This collection is the final volume of a four book survey of the state of phenomenology fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl. Its publication represents a landmark in the comprehensive treatment of contemporary phenomenology in all its vastness and richness. The diversity of the issues raised here is dazzling, but the main themes of Husserl's thought are all either explicitly treated, or else they underlie the ingenious approaches found here. Time, historicity, intentionality, eidos, meaning, possibility/reality, and teleology are (...) the main concerns of this collection devoted to studies in aesthetics, metaphysics and literary interpretation, written by such authors as, among others, R. Cobb-Stevens, C. Moreno Marquez, J. Swiecimski, Sitansu Ray and M. Kronegger. These original studies of phenomenological aesthetics and literary theory by scholars from all parts of the world were gathered by the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learn ing during the year 1988/89 during its assessment of the phenomeno logical movement, fifty years after Husserl's death. IX A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ix. (shrink)

Moral decisions concerning what ought to be done always assume metaphysical presuppositions concerning the way the world is. In the field of biomedical ethics, some of the metaphysical presuppositions underlying many current discussions of issues of life and death seem particularly implausible. These include our assumption of the reality of social atomism and our beliefs relating to the possibility of autonomy. Given the implausibility of these two assumptions, many discussions have focused our attention on the wrong issues by reducing questions (...) of alternative social practices to questions of individual preferences. Far from facilitating intelligent solutions to our problems, this merely clouds the issues involved. (shrink)

The metaphysics of a social reality assumes definition ontology various plans of its realization as sorts of attitude to kinds. The last ones represent phenomena of a social reality - as classical and nonclassical. The economy, morals, religion, the right concern to classical kinds of a social reality. Attributes of a sociality of the given kinds: activity, attitudes, forms of social consciousness. A nonclassical kinds given attributes yet "do not possess" to the full. Their metaphysics is defined through (...) parity with classical kinds of society. The structure of a social reality is mobile that is why "updating" of the list of classical kinds of a social reality is not soproblematic that is why the urgency of an explication ontology and metaphysics of a sort of a reality social and numerous kinds is undoubtedly rather productive and duly. (shrink)

Something extraordinary has happened to metaphysics. At the very moment when philosophy is focusing its efforts at bringing metaphysics to an ‘end,’ metaphysics finds itself flourishing in the theatre, which speaks of itself as ‘metaphysics-in-action’ and publishes treatises carrying such titles as The Act of Being: Toward a Theory of Acting. The irony of the situation appears to have been lost on postmodern philosophers. What this paper sets out to do is explore the potential consequences of (...) the metaphysical weight that has been acquired by the theatre for the practice of philosophy. It argues that the theatrical performance is in fact an ‘enactment’ of the performance of being and that, as such, it is possible to extend our understanding of this performance from the theatrical stage to the ‘theatre of the world.’ Finally, in doing so, we can establish the context for a metaphysics that does not privilege presence. (shrink)

Traditional theories of truth – such as the correspondence theory – are monist in character. All propositions, regardless of subject-matter, are true in the same way (if true). Recently, this view has been called into question by alethic pluralists (most notably Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch). According to the pluralist, the nature of truth varies across domains. Pluralists try to motivate their position by appealing to the following principle: for any domains D1 and D2, if the metaphysical constitutions of respectively (...) D1 and D2 differ, then D1-propositions and D2-propositions are true in different ways (if true). The aim of the paper isto present a monist challenge to this principle. The gist of the challenge is this: even if metaphysical pluralism (i.e. the antecedent) is granted, truth can be given a uniform account within a correspondence framework. The basic argument is this: every domain that the alethic pluralist is interested in is truth-apt. But any domain that deals in truth-apt propositions likewise deals in facts – after all, it seems a mere platitude that facts are what makes propositions true (if true). Once facts are admitted, the monist can argue as follows: a proposition is true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Now, a proposition corresponds to reality if, and only if, it represents reality correctly – and a proposition represents reality correctly if, and only if, what is says is a fact, or is the case. However, since the notion of fact is available for any truth-apt domain, a proposition – whatever its (truth-apt) domain – can be taken to be true if, and only if, it corresponds to reality. Thus, metaphysical pluralism does not imply alethic pluralism. (shrink)

This volume offers an unusual variety of topics presented during the fifth annual Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy.

