawn there coherently. Van Fraassen has only responded to Musgrave but Musgrave claimed not to understand van Fraassen's succinct response. I argue that van Fraassen's response is not enough. What remains in the end is an unsolved problem which CE cannot afford (...) to leave unsolved, or so I argue; I then strengthen Musgrave's criticism and indicate that an extension of the epistemic policy of CE is mandatory to solve the problem. I also argue that Friedman's and Foss' objection against the Distinction in CE misses the mark on closer inspection. An objection due to Creath does hit the mark but can be taken care of without too much ado. All these objections seem alive and kicking until the present day; I try to put them all to rest. (shrink)

In this journal, Peter Lipton and I discussed Musgrave's objection that the constructive empiricist cannot consistently maintain his own distinction between the observable and the unobservable, and van Fraassen's initial reply. We considered several possible interpretations of van Fraassen, and expressed misgivings about each. Muller and van Fraassen have consequently clarified the official constructive empiricist response to Musgrave, although some issues still remain.According to Muller and van Fraassen, Musgrave's objection assumes that constructive empiricism is to be understood in line with (...) a syntactic account of our scientific theories – whereby a theory consists of a set of sentences formulated in some suitable language – whereas constructive empiricism has always been wedded to an explicitly semantic account of our scientific theories, which understands a scientific theory in terms of a class of models. Once this oversight is amended, the objection is seen to be toothless. As Muller and van Fraassen write: " Indeed, the only proper response, and the one that turns the table on Musgrave and his followers, is to argue that his incoherence argument does not work in the context of the semantic view as here elaborated, while the bad consequence he draws is an inevitable corollary to the older view within which he presents it. "The force of Musgrave's objection therefore turns on nothing more than implicitly saddling the constructive empiricist with an independently problematic account of what a scientific theory is.This move should cause some surprise however, for Musgrave's objection – albeit usually presented in conjunction with an explicitly syntactic construal of our scientific theories – is in fact quite neutral between these competing accounts. As Musgrave originally put it, in order for the constructive empiricist to draw his distinction between observable and unobservable …. (shrink)

There is perhaps no more succinct a way of describing the controversy between scientific realists and antirealists than to say that it turns on the reality of the unobservable. Less concisely, it turns on whether we have reason to think that scientific theories tell us the truth (or something close to it) about some of the underlying, unobservable bits of a mind-independent, external reality, among other things. Claims to knowledge of such a reality have traditionally been a bone of contention (...) between realists and empiricists. Two decades ago, this ongoing debate was inflamed by the introduction of Bas van Fraassen’s particular brand of empiricism. Wholesale idealists and phenomenalists have been increasingly marginalized. The reality of the observable is now generally taken for granted by most parties to the debate. The epistemic status of the unobservable, however, remains controversial. (shrink)

Observation is described as that which is informationally linked to the observed with the help of its being characterized both internally and externally. The external characterization refers to what perception really is (exemplified by seeing) in the manner semantic externalism treats natural kinds. Observable predicates are treated as reducible to appearance behaviour thus characterized. Referring to this way of semantical reduction distinguishes cultures of knowledge from cultures which acknowledge linguistic utterances as truthmakers. Introductory Remarks Theories of the sciences have mainly (...) dealt with how observation confirms or disconfirms a hypothesis. The question why observation matters at all has hardly been dealt with. Instead of giving empirical evidence one could consider looking for evidence in books. Indeed, we use books in order to gain knowledge but in the sciences this is commonly justified for the reason that scientific books refer to formerly published empirical data utilized in current theories—because of their reference to observation. Imagine a text contains only true statements. Why not consider referring to it in order to decide upon the truth of a hypothesis? It does not matter whether I know for certain that its statements are true. Our concern is what I am justified to infer from the text, presupposing that its statements are true. A striking peculiarity is that in the sciences I am not justified to infer anything from it, even if the text leads me to true conclusions only. Obviously, the evidence I am finally allowed to rely on in the sciences is not a linguistic utterance be it a spoken or a written one. It seems that linguistic utterances do not count as reasonable truthmakers in the sciences as some utterances do in religion. (Quotes from the Bible or the Koran are examples.) It has traditionally been presupposed rather than justified that observation is basic in the sciences. To stress the role of observation seems trivial. How is observation related to scientific statements? (shrink)

Au cours du dernier siècle, l'investigation empirique a été bouleversée par le développement de nouveaux instruments et par la possibilité de traiter numériquement les données. Cet ouvrage entreprend d'adapter la notion classique d'observation scientifique à ces nouvelles pratiques.

