t. 1. Monologion ; Proslogion -- t. 2. Le grammairien ; De la vérité ; La liberté du choix ; La chute du diable -- t. 3. Lettre sur l'incarnation du Verbe ; Pourquoi un Dieu-homme -- t. 4. La conception virginale et le péché originel ; La procession du Saint Esprit ; Lettres sur les sacrements de l'Église ; Du pouvoir et de l'impuissance -- t. 5. Sur l'accord de la prescience, de la prédestination et de la grâce (...) de Dieu avec le libre choix ; Prières et méditations -- t. 6. Lettres 1 à 147 -- t. 9. Histoire des temps nouveaux en Angleterre. Livres I-IV ; Vie de Saint Anselme. (shrink)

In the first two chapters of the Monologion Anselm shows, or tries to show that “Of all the things that exist, there is one that is the best, greatest and supreme.” In this paper I examine his argument.

This paper argues that Monologion and Proslogion though distinguishable are not really separable. They are distinct as "the way in" and "the way when one is in" but "the way in" reveals itself as a discovery of already being in; thus these ways are distinct in act, but not in being. Monologion moves from imaginary ignorance to real reverence, while Proslogion begins within reverence to achieve understanding.

Williams's translations are scrupulously faithful and accurate without being slavishly literal, and yet are lively and graceful.--Paul Vincent Spade, Indiana University.

One large exception to this generalisation is John Scottus Eriugena, who wrote original philosophical works, and also produced some translations of philosophical works. "Eriugena" is his rendering into Greek of "Scottus", which at that time meant Irish: John the Irishman. He was born in Ireland about AD 810, lived and wrote in France from about 840; he was one of the Irish and English clergy attracted to France by the Carolingian renaissance. He mastered Greek; knowledge of Greek was rare in (...) western Europe before the Renaissance of the fourteenth century, but at most times during the middle ages there were some Latin-speaking Europeans who also knew Greek. He translated from Greek into Latin the works of Dionysios the Areopagite: the Mystical Theology , the Divine Names and the Celestial Hierarchy. Dionysios the Areopagite is mentioned in the bible, in Acts 17:34; he was one of the few converts Paul made when he visited Athens. In France it was believed that this Dionysios had travelled to Gaul to preach Christianity, and that he had founded the Abbey of St. Denys in Paris. His writings were held in great respect. Unfortunately they are not authentic. Modern scholars refer to their author as pseudo-Dionysios ("pseudo" meaning "false"), or as Dionysios the pseudo-Areopagite: perhaps his name was Dionysios, but he was not the "Areopagite" mentioned in the bible. His writings are a Christianised version of Proclus and are therefore yet another channel of neo-Platonic influence on medieval Latin thought. John's own philosophical writings, which are also in the neo-Platonic style, did not have much influence on later medieval thinkers. For an account of them see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. (shrink)

The opening chapters of Anselm's Monologion contain a ‘proof’ of a perfect being, which has received far less attention than the more famous Proslogion proof, and the ontological arguments derived from it. I wish to rectify this by developing an argument in defence of a crucial premise of the Monologion proof. This premise states that ‘the Good’, i.e. that in virtue of which numerically distinct things may all be good, must itself be a supremely good thing. I motivate (...) the argument before considering objections to both premises, as well as putative ‘parodies’ of my argument. Part of the motivation of my argument will involve the claim that the Good, if it is good at all, must be a paradigm good thing. I conclude that theists have a second kind of ontological argument at their disposal. (shrink)

The four theistic proofs of Monologion are based on the categories of being per se and being per aliud. This article analyses them through a comparative approach. The categories of per se and per aliud are compared with the categories of substance (ti) and function (yong) as touched on the first chapter of the Rectifying Ignorance (正蒙 Zhengmeng) of Zhang Zai (1020–1077), an exponent of neo-Confucianism. In fact, the two pairs of categories explain the relationship between an absolute, the (...) supreme nature (summum) or the Great Void (太虚 taixu) and the sensible world. Through the comparison, this article highlights the fundamental function of being per aliud in the rational knowledge of the supreme nature that exists per se and provides new insights into the process of derivation of being per aliud from the being per se.Contribution: This article, through the comparison with the Chinese philosophical tradition, intends to offer a new perspective on the understanding of the Anselmian categories of being per se and being per aliud. (shrink)