The paper discusses the metaphysical theory developed in the early eighteenth century in France by the so-called égoïstes, and explores some of its ramifications. In the eighteenth century French, the term égoïsme was used not only in the ethical sense, but also in the metaphysical sense, that is, to denote the extremist view that only oneself exists. The paper focuses primarily on Jean Brunet's work Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique, published in 1703, which has since been lost, analyzing its fundamental principle (...) that the egoist's thought is the cause of the existence of all creatures, as found in a contemporary review of the book. Examining Brunet's "new metaphysics" within the framework of its own epistemology, the paper shows that the egoist philosopher himself was not trulyconvinced of the central tenet of his own metaphysical theory, that is, he did not sincerely believe that other minds were nothing other than modes of his thought or ideas that refer to nothing outside his mind, and argues that the very existence of Projet d'une nouvelle métaphysique in the form of a book in the mind of its author was contrary to the metaphysical theory expounded in it. (shrink)

The Proceedings present the contributions to the 13th International Kant Congress which was held at the University of Oslo, August 6-9, 2019. The congress, which hosted speakers from more than thirty countries and five continents, was dedicated to the topic of the court of reason. The idea that reason stands before itself as a tribunal characterizes the whole of Kant's critical project. Without such a court, reason falls into conflict with itself. With such a court in place, however, it may (...) succeed in establishing the possibility and limits of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, law and science. The idea of reason being its own judge is not only pivotal to a proper understanding of Kant's philosophy, but can also shed light on the burgeoning fields of meta-philosophy and philosophical methodology. The 2019 Kant Congress put special emphasis on Kant's methodology, his account of conceptual critique, and the relevance of his ideas to current issues in especially political philosophy and the philosophy of law. Additional sections discussed a wide range of topics in Kant's philosophy. The Proceedings will provide anyone who is interested in exploring the variety of present-day work on Kant and Kantian themes with a wealth of fruitful inspiration. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the "incompleteness thesis" of Kant's General Metaphysics before completing a full analysis of the power of judgment which only occurred in the Critique of Judgment-Power. Kant scholars have argued that Kant's General Metaphysics was completed with the Critique of Pure Reason and the Third Critique added nothing significant to this quest. One of the issues in this paper is to understand Kant's various "transition problems" and their solution to unify knowledge under a (...) metaphysics, all of which has implications for the natural and cognitive sciences even today. (shrink)

Despite the attacks on metaphysics in the 20th century, the field remains surprising alive, not less robust, less interesting, nor ready to be consigned to the dustbin of history. The essays assembled in this volume, which come from all areas of the metaphysical tradition, are all by authors who are committed to the kind of metaphysics which Hume and later Kant recommended, although naturally they regard what good metaphysics is in very different ways. Contributors include D. P. (...) Chattoppadhyaya, Fred Dretske, Ludger Honnefelder, Peter van Inwagen, Jay F. Rosenberg, David-Hillel Rubin, and Loretta Torrago. Author abstracts are provided for each paper and a complete name index is provided. (shrink)

This volume presents an extended version of the contributions presented at the workshop "Kant's Concept of Law" held at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) in 2013. It handles issues of applied legal philosophy in Kant's Doctrine of Right such as ownership, the alleged right of necessity, the right of resistance and the right of revolution. With each of these applied issues, the focus lies, on the one hand, on the (...) relationship between the principles a priori of law and of the duties of rights, as well as their normative requirements - for instance, the duty of independence from the coercion by others - and, on the other hand, empirical situations and their pressing demands. Thus, this volume illustrates how Kant concretely conceives of the doctrine of "first metaphysical of the doctrine of right" as supplying "the immutable principles for any giving of positive law". Each essay of this volume not only undertakes a careful and original interpretation of Kant's theses, but also offers a critical assessment. (shrink)

Something extraordinary has happened to metaphysics. At the very moment when philosophy is focusing its efforts at bringing metaphysics to an 'end,' metaphysics finds itself flourishing in the theatre, which speaks of itself as 'metaphysics-in-action' and publishes treatises carrying such titles as The Act of Being: Toward a Theory of Acting. The irony of the situation appears to have been lost on postmodern philosophers. What this paper sets out to do is explore the potential consequences of (...) the metaphysical weight that has been acquired by the theatre for the practice of philosophy. It argues that the theatrical performance is in fact an 'enactment' of the performance of being and that, as such, it is possible to extend our understanding of this performance from the theatrical stage to the 'theatre of the world.' Finally, in doing so, we can establish the context for a metaphysics that does not privilege presence. (shrink)