This paper argues that new light may be shed on mathematical reasoning in its non-pathological forms by careful observation of its pathologies. The first section explores the application to mathematics of recent work on fallacy theory, specifically the concept of an ‘argumentation scheme’: a characteristic pattern under which many similar inferential steps may be subsumed. Fallacies may then be understood as argumentation schemes used inappropriately. The next section demonstrates how some specific mathematical fallacies may be characterized in terms of argumentation (...) schemes. The third section considers the phenomenon of correct answers which result from incorrect methods. This turns out to pose some deep questions concerning the nature of mathematical knowledge. In particular, it is argued that a satisfactory epistemology for mathematical practice must address the role of luck. (shrink)

In science, it sometimes occurs that an event is directly observed, and on other occasions that it is not directly observed but one can make the unambiguous inference that it has occurred. Is there any difference concerning the analysis of data arising from these two situations? In this note we show that there is such a difference in one case arising frequently in genetics. The difference derives from the fact that the ability to make the unambiguous inference arises only from (...) a restricted form of data. (shrink)

Summary In several places Popper describes a little experiment in which an audience is given the non-specific command ‚Observe!‘ He draws a number of conclusions from this experiment, in particular that observation takes place in the presence of theoretical problems, questions, hypotheses or points of view. The paper argues that while Popper's experiment is instructive, it hardly supports the strong conclusions he draws about the theory-dominance of observation in science. In particular, it is argued that talk of principles of selection (...) which guide us to relevant observations, rather than the host of irrelevant observations of the naive inductivist, is misleading. Rather, it is the goals, aims, motives or interests of an observer that guide observation and these need not always involve a theoretical component. (shrink)

This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation (...) as the foundation of scientific objectivity with the contemporary recognition that observation is theory-dependent. (shrink)

We hear that a glass of red wine prolongs life, that alcohol is a carcinogen, that pregnant women should drink not a drop of alcohol. Major medical journals first claimed that hormone replacement therapy reduces the risk of heart disease, then reversed themselves and said it increases the risk of heart disease. What are the effects caused by consuming alcohol or by receiving hormone replacement therapy? These are causal questions, questions about the effects caused by treatments, policies or preventable exposures. (...) Some causal questions can be studied in randomized trials, in which a coin is flipped to decide the treatment for the next experimental subject. Because randomized trials are not always practical, nor always ethical, many causal questions are investigated in non-randomized observational studies. The reversal of opinion about hormone replacement therapy occurred when a randomized clinical trial contradicted a series of earlier observational studies. Using minimal mathematics - high school algebra and coin flips -- and numerous examples, Observation and Experiment explains the key concepts and methods of causal inference. Examples of randomized experiments and observational studies are drawn from clinical medicine, economics, public health and epidemiology, clinical psychology and psychiatry. (shrink)

From Observables to Unobservables in Science and Philosophy focuses on knowing unobservable real things or attributes by means of observing real things or attributes, a topic central to twentieth-century scientific philosophy. Engaging both current and perennial issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of nature and of science, Connell writes from a realist perspective. He adds a cogent, well written, and much needed voice to the current debate over foundationalism from the perspective of the undersubscribed quarter of empirical realism. Principal audiences for (...) this volume will be scholars and graduate students in philosophy, working in the Aristotelian tradition. (shrink)

Using examples of observations of primates in the wild, I will focus in this chapter on the ways in which some of the main feminist critiques are applicable to the observation of non-human animals. In particular, I will focus on the relationship between primatology and various conceptions of human nature and on the fact that primatology has often been described as a “feminist science.” I argue that in primatology there is an openness to a diversity of approaches and to feminist (...) values that has made it possible for researchers to understand primates in new, more complex ways. Finally, I include a brief discussion of an avenue of future research that will show that even the feminist perspectives explored in this chapter are situated within a specific western background and that it is important to remember that this feminist perspective is just one among many different perspectives. To illustrate variations in the roles that feminist critiques can play in animal observation, I will use examples from my own personal experience of Latinx identity while conducting research in Gombe National Park (Tanzania, Africa). (shrink)

Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Dialectic of Reason Observing Nature Observing the Nature of the Self References Further Reading.