For Saint Anselm, the mystery of the Holy Trinity was not merely an object of intellectual speculation but, more importantly, the object of praise and worship. Even though he claims that there is nothing in his treatise that violates the teachings of the Fathers, especially that of Augustine, Anselm explores in Monologion the doctrine of the Trinity in his own unique style. One very interesting discussion that does not appear in Augustine’s De Trinitate or in any of the Augustinian (...) corpus is found in chapter 42, in which Anselm argues for the propriety of naming the Supreme Spirit “Father” and His Word “Son.” This paper examines this chapter, first, in the context of the four immediately preceding chapters and, second, in the context of those writings of Augustine that might have influenced Anselm in his presentation. The paper then offers reasons why Anselm included this unique chapter in his discussion on the Trinity. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate the role emotions play in the reflexive process of the rational knowledge of God in Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion. Special attention has been paid to the Proslogion, containing the renowned “unum argumentum”, which itself was commonly understood as a special form of Anselm’s methodology of the “sola ratione” for the knowledge of God. It could be seen as a significant argument against the emotions as affective expression of the soul, disqualifying the relevance (...) of the “affectus”. Introduced in the Monologion, the emotion is there a basic concept in the argument for the knowledge of God, and it assumes its full shape in the Proslogion. The aim of my contribution is to give an insight in the cognitive attitude, in respect to “affectus” as a “leading power” of the soul, as it unites with “ratio” and “fides” for the knowledge of God as a whole in the Proslogion. (shrink)

In this paper, I intend to demonstrate that in the Monologion Saint Anselm affirms the priority of the via negativa over the via positiva.More precisely, I shall argue that in that text Anselm defends a distinctive thesis with three components. There is, to begin with,a semantic component, according to which, all of our words for God—including those purporting to tell us what God is—fall utterlyshort of their mark. A consequence of this is that none of our speech is capable (...) of describing the reality that is God. There is, inaddition, an epistemic component according to which there is no way for us to understand what God is; we can only know what Godis not. In consequence, we have no way of directly grasping God or of comprehending God’s being. Finally there is a metaphysicalcomponent according to which what God is in himself is an infinite and ineffable mystery. A consequence of this would be that Godturns out to have nothing at all in common with his creatures. (shrink)

Anselmo escribió su primer libro, el Monologion, forzado por los hermanos de su monasterio. El método también le fue impuesto: no decir nada desde la autoridad de la Escritura, profundizar todo desde la sola razón y, al mismo tiempo, presentar todo con claridad. El artículo estudia las tres partes del método. Se ve la importancia de los razonamientos dentro del peligro de no citar la Escritura, sobre todo en tiempo en que la dialéctica entusiasmaba a los jóvenes inexpertos. Las (...) razones necesarias son una marca indeleble del método anselmiano. La claridad de la verdad pone en marcha la búsqueda de una presentación clara de la doctrina cristiana y, al mismo tiempo, el drama del cristiano que no puede expresar totalmente esta verdad en palabras humanas porque la verdad nos sobrepasa. Además, la Verdad es Dios mismo, inefable. Este método y su estudio nos ayudan a entrar en el pensamiento anselmiano, especialmente en el Monologion. Nos introducen también en el método teológico actual. Por algo, Anselmo es el Padre de la escolástica. Anselm wrote his first book, the Monologion, forced by the brothers of his monastery. The method also was imposed: to say nothing from the authority of Scripture, to deep everything from reason alone and, at the same time, to present everything clearly. This article examines the three parts of the method. We see the importance of reasoning despite the danger of not quote the Scripture, especially in times when the dialectic excited young inexperienced. The reasons needed are an indelible mark of Anselm’s method. The clarity of truth starts the search for a clear presentation of Christian doctrine and at the same time, the drama of the Christian that cannot fully express this truth in human words because the truth is beyond us. In addition, Truth is God himself, ineffable. This method and its study help us to enter the Anselm's thought, especially in the Monologion. We also introduce in the current theological method. We all know that Anselm is the Father of scholasticism. (shrink)

In this paper, Anselm’s argument for the uniqueness of God or, more precisely, something through which everything that exists has its being is reconstructed. A first reading of the argument leads to a preliminary reconstruens with one major weakness, namely the incompleteness of a central case distinction. In the successful attempt to construct a more tenable reconstruens some additional premises which are deeply rooted in an Anselmian metaphysics are identified. Anselm’s argument seems to depend on premises such as that if (...) two things have the same nature, then there is one common thing from which they have this nature and in virtue of which they exist. Furthermore it appears that infinite regresses are excluded by the premise that if everything that exists is through something, then there is something through which it is “most truly”. (shrink)