The Proceedings present the contributions to the 13th International Kant Congress which was held at the University of Oslo, August 6-9, 2019. The congress, which hosted speakers from more than thirty countries and five continents, was dedicated to the topic of the court of reason. The idea that reason stands before itself as a tribunal characterizes the whole of Kant's critical project. Without such a court, reason falls into conflict with itself. With such a court in place, however, it may (...) succeed in establishing the possibility and limits of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, law and science. The idea of reason being its own judge is not only pivotal to a proper understanding of Kant's philosophy, but can also shed light on the burgeoning fields of meta-philosophy and philosophical methodology. The 2019 Kant Congress put special emphasis on Kant's methodology, his account of conceptual critique, and the relevance of his ideas to current issues in especially political philosophy and the philosophy of law. Additional sections discussed a wide range of topics in Kant's philosophy. The Proceedings will provide anyone who is interested in exploring the variety of present-day work on Kant and Kantian themes with a wealth of fruitful inspiration. (shrink)

Two international congresses within the last five years attest to the current interest in the philosophical and theological thought of John Duns Scotus. Among Scotus' shorter works is the De Primo Principio which is a compendium of his basic metaphysics and natural theology. It has appeared in several modern editions, two with English translations, the latest of which was reviewed in this journal. Prentice's careful and detailed study makes an excellent introduction and commentary on this important but difficult (...) treatise of medieval scholasticism. It is clearly written and while following the general development of the text, it includes helpful cross references to Scotus' other works as well as well as to contemporary literature on controversial points of interpretation. The seventh chapter, devoted to showing something of the human spirit in which the tract was composed, is especially rich in illuminating insights. Medieval scholars will be grateful for this companion volume to the De Primo Principio.--A. B. W. (shrink)

Kant’s critical project has been understood as a description of the functioning of knowledge. Such an understanding of the first Critique seems however limited, especially if we consider Kant’s frequent use of political analogies. These analogies suggest another reading in which Kant’s critical project emerges as an attempt to overcome a state of nature in reason through the institution of a legal state in and by reason itself. Seen in this perspective, Kant’s critical metaphysics can be considered revolutionary, because (...) it assumes the issues of the two revolutions of modernity, the political and the scientific one: from the former, Kant adopts the conviction that a conflict can be settled only through the separation and reciprocal limitation of powers, as theorized by Locke and Montesquieu - and thus neither by force nor by the establishment of an absolute power; from the latter, he acquires a model of proof, which is based, not on description, but on the elaboration of an explicative hypothesis. The Critique of Pure Reason, then, is not a mere treatise of epistemology or of descriptive metaphysics, but the attempt of setting up a policy of reason at the service of peace and civil communal life. (shrink)

This is the first in a seven-volume series, to be based on The Jerusalem Conferences. Each volume is devoted to a specific topic, the first five following the division of Spinoza's "Ethics, the sixth dealing with Spinoza's social and political thought and the concluding one with the philosopher's life and origins. All papers are in English, yet present a wide-ranging picture of contemporary study of Spinoza's philosophy worldwide. Among the contributions to the present volume are Alan Donagan's "Substance, Essence and (...) Attribute in Spinoza," Edwin Curley's "On Jonathan Bennett's Interpretation of Spinoza's Monism," followed by Bennett's "Reply," Alexandre Matheron's "Essence, Existence and Power in Spinoza" and Herman De Dijn's "Metaphysics as Ethics." Papers are also presented by Margaret D. Wilson, Emilia Giancotti, Yirmiyahu Yovel, Jean-Luc Marion, Pierre Macherey, Jacqueline Lagrie, Don Garrett, Yosef Ben-Shlomo and Sylvain Zac. All participants present major papers, the book thus being the outcome of a long-standing interest in Spinozistic thought by a group of first-rate scholars. The book includes an index of subjects and proper names. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at the annual sessions of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

Modern physics asks: how do the objects exist? This kind of question inevitably touches upon philosophy; to be precise, it involves metaphysics that traditionally deals with these problems. There are grounds to assume that a quantum object in a certain sense does not exist until it is registered. Thus, one of the conclusions says, “Photon is a photon if it is a registered photon”. This is a paraphrase of well-known Wheeler’s words about the essence of quantum phenomenon. These effects (...) cannot be understood if we come from the assumption that all existing (‘real’) and quantum objects in particular, is only being of the actual. To explain quantum mechanics phenomena we need to realize that there exists another modus of being. Quantum mechanics refers to some sort oftranscendence. Such conclusion is based not only on the analysis of the testing of Aspeckt’s experiments. The whole structure of quantum mechanics confirms it. The revision of the New European paradigm leads to the return of such conception of existence that brings us to the traditional metaphysical understanding of the being and implies its study on several levels of existence. The conclusion of this kind leads to a serious correction of the philosophical model of the world built by modern natural science. (shrink)

