Music, art, and poetry were profound forces in Hermann Cohen’s thought. If we attempt to comprehend this philosopher, whose name is synonymous with the School of Marburg, that small charming town in Hesse from which Kant’s works and influence spread abroad like the magic of an irresistible melody, then we are forced to appreciate those lovers of music and art that brought him the friendship of the violinist Joseph Joachim, the admiration of painters such as Max Liebermann, Lenid Pasternak, (...) the father of Boris, and others whose names are now distant from us. European culture is alive in philosophy, not merely as illustrative references, but as the achievements of the mind devoted to reason and the power of imagination. This culture was not simply created by a mind that ignored the senses. The body was appreciated as the source of subtle and artistic movement, its power to build and form depended upon the grace and delicacy of the hands, sound awakened in us the inexhaustible dimension and possibilities of communication and relationship, sight the sensitivity to colors, to a variety of architectural forms that evoke a sense of beauty and sublimity by their effect and receptivity, taste and touch cultivate form and allow us to receive and be receptive with a heightened sense of delicacy and appreciation allowing form to be given to us in indescribable and unexpected ways. Through the senses we develop that intimacy with others that the mind can only define and analyze but never feel. Cohen has come forth from his detractors and even from his admirers as the distant and unapproachable “professor” of a forgotten philosophical “system.” He did his service in Kant’s army of interpreters adding volumes of interpretation and appreciation to the old master. Here he paid his dues to his profession and university. Cohen was a cultured man, a deeply sensitive individual, a fine product of artistic sensitivity and generosity. When he turned to the arts, when he moved to music, to religion, to social activity, the humaneness of his personality overcame the professor in him; it showed that tenderness for human relationship, that deep respect for love that Cohen found in his beloved Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, whose operas he believed reflected a sensitivity to moral and aesthetic values. (shrink)

Contents: K. Ludeking, The Body and the Letters Albrecht Durer s self-portrait from 1500; E. Osterkamp, Spartacus under the Germans on the history of a literary legacy; F. Forster-Hahn, German, Modern and Jewish Max Liebermann s 1906 exhibitions in Berlin and London; U. Haselstein, A Genealogy of Modernity Flaubert, Cezanne, and Gertrude Stein; C. Asendurf, Bodies in Force Fields Art War and Spatial Theory in Classical Modernity.".

Stefan Sorgner (2009) says that on becoming familiar with transhumanism, he “immediately thought that there were many fundamental similarities between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially concerning the concept of the posthuman and that of Nietzsche’s overhuman.” In contrast to Bostrom (2005), Sorgner sees significant and fundamental similarities between the posthuman and the overhuman. (I will adopt his use of “overhuman” in place of “overman” or Übermensch.) This overall view seems to me highly plausible. I agree with most of Sorgner’s comments (...) in this respect. My intent is to give further support to the conceptual parallels. In addition, I argue that these are not merely parallels: transhumanist ideas were directly influenced by Nietzsche. (shrink)

For this eighth edition he also wrote a new chapter on the quantum theory of solids.

THE "LOCATION" OF THE FEELING OF SHAME AND MAN'S WAY OF EXISTING The curious difficulties a phenomenology of shame, and of the feeling of shame, ...

This introduction to the aesthetics and sociology of music of the German philosopher and music theorist T. W. Adorno is the only book to deal comprehensively with this topic and it has quickly established itself as a classic text.

Brings together some of the most prominent and influential contemporary interpreters of Adorno's work in a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores Adorno's relation to themes and problems in postmodern thought.

The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be (...) objective in the sense of truthful or dispassionate, and procedures can be objective in being well-specified, but observed phenomena cannot be objective in the sense of being observer-free. Phenomena are only repeatable in the sense that they are judged by a community of observers to be tokens of the same type. Stripped of its dualist trappings the empirical method becomes if you carry out these procedures you will observe or experience these results -- which applies as much to a science of consciousness as it does to physics. (shrink)

To explain phenomenon R by showing how mechanism M yields output R each time it is triggered by circumstances C, is to give a causal explanation of R. This paper analyses what mechanistic analysis can contribute to our understanding of causation in general and of downward causation in particular. It is first shown, against Glennan, that the concept of causation cannot be reduced to that of mechanism. Second it is shown, against Craver and Bechtel, that mechanistic explanation allows us to (...) make sense of causal processes that cut across levels, either in bottom-up direction where a change in a part of a system causes a change in the whole, or in downward direction where a change at the level of the system causes a change at the level of its parts. I suggest construing a decision's influence on molecules in muscle cells as a global constraint. Microscopic laws determine the detailed evolution of muscle cells and glucose molecules, but this evolution is constrained by the fact that it must be compatible with the action caused by the decision. (shrink)