Among those who pay homage to Parmenides as a source of unquenchable inspiration for Western thought, we now revisit the Poem Of Nature as the birthplace of the principle of causality through the elimination of non-being at the origin of being. Indeed in Parmenides’ Poem, a negative conviction can be found—the refusal that the non-being is at the origin of the being—which leads most philosophers to the affirmative conviction that something is at the origin of the being. The two convictions (...) are two rational beliefs which have stimulated ancient Greek philosophy, and have continuously represented a structuring axis in the history of Western thought. With Aristotle, that affirmative conviction was converted into a principle of causality, that is, into a principle which requires a causal explanation for the intelligibility of reality. In Latin Middle Ages, we find a singular figure who promotes the synthesis of the two fundamental beliefs, the negative conviction, explicit in Parmenides, and the affirmative conviction, explicit in Aristotle: It is Saint Anselm. In an initial chapter of his first work, the Monologion, Anselm declares that “nothing is by nothing”, and that consequently “all that is, is not but by something”. All of Anselm’s metaphysics is an analysis and a development of this affirmative rational belief. Therefore, we claim Parmenides’ paternity of Saint Anselm’s metaphysics, of whom one may say he was the medieval Parmenides. (shrink)

The Monologion (Latin: Monologium, "Monologue"), originally entitled A Monologue on the Reason for Faith (Monoloquium de Ratione Fidei) and sometimes also known as An Example of Meditation on the Reason for Faith (Exemplum Meditandi de Ratione Fidei), was written in 1075 and 1076.The Proslogion (Latin: Proslogium, "Discourse"), originally entitled Faith Seeking Understanding (Fides Quaerens Intellectum) and then An Address on God's Existence (Alloquium de Dei Existentia), was written over the next two years (1077-1078).

v. 1. Monologion. Proslogion. Debate with Gaunilo. Meditation on human redemption.

The reason of faith -- Thought and language -- Truth -- The Monologion arguments for the existence of God -- The Proslogion argument for the existence of God -- The divine attributes -- Thinking and speaking about God -- Creation and the word -- The Trinity -- Modality -- Freedom -- Morality -- Incarnation and atonement -- Original sin, grace, and salvation.

Dewi Phillips was an insightful practitioner of a philosophical method of cultural phenomenology focused upon word and deed. His interests and outlook also brought him close to the concerns of some post-Kantian theologians, such as Schleiermacher. The present essay observes a link between their treatments of the nature and significance of the idea of immortality. It then explores something of Phillips' positions as developed in Death and Immortality, acknowledging the importance, which he emphasises, of the spiritual meaning of these ideas. (...) On the other hand, it argues that his rejection of metaphysical aspects and underpinnings to these ideas is misplaced, in part because it leads not only to overlooking certain possibilities, but also because it fails to capture the complexity of actual religious claims concerning these matters advanced in Judaeo-Christian scripture and related literature. The essay ends by setting out an argument from Anselm's Monologion concerning the immortality of the soul in relation to loving and being loved by God. It is pointed out that since loving is an intentional attitude, one might love God while not knowing that God was the object of one's affection. (shrink)

Throughout Anselm’s writings one can trace what seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in his treatment of reason (ratio), understanding (intelligere) andthought (cogitare). The Monologion begins by proposing that even an unbeliever can convince himself of truths about God, “simply by reason alone,” while in theProslogion Anselm claims, to the contrary, “I believe so that I may understand.” Much of this confusion can be resolved by clarifying Anselm’s distinctions betweenreason, understanding and thought. Thought follows reason, but reason can surpass (...) understanding; one need not understand a conclusion reached through reason. Ultimately, one must understand what God is—‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought’—in order to prove through reason that one cannot think of God as non-existent, but the deeper understanding that God exists must come, not from reason, but through God’s illumination of one’s soul. (shrink)

A good place to start in assessing a theory of truth is to ask whether the theory under discussion is consistent with Aristotle’s commonsensical definition of truth from Metaphysics 4: “What is false says of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it is; and what is true says of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it is not.”1 Philosophers of a realist bent will be delighted (...) to see that Anselm unambiguously adopts the Aristotelian commonplace. A statement is true, he says, “when it signifies that what‐is is.”2 But the theory of truth that Anselm builds on this observation is one that would surely have confounded Aristotle. For no matter what the topic, Anselm’s thinking always eagerly returns to God; and the unchallenged centrality of God in Anselm’s philosophical explorations is nowhere more in evidence than in his account of truth. Indeed, we see in the student’s opening question in De veritate that the entire discussion has God as its origin and its aim: “Since we believe that God is truth, and we say that truth is in many other things, I would like to know whether, wherever truth is said to be, we must acknowledge that God is that truth.”3 The student then reminds Anselm that in the Monologion he had argued from the truth of statements to an eternal Supreme Truth. Does this not commit Anselm (the student seems to be asking) to holding that God himself is somehow the truth of true statements? But what definition of truth could make sense of such an odd claim? Anselm is happy to take up the challenge of showing that his description of God as “Supreme Truth” is no mere metaphor, but the expression of the deepest insight into the nature of truth. An account of truth is just theology under a different name. This first distinctive characteristic of Anselm’s theory, the centrality of God as Supreme Truth, helps account for a second distinctive characteristic: its strong insistence on the unity of truth. All truth either is God or somehow reflects God; thus, one simple being provides the.... (shrink)