Kant’s critical project has been understood as a description of the functioning of knowledge. Such an understanding of the first Critique seems however limited, especially if we consider Kant’s frequent use of political analogies. These analogies suggest another reading in which Kant’s critical project emerges as an attempt to overcome a state of nature in reason through the institution of a legal state in and by reason itself. Seen in this perspective, Kant’s critical metaphysics can be considered revolutionary, because (...) it assumes the issues of the two revolutions of modernity, the political and the scientific one: from the former, Kant adopts the conviction that a conflict can be settled only through the separation and reciprocal limitation of powers, as theorized by Locke and Montesquieu - and thus neither by force nor by the establishment of an absolute power; from the latter, he acquires a model of proof, which is based, not on description, but on the elaboration of an explicative hypothesis. The Critique of Pure Reason, then, is not a mere treatise of epistemology or of descriptive metaphysics, but the attempt of setting up a policy of reason at the service of peace and civil communal life. (shrink)

Basic justice is needed everywhere, but the traditional criteria of substantive justice, such as liberty, equality, efficiency, or‘justice as fairness’etc., is challenged in contemporary society because of the ruin of the traditional metaphysics and religions. Habermas’s theory of discourse perhaps provides us a way to set a criterion for the post-metaphysical time. Justice is the union of the content and form. However, what his viewpoint on justice emphasizes is only the form of justice; he fails to consider the substance (...) of justice, even for the criterion of substantive justice. In the post-metaphysical society of pluralized values, we can obtain the criterion of substantive justice from his theory of justice. This criterion is the discursive consensus. (shrink)

By means of comparison between Lao Tzu’s theory of Tao in ancient China and the concept of metaphysics originated from ancient Greece, the author redefined the concept of “form” and therefore, elaborated the meaning of metaphysics from its Chinese translation. According to the author’s re-interpretation of Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu had resolved the ontological questions in a different way with that of ancient Greek philosophers, and he had answered the question of “One and Many”. In the past, (...) people had omitted the fact that there are actually two different “ones” in this question, and hence, metaphysics and ontology had been remained in a confused state. By giving an example in natural science, the author had illustrated clearly what is the metaphysical Tao, and then extendedthe idea to metaphysics of morals. As a conclusion, the author suggests that it is better to use a new term to replace the imperfectly defined “metaphysics”, for example, metaformology. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the possibility of reading Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics of morals as a proposal of global ethics, that is, ethics of the globalizing world. We have a good reason to undertake this exploration because Kant suggests that the earth being a globe with a finite spherical surface is a fundamental condition ofrealization of the universal principle of right among the world citizens. Unfortunately, however, Kant did not develop a theory of cosmopolitan rights as far as he (...) could have. The reason is that he faced with a serious question which originated from his realistic judgment of his time, that it would be almost impossible to establish a cosmopolitan constitution without constraint of power. Today, however, we can hope to find an answer to this question in the development of global civil society and by virtue of this hope we can conceive global ethics which is further developed from Kant’s metaphysics of morals. (shrink)

It is appropriate to ask about the prospects for metaphysics at the present time as we near the end of a century in which, perhaps more than at any other moment in its long history, metaphysics has been under persistent, unrelenting attack. The traditional concern with metaphysics is very old, depending on the definition, as old as philosophy, even its main theme. Depending on the point of view, much is at stake in the continued viability of (...) class='Hi'>metaphysics, including the viability of a central philosophical theme or even the very viability of philosophy itself as a meaningful enterprise. (shrink)

The question addressed here is how Aristotle can characterize the ‘unmoved mover’ that is the ‘first ousia’ and first principle of his metaphysics not only as being alive, but as a model for the best kind of human life. The first step towards understanding this characterization is the distinction between ‘motion’ and ‘activity’ that Aristotle develops in 6th chapter of Metaphysics. Only on the basis of this distinction can we understand how the unmoved mover can be active without (...) being in motion. The second is the argument in De Anima that the soul as principle of life is not any kind of motion, being unmoved even by itself. The soul indeed ‘moves’ in the sense of causing motion, but while remaining itself unmoved. On this basis we see that the meaning of ‘life’ in us is not fundamentally different from its meaning in the divine, and that therefore we can indeed find in the ultimate object of metaphysics a model for how we ourselves are to live. (shrink)