The functionalist conception of mental properties, together with their multiple realizability, is often taken to entail their irreducibility. It might seem that the only way to revise that judgement is to weaken the requirements traditionally imposed on reduction. However, Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that we should, on the contrary, strengthen those requirements, and construe reduction as what I propose to call “logical reduction”, a model of reduction inspired by emergentism. Moreover, Kim claims that what he calls “functional reduction” allows (...) one to reduce (at least some) mental properties by these new standards. I argue against both theses. First, I present a counterexample to the emergentist model of reduction: The model judges irreducible certain properties which are clearly reducible. Second, I contestthat functional reduction as construed by Kim satisfies the emergentist constraints. Functional reduction implies, over and above a functional definition of the reduced property, the indication of its realizers. But the latter information corresponding to the discovery of a (local) bridge law, is empirical and not purely logical. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno’s Jargon of Authenticity is one of the bestknown, but also most controversial works of Critical Theory. Many philosophers, writers and editorialists have attacked the text in recent decades and accused Adorno of cultivating his own “jargon”. In his book, Adorno develops a critique of metaphysical and theological language, which he observed in Germany from the 1920s up to the 1960s. In my paper, I argue that the mode of critique Adorno deploys is still relevant today, even if (...) its object has largely disappeared. This becomes clear in comparison to the language criticism of the analytical tradition, namely logical empiricism or Harry G. Frankfurt’s critique of “bullshit,” which are comparably more widespread today in academic debates. While Adorno examines linguistic expressions in terms of their social content and places them in a historical constellation, the critique of “bullshit” following Frankfurt remains constrained to a personal approach. In the language criticism of logical empiricism, on the other hand, the possibility of understanding linguistic phenomena as expressions of social conditions is still present. From this comparison, much can be learned for an up-to-date language criticism. (shrink)

In times of modern information technology, the world of science is becoming smaller. Does this mean that there will be no more provinces? We do not think so. Setting out from Leszek Nowak's thought “province is where one thinks not on one's own account but on account of another,” we indicate a number of processes that perpetuate provinces. These processes are driven by specific access to scientific knowledge, by education, by new forms of communication, by shortage of financial support and (...) the concentration of resources. We look at the interplay between criteria of theory choice and location on the scientific map. Next, we explore the connection between geo-social and scientific provinces, taking into consideration political and cultural parameters. The conceptual framework of metropolises and provinces in science turns out to be, though not all-embracing, an extremely fruitful one. (shrink)

According to Nagel, bat consciousness is "what it is like to be a bat.'' According to Baars, we will never know what it is like to be bat, so this approach to consciousness does not allow the science of consciousness to progress. Rather, the nature of consciousness as such should be determined empirically, by contrasting processes which are conscious with processes that are not conscious. The present commentary argues that contrastive analysis is appropriate for finding the processes most closely associated (...) with consciousness; but it will not illuminate the nature of consciousness as such. Unlike bat consciousness, human consciousness is accessible to humans introspectively. Consequently, a complete science of consciousness needs to relate introspective, first-person accounts of consciousness to third-person processing models of the brain. (shrink)

Ist Musik eine Anschauungs- und Denkform aus eigenem Recht? Wie steht es um die systematischen, historischen und ethnologischen Aspekte einer solchen Thematik? Verändert sich die Fragestellung dank kulturspezifischer Besonderheiten befragbarer Stoffe oder lassen sich auch Universalien im Sinne von Invarianten ausmachen, die nicht automatisch aus neuzeitlichen Vorprägungen des Begriffs «Musik» gewonnen sind, sondern die auf anthropologische Prägungen verweisen? Dieser Band vereinigt die aufgrund mehrerer Symposien entstandenen Beiträge zu diesen Fragen.

Dialektik der Aufklärung: Exkurs 1. Odysseus; oder, Mythos und Aufklärung. Exkurs 2. Juliette; oder, Aufklärung und Moral.--Kulturindustrie. Aufklärung als Massenbetrug.--Elemente des Antisemitismus. Grenzen der Aufklärung.--Aufzeichnungen und Entwürfe.