An important issue raised and resolved in St. Anselm’s Proslogion is the compatibility between justice and mercy as divine attributes. In this paper I argue (1) that Anselm’s discussion of divine justice and mercy is an exploration of God’s nature as quo maius cogitari non potest, and (2) that his discussion contributes to a better understanding of the complicated relationship between God and creatures—including the creatures attempting to know or argue about God. It seems at first that God’s mercy must (...) be in contradiction with God’s justice. On the basis of a more adequate way of framing the issue, however—one that requires reference to other parts of the Proslogion and is supported by the Monologion—we can grasp, though not fully comprehend, the harmony between divine justice and divine mercy. (shrink)

Nella prima parte del saggio l'A. esamina gli argomenti del Monologion sulla verità e il modo in cui si collegano allo studio ontologico della summa natura. Nella seconda parte passa all'analisi della teoria anselmiana della verità esposta nel De veritate, dove si definisce il significato della verità nel linguaggio , nelle azioni e nell'essenza delle cose. Nell'ultima parte si approfondisce il senso della convergenza dei tre approcci alla verità, si valuta la definizione di verità come giustizia percepibile dalla mente (...) e il rapporto fra suprema verità eterna e la verità degli esseri creati. (shrink)

In the first two chapters of the Monologion Anselm shows, or tries to show that “Of all the things that exist, there is one that is the best, greatest and supreme.” In this paper I examine his argument.

De concordia, el último tratado escrito por Anselmo constituye un hito privilegiado en la ontogénesis de su pensamiento. Intentaré delinear en De concordia aquellos aspectos de su macroestructura que juzgo importantes y que pertenecen a ese proceso genético: a) la obra se inscribe —junto con Monologion y Cur deus homo— en la ontogénesis del pensamiento anselmiano en tanto pensamiento especulativo; b) este carácter especulativo está asociado íntimamente al lenguaje a través de la noción nihil; c) la articulación entre libertad (...) y necesidad cuanto el desdoblamiento del centro de DC, son subsidiarios del antedicho carácter especulativo. (shrink)

This essay intends to contribute to the history of the ideas of omnipresence and infinity as two related attributes of God in the theology of the Latin Church Fathers and in the philosophical and theological thinking of the early Middle Ages. The classical Christian doctrine of the infinite presence of God was developed within the early Latin context by Hilarius of Poitiers and foremost by Augustine, who set forth the unique omnipresence of God through the formula that God is «wholly (...) everywhere in himself». Gregory the Great expanded upon this formula and passed it on to the early Middle Ages. Boethius comprehended the omnipresence of God primarily as his omniscience and defined his timeless presence - his eternity - as the simultaneously entire and perfect possession of unlimited life. While Eriugena's comprehension of the omnipresence of God is mostly rooted in Maximus Confessor's doctrine of God's omnipresence, his teaching of the essential infinity of God is quite original. The clearly most important contribution to the history of the omnipresence and infinity of God in the early Middle Ages was made by Anselm of Canterbury in chapters 20-24 of his Monologion, in chapters 13,18 and 19 of his Proslogion and in his famous reply to Gaunilo. (shrink)

El presente artículo interpreta la regla propuesta por san Anselmo en el c. 15 del Monologion, siguiendo la distinción aviceniana entre ens y res. Su distinción y coincidencia ayuda a explicar la diferencia entre el ser entendido como ámbito y el ser en sentido real, como “algo”. Se concluye que la “regula Anselmi” establecería los parámetros para una atribución trascendental de las perfecciones de las criaturas a la esencia divina, en la medida en que su perfección intrínseca es tal, (...) que pueden ser predicadas del ser necesario y de los seres posibles. (shrink)