I first examine and reject a prominent rationalist approach to knowledge of metaphysical modality, advocated by philosophers such as Yablo and Chalmers, who rely on the notion of conceivability to explain how we can achieve such knowledge. The focus of my criticism concerns a particular requirement of these accounts, namely that the content of modally reliable conceivability intuitions, which is in the first instance a simple imaginary situation, can be extended to completeness and thus considered to be verifiable by a (...) range of possible worlds. I thus argue that the notions these philosophers employ cannot provide the criteria by which we could understand how such an operation could be understood in a purely epistemic way. This is because they rely on substantial metaphysical assumptions, for instance the assumption that all aspects of reality can in principle be represented and grasped by the human mind as a unified whole. These assumptions render their notion of conceivability inadequate to be used as an epistemic guide to possibility. Finally, I outline the broad epistemological principles that pertain to a specific Kripkean understanding of metaphysical necessity that I favor, which construes it as a kind of natural necessity. (shrink)

Both Aquinas and Siger were familiar with a fundamental disagreement within the earlier philosophical tradition concerning the subject of metaphysics: Is it being as being, or is it divine being? If Avicenna represented one approach to this issue, and Averroes another, both Thomas and Siger were closer to Avicenna than to Averroes in their respective solutions. Nonetheless, each resolved the issue in a distinct way. Also contested in the earlier tradition was the question of whether it belongs to physics (...) or to metaphysics to demonstrate the existence of God. Again, Avicenna represents one side on this issue, and Averroes the other. Thomas’s personal position continues to be debated by contemporary scholars, and Siger’s seems to fall between those proposed by Avicenna and Averroes. Finally, Aquinas is credited with having developed a new and unique way of accounting for the discovery of being as being, through a process known as separatio; though there are antecedents for this in Avicenna. (shrink)

In what follows, I argue that the thinkers of the twelfth to thirteenth century rediscovered and passed on the questions of metaphysics; in what I call the second beginning of metaphysics they also developed those questions in such a way that they could be received into the thinking of the modern era in the first place. It was precisely the theological context which forced this development and lead the theologians of the Latin West, inspired by their Arabic predecessors, (...) to redesign metaphysics according to the rules of Aristotle’s logic and philosophy of science. Put differently, through the challenge of theology medieval metaphysics was forced to become what it had claimed to be from the onset: first philosophy. (shrink)

The Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy was held in Boston in August 1998. Twice in this century has there been a philosophy world congress in the United States, both times in Boston. Congresses have long been held every five years, but mostly in France, Germany, Russia, England, and other European countries. Aside from the two in this country, only one had previously been held in the Americas, in Mexico. The organization responsible for holding such congresses is, and has (...) long been, the Federation International de Societes de Philosophie. (shrink)

The terms “essentialism” and “antiessentialism” have rhetorical, metaphysical, and political force in feminist philosophical literature. This paper develops the relation between the metaphysics and the politics of essentialism. I argue that there are broadly two metaphysical conceptions of essentialism implicit in the literature: the idea that there is a universal womanness that all women share, and the idea that each individual woman has certain essential properties. The first conception is false because it is incompatible with the existence of “multiple (...) identities” pointed out by proponents of the “politics of identity.” The second conception, while it may be true, is politically innocuous. In order to explain the observations of the politics of identity, we need a “metaphysics of diversity.” This paper argues that adopting a kind of resemblance nominalism will provide the required metaphysics of diversity. (shrink)

In this volume, the world's foremost Scotus scholars collaborate to present the latest research on his work.

Aquinas held that the metaphysical consideration of beings as being consists in the consideration of being as created, i.e., the consideration of things in their complete reality, and the reduction of this complete reality to its complete cause. When existence displaces form as the primary sense of being, the thing’s act of existing is conceived of as ‘formal’ with respect to its essence. Consequently, the primary object of metaphysical consideration becomes the complete entity, a composite of essence and existence, and (...) the primary sense of being becomes the subsistence of the complete entity. In Aquinas’s creationist discourse, the term supposit denotes the concept of the entitative whole or complete entity. What this concept of the supposit adds to the Aristotelian conception of the concrete individual derives from the contingency of existence in every being beyond the first being. The subject of a nature and of categorical accidents is now also conceived of as the subject of a received act of existing. Aquinas reduces the distinctions of finite entities to their possession of acts of existing that are diverse absolutely, in virtue of a ‘privation’ of the fullness of existence, just as Aristotle reduces formal contrariety to the possession or ‘privation’ of differences that are diverse absolutely. And as Plato traced the negations constitutive of formal contrariety to a correlative participation between being and otherness, Aquinas analogously traced the distinctions of finite entities to a transcendental duality between participated existence and receiving essence. The necessary participation of each of these principles of finite being in divine and infinite existence constitutes the ultimate metaphysical reduction and horizon of a creationist metaphysics. (shrink)