Some commentators have worried that Descartes‘s ontological proof is a kind ofafterthought, redundancy, or even embarrassment. Descartes has everythingneeded to establish God as the ground of certainty by Meditation Three, so whybother with yet another proof in Meditation Five? Some have even gone so far asto doubt his sincerity.1Past literature on this topic is of daunting variety andmagnitude, dating back to the seventeenth century.2The current discussion hasfocused on Descartes‘s premises in relation to the coherence of his concept ofGod.3I wish to (...) take up this issue from a somewhat different tack, showing that Descartes‘s ontological proof actually involves a subtle change in the direction ofhis argument from a reflective to a recollective theory of innateness. In the FifthMeditation, Descartes does not simply expand on his previous discussion of God,which arose out of reflection on his self; rather, the ontological proof depends ona kind of recollection of God‘s being that could only be based on the causalpositivity, or ―power,‖ of His existence. God is the structural cause of our idea ofhim and thereby restricts the way in which we may think of Him, in the sameway as the essence of a triangle structurally determines the ways we must thinkof it.4We are not free to construct such ideas in any way we want, so there mustbe a cause, or a reason, that restricts such construction.The specific argument of Meditation Five, however, must be understoodin its larger context, for part of the structurally determined idea of God containsnecessary existence, which Descartes interprets in terms of causal power. In theprocess of explaining this causal power, first to Caterus and, later to Arnauld,Descartes develops a way of interpreting God‘s causal relationship to himself, interms of a scholastic distinction between God as causa sui and ens a se, whichpreserves the universality of the causal principle and allows us to understand whyGod can be considered as the formal cause of His own being—the self-groundingground of all existence—an idea of subsequent importance to Malebranche andSpinoza, among others. Understanding this position on God and cause allows usto see a complementarity between Mediations III and V that has previously beenoverlooked.5While the principle of eminent causality found in Meditation Threeis central to the structural causation argument of Meditation Five, it is God‘spower, the positivity of His causal relationship to himself, that allows theargument from his effects to his existence in the first place.The dualistic structure to Descartes‘s arguments for God‘s existence inMeditations Three and Five mirrors Anselm‘s approach in the Monologion andthe Proslogion. Appreciating this stylistic debt is crucial for understandingDescartes‘s attempts to improve on Anselm‘s arguments, as well as his attempt totruly ground all knowledge in the certainty of God‘s existence. Yet whileAnselm‘s dual argument is ultimately based on a negative intuition of God‘sbeing, described in the Monologion as that without which the world cannot be,Descartes‘s dual argument in Meditations Three and Five is based on a positiveintuition or recollection of God‘s being as a necessary structural restriction on our concepts of the world. The ontological proof is primarily based on thisrecollective theory of innateness. It is God as causa sui, recollected as thenecessary ground of all things, that is the sole efficient cause of the existence ofevery finite, limited thing—especially human beings and their clear and distinctideas. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is that there is a common form of reflection in Anselm’s prayers and the Proslogion and Monologion. The practice of meditation, of rumination and introspection, is the crucial link between these works, mostly thought of as philosophy or speculative theology, and as opposed to Anselm’s monastic practices of meditative prayer and thoughtful examination of self and scripture. The philosophical meditations are, like the prayers, the product of an imaginative project, in this case of reasoning (...) as if he did not already believe and as if reason alone were his only resource. I show that Anselm’s arguments are solutions to the aporetic paradoxes toward which he pushes reason. Like the sinner’s realization of his own inability to extricate himself, grasping these paradoxes is for Anselm the only way of moving toward a sense of the metaphysically unique being of God. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs and discusses a proof of God’s existence by Anselm of Canterbury’s friend Ralph of Battle, developed in his recently edited De nesciente, a fictitious dialogue between a Christian and an atheist. Without precedent in antiquity and the Middle Ages, Ralph’s proof has never been examined in detail. It combines a “cogito” argument with a two-part cosmological argument. The paper first presents the textual basis and an exegetical interpretation of Ralph’s reasoning, classifies the parts of the proof historically (...) and systematically, and then compares these with the proofs of God’s existence as well as other arguments in Anselm’s Proslogion and Monologion. Finally, it points out some similarities between Ralph’s “cogito” argument and a passage in the Liber pro insipiente, which may suggest that this anonymous critique of Anselm’s Proslogion proof was authored not by Gaunilo, as traditionally thought, but by Ralph. (shrink)

Ranging from his early treatises, the ’Monologion’ (a work written to show his monks how to meditate on the divine essence) and the ’Proslogion’ (best known for its advancement of the so-called ontological argument for the existence of God), to his three philosophical dialogues on metaphysical topics such as the relationship between freedom and sin, and late treatises on the Incarnation and salvation, this collection of Anselm’s essential writings will be of interest to students of the history of philosophy (...) and theology as well as to anyone interested in examining what Anselm calls "the reason of faith." (publisher). (shrink)